Consciousness Of Internal Time Research Articles

Awakening Dead Time: Adorno on Husserl, Benjamin, and the Temporality of Music

This essay studies the relationship between Adorno's philosophy of music and his critique of phenomenology. It argues that the understanding of historical experience that Adorno develops in his reading of phenomenology casts light on his understanding of the experience of music as well, especially the experience of musical time. It proceeds in three parts. First, it sketches two moments in Adorno's critique of Husserl. Second, it relates this critique to the thought of Walter Benjamin. Third, it contrasts Adorno's conception of musical time with Husserl's account of time in his On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. These readings show that Adorno models musical time on what Benjamin calls Messianic time; that Adorno opposes musical time to what he calls empirical time; that Adorno models empirical time on Benjamin's concept of phantasmagoria; and that Adorno sees this phantasmagoric temporality reflected in Husserl's phenomenology.

Broad’s Accounts of Temporal Experience

Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad’s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ‘Overlap’ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that we can learn two extremely important lessons from Broad’s work on temporal experience. The first lesson is that there is a structural problem facing any account that commits to these two principles. This is significant given that a number of recent accounts of temporal experience are so committed.The second lesson is that the problem facing these accounts stems only from commitment to the Thin-PSA and ‘Overlap’, rather than to commitment to a particular conception of how experiences are to be individuated. This, I argue, gives us reason to reject Tye’s recent claim that the problems facing accounts of temporal experience can be dissolved simply by making stipulations about how experiences are to be individuated. References C. D. Broad. Scientific Thought. Routledge & K. Paul, London, 1923.C. D. Broad. An Examination of McTaggart’s philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1927.C. D. Broad. The philosophy of C. D. Broad. Open Court Pub Co, 1959.T. Clarke. Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects. In M. Black, editor, Philosophy in America, pages 98–114. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1965.B. Dainton. Time and Space. McGill Queens University Press, Montreal, 2001.B. Dainton. Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche, 9(10), 2003.B. Dainton. Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge, London, 2nd edition, 2006.J. Foster. The Case for Idealism. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1982.S. Gallagher. Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience. PSYCHE, 9:10, 2003.S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi. The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge, London, 2008.E. Husserl. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991.F. Jackson. Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.W. James. The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1. Cosimo Classics, New York, 2007.S. D Kelly. The Puzzle of Temporal Experience. In A. Brook and K. Akins, editors, Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement, pages 208–240. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.R. Le Poidevin. The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation. Oxford University Press, USA, 2007.J. D. Mabbott. I. Our Direct Experience of Time. Mind, 60(238): 153–167, 1951.http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/LX.238.153M. Martin. Perception. In The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Ed. F. Jackson & M. Smith). Oxford University Press, USA, 2008. I. Miller. Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1984.I. Phillips. Perceiving Temporal Properties. European Journal of Philosophy, 18(2):176–202, 2010.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00299.xB. Russell. Theory of Knowledge. Routledge, London, 1992.M. Soteriou. Perceiving Events. Philosophical Explorations, 13(3): 223–241, 2010.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2010.501904T. L. S. Sprigge. American Truth and British Reality. Open Court Pub. Co., LaSalle, Ill., 1993.M. Tye. Consciousness and Persons. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 2003.D. Zahavi. Husserl’s Phenomenology. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003.

Telos and Temporality: Phenomenology and the Experience of Time in Lewin's Study of Perception

Abstract In his 1986 essay on the intersections between music theory, phenomenology, and perception, David Lewin develops a heuristic model through which to come to terms with the constitution of multiple and heterogeneous perceptions of musical events. One of his principal vehicles for demonstrating this phenomenological turn is the well-known analysis of Schubert's “Morgengruß.” The present article considers the ramifications of Lewin's methodology, particularly with respect to the experience of time that emerges from Lewin's mobilization of the heuristic perception model, by approaching it from the perspective of Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. This perspective reveals a superposition of temporalities as well as a superposition of languages as the underlying factors through which Lewin's analysis is produced.

Husserl, the Absolute Flow, and Temporal Experience

Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of internal time consciousness has a reputation for being complex, occasionally to the point of approaching impenetrability. The latter applies in particular to his remarks about what he calls the ‘absolute time-constituting flow’,1 some of which Husserl himself describes as ‘‘shocking (when not initially even absurd)’’ (Husserl, 1991, p. 84). [...]

Husserl's assistants: Phenomenology reconstituted

Edmund Husserl devoted much attention to the analysis of internal time consciousness beginning as early as the turn of the twentieth-century. His various notes and lectures were left unorganized and unpublished until Husserl's capable assistants were given the responsibility of organizing his work for publication. This paper provides a social and philosophical account of the redaction of Husserl's materials on time consciousness as it involved the activity of his famous assistants Edith Stein, Roman Ingarden and Martin Heidegger. Special attention is given to the way that both Stein and Heidegger appropriated Husserl's work and at the same time challenged fundamental elements of the master's phenomenology.

Material Phenomenology to the Test of Deconstruction: Michel Henry and Derrida

What would be the result of reading Derrida from the standpoint of material phenomenology? And what would be the result of reading material phenomenology on the basis of the requirements of Derridean thought? These are the questions that this article endeavours to tackle by focusing on the two philosophers' readings of Husserl's Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time. At first strangely similar, these two readings soon display marked differences. Whereas Derrida, in his approach, is keen to demonstrate that there is never any pure presence, Michel Henry brings out an Archi-presence which he attempts to safeguard from any deconstruction. So perhaps material phenomenology functions as quasi-deconstruction, having the same relationship with Derridean thought as negative theology has with deconstruction.

An Absence that Counts in the World: Merleau-Ponty's Later Philosophy of Time in Light of Bernet's “Einleitung”

In his “Einleitung” to Edmund Husserl’s Texte zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), translated for the first time in this volume, Rudolf Bernet convincingly argues for an alternative order and grouping of Husserl’s early texts on time — texts originally published as “Supplementary Texts” (Part B) in the critical edition of Husserl’s Time Lectures in Husserliana X: Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917). Most significantly, Bernet situates these texts within the context of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology and brings to light not only their philosophical import but also their limitations and blind spots. By means of Bernet’s re-reading and reconstruction, Husserl’s early analyses of time come to reveal tendencies and directions of thought that are otherwise obscured by the organization of the Time Lectures themselves. As is now well known, the “Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time” (originally published in 1928 and republished as Part A of the critical edition in 1966) were edited by Edith Stein and nominally by Martin Heidegger and juxtapose texts from different periods of Husserl’s thought on time between 1893 and 1917; this collage effectively masks the philosophical and terminological shifts within Husserl’s phenomenology of timeconsciousness. What is masked is precisely that “unthought-of element” of Husserl’s analyses that Maurice Merleau-Ponty was to find so productive; this is Husserl’s constant self-questioning and rethinking of earlier positions, the divergence and revision that reveal his thought as a process in the making. In taking up and re-ordering the “Supplementary Texts” from Husserliana X, Bernet’s “Einleitung” makes visible the stakes implicit in the movement of Husserl’s thought on time, both in the continuities upon which it insists and in the transformations it enacts. The “Einleitung” reveals reiterations but also differences within Husserl’s own thinking of time; it exposes the articulations, hesitations and sometimes even the worries that make the concepts central to Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness — concepts of retention, primal impression and absolute consciousness — what they have become for us. As Bernet notes, Husserl’s time-analyses have been a generative, albeit contested, ground for later French phenomenologists for whom the critique of these analyses has constituted an indispensable point of departure in their own thinking of time (“Einleitung,” lxiii). Maurice Merleau-Ponty is a curious case

Identity, Alterity, and Ethics in the Work of Husserl and His Religious Students

In this essay I shall compare and contrast the work of Edmund Husserl with that of two of his most famous students, Edith Stein and Emmanuel Levinas, on identity and alterity in the constitution of the and the Other.1 The implications of their respective theories of the intersubjective, of how any we can be posited, on ethical formulations will be explored. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Stein or Levinas, who belonged to different generations of Husserl's students, ever met or corresponded with one another, their mutual interest in these topics is great. Each has offered critiques of their teacher's portrayal of empathy (Einfuhlung-in feeling), in addition to proposing their own unique positions. They also engaged actively in debate over the proper relationship between individuals, between individuals and communities, as well as between communities and states. I will argue that in rebutting Stein's work on empathy, Husserl himself made way for Levinas's later contributions. At the same time, a number of Levinas's criticisms of Husserl are prefigured in Stein. Clarifying Levinas's own views vis-a-vis Husserl is itself a complicated affair and requires explication. At times, Levinas praised Husserl as having opened the door to his own elucidation of the Other. This was accompanied, however, by a number of criticisms of Husserl's approach-some of which I shall dispute. In the end, I will highlight not only intriguing assertions which Stein and Levinas held in common, but also the middle ground between the two-more or less congruent with that maintained by Husserl himself. In many respects, the biographies of Stein and Levinas are similar. Each was drawn to Husserl's philosophy after reading his Logical Investigations very early in their careers. Each played critical roles in the dissemination of Husserl's thought. Stein, who served as Husserl's assistant for eighteen months from 1916 to 1918, prepared a revision of the sixth Logical Investigation, Ideas II, and compiled what became the basis for On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)-more famously edited by Martin Heidegger. Neither of these texts was published by Husserl while Stein was in his employ, and she complained that it was difficult to get the ever busy Husserl to review what she had done. When he did get to her work, new questions and developments forestalled completion.2 Levinas was also well-known to Husserl. This is important to establish, not only for biographical reasons, but because it increases the likelihood that Levinas had knowledge of Husserl's earlier unpublished texts on intersubjectivity and perhaps even of disagreements between Husserl and Stein. Levinas translated part of the fourth and the entire lengthy fifth Cartesian Meditation, introducing Husserl's texts to French speaking philosophers. Both Stein and Levinas in the years after these contributions underwent religious conversions of differing sorts. Stein was baptized as a Roman Catholic Christian in 1922. It is important to note that Stein believed she was integrating and Christianity-two aspects of the same-in taking this action.3 She too, then became a translator, but of John Henry Cardinal Newman and St. Thomas Aquinas.4 In 1934, Stein entered a convent as a postulant and subsequently became a nun of the Carmelite order adopting a new name-Sister Teresa Benedicta of the Cross. Forty-five years after her death as a Jew in Auschwitz on May 1, 1987, she was beatified-declared worthy of public veneration as a holy, blessed person-in a ceremony performed by Pope Jean Paul II.5 Emmanuel Levinas followed another distinctly religious path. After World War II from 1947 to 1951 he studied under the mysterious Mordechai Chouchani-to many like Elie Wiesel, a surviving link to the worlds of Talmudic learning before the Shoah.6 Even though Levinas at different times claimed to universalize Judaism and bridge Greek and Jewish thought,7 as a philosopher who effectively constructed a fence (gezeirah/siag) around Otherness he was not a proponent of any religious or cultural integration, much less assimilation. …

Subjetividade e Tempo na Fenomenologia Husserliana

This dissertation aims at discussing the limits of the relation between subjectivity and time in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, seeking to think about the deep meaning that this originating relation has in the process of phenomenological fundamentation of philosophy. With the objective of undertaking a genetic analysis about time and subjectivity, we will use as our basis texts The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness and the Cartesian meditations. We will undertake, in a first moment, an investigation about the origin of time, an investigation which reveals that time has its origin in the absolute flux of subjectivity. In a second moment, it will be necessary to investigate the dynamics itself of the constitution of time by subjectivity. One such investigation reveals that the subjectivity is the absolute origin of any constitution, and thus, that it is also the origin of itself. But this genetic analysis reveals also that the absolute subjectivity is untimely ( unzeitlich ), yet only constitutes itself in its exercise of unfolding in time, in its fluent dispersion in time. Thus, it is necessary to discuss, in the last instance, how, in the constant process of the constitution of time, the subjectivity derives from that of which it is the origin itself.

Derrida and Husserl on Time

In this essay I take issue with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness in Speech and Phenomena. Derrida's critique of Husserl's phenomenology of time also forms the basis for what Derrida regards to be an undermining of phenomenological philosophy itself. After first disagreeing with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's understanding of time I proceed to object to his “undermining” of phenomenology. I attempt to illustrate that his critique of phenomenology is unconvincing.

Repertoires of Timekeeping in Anthropology

Communities the world over record the timing of objects and events in ways that adhere to notions of both objective measurable time and what may be called the apprehension of time, or time-consciousness. Situating objects and events in time circumscribes the relative certainty of their existence. Speakers of the South American Indian language Aymara, for example, locate objects and events in either present-past time, which is considered visible and knowable, or future time, understood as located “behind” a person, because it has not been seen (Miracle and Moya 1981). Members of communities may have invariant or multiplex paradigms for conceptualizing and marking time. Some members of the scientific community, for example, entertain the idea that time is not absolute but rather runs faster or slower depending upon conditions of gravity and therefore has been difficult to measure (Browne 1998). The intertwining of categorizations of time and certainty means that timekeeping also is a moral matter, implicating such notions as truth, virtue, authority, origins, memory, desire, progress, and anticipation. Ephemeral and durable recordings of the occurrence of objects and events thus warrant analysis that transcends simple timekeeping depictions of calendars, chronicles, and agendas. This collection of essays probes the concept of record through an examination of culturally and professionally diverse modalities for temporally situating events. Modalities for recording include but are not limited to oral, written, material, somatic, and visual forms. Each of these modalities may in turn yield a range of recording genres. Spoken and written records, for example, may take the form of grammatical structure, myth, personal narrative, ritual, theatrical performance, history, a country’s constitution, an official census, a birth, health, mar-

In Praise of Presence

. . perception is unconsciousness. Merleau-Ponty (VAI 189)1 . . ego can really in its experiences without being conscious of them. Andrd de Muralt (IP 300)2 [It is a] philosophical error... to think that visible is an objective presence (or an idea of this presence). Merleau-Ponty (VAI 258) Jacques Derrida's Speech and Phenomena fundamentally constitutes a critique of Husserl's theory of signs. More specifically, it critiques Husserl's of principles, principle of non-signification, according to which the self presence of living or pure presence can occur only where signification can not occur, only where there is an absence or uselessness of (SP 60). Contrary to this, Derrida denies possibility of pure presence altogether and in Speech and Phenomena he sets out to prove that thesis of temporality that Husserl advances in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness in fact fails to support latter's philosophy of presence, and that it instead supports Derrida's own thesis that at heart of self we find signs (the trace), signs which forever keep self from itself, signs that introduce a radical alterity at heart of self. In this essay I will analyze and critique Derrida's critique of Husserl's notion of pure presence. I will show that Husserl's theory of temporality in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness does support a philosophy of pure presence, but that Husserl's notion of presence is not, as Derrida would have it, one which reject[s] `after-event' of becoming conscious of an `unconscious content' which is structure of temporality implied throughout Freud's texts. I will argue that Husserl's notion of presence is transcendental, hyletic, and unconscious. I will not, however, argue against notion of dissemination which I do consider to be phenomenologically significant. Instead I will argue that dissemination, characterized by a lack of stable meaning, non-origin, and departure from rules of logic, is constituted by relation of transcendental presence to mundane. The Central Issue In The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, Husserl maintains that an analysis of experience reveals a constant presence, a now. The now presents us with differing content: content that fills now, impression, passes and gives way to new content. As it does, primal impression is not lost but is retained (ITC 161). Using example of hearing a melody Husserl describes how each tone heard in now sinks off into retentive consciousness as next tone takes its place in now. Consciousness, embracing both now and retention, anticipates next tone (protention). In this fashion consciousness perceives whole succession of tones as a unified melody. In other words, according to Husserl, an analysis of experience reveals that form of consciousness consists of a flow, of a series of nows or impressions which run off into retentions or primary remembrance. Retention, a non-now, and now form a continuity or a unity since they are both moments of flow of experience. In Husserl's words, the unity of consciousness which encompasses present and past is a phenomenological datum (ITC 36). Because of retention (and protention) we are able to live through present, according to Husserl. While Husserl's analysis seems to reflect experience, Derrida maintains that continuity between now and not-now, between now and retention, destroys any possibility of a primordial pure presence. In Derrida's words: As soon as we admit this continuity of now and not-now, perception and nonperception, in zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit other into self-identity of Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into blink of instant. …

The Site of Affect in Husserl's Phenomenology

SENSATIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LIVED BODY To discover affects within Husserl's texts designates a difficult investigation; it points to a theme of which these texts were forced to speak, even as they were explicitly speaking of regional ontologies and the foundations of sciences. For we may at first wonder: where can affection find a positive role in the rigor of a pure philosophy that seeks to account for its phenomena from within the immanence of consciousness? Does this not mean that the very passivity and foreignness of affect will be overlooked; will it not be continually linked to a Vorstellung that issues as a ray of the pure ego? That is, will the phenomenological account of affect be reduced to the cognition of an object, as Emmanuel Levinas suggests? Yet there are affects in Husserl's texts that maintain their autonomy and resist subsumption to an objectivating intentionality. We may see this in the Lectures On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time: in the longitudinal intentionality of retention, through which consciousness becomes aware of its elapsed phases without making them into objects-a passive synthesis that gives the flow of time-constituting consciousness the form of a continually deferred auto-affection.1 We find it again as early as the fifth Logical Investiga tion,2 providing us with the impetus to radicalize Husserlian phenomenology. Logical Investigations introduce us to the question of the structure of affect: are feelings to be conceived on the model of intentional lived experiences, explicitly related to objects, or are they to be taken as neutral hyletic contents awaiting interpretation? In Husserl's careful analyses, affect begins to take on a meaning of its own, by which it resists falling into either of these theoretical extremes. While there are affects in Logical Investigations that have an intentional structure (feeling-acts), this intentionality is not itself objectivating (though it does rely on prior objectivating presentations).3 Moreover there exist affects that omit this intentional structure, that no longer refer to an object, and that inhere simply in the embodied subject. Yet these feelings do not become meaningless as a result-, they have a particular coloring, a sense that attracts or repels.4 This is the case of feeling-sensations-the Bodily sensations of pleasure and pain, but also anxiety, and such drives and desires as lack determinate objects.5 These examples bring us into contact with an important and somewhat ambiguous field of Husserlian phenomenology-that of sensations. Therein we encounter the above-mentioned sensuous feelings, as well as tactile and visual sensations, i.e., affections of the Body, and the kinaesthetic sensations involved in Bodily movement. The role of these sensations in perception and the constitution of the lived Body is specifically addressed in the Second book of Ideas, to which my essay now turns.6 In what follows we take sensation as our focus; for it is in this field that an alternative account of affection can be found, an account of affect as preintentional and yet essential to the development of intentionalities. It is here that Husserl's concern with faithful description can yield a theory of affect that his phenomenology anticipated but did not itself bring about. For the insight into the ambiguity of feeling found in Logical Investigations was eventually hidden from view, having been superseded by the intentional theory of the emotions.7 It will be our task to steer a difficult path between versions of sensation that cover over the insight of Logical Investigations in one way or another. On the one hand, sensation can be conceived as representational, as containing a copy or imprint of the thing to which it refers. At the other extreme, sensation becomes an amorphous and undifferentiated content, requiring an additional interpretative act to reach the object. Both positions can be drawn from Husserl's texts. …

Husserl

I am going to examine a problem which Edmund Husserl claimed threatened to stymie his entire phenomenological enterprise. question of how a temporally extended melody can be given to consciousness served as an extremely challenging and disconcerting puzzle, the explication of which spurred on a key development in his mature philosophy. I will discuss how a few philosophers before and after him (Augustine, Brentano, Meinong, Broad) have dealt with this same conundrum. Husserl's answer will be examined in order to situate it amongst the most contemporary ways of addressing the issue of time-consciousness and of perception in general. Primary Sources By far the most important event for scholars investigating Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness was the publication of Husserliana X: Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1966), edited by Rudolf Boehm.1 This critical edition of the earlier Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins2 supplemented by additional material on the subject, which surfaced primarily at the Husserl Archives where it was then comprehensively dated, is an irreplaceable tool for the student attempting to flesh out the development of Husserl's ideas on this topic. 1928 publication itself, edited only superficially by Martin Heidegger, is really little more than a somewhat confused jumble of Husserl's lectures and notes cut up, drafted, and given order (in a decidably unchronological manner) by his Freiburg assistant Edith Stein a decade earlier. This original publication, translated into English by J. S. Churchill as Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,3 easily deceives its reader. Husserl only pushed for its release upon being presented with a manuscript of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. Positions incompatible with each other appear side by side, the evolution that took place in Husserl's thought and the vocabulary he used to express it being completely ignored. John Barnett Brough's translation enables English speakers for the first time to access Husserl's writings on time-consciousness directly and within the context of his overall philosophical development. 4 Puzzle Under Examination What was it about the cogitatio of time that so occupied Husserl's attention from the years 1893-1928? Beyond the wonder5 and mystery6 generated by his fascination with the topic as described in lectures given during 1906/7, and the arduous labors he deemed necessary for any who would be successful in unlocking its treasureS,7 Husserl writes that he came to view his entire phenomenological endeavor as threatened by the flow of time. From the transcript of one often overlooked gem embedded within Husserliana X (No. 51 taken from a 1909 lecture at the University of Gottingen entitled The Problem of Time in the Considerations Fundamental to Phenomenology)8 we read the following: All asserting, consequently, is a matter of indifference; we really cling only to the this-there!, which at any given time is the sole thing about which we should be permitted to speak. And, of course, our whole reflection up to this point would be affected. We might have carried out the exclusion of nature, but if one also requires of us the exclusion of that transcendence that is inherent in memory and retention, then at the end we find ourselves in the moment in which we began. It is indeed easy to see that we have presupposed a certain validity belonging to memory and retention. tug of doubt leads still further in other respects. What about the actually present phenomenon, about the consciousness that is actually carried out and about the viewing directed at it?9 And then: These doubts seem to touch even phenomenological perception. Every grasping of an enduring phenomenon also implies retention in company with the grasping of the duration. Should we therefore say that only the absolute now is something actually given and free from the problem of transcendence, and that even the least extension into the past-which surely belongs essentially to duration-is problematic? …

The sound of the life-world

Husserl's investigations of internal time-consciousness take sound as the primary temporal object. However, in these investigations, the structure of the flux of temporal subjectivity is established to the detriment of the rich tonal content of sound. Just as Husserl has enlarged the significance of the spatial object of mathematical physics to include the historically-sedimented layers of its appearance, so the temporal object will receive additional intelligibility if the rich texture of musical sound is taken into consideration. Particularly useful for this task is Bergson's philosophy of the listening experience.

Letter to Claude Evans

March 21, 1995 Dear Claude, As you requested, I'm writing you a letter responding to your comments on my review conceming Derrida on Husserlian inner-time consciousness (in 6/7/94 letter). I'm also going to take up comments in your SPEP paper that concern my review's interpretation of Speech and Phenomena, chapter 5. my diacritics review (p. 10), claim that Yet what is crucial for Derrida in passages from sections 16 and 17 [i.e., from Husserl's Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness] is not that Husserl contradicts himself, but what contradiction betrays. your June 7th letter, you say, I must confess that don't know what to do with this sentence (p. 13), and you make a similar comment in your SPEP paper (p. 6). Speech and Phenomena, Derrida indeed argues that two texts from The Lectures contradict one another. Nevertheless, in my review, my strategy, if may be permitted to use this word, was to shift attention from Speech and Phenomena's socalled criticisms of Husserl to this text's positive philosophical contribution. The positive contribution is what is crucial. Overall, if we are to understand Speech and Phenomena, indeed Derrida's thought in general, we must not get stuck on criticisms of phenomenology, but rather we must seek what is positive in deconstruction. Everything positive in deconstruction arises out of most basic phenomenological impulse, an impulse first described by Hegel in Phenomenology of Spirit's chapter on understanding, but perhaps best expressed by Nietzsche in his True World Finally Became a Fable. The History of an Error (in The Twilight of Idols). If there is no true world, if strict opposition or contradiction between essence and appearance no longer holds, then what we must devote ourselves to is to conceive relation-the difference-within phenomenon from which logos arises. We must think about, in other words, relation between voice and phenomenon. my SPEP paper, in my review, and in certain published articles, have always stressed (with Derrida's approval, might add) that Dernda's thought concerns notion of relation, whether one calls relation passage, transition, mediation, or difference. Thus, in my review, was trying to push discussion towards positive concept of trace that Derrida develops on basis of Husserl's descriptions. When you get right down to it, it matters little whether Husserl contradicts himself or not. Yet, if he is contradicting himself or even if his descriptions are confusing, if they are a little less than consistent, then one might wonder what is really going on in these descriptions. think you yourself made it clear in your SPEP paper, when you said, In one sense retention is perception, in another sense it is not (p. 8), that Husserl provides retention with a perplexing definition and who would deny perplexity of Husserl's definition of retention? He provides a definition that at least borders on being contradictory, being defined both as perception and non-perception. Thus if one can argue plausibly that Husserl's definition of retention is perplexing, then one can investigate definition and, as Derrida has done, discover another logic going on below it, another logic based neither on law of non-contradiction nor on Hegel's wellknown acceptance of contradiction. This logic perhaps would be same one that Heidegger sought in notion of ontological difference. And, of course, this logic (or better, graphics) is what Derrida's notion of differance (and of trace) is supposed to designate. How Derrida himself has described graphics of differance is through notion of undecidability. your SPEP paper, you claim that [Retention having a double sense] has nothing to do with undecidability (p. 8; cf. also, July 7th letter, p. 19). You also say that the two texts [concerning retention, i. …

Internal time‐consciousness of modernism

Critical QuarterlyVolume 36, Issue 3 p. 20-29 Internal time-consciousness of modernism ROBERT SMITH, ROBERT SMITHSearch for more papers by this author ROBERT SMITH, ROBERT SMITHSearch for more papers by this author First published: September 1994 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8705.1994.tb00515.xCitations: 1AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume36, Issue3September 1994Pages 20-29 RelatedInformation

The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and Images.

Contents: Part I Differences in the Cognition of Time attributed to Society and Culture - Durkheim, Evans-Pritchard, Levi-Strauss, Leach, Time-Reversal in Umeda ritual, Cultural Relationism, Transcendental Temporal-Cultural Relativism, Bali: the 'Motionless' Present, Anti-Durkheimian Anti-Relativism, Contrasted Regimes, Psychological Evidence for the Universality of Time Cognition, Piagetian Developmental Psychology, Critique of the Piagetian Approach to Time-Cognition, Linguistic Arguments for the Cognitive Universality of Time, The Development of Time-Talk. Part II Time-maps and Cognition - Time in Philosophy: the A-series vs. the B-series, The B-series, The A-series, B-theory economics versus A-theory Economics, Chrono-geography, The Economics of Temporal Opportunity Costs, Opportunity Costs and the Fatefulness of Human Existence, Husserl's Model of Internal Time-Consciousness, The Temporal-Perceptual Cycle, The Modalization and Counterfactuality of Time-Maps. Part III Time and Practice - The Natural Attitude and the Theory of Practice, The Theory of Practice and the Timing of Exchanges, A-series: B-series :: gemeinschaft : gesellschaft :: Them : Us, Calendars and Consensual co-ordination, Calendars and Power

Sketch for a Phenomenology of Dreaming

AbstractDreaming as lived experience qualifies as intentional life, despite its strangeness. Yet the dream-phenomena themselves receive little direct clarification consistent with Edmund Husserl's major work on conscious intentionality. With fundamental accomplishments of Husserlian phenomenology in play, how could a study of these neglected appearances begin? First it is necessary to describe the essential relevant Husserlian concepts. From Husserl's descriptions in his phenomenological psychology, his analysis of internal time-consciousness, and his theory of wholes and parts in Logical Investigations, the sense of intentionality as a streaming indivisible nexus, a double continuity of inseparable wholeness, becomes evident. Immersed in this self-awareness, we do not find it difficult to access dream-appearances and account for their connection in intentional life. A claim can be made for their presentational objectivity as well as for their "gnomonic" subjectivity. A systematic sketch of their typology or fundamental structure is thus possible without reducing dream-intentionality to something other than itself. Hence, a Husserlian sense of conscious lived experience is first presented. Dream evidence is then considered, despite possible bewilderment, in order to provide a clue to an extended sense of both subjectivity and objectivity. Lines toward a development of dream typicality are thereby indicated.

Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum.

Franz Brentano is one of the most important philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This work has considerable historic importance through its influence on Husserl's views on internal time consciousness.