Abstract
In this essay I take issue with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness in Speech and Phenomena. Derrida's critique of Husserl's phenomenology of time also forms the basis for what Derrida regards to be an undermining of phenomenological philosophy itself. After first disagreeing with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's understanding of time I proceed to object to his “undermining” of phenomenology. I attempt to illustrate that his critique of phenomenology is unconvincing.
Highlights
In this essay I take issue with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of intemal time-consciousness in Speech and Phenomena
In SP, to be giving a critique of phenomenology's central concepts, rendering them problematic; anyone familiar with phenomenological thought knows that phenomenology is not so much a system or body of concepts as a particular way of doing philosophy
Derrida places much weight on the fact that phenomenology does not have its own specific language; it must communicate itself in German, English, French etc., languages imbued with a specific manner of conceptualizing the world, and a particular metaphysical history
Summary
In this essay I take issue with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of intemal time-consciousness in Speech and Phenomena. Husserl is aware that consciousness of a now is always an awareness of a difference - temporal and apprehensional; the now is always relative to retentional modifications
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