In Praise of Presence

Abstract

. . perception is unconsciousness. Merleau-Ponty (VAI 189)1 . . ego can really in its experiences without being conscious of them. Andrd de Muralt (IP 300)2 [It is a] philosophical error... to think that visible is an objective presence (or an idea of this presence). Merleau-Ponty (VAI 258) Jacques Derrida's Speech and Phenomena fundamentally constitutes a critique of Husserl's theory of signs. More specifically, it critiques Husserl's of principles, principle of non-signification, according to which the self presence of living or pure presence can occur only where signification can not occur, only where there is an absence or uselessness of (SP 60). Contrary to this, Derrida denies possibility of pure presence altogether and in Speech and Phenomena he sets out to prove that thesis of temporality that Husserl advances in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness in fact fails to support latter's philosophy of presence, and that it instead supports Derrida's own thesis that at heart of self we find signs (the trace), signs which forever keep self from itself, signs that introduce a radical alterity at heart of self. In this essay I will analyze and critique Derrida's critique of Husserl's notion of pure presence. I will show that Husserl's theory of temporality in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness does support a philosophy of pure presence, but that Husserl's notion of presence is not, as Derrida would have it, one which reject[s] `after-event' of becoming conscious of an `unconscious content' which is structure of temporality implied throughout Freud's texts. I will argue that Husserl's notion of presence is transcendental, hyletic, and unconscious. I will not, however, argue against notion of dissemination which I do consider to be phenomenologically significant. Instead I will argue that dissemination, characterized by a lack of stable meaning, non-origin, and departure from rules of logic, is constituted by relation of transcendental presence to mundane. The Central Issue In The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, Husserl maintains that an analysis of experience reveals a constant presence, a now. The now presents us with differing content: content that fills now, impression, passes and gives way to new content. As it does, primal impression is not lost but is retained (ITC 161). Using example of hearing a melody Husserl describes how each tone heard in now sinks off into retentive consciousness as next tone takes its place in now. Consciousness, embracing both now and retention, anticipates next tone (protention). In this fashion consciousness perceives whole succession of tones as a unified melody. In other words, according to Husserl, an analysis of experience reveals that form of consciousness consists of a flow, of a series of nows or impressions which run off into retentions or primary remembrance. Retention, a non-now, and now form a continuity or a unity since they are both moments of flow of experience. In Husserl's words, the unity of consciousness which encompasses present and past is a phenomenological datum (ITC 36). Because of retention (and protention) we are able to live through present, according to Husserl. While Husserl's analysis seems to reflect experience, Derrida maintains that continuity between now and not-now, between now and retention, destroys any possibility of a primordial pure presence. In Derrida's words: As soon as we admit this continuity of now and not-now, perception and nonperception, in zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit other into self-identity of Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into blink of instant. …