The welfare effects of two policies that could promote intermodal services, investment grants for terminal operators and the internalisation of external cost are analysed. For this purpose, a market equilibrium model has been developed, covering the dynamic demand and supply interactions of logistics and transport markets. The emergence or closure of terminals is modelled assuming free market entry and exit, and competition by product differentiation. In a first step, analytical results are presented showing that investment grants for terminal operators could have a negative effect on market efficiency due to a massive entry on the market for terminals. In a second step, a hierarchical choice model mapping the decisions of shippers/forwarders in detail is combined with the market equilibrium model. The combined simulation model is applied to German terminals, and different policy packages are analysed. It can be seen that in markets with high volume, the welfare maximizing policy strategy is the internalisation of external cost only. However, in less developed markets, a combination of both, direct subsidies in form of investment grants and internalisation of external cost, could be indicated. Finally, the implications of the results derived from the model and the empirical analysis of transport policy are identified.
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