Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Research Articles

The Determination of Shock Accelerations on a Small Nuclear Power Plant Structural Elements When Falling to the Surface

The article conducts research one of the expansion phase of emergency with an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, accompanied by an carrier explosion, an ejection of the reentry vehicle from a silo and its subsequent fall. The simulation of the collision of the reentry vehicle with a weakly deformable barrier in the event of fall is performed, the result calculation valuation and experiment are carried out.

Assessing Priorities towards Achieving Dependable and Secure Computing in the U.S. ICBM Force

This paper is an assessment of cybersecurity principles within the nuclear arsenal of the United States, specifically the nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile forces. Ongoing modernizations will introduce new components, and potentially new vulnerabilities, into U.S. nuclear forces. The principles for achieving secure operations from the fields of computer security, dependable computing, and systems analysis, and the extent to which they are addressed within the management of U.S. nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles is discussed. This paper then considers the types of vulnerabilities that may be overlooked during modernizations, followed by a critique of U.S. nuclear command and control policy choices that could make the consequences of these vulnerabilities more catastrophic.

Ablative Heating Technology in Hypersonic Re-entry Vehicles and Cruise Aircrafts

The aim of researches conducted in thermal protection systems in aeronautics and astronautics field of engineering is to generally defend the craft from high heat loads during operation while operating at hypersonic regimes in air and space. The motive of the following composition is to draft a review analysis on ablative heating materials as thermal protective equipment on reusable planetary/atmospheric re-entry vehicles such as a space shuttle, an inter-continental ballistic missile, or a hypersonic cruise missile. The heat liberation can cause much damage to the aircraft/spacecraft whilst operation which is generally beyond repair. It is therefore of utmost importance to research multiple strategy to reduce the effect of shockwaves damage to spacecraft/aircraft materials. We shall initiate the analysis by mentioning some re-usable tile thermal protection system types such as high temperature reusable surface insulation tiles (H.R.S.I), fibrous refectory composite insulation tiles (F.R.C.I), low temperature reusable surface insulation tiles (L.R.S.I) and gradually move on to ablative thermal protection systems with the advent of reinforced carbon-carbon’s application in astronautics and aeronautics respectively.

SANITARY-HYGIENIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF POSITIONING FOR THE DISPOSAL OF ROCKET TECHNICS

There was executed the sanitary-hygienic assessment of residential areas in the zone of possible impact of industrial activity of the Center for the elimination of Intercontinental ballistic missiles affiliated to the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Center for Operation of Ground-Based Space Infrastructure Facilities” located in the Nizhny Novgorod region. There were performed full-scale studies of air samples, water reservoirs and sources of drinking water, the soil on the content of components of liquid rocket fuels and their degradation products. Studies have shown full-time work enterprises not to be accompanied by the emission of unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine, Tetramethyl-2-tetrazene, NDMA into the environment. In samples of water from open stagnant water bodies there was detected both dimethylamine in concentrations exceeding MPC by 1.1 - 1.3 times, and formaldehyde in the concentration below the MAC. All soil samples also contain FA and DMA in concentrations significantly lower than the MPC. As, Be, Cd, Pb in drinking water was not detected within the sensitivity of the method, Ni content, Zn, Mg, Mn, Al does not exceed hygienic standards. Fe content in the water of centralized water supply amounted to 1.5 MAC.

PRACTICAL APPROBATION OF THE DEVELOPED MEASURES ON ECOLOGICAL-HYGIENIC AND TOXICOLOGICAL ESTIMATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE DISTRICT OF THE FORMER OBJECTS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The evaluation of the sanitary-hygienic and ecological state of the environment on the territory of the location of the former silo launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles after their partial elimination, as practical testing of the main provisions of the developed draft methodological manual on ensuring of environmental and hygienic safety of the sites for placing silo launchers after their decommissioning and Land reclamation. A comprehensive observation of the combat launch positions of liquid intercontinental ballistic silo based missiles after their decommissioning and partial liquidation was carried out. In accredited testing laboratories in soil, water, building structures, there were carried out.studies of the qualitative and quantitative content of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and its degradation products, heavy metals, radionuclides. In studied soil samples unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine was found to be in the soil in 69.4.7% of cases, and in 40.8% of cases in the studied samples, the excess of the MPC content of UDMH was recorded by 1.2 - 32 times. The study of soil on the degradation products of UDMG revealed their presence in some substances in most of studied samples, but their values did not exceed the MPC. The content of a number of heavy metals, both anthropogenic (zinc, lead, nickel) and natural (cobalt, chromium) nature was noted to exceed the maximum permissible and approximately permissible concentrations. It has been established that if the incomplete disposal of the former chemically hazardous facilities of the Ministry of Defense and land reclamation is concerned, the environment may contain toxic and highly toxic substances in concentrations exceeding the established standards. This circumstance determines the potential danger of decommissioned, but not properly disposed former military facilities for the environment, as well as for the local population. The experience gained during the practical activities made it possible to make the necessary additions and changes to the final version of the draft document on ensuring environmental and hygienic safety of the areas where the silo launchers were placed after their decommissioning and land reclamation.

Hafnium Diboride as a saturable absorber for Q-switched lasers

ABSTRACTHafnium diboride (HfB2) is used in hypervelocity re-entry vehicles (such as intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or ICBM heat shields), nuclear reactors and aerodynamic leading edges because of its strong tensile strength and high thermal resistance. HfB2 is an ultra-high-temperature ceramic (UHTC) with a melting point of 3250°C. In this paper, we study the performance of HfB2 as a saturable absorber in Q-switched lasers. HfB2 has a non-saturable absorptance of 2.5 dB/µm, a saturable absorptance of 0.8 dB/µm and a saturation fluence of 12 µJ/cm2. In addition, the saturation lifetime is estimated as 989.3 ps, while the recovery lifetimes are estimated as 254.9 and 22.1 ps. As a saturable absorber in our Q-switched laser, we observed pulses with durations between 880 and 2000 ns. With the addition of an acousto-optic modulator, we have observed Q-switching mode-locking, with pulses as low as 250 ns. HfB2 can potentially work at very high power, since its damage fluence is no less than 361 mJ/cm2.

A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: the best achievable objective

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea’s survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy.

The Scope of Foreign Assistance to North Korea’s Missile Program

There is evidence that North Korea’s ballistic missile program benefited from support from the Soviet Union until its collapse and from Russia thereafter. Along with transfers of missile systems and rocket components, it appears that Russian engineers directly supported the program in North Korea. Analysis of missile launches, imagery, design solutions, and technology suggest that Pyongyang’s recent missile program may have continued to have external support despite a pause in the 2000s. This assistance may have enabled the progress in North Korea’s missile program leading to tests of an intercontinental range ballistic missile in 2017.

The Challenges of Getting Adversaries to the Negotiating Table

The Challenges of Getting Adversaries to the Negotiating Table Patricia M. Kim (bio) Oriana Skylar Mastro's book The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime addresses a critical question all leaders grapple with while engaged in a war that is costing the lives and resources of their citizens: what will it take for their adversary to come to the negotiating table? Her research makes an important contribution to international relations literature by identifying two key factors that warring states take into account when contemplating their willingness to talk: whether entering negotiations will make them look weak and whether their adversary could exploit this perceived weakness to prolong or escalate the conflict. Mastro collectively calls these two factors the "strategic costs of conversation." The case studies in the book are particularly rich with detail. Mastro draws on a vast array of primary sources, with original archival work at the Johnson Presidential Library, the British National Archives, and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. She also draws on Chinese primary source documents and personal interviews with Vietnamese leaders. This effort shines through in the case study chapters, which features meticulous analysis of the Chinese, U.S., Indian, and North Vietnamese decision-making processes during the Korean, Sino-Indian, and Vietnam Wars. While the book is limited to actual cases of war, Mastro's theory is quite useful for shedding light on factors that influence leaders' decision-making when considering whether to negotiate in broader conflict situations. Two of the United States' biggest foreign policy challenges at the moment come to mind: the ongoing "trade war" with China and the stalled nuclear negotiations with North Korea. While these examples are outside the scope conditions set in the book, as they fall short of war and the relevant parties are already engaged in various negotiation stages, all the parties involved are just as concerned about the strategic costs of talking. This in turn affects the characteristics and pace of negotiations. Fears of looking weak and thus encouraging an opponent to press harder for its demands are universal concerns, whether in wartime or not. Washington and Pyongyang's tortuous history of nuclear negotiations in particular is marked with long pauses and provocations by North Korea [End Page 177] attempting to project strength and communicate that it will not cave to international pressure. While many factors have contributed to the current opening of negotiations, the fact that North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and Kim Jong-un felt confident enough to declare his nuclear weapons program "complete" undoubtedly played a role in bringing Pyongyang to the table. Since walking away empty-handed from the Hanoi Summit earlier this year, however, North Korea's leadership has yet to return to working-level negotiations. In recent months it has engaged in muscle-flexing—firing missiles off its coasts and ramping up its rhetoric against Seoul and Washington, notwithstanding the most recent and brief Trump-Kim encounter at the demilitarized zone. Such behavior is designed to signal that North Korea will not be coerced into an unfavorable deal and is aimed at two audiences: (1) the international community, especially Washington and Seoul, and (2) the North Korean people, especially hard-liner political elites, who are skeptical of Kim Jong-un's outreach to the United States and his stated shift away from North Korea's traditional policy of simultaneously pursuing nuclear weapons and economic development to one that focuses only on the latter. Mastro makes the theoretical case in chapter 1 that strategic costs have the most explanatory power, at least in her four cases studies, while recognizing that domestic factors are important and often part of the story (pp. 29–31). But in the case of the nuclear negotiations with North Korea and in most cases, leaders are always adjusting their policies with one eye on their domestic audience and the other on their foreign counterpart. Regardless of whether leaders can be immediately constrained or punished by their audience, they are undoubtedly thinking about their legacies, election calendars, and reputation among political elites, among other factors, in addition to the strategic realities on the battlefield. As Mastro notes in the concluding chapter, there...

The Peculiarities of the National Missile Defense

The view of both Moscow and Washington on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for a long time rested on the principle, formulated in the late 1960s, which held that anti-missile systems for defense of the territories were destabilizing, therefore limiting them would strengthen strategic stability. Since that time the USSR and then Russia always adhered to this principle, while the US at times rejected it (i.e. the SDI program of the 1980s) and by now has finally given it up altogether. Meanwhile , the majority of the independent leading experts assess the chances of the existing US missile defense to tangibly affect Russia’s nuclear strike capability as extremely low. However, the US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 seriously undermined political trust between Moscow and Washington. The unwillingness of the US to provide Russia with a legally binding commitment not to direct its BMD system against it (including technical constraints) contributes to the problem. In addition, the US missile defense system is being built as an open-ended system with no future restrictions on its expansion and improvement. Russia has responded to the creation of the US national missile defense system with the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces and initiation of its own Air-Space Defense (ASD) system. The difference of the concepts of the BMD system development in the United States and the ASD system in Russia lies in that the US system is intended to defend against limited attacks of intercontinental ballistic missiles against the North American continent or of medium-range missiles against the US allies in Europe and the Pacific region. The Russian ASD is a multilayered system designed to protect against a protracted air-space of-fensive by the US/NATO involving high-precision conventional weapons (including future hypersonic and space-based systems) and limited use of nuclear weapons. Although there has been a long break in a meaning ful US-Russian dialogue on missile defense, it is still possible to reach some positive agreements. If the US and Russia resume negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms, it might open a window for a compromise on missile defense. Such a compromise can be based on an agreed threshold separating, on the one hand, missile defense systems that can significantly affect strategic stability by in-tercepting a large number of US or Russian ICBMs and SLBMs and, on the other hand – systems that will allow the US and Russia to protect their territories against at-tacks by third states or rogue regimes and would thus strengthen their mutual security. The first class of BMD systems would be subject to restrictions, while the second one would be given a green light. Moreover, in the second case there would reemerge an opportunity of the development of a joint defense systems of the two powers, which was declared in 2002 but never came true.

North Korean strategic culture: survival and security

Abstract During last year North Korea has made almost daily headline. Topics such as the strongest nuclear test, tests of missiles from medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), readiness to retaliate to any possible U.S. attack, appeared frequently. In addition, the reaction of U.S. president D. Trump about American readiness to solve the issue, sending armada or reacting with fire and fury, were also covered by media all around the world. With these developments a possibility of nuclear war was discussed for the first time since the end of Cold War. This article aims to look closer to the reasons of North Korean behaviour, not only in last few years but within the contest of the concept of strategic culture. This concept has been used to explain behaviour of powers mainly, but the article aims to prove it is a viable tool to explain the motives and perceptions of any state in international system. The article aspires to conclude that the North Korean foreign and security policy is necessary to perceive in more complex picture. The current situation in North Korea is a result of combination of several factors that are determining and that have formed its perception of international relations

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy July to December 2017

The Turnbull government faced an international environment marked by disruption and volatility that was “unprecedented in both scale and pace”1 during the second half of 2017. The period was launched, quite literally, on 4 July by North Korea testing an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the first of eight missile tests — two of which overflew Japanese territory — to occur between July and December 2017. Dramatic in their own right, the tests revealed a stark reality to the rest of the world: North Korea’s missile and nuclear technology was expanding rapidly. It was a reality to captivate global media and public attention. Yet, the absence of a swift, coordinated global response, exacerbated by United States (US) President Trump’s goading Twitter commentary, raised potentially devastating prospect of conflict on the Korean Peninsula for the first time in several decades. For Australia, “joined at the hip”2 to the US, the stakes could not have been higher.

‘Dog-beating stick’: General Zhang Aiping’s contribution to the modernisation of China’s nuclear force and strategy since 1977

Since the Reform and Opening-up in the late 1970s, the second generation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping, worked towards a breakthrough in the development of strategic nuclear weapons and employment policy. By the middle 1980s, the Chinese military had successfully developed China’s first generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and communication satellites, which provided China with an elementary and limited second-strike capability. These technological advances were complemented by advances in Chinese nuclear strategy as well. Despite retaining the basic principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, the Chinese military leaders, such as Deng and General Zhang Aiping, gradually accepted the concept of nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, they put forward China’s own concepts, including ‘da gou gun’ (‘dog-beating stick’), ‘huan shou zhi li’ (‘the power to strike back’), ‘xia hu ren’ (‘bluff’), and ‘di you wo you, di yong wo yong’ (‘we have whatever the enemy has; we use whatever the enemy uses’). All of these new strategic weapons and concepts, which came from the 1980s, have been playing a key role in ensuring that China enjoyed limited nuclear deterrent since the late 1980s. Zhang devoted most of his attention to these achievements.

Using Elementary Mechanics to Estimate the Maximum Range of ICBMs

North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and, more recently, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has added a grave threat to world order. The threat presented by these weapons depends critically on missile range, i.e., the ability to reach North America or Europe while carrying a nuclear warhead. Using the limited information available from near-vertical test flights, how do arms control experts estimate the maximum range of an ICBM? The purpose of this paper is to show, using mathematics and concepts appropriate to a first-year calculus-based mechanics class, how a missile’s range can be estimated from the (observable) altitude attained during its test flights. This topic—while grim—affords an ideal opportunity to show students how the application of basic physical principles can inform and influence public policy. For students who are already familiar with Kepler’s laws, it should be possible to present in a single class period.

The Role of Japan in Sustaining Regional Order in East Asia

The Role of Japan in Sustaining Regional Order in East Asia Hideshi Tokuchi (bio) East Asia faces a diverse set of security challenges, both traditional and nontraditional. Countries have attempted to address these challenges through a variety of security measures, including alliances, political and security communities, and other frameworks for regional cooperation. These initiatives are often independent from each other but not mutually exclusive. It is important for countries to share a clear understanding of what the core element of the regional order is and to try to network their various endeavors in order to generate maximum synergy. Many in Japan view the U.S.-centered alliance network as the bedrock institution of the regional security structure in East Asia and believe that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the central piece of this network. This essay examines this conception of the regional order and is organized into three sections. The first section provides an overview of the regional security environment, while the next section explains the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the regional security system. The essay then concludes by discussing the prospects for multilateral cooperation to strengthen the regional order. The Regional Security Environment East Asia has been stable for decades but includes numerous sources of potential instability. Asia is home to four established nuclear powers, and five nuclear weapons states in total with the addition of North Korea. Three of these countries are in East Asia, and Japan neighbors all of them. Moreover, the region includes two hot spots with long-standing military disputes that involve divided states—the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait—as well as a flashpoint for potential conflict, the South China Sea, given the escalation of territorial disputes between China and other claimant states. The most serious threat to regional stability is North Korea's rapidly developing nuclear weapons and missile programs. North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests since October 2006, and one can reasonably assume it has already, or is close to, successfully miniaturizing [End Page 32] nuclear warheads. Pyongyang has also conducted tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles with the capability to reach much of the continental United States. Just as the Korean War militarized and globalized the Cold War over a half a century ago, the current situation on the Korean Peninsula reminds the world of the global nature of the security threat posed by North Korea. Another serious challenge in East Asia is China's maritime expansion. China's land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea continue, while in the East China Sea Chinese law-enforcement vessels regularly enter the contiguous zone surrounding the Senkaku Islands and intrude into Japan's territorial waters.1 To become a maritime power has been a dream of China's since its defeat to the United Kingdom in the Opium Wars in the 1800s.2 China's provocative actions in the East and South China Seas have heightened tensions with regional states and disrupted the East Asian order by trying to alter the status quo by force and challenging the U.S. presence, which is the basis of the regional security system. Looking at the big picture, today we see more competition between sovereign states and more confrontation between liberal democracy and authoritarianism. This trend is accelerating WMD proliferation and disrupting free and unimpeded access to the global commons, particularly in the maritime sphere. China, with its growing power and influence, is trying to keep the United States as far away as possible from the Asian continent. If this situation continues, the balance of power will tilt more toward China, which would be detrimental to the national interests of Japan. However, it is also important to note that the Sino-U.S. competition is not a Cold War–style competition. Because of globalization, both the United States and China have national interests that overlap in a number of areas, as does Japan. In those areas, there is room to broaden cooperation. The international security agenda in East Asia today intertwines complex traditional and nontraditional issues and requires delicate diplomacy by all players involved. [End Page 33] The Importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Regional...

North Korea in 2017

Kim Jong Un continued to consolidate his power through personnel changes, and North Korean society saw increasing consumerism, along with signs of growing inequality. The economy did well through early 2017 but the subsequent effects of sanctions remained uncertain. North Korea conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its sixth nuclear test, triggering heated debate in the US and elsewhere about how to respond. Kim clearly is not going to give up working on weapons of mass destruction.

An Untaken Road: Strategy, Technology and the Hidden History of America's Mobile ICBMs by Steven A. Pomeroy

Reviewed by: An Untaken Road: Strategy, Technology and the Hidden History of America's Mobile ICBMs by Steven A. Pomeroy Christopher Gainor (bio) An Untaken Road: Strategy, Technology and the Hidden History of America's Mobile ICBMs. By Steven A. Pomeroy. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2016. Pp. 304. Hardcover $44.95. Some of the biggest and most expensive engineering works on earth are the hundreds of silos designed to protect intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the United States, Russia, and China. These huge silos are designed to ensure that nuclear-armed missiles are protected against a surprise first strike in a nuclear war. Submarine launched ballistic missiles [End Page 485] (SLBMs) are also widely used because their constant movement underwater makes it difficult for adversaries to target or even locate them. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Air Force, which operates America's landbased ICBM force, has also given serious consideration to making ICBMs portable as a means of safeguarding America's nuclear deterrent against a first strike. The USAF has also been motivated by its desire to retain its hold on the U.S. ICBM force against the inroads made by the U.S. Navy and its SLBMs. Many people will recall that as the Soviet Union's advances in the field of ICBMs became a major concern to American policymakers, President Jimmy Carter proposed in 1979 that 200 of a newly developed ICBM known as MX be based in 4,600 underground shelters linked by roads known as "racetracks." The idea was that each missile could be hidden under any of a number of shelters, making it very difficult for Soviet ICBMs to hit every ICBM during a first strike. In the face of growing controversy over the idea, particularly among landowners in Utah and Nevada, President Ronald Reagan cancelled the shelter system in 1981. Reagan renamed the MX missile Peacekeeper, and it was later deployed until 2005 in refurbished silos originally built for Minuteman ICBMs. Less well known is the fact that the USAF began studying similar mobile ICBM schemes even before its first ICBM was deployed and continued through to the end of the Cold War. In its efforts to protect ICBMs, the air force considered basing them on trains, trucks running on public highways and purpose-built tracks, aircraft, ships, and even submarines renamed "manned underwater launch platforms" in a doomed attempt to avoid the navy's notice. In spite of all the studies and proposals for mobile ICBMs, the USAF has never deployed them. Author Steven A. Pomeroy's book asks why this technological route was never taken. He concludes that the U.S. Navy's successful creation of its SLBM force that would survive a first strike, along with the success of Minuteman missiles in silos, especially in comparison to the ponderous Atlas and Titan ICBMs that preceded them, undermined the USAF's case for portable ICBMs in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s and 1980s, American decision makers were divided over the degree of the vulnerability of ICBMs. Pomeroy, whose scholarship is informed but not limited by experience as a launch officer in the USAF, has written a rare and badly needed history of the deployment of America's ICBMs during the Cold War while telling the story of the USAF's quest for mobile ICBMs. In explaining why he emphasized the road not taken in this history, Pomeroy argued that too great an emphasis on adopted technologies fosters determinist narratives in the history of technology. Reading this well paced account of the USAF's many schemes to move missiles before [End Page 486] launch, this reviewer is struck by the prodigious work and expenditure that went into developing these schemes before they were rejected. Many books have been written about nuclear weapons and bomber aircraft, but comparatively little attention has been given to ICBMs, and much of that relates to the first generation ICBMs that were also used as space launch vehicles. Works like An Untaken Road and Gretchen Heefner's The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland (Harvard University Press, 2012), are valuable histories of this expensive military technology. More historical work needs to...

The North Korea crisis

North Korea is clearly making rapid progress towards possessing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of hitting the United States mainland with a nuclear warhead. An incoherent US approach involving reckless military threats and economic pressure is not working. The Trump administration should consider diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang before its nuclear ICBM capability becomes a fait accompli.

Reaffirming U.S. Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: A Japanese Perspective

Reaffirming U.S. Alliances in the Asia-Pacific:A Japanese Perspective Noboru Yamaguchi (bio) From a Japanese perspective, the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific under the Trump administration seems to be far more robust than many in the region worrisomely speculated during the presidential election campaign. Despite Donald Trump's tough words on U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe as a presidential candidate, the administration's approach in East Asia, centering on the alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), has been positive and pragmatic, endorsing the importance of the hub-and-spoke network of bilateral arrangements between the United States and Asian partners.1 Visits to Asia by Secretary of Defense James Mattis in February and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in March, followed by Vice President Mike Pence in April, have signaled that the United States will keep emphasizing its Asia policy and cooperation with allies and partners in the region. This essay discusses, first, how Japan sees the Trump administration's commitment to Northeast Asian security; second, the implications of the Trump administration's Asia policy; and third, the outlook for the U.S.-Japan alliance in the near future. The U.S. Commitment to Northeast Asian Security in the Trump Administration The Trump administration has so far proved the United States' strong commitment and firm resolution to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. In particular, the administration's willingness to cooperate with important players in the region, including China as well as U.S. allies Japan and the ROK, to address the threat posed by North Korea exemplifies its commitment to regional stability. For Japan, while serious concerns [End Page 13] remain regarding the future direction of China, whose rise might have both positive and negative impacts on the regional and global strategic environments, North Korea constitutes the paramount foreign threat to national security. North Korea has been vigorously pursuing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs despite a series of UN resolutions.2 In 2016 alone, the country conducted its fourth and fifth nuclear tests and launched 24 missiles. Pyongyang has claimed that it is developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the United States.3 With the possibility of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, the danger posed by such programs is no longer regional but soon could directly threaten the United States. On March 6, 2017, North Korea simultaneously launched 4 missiles with a range of around one thousand kilometers, 3 of which landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan. Ten days later, presumably in response to North Korea's accelerated missile and nuclear programs, Secretary Tillerson made it clear that "all options are on the table" to deal with North Korea's destabilizing acts against Japan. He further commented in Seoul on March 17 that "if they elevate the threat of their weapons program to a level that we believe requires action, that [military] option is on the table." 4 This statement was powerfully endorsed earlier by Secretary Mattis on February 3 when he stated that "any use of nuclear weapons would be met with a response that would be effective and overwhelming." 5 These words were followed by deployment of the carrier strike group headed by the USS Carl Vinson near the peninsula. Strategic bomber overflights, frequent port visits by U.S. Navy ships to the ROK, and joint exercises with Australia, the ROK, and Japan, among other actions, also demonstrate U.S. determination and capabilities on issues related to Northeast Asian security. The U.S. attack against Syria on April 6 reinforced this message to North Korea and other concerned parties that the United States will not tolerate any action threatening the international community with the use of [End Page 14] weapons of mass destruction. This message was seemingly well understood by China and conveyed to North Korea. Indeed, one of the Chinese Communist Party's own international media outlets, the Global Times, openly warned North Korea and expressed China's reluctance to be involved in a military conflict, stating that "if Pyongyang's unwavering pursuit of its nuclear program continues and Washington...

The Announcement of Dar al-Harb in Cyber Media in Context of the Theological Policy of Jihad: Reading the Cyber-Jihad and ISIS based on the Pharmakon Characteristic of the Cyber Media

Before understanding and making sense of the pharmakon character of cyber media as well as the phenomenon of jihad, we would like to begin by describing the technology of the which is an important phenomenon in the development of the Western world in terms of communication sociology. This is because the West created a curious development in its quest for growth and founded and improved ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), which is the premise of the Internet. This network became more popular and widespread and also became the topic of democratic public spaces. In fact, it was intended to be a project. There was no way for the West to know that this new defense project would be used by mujahids when they were creating it. Yet, there was a production similar to the chimeric living things which carry multiple DNA profiles in the same body together. Internet is a tool which is almost impossible to supervise and determine who, how, and for what purposes it will be used. most controversial example of this is the announcement of jihad against the Western world by the radical Islamic terrorist organization ISIS.The Internet came into existence as a defense project funded by the West, and it has been used by some radical (Eastern) Islamic organizations for a very long time. However, ISIS is the first organization that followed an Internet policy including having their mujahids develop software programs to increase the number of tweets they send; that is, they transformed this tool of defense into an attacking tool which is as competent and sufficient as it was intended to be. They see the Internet as a battlefield where the disbelievers can fight against them (e.g. do their propaganda and make an anti-Islam lifestyle attractive through movies and websites), and as an area of Dar al-Harb (House of War) which should become Dar ai-Islam (House of Islam). ISIS have discovered an area in cyber media where they can fight with the state authorities and even the big Western evil allies they oppose to in the world as an Islamic organization and as equals practically without leaving their geography for the first time in history.The Roots of the Cyber Media: The Internet: From a Defense Project to an Antagonistic WeaponThere are two fundamental approaches to the intentions and circumstances of the creation of the Internet. These approaches both deny each other and bring us closer to the dualist character of the Internet. first approach indicates that the ARPANET, which is the premise of the was started as a defense project against nuclear attacks when the intercontinental ballistic missiles were developed. second approach, which was claimed by the multiple writers of the article A Brief History of the Internet, is that the ARPANET was not designed to resist to a nuclear attack. Accordingly, the main intention of the ARPANET was to solve the problems related to the loss of capacity created by the geographic disconnection between the researchers in the country. In other words, it is completely addressed to the civil targets of civil researchers.What and who these researchers were that were struggling with these crucial disconnections and losses is also controversial, because the efforts to prevent the crucial disconnections and losses can also be seen as defensive and/or protective. purposes and circumstances of the development of the Internet have been discussed. Another discussion emphasizes the dualist character of the Internet and its relation to freedom of expression, participation, and equality, which are the core qualities of democracy.The arguments that the in contrast with other types of media, eliminated the inequalities between gender and age groups, classes of income, urban and rural areas, developed and under-developed parts of cities, and the inequalities between cities, regions, countries, and continents thanks to the equal access facility it provides has created a debate in communication and sociology that brought technological determinists to the concept of a global village. …