Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Research Articles

Distant early warning systems in the North American Arctic

The Distant Early Warning System (DEWLine) is a network of radar and communications stations stretching for some 3600 miles along the 69th parallel from Cape Lisburne, Alaska, to Cape Dyer, Baffin Island, and continuing across Davis Strait and the Greenland ice sheet to the east coast of Greenland. Thence it maintains communication with the North Atlantic Radio System from Keflavfk, Iceland, to Fylingdales Moor, England. The DEWDrop system, a tropospheric scatter communications system links Cape Dyer with the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Station at Thule, Greenland and another connects Thule with the DEWLine station FOX, on Foxe Basin. DEWLine stations are supervised and controlled by the US Air Force, by agreement with the Canadian and Danish Governments.

Edwin Ginn's Commitment to World Government

Edwin Ginn's vision of world peace, as recorded in his last will and testament, involved him in a commitment to world government. World government, however, is an objective which seems to many mid-twentieth century observers of international politics excessively visionary. The nineteenth-century dream of a parliament of man, a federation of the world, fills a bright page in Victorian poetry. But much contemporary prose is written by men whose vision is obscured by space rockets, intercontinental ballistic missiles, atomic bombs, and other lethal weapons of ultramodern warfare. They see only a world of heavily armed, self-styled sovereign states bent on the protection of alleged vital interests and on the defense of so-called national honor with little patience for the restraints of any higher law designed to prevent them from making war upon one another.

Ballistic-missile research with athena

Athena was conceived to reduce the cost of ballistic-missile experimentation and employs comparatively inexpensive solid-propellant rockets to simulate the flight dynamics of intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is a four-stage, partially guided vehicle that has been launched from a point near Green River in south-eastern Utah and impacted at the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) 420 naut miles away. The vehicle propels a variety of payloads into the atmosphere at various velocities and re-entry angles from altitudes < 400,000 ft. The nominal performance requirements are 1) 50-lb pay load delivered at 250,000 ft, 2) separation distances (fourth stage from pay load) of at least 5000 ft at test altitudes, 3) velocity at test altitudes of 22,000 fps, 4) re-entry angles of 18° to 46°, and 5) payload angle of attack as close to zero as possible. Nomenclature a.c. = aerodynamic center CD = drag coefficient CNCX = normal-force slope coefficient FA = pitch frequency h = altitude M = Mach number P = spin rate R = range $ref = reference area t = time VE = re-entry velocity ex. = angle of attack 7 = flight path angle

Integrated management in ICBM base activation.

The period from 1954 to 1964 is often referred to as the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) era by the Air Force and Aerospace Industry. This decade covered the period of research, development, design, and test of ICBM's, their ground support equipment and the activation of strategically located bases with facilities, equipment and support services. During this period, the Atlas, Titan and Minuteman became operational. The management, organization, and responsibilities for the activation of a Titan II Operational Base (Davis-Monthan, Arizona) are herein described. Concurrency and specific examples of management actions in solving problems under field conditions to assure delivery of a complete Weapon System are explained.

The Atlas, Thor, and Titan

ALTHOUGH AN intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was among the several basic new weapons urgently recommended during the first postwar analysis of United States military needs, several factors combined to delay the start of actual development until 1954. Perhaps the chief of these was a compound of complacency and self delusion arising from the popular notion that possession of the atomic bomb and the means of its delivery conferred near invincibility on the United States, the only victorious power to emerge unscarred from World War II. That attitude was complicated by the conviction, expressed by some of the nation's most respected scientists and echoed by some of its most prominent military spokesmen, that the V-2 rocket missile was inherently an inaccurate, range-limited weapon, prohibitively expensive, and of slight military effectiveness, which Germany would have done well to forego in favor of improved conventional weapons-such as jet aircraft. General of the Armies Henry H. Arnold, certainly the most farsighted of all World War II allied leaders, was the first important military spokesman to endorse the need for an ICBM. For his pains he was subjected to the derision of leading civilian scientists, most of whom seemed content that logical extensions of existing weapons should remain the objectives of realistic military planning. There seemed slight cause for concern that a genuine need for an ICBM would develop within the predictable future. Two or three decades hence would be time enough.' By 1947 it was a precept of American folklore

Aftermath of a Thermonuclear Attack on the United States: Some Sociological Considerations

With the development of such weapon delivery systems as intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the United States finds itself today for the first time quite vulnerable to a massive air attack. This, coupled with the development of Hbombs and thermonuclear weapons having a fantastic explosive force of 15 to 50 megatons of TNT,** has placed this country in a perilous position if an attack should occur.

Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis

Alliance with Soviet Russia has served the mili tary, economic, and political interests of Communist China. The dependency of Peking upon Moscow during the Stalin period compelled suppression of ideological differences on the part of Mao Tse-tung. Growing Chinese strength, however, afforded increased leverage upon the post-Stalin leadership. In 1956, the East European crisis prompted Peking to inter vene in bloc affairs, promoting a formula which varied from the approach of Moscow. This formula called for relegation of bloc differences to secret bilateral discussions as well as for toleration of greater divergence in the domestic practices of bloc regimes. Chinese mediation between the Polish and Russian positions during 1956-57 appeared to smooth bloc relations throughout East Europe. Abandonment of this formula at the November 1957 con ference in Moscow coincided with a major shift by Mao Tse- tung on other aspects of Chinese foreign policy. This shift paralleled preconference signs from Khrushchev of a harsher line both on bloc affairs and toward the non-Communist world. Overtly the Sino-Soviet attack against "revisionism" applied to the Yugoslavs. Gomulka's position at the conference, how ever, as well as during the 1958 attack on Tito, suggested that Poland also felt pressure from the new line. The change in Peking's policy from 1956 to 1957 may have come from a reappraisal of Soviet strength resulting from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and artificial satellite developments in the latter half of 1957. Such a reappraisal may explain the new harshness of Chinese foreign policy statements directed not only within the bloc but to other areas as well.

Instrumentation and Range Safety System for Vandenberg Air Force Base

This paper is a survey of the Instrumentation and Range Safety System (IRSS) now under design for installation at Vandenberg Air Force Base (see Fig. 1). The Vandenberg Air Force Base will be used for launching intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles, such as the Atlas, Titan, and Thor. These missiles, their launching pads and other associated information, are identified throughout the rest of the paper by the Air Force designation number. The number 65 identifies the Atlas; 68, the Titan; and 75, the Thor. The Vandenberg Air Force Base has been established in order to train Air Force crews in the launching of ballistic-type missiles and to establish an initial operating capability. Research and development will be provided only to the extent necessary to achieve the program. The range area is limited to the Vandenberg Air Force Base and the immediate launching facility, and does not include the area normally referred to as ``downrange''. The instrumentation System's basic function is to provide data substantiating the proper operation and reliability of the missile. The Range Safety System's basic function is to protect the life and property on and near Vandenberg Air Force Base.

SATELLITE—BANE OR BLESSING?

ON AUG. 5, 1945, the world was made dramatically aware of the successful conclusion of the greatest scientific research effort in history—the splitting of the atom. On Oct. 4, 1957, the world again was startled to learn of another tremendous breakthrough in science. That day will be remembered as long as the world exists as the day Russia successfully launched a satellite and confirmed the claim made by Moscow six weeks ago of the first conclusive test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Russia has won both a scientific and a propaganda victory. Its effects on a stunned world are profound but only partially understood. While they are debated, the Russian satellite continues to circle the earth at 18,000 miles an hour. It is giving off signals that are being broadcast to millions who wonder what this world will be like now that we are on the verge of possibly reaching other planets. ...