Innocent Human Beings Research Articles

Peace and Conflict in Two Friends: A Naturalistic Short Story

As a mover and shaker man of letters, the French short story writer Guy de Maupassant penned hundreds of groundbreaking stories, yet sundry of them are still eclipsed owing to the rarity of reviews. Two Friends (1882), one of his eloquent works, is a pertinent case worth reading and analyzing. As a corollary, this article comes to terms with Two Friends to uncover the story’s narrative structure, point of view, setting dimensions, historical context, style, and symbolism to cognize readers about the significance of this piece of work that comes to grips with two dialectical phenomena which are peace and brutality. This juxtapositional datum in human nature echoes how realistic literature in the 19th century represented societies by shedding light on divergent issues in Two Friends and conversing about the impulse that thrusts Guy de Maupassant to tell about the faith of two commoners living in Paris. This investigation indulges realism in Maupassant’s work through the projection of commoner characters entangled with the dire reality of armed conflicts. Besides, naturalism discloses the reasonable forces of the environment and innate heredity that navigate the characters' actions. This will inform us about how war sometimes has the repercussions of foolish decisions or human greed, out of which innocent human beings are the overt victims who pay a heavy price.

Some concerns about the idea of basic moral certainty: A critical response to Samuel Laves

AbstractPleasants has developed the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties, they are best described as universal moral certainties which are natural and nonpropositional, and show unreflectively in the way we act. A clear‐cut example is the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Philosophers have levelled three damaging criticisms against Pleasants' proposal by (i) offering counterexamples to his proposed example of moral certainty, (ii) highlighting some disanalogies between moral certainties and Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties and, lastly, (iii) showing the lack of arguments and evidence offered by Pleasants to substantiate the claim that moral certainties are natural. To address these criticisms, Laves has revised Pleasants' proposal by providing numerous amendments. In this paper, I develop some concerns about Laves' proposed amendments and indicate that, at present, they are unable to fully overcome the criticisms levelled against the idea of basic moral certainty. Whether Laves' proposal can escape these troubles demands further attention.

The Latest Viral Battle: The Newest Crowned Viruses Soldiers Attacked to Innocent Human Beings

The main aim of this study is having a deep look from different facets at an undesirable virus, COVID-19, which challenge people's life around the world. There is another crucial goal for this study and is providing a piece of brief COVID-19 information from molecular aspects to clinical. COVID-19 has launched terrible mortality in the world as an epidemiologists reported in different articles. Some prevention ways are provided for more security in this article with meticulous studies which have done by scientists. Complex pathogenicity of the virus, structure, it’s resemblance to SARS and MERS, and even easy transmission of the virus confused scientists to provide an efficient vaccine for humanity. Also, this tough situation of the virus required scientists to examine any effective medication on the small community of patients. In addition, there is a greatresemblance pathological features of COVID-19 to SARS and MERS coronavirus infection. Moreover, COVID-19 soldiers attack the lungs region which resulted in lung failure. Having a complete study on the variety of articles lead to have an exact conclusion that COVID-19 is a resistant virus which transmits easily person to person and targets the individual’s lung lead to lung failure. There is no exact treatment and even a lucrative vaccine for the virus yet.

F.A. Hayek and why government can’t manage society

This year marks the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Sec-ond World War. On May 8th, Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allied Powers in Europe. On September 2nd, Imperial Japan sur-rendered to the Allies on the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay, thus ending a global conflict that is estimated to have cost the lives of upwards of 50 million people.
 In autumn of 1945, everyone was looking forward, finally, to a world at peace that could recover from the destruction of a cata-strophic war and move towards a bright new future. But what kind of world was it to be?
 Nazism and fascism had been militarily and ideologically pul-verized in the conflict. No one wanted to goose-step to Hitler and Mussolini’s grandiose dreams of a world-ruling master race or a war-worshipping aggressive nationalism to which innocent hu-man beings were to be sacrificed.

ABOUT LIFELONG AND REAL LIFELONG SENTENCE – (SEMI)PERMEABILITY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE – SUPRANATIONAL JUDICIAL APPROACH BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Desde a proposta de abolição da pena de morte nos países que formam as Altas Partes Contratantes da Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem (47 Estados), gerou-se uma discussão preoccupante e perturbadora. Argumentos distintos, a favor e contra, tem aumentado desde então. Poderia haver uma penalidade suplementar aos crimes mais brutais, semelhantes a tortura e a tratamento desumano ou cruel, privando a vida de modo agravado? A resposta é: "sim" ... com muitas barreiras, pré-condições e pré-requisitos. Pensando profundamente na privação de liberdade por toda a vida do réu / condenado, tem o Estado o poder de fazer isso? O judiciário do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos (em Estrasburgo / França) não pôde responder, consequentemente, à questão avassaladora: o caso Vinter e, posteriormente, o caso Hutchinson formaram pontos de vista polêmicos e comprometedores. A Hungria introduziu um remédio jurídico importante, devolvendo a esperança de ser libertado - mesmo condicionalmente: - após 40 anos de prisão, uma Comissão Nacional especialmente formada para esta finalidade, terá autoridade para revisar o comportamento da pessoa condenada na prisão, examinando se ele ou ela pode ser devolvida à sociedade normal ... Pesado trabalho à Comissão, pesadas pré-condições serão dadas a pessoa aprisionada. O presente ensaio tenta esclarecer por que tem sido tão difícil alcançar uma solução comprometida com os princípios e normas da Convenção. Aproveite e forme sua própria opinião.

God’s Existence and the Kantian Formula of Humanity

Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative can be expressed as the formula of humanity. This states that rational beings ought always to treat humanity, whether in our own persons or in others, as ends in themselves and never as mere means. In this essay, I argue that if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. The basic idea behind my argument is that if God exists, then he has knowingly created a world with all kinds of naturally occurring threats, such as disease, flood, drought, etc. and he has knowingly placed human beings in such a world without their consent, knowing that many innocent human beings will be led to suffer, and he allows this suffering to occur. I argue that even if this is somehow for their own good or the good of others or contributes to the goodness of the world as a whole, God treats these innocent human beings as mere means when he places humans in such a world without their consent and allows this suffering to occur.

Losing Faith in the Dead Donor Rule

According to the Dead Donor Rule (DDR), vital organs can only be removed from donors who are already dead. Organ procurement, in other words, must not be the cause of their deaths. The rule purports to protect dying and vulnerable individuals from being sacrificed for the benefit of other people who are in need of those organs. This notion that innocent human beings should not be used as means to an end is undoubtedly a concern that is unequivocally shared by Abrahamic faith communities. In this regard, the philosophy and rationale of the DDR fully cohere with their religious teachings. However, the method by which death is officially diagnosed to determine when an individual qualifies as a dead donor is not one that they necessarily share. Whilst English law recognises death as having occurred when the brainstem is dead, these faith communities ordinarily associate death with the departure of the soul. The latter is signified by the cessation of breathing and heartbeat. From this perspective, a person is still alive as long as they are still breathing even if this function is rendered possible only through artificial ventilation. Since it is currently lawful to remove the vital organs of mechanically-ventilated brainstem dead persons without contravening the DDR, it will be argued that the rule does not adequately protect the welfare of Christians, Muslims and Jews in the UK. The article ends by making recommendations on how their faith in the DDR could be restored.

1044 PERNKOPF AND THE BLIND EYE

You have accessJournal of UrologyMale Voiding Dysfunction (BPH & Incontinence) & Infection1 Apr 20121044 PERNKOPF AND THE BLIND EYE Jerry Greenberg, Alfredo Guevara, and Michael Moran Jerry GreenbergJerry Greenberg Tucson, AZ More articles by this author , Alfredo GuevaraAlfredo Guevara Nogales, AZ More articles by this author , and Michael MoranMichael Moran Tucson, AZ More articles by this author View All Author Informationhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.juro.2012.02.1149AboutPDF ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints ShareFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES The Nazi atrocities that were attributed to physicians have long been pondered discussed as to how such intelligent individuals could have been perverted into either actively participating in experimental inhumane investigations or even tangentially affiliated with such atrocities. Eduard Pernkopf was an outspoken National Socialist (NS) sympathizer and after the war his crimes against humanity were minimized and his Topographical Anatomy of Man went through an American edition before someone began to question his willingness to collect “specimens” from victims of Nazi genocides. METHODS A review of Pernkopf's writings, his journal articles, and access to a rare textbook of his anatomical work represents the primary sources. Subsequent writings about Pernkopf's textbook of anatomy, ethical works about his NS ideologies, and calls to ban and/or destroy this anatomical work were secondary sources. RESULTS Eduard Pernkopf was a early Nazi Party supporter from Vienna, Austria. He appears to have gathered about his Section of Anatomy, a whole host of talented artisans who were also rabid Nazi sympathizers while eliminating 153/197 Jewish faculty. Pernkopf used his Nazi sympathies to consolidate anatomical science in Vienna that had been separated by racial prejudice for decades- he formally reunited the Anatomy I and II into one chairmanship with the help of the SS in April 1938 just weeks after the Anchluss. He utilized his anatomical material to make his fabulous anatomical illustrations for his famous textbook of anatomy. Nowhere in his academic works, did Pernkopf admit to using innocent human beings who were being systematically exterminated throughout much of Europe. Pernkopf was incarcerated for three years after the war, but was rapidly rehabilitated, yet he never admitted to any wrongdoing. Despite this, his name was sullied by clearly participating during the Third Reich's 12 year reign. CONCLUSIONS Pernkopf died on April 7, 1955 of a stroke and was much lauded as a “lover of music and composer of an unpublished symphonic drama, a great teacher, researcher, and human being” by his successor Dr. Hayek. His textbook, the magnum opus of his professional career became a widely acclaimed anatomical guide and a first American edition appeared in 1963. In 1988, investigations into the anatomical collections indicated that over 1400 bodies from innocent Nazi atrocities were utilized for illustrations in this anatomical treatise, he blithely disregarded his Nazi past and admitted to doing no wrong, his peers essentially agreed turning a “blind eye” to any links between his academics and his politics. © 2012 by American Urological Association Education and Research, Inc.FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Volume 187Issue 4SApril 2012Page: e423 Advertisement Copyright & Permissions© 2012 by American Urological Association Education and Research, Inc.MetricsAuthor Information Jerry Greenberg Tucson, AZ More articles by this author Alfredo Guevara Nogales, AZ More articles by this author Michael Moran Tucson, AZ More articles by this author Expand All Advertisement Advertisement PDF downloadLoading ...

Finnis, Dworkin and Restrictions on Liberty

Subjects of ongoing public controversy such as abortion and homosexuality mark the watershed between the arguments of John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin. For Finnis, the purpose of government is to create the conditions ideal for the pursuit of the common good. For Dworkin, the purpose of government is to respect and protect individual rights. Finnis would therefore class an anti-abortion law as a legitimate restriction on intentionally destructive individual action: action that, if permitted, would undermine the common good. Dworkin, on the other hand, would hold that abortion should be allowed for the sake of individual rights, even if it involves the killing of innocent human beings and fundamental harm to society. Any common ground between the two legal philosophers is overshadowed by this fundamental disagreement on the role and limits of government. This paper will set out the areas of agreement and disagreement between Finnis and Dworkin, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments, and conclude with some thoughts on whether government is entitled to restrict liberty based on judgments about the value of a particular way of life.

Sozialethische Probleme des Lebensschutzes (Społeczno etyczne problemy ochrony życia - tekst po niemiecku)

The Social Doctrine of the Church investigates the structural and institutional prerequisites for the success of human life. This endeavor is focused on guidelines for a beneficial and just social order which allows human beings to enjoy a person-centered development. Until very recently, Christian Social Doctrine has displayed a remarkable blindness towards the ethical problem of the protection of life at the beginning and at the end of the human life cycle. Little was said about abortion, euthanasia, research on human embryonic stem cells, cloning and Pre-Implantation Diagnostics. As long as the legal and constitutional frameworks of civilized modern states protected human rights, especially with a firm injunction against abortion and euthanasia, the issue of the protection of life did not require the undivided attention of Christian Social Doctrine. All this changed with the dawn of the 1970s. Christian Social Doctrine must underscore the key prerequisites of the rule of law in democratic societies: the prohibition of the private use of force and the killing of innocent human beings.

Humanitarian Intervention: Moralism versus Realism?

Justice, Intervention, and Force in International Relations: Reassessing Just War Theory in the 21st Century. By Kimberly A. Hudson. New York: Routledge, 2009. 192 pp., $140.00 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-415-49025-2). Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention. By Eric A. Heinze. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009. 207 pp., $65.00 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-791-47695-6). How Do I Save My Honor? War, Moral Integrity, and Principled Resignation. By William F. Felice. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009. 223 pp., $44.95 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-742-56666-8). First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. By David N. Gibbs. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009. 346 pp., $27.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-826-51644-2). The unifying theme of these four books is humanitarian intervention—a paradigm that permits a state to intervene into the territory of another state, by employing military force, for humanitarian reasons: to stop large-scale atrocities committed against innocent human beings—the citizens of the target state.1 But this paradigm is not to be confused with the practice of intervention which violates the non-intervention principle foundational to the modern system of sovereign states. Non-intervention is of crucial concern because it constitutes the flipside of the principle of sovereign autonomy and territorial integrity embraced by realists and by legalists favoring international law—both asserting the stability of the international system and its standing territorial arrangements as a baseline. Non-intervention on these premises is the norm while intervention is the exception that calls for justification (Realists justify intervention as a foreign policy tool by claiming that it serves the national interest). Humanitarian intervention is an altogether different concept. Its ground is neither international law nor realpolitik but ethics. Its raison d’etre is protecting the innocent from unjustified violence and its logic is characteristically prescriptive: we ought to intervene in Sudan to alleviate on-going human suffering or we ought to have intervened in Rwanda to prevent the 1994 genocide. Mastering the humanitarian intervention debate is a demanding task because it presupposes familiarity with theories of ethics that transcend the immediate concerns of International Relations (IR). All four books under review contribute to this debate by elucidating how matters of right and wrong bear on the question of what states and governments do, or ought to do, in their mutual relations in the international realm. They are likely to attract the attention of advanced graduate students, IR theorists, and all those interested in the relationship between intervention, ethical constraints on foreign policy, and interstate war. My discussion …

SURVEYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF MEDICAL LAW: A REASSESSMENT OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS'S THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

Much of the confusion in the current debate about embryonic stem-cell research is generated by the advocates of stem-cell research who use controversial and misleading terminology about what it involves and who evade or misrepresent the central moral argument against such research, namely, that it involves the destruction of innocent human beings. This essay points out that such failings are not new to bioethical debate and exposes them in one of the earliest and most influential books on the law and ethics of medicine: The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law by Professor Glanville Williams.

How physicians and scientists can respond responsibly and effectively to religiously based opposition to human embryonic stem cell research

Physicians and scientists should respond to bioethical and public policy controversies about human embryonic stem cell research by insisting that public policy meet the requirements of fairness. Doing so denies religiously based objections their current "trumping" power and supports public funding and regulation of human embryonic stem cell research.

Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing

In this article it is argued that in two controversial homicide cases—severing conjoined twins and downing a hijacked commercial plane headed toward a heavily populated area—it is permissible to kill innocent human beings without having to establish the existence of a claim of justification such as selfdefense or choice of evils. Even though criminal law scholars consider that unjustified conduct is always wrongful, the position defended in the article is that there is a normative gap between an absence of justification and a finding of wrongdoing. This "normative gap defense," which negates wrongdoing without justifying the conduct, is the best way to deal with the troubling homicide cases described above. The normative gap defense is grounded on what is called a "reasons" theory of wrongdoing. According to this theory, the state cannot legitimately prohibit conduct when, in light of the fact that there are powerful utilitarian reasons in favor of performing the act and commanding deontological reasons against performing it, we are in a state of equipoise in which it is impossible for us to determine which course of action is "the right thing to do" (i.e., justified). Under these circumstances, the conduct should be regarded as non—wrongful even though it is unjustified.

Economic Oppression as an International Wrong or as Crime against Humanity

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to secure the punishment of persons who have committed the most serious crimes which ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity’.1 Yet what shocks the ‘conscience of humanity’ and what leaves people yawning, depends to a large extent on how mass media select and present facts. While millions of innocent human beings have been killed and maimed over the last century in armed conflict and by mass killing, the overwhelming majority of those who fall victim to adverse human agency are not injured by proximate violence but as a result of being compelled to live in subhuman conditions. Many more die silently each year of preventable hunger and disease than from widely reported direct violence. These silent deaths are mostly the result of decisions made, without malice, by individuals pursuing political or economic interests. Yet, intentionally or recklessly depriving even a single person of basic necessities may give rise to criminal penalties. Failing by gross negligence to ensure basic necessities to a dependent person may also give rise to criminal penalties. Causing death by deprivation of air, water, food, shelter or medicines may amount to murder. Compelling a person to live in inhumane or degrading conditions amounts to inhumane treatment, a violation of customary international law. Such conditions are defined herein as those which do not fulfil minimal humanitarian standards applicable to prisoners of war. The present article examines the conditions under which measures which subject a civilian population to inhumane or degrading conditions of life or perpetuate such conditions, constitute an international wrongful act2 that may reach the level of a crime against humanity under customary and conventional law.3

Abortion Policy and the Market

The only true scarce resource is the human mind. Yet abortion is perhaps the most potent enemy of the human mind, since it destroys the one thing in life that cannot be replaced. Ecmomic analysis suggests that abortion policy will fail to serve the public iruerest due to public choice and knowledge problems, and it will adversely distort beneficial market phenomena like adoption services. Even if markets fail to produce zero unwanted pregnancies, it is not clear that abortion policy has avoided more tragic government failures. Theologians argue that killing innocent human beings is moral turpitude, since an irreplaceable soul is lost. But abortion is also a huge social loss in an economic sense. Society loses from legalized abortion by losing a mind and from the social costs that devolve from destroying that mind. Hence, classical liberals should embrace the recent pro-life momentum.

Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and the Law

[Editor's Note: As a contribution to analyzing an increasingly prevalent social phenomenon, this Note on Moral Theology dis­ cusses recent developments related to physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and the law; in particular Compassion in Dying v. Washington and Quill v. Vacco, the decisions of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals that found a constitutional to die on behalf of competent, terminally ill patients.] I s rr EVER morally right intentionally to kill innocent human beings in order to spare them the suffering that continued life would bring? If so, under what circumstances? If not, why not? Furthermore, which courses of action count as intentional killing in the context of medical decision making? When is it morally acceptable to forgo cer­ tain medical care, although it will likely prolong a patient's life? When it is permissible to seek certain treatment, despite the fact that it will probably hasten a patient's death?1 These are the first-order moral questions raised by the closely re­ lated matters of assisted suicide and euthanasia. They are not unfa­ miliar to the readers of this journal. In recent years both Lisa Sowie Cahill and John Paris have discussed here bioethical issues relating to the end of life. Cahill devoted the majority of her attention to the controversial issue of whether or not artificial nutrition and hydration may be withheld or withdrawn from patients in a persistent vegeta­ tive state; she also probed contemporary discussions of whether tak­ ing active steps to end a patient's life might be justified in exceptional

Medical genetic engineering and the Catholic Church's teaching

The main steps taken and the goals reached in the field of Human and Medicai genetics, the expected knowledge from the rapidly evolving Human Genome Project, and the new important medicai applications are briefly outlined. Then, the view of the Catholic Church on three controversial ethical problems arising from these new developments is proposed. As to the first problem, concerning the research on early human embryos, it seems clear that- whichever their origin and the type of experimentation- they are considered and treated, contrary to any other experimentation on humans, as pure producible and/or disposable objects, thus violating their human dignity and rights. As to the second problem, conceming the use of preimplantation and prenatal diagnosis with the aim to discover and abort embryos and fetuses who are or shall be affected by some serious disease, beside the patent eugenistic perspective one must recognize that they are innocent human beings who have an absolute right to life. As to the third problem, concerning the epidemiologic genetic surveillance, although this could afford a possible and plausible way of preventing the risk of affected conceptuses, it has already opened the door to a number of abuses against justice an d equity.

Abortion and Tinkering

Recent defences of abortion on demand have located the morally relevant difference between normal adult human beings and non-viable fetuses in the possession of personhood by the former but not by the latter. It is, so the story goes, morally wrong to kill innocent human beings because they are persons, but non-viable fetuses, though they be biologically human, are nevertheless not persons and may therefore be killed without doing anything morally wrong.

Abortion and the argument from innocence

There is an argument against abortion that should be rejected. It is the argument that abortion is the killing of an innocent human being, and since the killing of an innocent human being is immora...