Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and the Law

Abstract

[Editor's Note: As a contribution to analyzing an increasingly prevalent social phenomenon, this Note on Moral Theology dis­ cusses recent developments related to physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, and the law; in particular Compassion in Dying v. Washington and Quill v. Vacco, the decisions of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals that found a constitutional to die on behalf of competent, terminally ill patients.] I s rr EVER morally right intentionally to kill innocent human beings in order to spare them the suffering that continued life would bring? If so, under what circumstances? If not, why not? Furthermore, which courses of action count as intentional killing in the context of medical decision making? When is it morally acceptable to forgo cer­ tain medical care, although it will likely prolong a patient's life? When it is permissible to seek certain treatment, despite the fact that it will probably hasten a patient's death?1 These are the first-order moral questions raised by the closely re­ lated matters of assisted suicide and euthanasia. They are not unfa­ miliar to the readers of this journal. In recent years both Lisa Sowie Cahill and John Paris have discussed here bioethical issues relating to the end of life. Cahill devoted the majority of her attention to the controversial issue of whether or not artificial nutrition and hydration may be withheld or withdrawn from patients in a persistent vegeta­ tive state; she also probed contemporary discussions of whether tak­ ing active steps to end a patient's life might be justified in exceptional