Finnis, Dworkin and Restrictions on Liberty

Abstract

Subjects of ongoing public controversy such as abortion and homosexuality mark the watershed between the arguments of John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin. For Finnis, the purpose of government is to create the conditions ideal for the pursuit of the common good. For Dworkin, the purpose of government is to respect and protect individual rights. Finnis would therefore class an anti-abortion law as a legitimate restriction on intentionally destructive individual action: action that, if permitted, would undermine the common good. Dworkin, on the other hand, would hold that abortion should be allowed for the sake of individual rights, even if it involves the killing of innocent human beings and fundamental harm to society. Any common ground between the two legal philosophers is overshadowed by this fundamental disagreement on the role and limits of government. This paper will set out the areas of agreement and disagreement between Finnis and Dworkin, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments, and conclude with some thoughts on whether government is entitled to restrict liberty based on judgments about the value of a particular way of life.