In their provocative review, Lubman et al. (2004) propose that dysfunction of inhibitory control systems in the brain is a core feature of the study for substance abuse. There is substantial merit in this concept. Once stated, it appears obvious that an impaired ability to suppress one's behavior would lead to excessive drug use, so it is surprising how little research there has been in this area. But it is precisely because this approach has such a strong intuitive appeal that it is in danger of being tautological, i.e. that the definition becomes the solution. In fact, it is in the definition of the problem wherein lie the greatest challenges to obtaining sound empirical support for this hypothesis. Inhibitory control is the third major paradigm in investigation of the neuronal basis of addiction. The first paradigm was withdrawal and the second was positive reinforcement. Yet each of these paradigms has something that the inhibitory control framework currently lacks: a clearly defined operational definition and experimental implementation (e.g. abstinence signs and symptoms, drug self-administration). Unlike the prior models of addiction, inhibition is both a subject of scientific inquiry and regular part of everyday conversation. To paraphrase William James’ famous comment regarding attention, everyone knows what inhibition is. Unfortunately everyone may have a different meaning for inhibition. Putting aside the connotations of morality and character often conveyed when loss of inhibition is used in everyday speech, the major impediment to the scientific study of inhibitory control at this time is the diversity of competing definitions and approaches. Starting with the title, the authors tend to use terms such as ‘loss of inhibition’, ‘impulsive’ and ‘compulsive’ interchangeably. However, there are reasons to consider that these terms are not identical, but rather may represent anchors on a continuous dimension. If so, then seemingly similar pathological repetition of behavior may be due to entirely different dysfunctions, and therefore may require entirely different treatment approaches. Hollander & Rosen (2000) have proposed that avoidance of harm underlies compulsive behavior whereas during impulsive behavior, harmful consequences are ignored and/or there is excessive attention on positive consequences. Hollander and Rosen's approach provides an entry point for designing studies to determine more precisely what type of dysfunction underlies the loss of control of drug use that characterizes addiction. Beyond issues of definition are the problems of measurement. The construct of impulsivity is a good example. There have been numerous studies using psychometric instruments to study impulsivity as a normal personality factor. Clinical criteria exist for diagnosing pathological aspects of impulsivity. There are also a variety of behavioral, cognitive and even economic tasks that can be used to gauge impulsivity in humans and animals. The problem is that there is not a consistent pattern of agreement across these measures, in that an individual may be considered impulsive by some measures, and not impulsive at all by other measures. Thus, it is becoming increasingly apparent that impulsivity is not a monolithic function. Rather, it is likely that taxonomy of impulsivity will eventually emerge, similar to what has developed for other broad psychological functions such as attention, memory, and emotion. As impulsivity becomes better defined, it is likely that only a subset of processes related to impulsivity will be related to addiction. The problem of specificity also exists at the neurobiological level. The authors cite studies implicating the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex in both inhibitory control and obsessive-compulsive disorder. However, both the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex are now known to be heterogeneous neuronal structures, with studies in both animals and humans beginning to delineate the functional differences between sub-regions of the frontal lobe (cf. reviews in Cavada & Schultz 2000). Attending to such regional differentiations may be especially critical when applying these findings to specific aspects of addiction (Kaufman et al. 2003; Fuchs et al. 2004). In summary, there is great merit using dysfunction of inhibitory control as a conceptual framework to guide addiction research. However, the current lack of agreement regarding the definition and measurement of the critical psychological constructs, let alone their neurobiological counterparts, represent significant challenges in conducting research that can be translated into effective methods to prevent and treat drug addiction.
Read full abstract