Indian Philosophy Research Articles

YOGA – “CHOOSE STRETCHING OVER STRESSING”

ABSTRACT The yoga is a combination of physical and mental practice of our ancient Indian philosophy. The various styles of yoga are physical postures, breathing practices and relaxation techniques. World Health Organisation (WHO) declared Complementary and Alternative Medicine of yoga to be a beneficial for increasing the immunity promote control over the mind, flexibility to the body and enhance well-being of the individuals. Key words: Yoga, stretching, stressing.

Daya Krishna and Twentieth-Century Indian Philosophy: A New Way of Thinking about Art, Freedom and Knowledge by Daniel Raveh

Reviewed by: Daya Krishna and Twentieth-Century Indian Philosophy: A New Way of Thinking about Art, Freedom and Knowledge by Daniel Raveh Elise Coquereau-Saouma (bio) Daya Krishna and Twentieth-Century Indian Philosophy: A New Way of Thinking about Art, Freedom and Knowledge. By Daniel Raveh. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. 209. Paper $20.65, isbn 978-1-350-10163-0. In a world where philosophy has become "global" and yet is mainly written by scholars educated and/or writing in "top" universities, where syllabi must become more "inclusive" yet conform to the same academic style, Daya Krishna's philosophy is distinctively refreshing and thought-provoking.1 Professor at the University of Rajasthan (Jaipur, India), prolific author, unremitting correspondent in journals, letters, and dialogues, anti-conformist regarding the norms of Western academia and irreverent toward the "inalterability" of the philosophical Indian traditions, Daya Krishna's creative and daring philosophical spirit is paid homage to by Daniel Raveh (Tel-Aviv University) in his book, Daya Krishna and Twentieth-Century Indian Philosophy: A New Way of Thinking about Art, Freedom and Knowledge. The book is structured into an introduction and four chapters. Raveh proceeds from Daya Krishna's most noticed dialogical experiments to earlier, unremembered dialogues. He begins with Daya Krishna's explorations in Indian philosophy and the parallel dialogues that the latter pursued with pandits (traditional learned scholars of Sanskrit, who usually are not included in English-speaking Universities), referred to as the Saṃvad experiments (chapter 1). Daya Krishna dismantles conventional interpretations of Indian philosophy that are commonly accepted and repeated (such as the prevalence of mokṣa and the rigid number of puruṣārthas) and urges us to consider "thinking creatively" about (Indian) philosophy instead. How Daya Krishna conceives this idea is illustrated in chapter 2 with reference to the aesthetic realm. His creative thinking is further instantiated by his pluralistic conception of freedoms and their relation to knowledge, for which Daya Krishna engages with Indian and Western concepts of "freedom" discussed in chapter 3. Finally, in chapter 4, Raveh reminds us of Daya Krishna's dialogues on economy and development in his early years. This last chapter contributes in return to understanding Daya Krishna's later battle against an overemphasis of Indian spirituality in philosophy, owing to the manner spiritual communities are bound to economy [End Page 1] and society. In that sense, chapter 4 lays the foundation for the later critique exposed in chapter 1. Raveh's book thus masterfully reveals the diversity of Daya Krishna's interests and the unity of his philosophical project. Daya Krishna's ease at crossing philosophical traditions, his striking capacity to question the most accepted axioms, most visible in the variety of his lively dialogues, is distinctly depicted throughout Raveh's book. Thus, in Raveh's own words, Daya Krishna's art of questioning philosophical traditions "emphasizes the continuity between his writings, the dialogic aspect of his work, and the task that he has taken upon himself, to shoot question-arrows at 'the beliefs,' many of them 'totally unfounded,' that constitute the conventional picture of Indian philosophy" (p. 9). These "question-arrows" refer to Daya Krishna's denunciation of the "myths about Indian philosophy" (2006, p. 3). These myths include such stereotypes as the association of Indian philosophy with mokṣa or liberation as its ultimate purpose, its essentially spiritual character, and its inalterable classification into orthodox and heterodox "schools." Thus, in his first chapter, "Toward a New Picture of Indian Philosophy," Raveh begins with Daya Krishna's struggle against these myths, i.e. against the frozen and unified conceptions of Indian philosophy. This brings us to reflect more fundamentally on how historiographies are made and how to challenge the sense of self-evidence that they entail. Interestingly, Raveh presents to his reader not only Daya Krishna's famous critique or "counter-perspective" of the myths of Indian philosophy, but also an alternative picture he proposes in the less-read Indian Philosophy: A New Approach (1997) in which his critiques ground a new "perspective." Daya Krishna's analysis of the "myths" of Indian philosophy is the best-known of his numerous writings. However, the responses so far have mostly...

Consciousness in Indian philosophy and modern physics

This paper makes an explorative journey into the concept of consciousness (prajna) as explained in the Indian philosophy (both orthodox and heterodox) and modern physics. The paper explains about knowledge domains in the traditions and their distinctive features, different connotations, and denotations of consciousness, the different methods being used in explaining consciousness. The current scientific analyses of consciousness from the stand point of theoretical and quantum physics are discussed here and compared with the concept of consciousness in the Indian philosophical traditions.

Classical Indian Philosophy: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps by Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri

Reviewed by: Classical Indian Philosophy: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps by Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri Joerg Tuske (bio) Classical Indian Philosophy: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps. Volume 5. By Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xxiv + 397. Hardcover $32.95, ISBN 978-0-19-885176-9. "I cannot recommend this book highly enough!" Is this statement true or have I succeeded in lavishing enough praise on this book by writing this statement, making this statement in fact false? This is one way in which Adamson and Ganeri explain the view of the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna that everything is empty. (However, humble as they are, they use the movies of Buster Keaton instead of their own book as an example.) Nāgārjuna has to defend himself against the objection that if everything is "empty" then this surely also applies to his own view. He famously argues that he does not have a thesis and provides the "silence" analogy, which I want to illustrate using my own example: if there is too much off-topic chatter in class and I want students to be quiet and pay attention I could shout "silence!" in order to create silence but of course my act of shouting itself is the opposite of silence. Nevertheless, it can bring about silence and Nāgārjuna claims that his view that everything is empty could be an instrument to make "Brahmanical (and other) dogmatists" aware of this. In Classical Indian Philosophy, the fifth volume of transcripts from the excellent podcast History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps, and the first to discuss philosophers with no direct connection to ancient Greece, Peter Adamson has teamed up with Jonardon Ganeri to provide a comprehensive, fascinating, and fun account of the history of philosophy on the Indian sub-continent up until the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (c. 480–540 CE) with many glimpses of philosophical developments beyond Dignāga's time. (Listeners of the podcast series might know that Adamson is also collaborating with Chike Jeffers on a podcast series on Africana Philosophy, which I hope will eventually appear in book form as well.) Classical Indian Philosophy is divided into four parts: in the first part ("Origins") the authors provide an introduction to philosophy in India and then discuss the background to any philosophical activity in India, namely the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata (including a chapter on the Bhagavad-gītā) and the Buddha's teachings. The second part, entitled "The age of the sūtra," [End Page 1] gives a thorough overview of what is often called "the six orthodox schools" (Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika). Part three adds Buddhist and Jaina philosophy while part four ("Beyond ancient India") introduces miscellaneous topics, such as "The aesthetics of Rasa," "Tantra," two chapters on the (possible) influence of Indian philosophy on Greek, Islamic and later European thought, as well as a brief glimpse of philosophy after Dignāga. While my rendering of the outline of the book seems as if it could apply to any number of histories of Indian philosophy, there are several points that make this book stand out. Listeners of the podcast already know that the authors are not afraid to resort to the occasional pun in order to get a point across and I am happy to say that all of them (as far as I can tell) made it into the book version. With that in mind, I want to offer the cliché that Classical Indian Philosophy is a tour de force but what makes it stand out from traditional histories is that there is nothing forced about it. This is partly due to the fact that this book (as the previous volumes) is written as a series of podcasts. This makes for a much more engaging style than is found in standard accounts of the history of philosophy (Indian, European, or otherwise). Listeners of the first four seasons of the podcast or readers of the first volumes will be familiar with Adamson's frequent references to giraffes as contents of our beliefs...

Constructing Indian Philosophical Antidotes for the Cardinal Fallacies

Philosophy in general is defined as the theory or attitude that acts as a guiding principle for an enriched life. Since time immemorial, many notable scholars have guided humanity towards leading a nourished and fulfilling life through their philosophical preaching and writings and were used by as benchmarks many in their day-to-day life. With the passage of time, Philosophy has taken strides and has evolved majorly to touch the human race irrespective of their caste, race, color, creed, region, etc. and is presently a major contributor for a better world. An extension of this subject is the Logic Based Therapy (LBT) which is slowly but surely is gaining grounds in today's world and is being used as a proficient tool to enhance the value of an individual's life by tackling his erroneous thoughts, also called fallacies in philosophical terms and to bring him on track towards a better existence. Hence, Logic-Based-Therapy (LBT) is fundamentally a philosophical therapy as it makes use of the philosophical wisdom from antiquity, transforming them into antidotes and ultimately using these potent antidotes to treat the cardinal fallacies. Till date, LBT has been the domain of Western philosophical antidotes but Indian philosophy also has an immense plethora of insights to offer in this area. The Sanskrit word for Philosophy is 'Darshan' which means 'Vision'. Indian Philosophy is considered as the vision of the wise and learned people and it becomes even more relevant as it embeds the potential to make our lives qualitatively better. Hence, the ultimate aim of Indian Philosophy is to be a guide for humanity and lead them towards the path of leading a 'good and meaningful life' whilst overcoming our fallacies and issues in our daily lives mainly through the preaching and writings of some great Indian philosophers. The current paper is an attempt at constructing such useful Indian Philosophical antidotes from the ideas of some of the most prominent contemporary Indian Philosophers like Rabindranath Tagore, Swami Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi, Lokamanya Tilak, Gopal Agarkar and J. Krishnamurti. The main focus being the key aspects of these philosopher's ideas that are relevant in addressing the cardinal fallacies and strengthening/promoting the corresponding transcendental virtues.

Пауль Дойссен как философ

Paul Deussen (1845–1919) as a philosopher followed Arthur Schopenhauer and in his main philosophical work “The Elements of Metaphysics” developed the teaching of the universal Will that reveals itself in living beings as organs of the body and instincts and in human being – as personal will. Intellect is the highest form of the Will but it can free itself – temporarily in esthetic contemplation and totally in overcoming the Will by the Will itself. Deussen’s interest to the philosophy of Schopenhauer influenced his interests in Oriental studies. He analyzed Indian philosophy in comparison with the European one. He discovered nonrandom similarities between philosophical teachings formed in these cultures that, in his opinion, testified to the principal unity of laws of philosophical thought that do not depend on the cultural affiliation of a thinker. Basing on this, he put the problem of possibility and ways of comparative study of philosophy. In his interpretation of Indian philosophy he reproduced and developed the ideas of German Romanticists who searched new ways of cultural development beyond the sphere of Western civilization. Deussen’s interests in Indian philosophy were in fact the continuation of his general philosophical interests. But they are demanded also today inasmuch as philosophical comparative studies offer the challenge for that intercultural philosophy having as it is also religious dimension which was worked on by Paul Deussen as one among the earliest scholars.

Ratnakīrti's Proof of Exclusion by Patrick McAllister

Reviewed by: Ratnakīrti's Proof of Exclusion by Patrick McAllister Joel Feldman (bio) Ratnakīrti's Proof of Exclusion. By Patrick McAllister. Vienna: Austrian Academy of the Sciences Press, 2020. Pp. vi + 394. Paperback $34.95, ISBN 978-3-7001-8400-3. Eleventh-century Buddhist philosopher Ratnakīrti has garnered increasing scholarly interest over the past two decades. The conciseness and logical precision of his work, which encapsulates arguments from the lengthier works of his teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, make him a convenient window into the last phase of Buddhist philosophy in India. We now have reliable translations of most of the extant philosophical works of Ratnakīrti, and a number of studies have explicated his philosophical views on a range of issues. Patrick McAllister's recent book, Ratnakīrti's Proof of Exclusion, makes an important contribution to this growing body of scholarship by providing not only a clear and precise translation of the Apohasiddhi, but also a new critical edition of the text, and an extensive analysis of Ratnakīrti's formulation of the theory of exclusion. McAllister thereby advances significantly our understanding of Ratnakīrti's views on the ontological status of universals, his theory of language, and his account of conceptual cognition. The theory of exclusion (apoha) is a distinctive aspect of the tradition of Buddhist philosophy tracing back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, which embraces a radical nominalism holding that ultimately only absolute momentary particulars exist. The apoha theory is designed to provide an account of the meaning of general terms by appealing to the exclusion of others (anyāpoha) as an alternative to positing real universals. On this view, the word "cow" is able to refer to all particular cows, not because of the presence of a universal, cowhood, in all the particulars, but rather because the word "cow" signifies the exclusion of all those particulars that are not cows. This theory was the subject of much debate over several centuries both within Buddhism and with opponents from the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā traditions. McAllister's thorough study sheds light not only on Ratnakīrti's late formulation of and argument for the theory, but also on its development during the period from Dharmakīrti to Jñānaśrīmitra. The book begins with a concise discussion of Ratnakīrti's central philosophical views, setting the context for the exposition of the theory of [End Page 1] exclusion. McAllister then undertakes an extensive examination of all available manuscripts of the Apohasiddhi, providing a new critical edition of the text in transliteration with references to all variant manuscripts, which is likely to become the definitive edition for future scholarship. The translation itself aims for scholarly precision over readability, but succeeds admirably in achieving both. References to a detailed outline of the argument are provided in the margins, helping the reader find a clear path through the dense and detailed thicket of arguments and objections considered in the text. The extensive footnotes offer a wealth of references to both modern scholarship and to the works of earlier Buddhist authors and their opponents, setting the arguments into their proper historical context. This goal is also advanced in the fourth chapter, which offers comments on selected passages from the text, tracing key elements of Ratnakīrti's argument through a range of earlier authors, not only from Buddhist sources, but also the works of their Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā critics, often providing translations of key passages. Many other relevant passages from Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla are translated in an appendix, revealing much about the evolution of the theory of exclusion. One notable feature of the translation is that the square brackets, prominent in many scholarly translations, have been printed in a lighter grey. These brackets are used to signal words, implicit in the original, that have been added by the translator. This stylistic tendency has been criticized by some for inhibiting the readability of translations, including Parimal Patil, who emphasized this point by publishing his 2011 translation of the Apohasiddhi under the title, "Without Brackets." While the elimination of brackets certainly aids the readability of a text, there...

Joel J. Kupperman, 1936–2020

Joel J. Kupperman, 1936–2020 Diana Tietjens Meyers (bio) It is with deep sadness that I report the death of Joel Kupperman, University of Connecticut Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor Emeritus. He died in Brooklyn, New York on April 8, 2020. Joel received both his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Chicago and his PhD from Cambridge University. He joined the Philosophy Department at the University of Connecticut in 1960. Except for visiting Trinity College, Oxford as a lecturer in 1970, two years supported by NEH fellowships, and fellowships at Clare Hall, Cambridge and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, he remained at UConn until his retirement from teaching in 2013. In addition to these major national and international awards, Joel received the Faculty Excellence in Research award from the UConn Foundation in 2004. A widely recognized and influential scholar, Joel specialized in ethics, aesthetics, and Asian philosophy. He published numerous journal articles and chapters in all three fields. Two early books resist subjectivism in ethics: Ethical Knowledge (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970; reprint Routledge, 2002) and The Foundations of Morality (London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983; reissue from Routledge, forthcoming in 2022). In his monographs, Joel’s long-standing interest in Chinese philosophy first became prominent in Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Value . . . And What Follows (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Joel’s scholarship in Asian philosophy long predated the recent professional awakening to non-Western philosophical traditions. Initially, he studied Chinese philosophy with H. G. Creel at the University of Chicago, and in 1967 he traveled to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan to continue his studies. In the 1980s he created Asian philosophy courses at all levels of the UConn undergraduate and graduate curriculum. His scholarship and pedagogical initiatives were visionary. Regarded as a classic by many in the field, his Learning from Asian Philosophy nimbly integrates insights from classical Chinese and Indian philosophy as well as Western philosophy into nuanced accounts of the self, choice, moral psychology, moral requirements, and interpersonal communication (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Chinese translation, Beijing: Renmin Press, 2009). That Joel delivered the keynote lecture at the [End Page 1] conference honoring the ninetieth anniversary of the Peking University Philosophy Department as well as the keynote lecture at the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy’s 2011 meeting in Hawai‘i are two measures of the importance of this book. Click for larger view View full resolution Joel Kupperman (1936–2020) during his keynote speech at the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy 43rd annual conference, May 25–28, 2011 in Honolulu. In addition, Joel published books that would be valuable to professional philosophers and that would also reach college students and the larger educated public. Notable among these are Theories of Human Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2010), Ethics and Qualities of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Six Myths about the Good Life: Thinking about What Has Value (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), and Classic Asian Philosophy: A Guide to the Essential Texts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001; second edition, 2006). When it became possible for Chinese students to come to the United States to study, Joel attracted some of them to the UConn philosophy department. Like all the graduate students, they studied Western philosophy. But thanks to Joel, they were able to study Chinese philosophy as well. Joel received the Faculty Excellence in Teaching award from the UConn Foundation in 1973. Upon his retirement, two of his Ph.D. students, Chenyang Li and Peimin Ni, celebrated his career by publishing a festschrift containing chapters by leading scholars: Moral Cultivation and Confucian [End Page 2] Character: Engaging Joel J. Kupperman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014). Joel is survived by his wife, Karen Ordahl Kupperman, his two children, Michael Kupperman and Charlie Kupperman, and a grandchild, Ulysses Kupperman Dougherty. His colleagues and many students join me in sympathy over their loss. His singular voice and distinctive presence are irreplaceable. In honor of Joel and his philosophical legacy, the department and Joel’s family have set up a graduate fellowship fund in his name to provide some financial support for Ph.D. students in the UConn Philosophy...

The Relation And The Effect of Yoga And Ayurvedha

Yoga is that the preferred complementary health approach practiced by adults within the us. It's associate ancient mind and body observe with origins in Indian philosophy. Yoga combines physical postures, measured respiration and musing exercise to supply the practitioners a singular holistic mind-body expertise. Some square measure significantly galvanized by the non- secular part that yoga provides; others by the raised Fitness and adaptability that it leads to. Some individuals notice solutions to stricken by varied Health Disorders associated there square measure others United Nations agency accomplish an all-around Development of a peaceful, stress-free mind and a work body

Salvation in Indian Philosophy: Perfection and Simplicity for Vaiśeṣika. By Ionut Moise

Salvation in Indian Philosophy: Perfection and Simplicity for Vaiśeṣika. By Ionut Moise

Понятие искусственного интеллекта и его перспективы с точки зрения философии Живой Этики

The article considers the concept of artificial intelligence (AI) using categories and basic principles of the consciousness theory developed in the Living Ethics (LE). The latter is a modern form of the ancient tradition of exploring conscious­ness in Indian philosophy and spiritual practice. Categorial apparatus of Indian philosophy contains rich variety of distinction which may be successfully imple­mented also in the modern cognitive researches. The article shows that more pre­cise definitions of the basic concepts allow to fulfill strict delimitation between “strong” and “weak” AI as well as between what is possible and what completely impossible regarding AI. Strong AI in a sense of possessing “subjective presenta­tions” appears to be impossible. But, a deeper understanding of nature of con­sciousness in LE allows to move the limits of what is considered as possible for the weak AI. First, LE asserts mechanical mode of operation underlying the most of intellectual operations. Hence, even “weak AI” may fulfill many functions which were before attributed only to “strong AI”. Second, LE defines conscious­ness and intelligence as inherent inner potential powers of material systems, manifesting also in their ability and tendency to self-organization. Therefore, some features of “artificial” intelligence may be reconsidered as manifestations of intrinsic “intelligence” of matter, which also implies wider possibilities for AI systems. Some parallels appear with major Western philosophers such as G. Bruno, Leibnitz, H. Bergson, E. Husserl, including recent approaches of N. Luhmann’s systems theory and B. Latour’s actor-network theory

A Study of the Advaita Vedāntic Critique of <i>Anyathākhyātivāda</i>

We usually discuss the question of determining the logical meaning of error and that of finding out the psychological conditions under which error is made possible. It is important to consider the general implications of those judgments regarding the ontological status of an illusory object. Unlike their Western counterpart, the investigation of an erroneous cognition has drawn the special attention of ancient philosophers of India. As a result, in Indian philosophy there are different theories of error which are propounded by different philosophers in accordance with the ontological schemes of their schools of philosophy. This paper is an attempt to critically discuss the Naiyāyikas’ view of error called <i>Anyathākhyātivāda </i>with special attention to the Advaita Vedāntic critique of it. It is interesting to analyze different new arguments that have been developed by the later philosophers of these schools. The investigation of an erroneous cognition by the philosophers of Advaita Vedānta has been continuing from Śākarācarya to the modern Indian philosophers who refute the Nyāya position with new arguments. In what follows we propose to discuss critically some of these arguments.

Tagore’s “Kabuliwallah”

This paper explores the concept of virtual diaspora, a concept through which I hope to establish another bridge between East and West. Virtual diaspora is a distinct and fluid location somewhere between postcoloniality and globalization, which allows the immigrant to address the pain of leaving home by moving back and forth mentally and thus being at home and abroad at the same time. I illustrate this subjective location with the aid of Rabindranath Tagore’s short story, “Kabuliwallah.” The state of mind of virtual diaspora I link systematically to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of immanence as a transcendental field that is without subject or object. As such it is without the material constraints of objects or the identity-based constraints of subjects, such as national and cultural boundaries. Living from this plane of pure immanence opens up the possibilities for the immigrant to move mentally back and forth, thus virtualizing his/her diaspora. I also link this concept of virtual diaspora to the concept of “the religion of man” in Tagore, and also to that of “the religion of humanity” in the Indian philosopher, Sri Aurobindo. In these ways, I hope to establish the concept of a virtual diaspora and at the same time a bridge between East and West.

Rasāsvāda: A Comparative Approach to Emotion and the Self

This paper explores the philosophy of emotion in classical India. Although some scholars have endeavored to develop a systematic philosophy of emotion based on rasa theory, no serious effort has been made to read the relationship between emotion and the self in light of rasa theory. This exclusion, I argue, is an outcome of a broader presupposition that the 'self' in classical Indian philosophies is outside the scope of emotion. A fresh reading of classical Sanskrit texts finds this premise baseless. With an underlying assumption that emotion and self are inherently linked, this paper explores similarities between the Indian and Chinese approaches.

Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-Cultural Dialogue

Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-Cultural Dialogue Dimitry Shevchenko (bio) Introduction The subject of this article is comparative philosophy—its goals and methods—as discussed in the work of Wilhelm Halbfass (1940–2000), a prominent German scholar of Indian philosophy. Halbfass' classical works, such as India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (1988),1 Tradition and Reflection (1991), On Being and What There Is (1992), and Karma und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken (2000) have left a lasting influence on a generation of scholars and students of Indian philosophy. The appreciation of his work and a testimony to its impact can be seen, for instance, in the voluminous study Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies (1997) edited by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, which contains thorough discussions of different aspects of Halbfass' work by twenty-five scholars, with Halbfass' own responses. Karin Preisendanz has also edited a second volume, published after Halbfass' passing, titled Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass (2007).2 Halbfass' distinguished approach is his acknowledgment of the inevitability of prejudices affecting a researcher's understanding of foreign cultures. It is not possible to adopt an impartial vantage point from which one could assess different traditions, nor is it possible simply to adopt the point of view of someone else, to slip into someone else's skin. The process of understanding begins with preconceptions regarding the object of study, which, nevertheless, can be rectified through constant awareness of one's hermeneutic horizon, and through patient attempts to reach the horizon of the other side. Halbfass argues that the privileged position of European conceptual frameworks of understanding does not yet allow us to determine the proper place of Indian philosophy in relation to Western philosophy. At the present stage of the dialogue, our exploration of Indian philosophy must continue without any determinate purpose in view, other than simply trying to understand what the tradition has been saying. As I will argue, Halbfass' contention that Indian and Western philosophers are still found at the preliminary stage of understanding each other,3 [End Page 793] coupled with his methodical demand to exclude purposes from the dialogical pursuit of understanding, should be seen as an obstacle to fruitful philosophical dialogue qua philosophy. Instead, I propose a model of cross-cultural philosophical dialogue, in which the pursuit of understanding is inseparable from the pursuit of human goals. I will focus on the concept of prayojana, the statement of purpose to be achieved by the pursuit of knowledge, formally required in philosophical literature and debates in classical India. Prayojana implies that the accomplishment of understanding is instrumental in bringing about some desirable result. It follows that philosophical dialogue is considered a goal-oriented activity, the initiation of which ought to be motivated by good reasons. This tension between Halbfass' rejection (even if temporary) of purpose as detrimental to understanding and purposefulness of philosophical dialogue in classical India invites some reflection over the role that human goals play or should play in cross-cultural philosophical dialogue. I will further briefly review the reasons Halbfass attributes to the refusal on the part of some Indian traditionalists to engage in a dialogue with Western philosophy. Halbfass examines the "xenological" frameworks of Indian traditions, responsible for various degrees of closure and openness toward foreign cultures prior to Colonialism, its "inclusivism," and the unequal colonial situation—all affecting the Indian side of the encounter with Western philosophy. However, it is not enough to render the isolationist tendencies described by Halbfass as merely defensive reactions to the imposition of European conceptual schemes or as a form of xenophobia. Without denying these external factors, I will argue that purposes as internal factors of philosophizing in India can play a role in the rejection of the inter-cultural dialogue by some participants of the intra-cultural dialogue in India. By reflecting on the role of prayojana in philosophical interaction, I will demonstrate that the resistance to cross-cultural dialogue can be a rational and, in principle, morally justifiable choice. Comparative Philosophy and Dialogic Approach In Halbfass' own words, his book...

After Comparative Philosophy: A Discussion of "Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-Cultural Dialogue," by Dimitry Shevchenko

After Comparative Philosophy:A Discussion of "Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-Cultural Dialogue," by Dimitry Shevchenko Purushottama Bilimoria (bio) Wilhelm Halbfass (1940–2000) deserves to be celebrated as a leading pioneer of the history of Indian philosophy in the modern era. The sheer volume of work in recent times and the extent of citations devoted to Halbfass' works well attest to the impact of his gallant endeavors. Dimitry [End Page 815] Shevchenko's article "Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-cultural Dialogue" in this issue of Philosophy East and West is a most recent attempt to take further the goals and contours charted by Halbfass, with a focus, however, not so much on the history of Indian philosophy as on the prayojana (purpose) of inter-cultural or cross-tradition discursive engagement and the ramifications thereof for comparative philosophy. This makes for a timely discussion, and here I am grateful to be invited by the editors to offer a few comments by way of a response. Besides his remarkable oeuvre, some of my comments may be directed, albeit anecdotally, toward Halbfass' shyness, his wry style, and a certain motivation informing his scholarship. Halbfass placed himself within the European philosophical paraṃpara (lineage) of Hegel, Heidegger, and Gadamer (and to an extent Habermas), but, as will be noticed, I have a certain hesitation in acknowledging this grandeur; rather, I place him centrally within the German philological-Indological tradition—what elsewhere has been christened as 'Indologism' (Bilimoria 2009)—or at best in the interstices of Indology, philology, and classical philosophy (Mohanty 1997). And yet Halbfass' masterly exegetical study of traditional texts has provided a profound understanding of different traditions of India, from Vedānta to Vaiśeṣika to Mīmāṃsā, that stemmed from his commitment to non-orientalized scholarship and what it means to delve deep into a tradition's self-understanding. He wrote one of the more accessible books on Ādī Śaṅkara of Advaita Vedānta and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of Pūrvamīmāṃsā fame, which, not surprisingly, contains one of the finest studies on the origins of the Brāhmaṇic doctrine of karma from the sacrificial ashes as it were of the fading apūrva ("unprecedented potentiae") theory of the ritualist Mīmāṃsakas (Halbfass 1980, p. 274). That study highlights the unique insights that Halbfass has offered in his close reading of the rather difficult and often marginalized darśana of the Mīmāṃsā (for its apparent ritualistic excesses, at the expense of much else of philosophical significance in the textual oeuvre), which has earned him timeless gratitude from traditional paṇḍita-scholars who have yet to work through the Orientalist legacy bequeathed by colonial scholars in India and pay more attention to 'India in Europe'. So much so that J. N. Mohanty, circa the mid-1970s, would recommend Halbfass' appointment as professor of Indian Philosophy to the University of Pennsylvania's Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (where Halbfass had arrived as visiting lecturer in 1973). Halbfass wrote a splendid essay—"Happiness: A Nyāya-Vaiśeśika Perspective"—for a volume on Bimal K. Matilal that Mohanty and I co-edited (1997), and it was a sheer delight to work with him (though largely remotely). He had also kindly agreed to write for a volume on Mīmāṃsā and another for the Routledge History of Indian Philosophy, but sadly he passed away all too prematurely. [End Page 816] Let me turn for a moment to Halbfass' vision of comparative philosophy, which is the main concern that triggers this discussion. Mention is made that some form of comparative philosophy was being practiced by Indian scholars around the beginning of the twentieth century, and that a learned Society founded by S. V. Ketkar in Pune used the appellation "Comparative Theology and Philosophy." However, in his plenary lecture on "India and the Comparative Method" in the 1984 Research Conference on Asian and Comparative Philosophy, held in Honolulu (Shaner 1986), Halbfass made the case that the term describing the practice of "comparative philosophy" was actually not invented until after 1923 with the publication in 1926 of Paul Masson-Oursel's...

Инклюзивизм как категориальное средство в работах Пауля Хакера и Герхарда Оберхаммера

The concept of inclusivism was introduced by German indologist Paul Hacker (1913–1979) to designate a specific polemical strategy characteristic to Indian religious teachings. Inclusivism is described as adoptiong the views of alien reli­gious groups and including them in the own doctrine at a hierarchically subordi­nate place. In Hacker’s view, inclusivism is an intellectual practice widely used in the rivalry between different religious traditions in India, and as such it should be distinguished from European tolerance. In recent forty years the concept of inclusivism has been widely discussed and criticized. Gerhard Oberhammer, in particular, objected against interpreting inclusivism as a social strategy. In the context of his doctrine of transcendental hermeneutics, he considered inclu­sivism to be a normative way in which many Indian religious traditions devel­oped their canons of scripture. In this paper I analyze the concept of inclusivism in the works of Hacker and Oberhammer and discuss its’ outlook in contempo­rary indological studies. A broad interpretation of inclusivism as an implicit tex­tual strategy characteristic to intellectual traditions at different periods of Indian history makes this concept a promising tool for a study of Indian philosophy and Indian culture.

Effect of yogic intervention on cardio respiratory fitness of overweight school children

he word “yoga” comes from a Sanskrit root “yuj” which means union, or yoke, to join, and to direct and concentrate one&#39;s attention. Yoga is an ancient system of Indian philosophy. It has been practiced for health and well-being. Several researches have shown that regular practice of yoga improves health and well-being. The purpose of the present investigation was to look for the effect of yogic intervention on Cardio respiratory fitness of overweight school children. A total of sixty (N =60) subjects were involved for this study. The subjects were randomly selected from the two schools viz. Ghoshpara Saraswati Trust Estate Vidyapith and Ramnagar Milan Bagan Siksha Niketan of the district of Nadia, West Bengal. The age of the subjects for the study was ranged from (12 -15) years. All the subjects were divided into two equal groups, one was the experimental group (n= 30) and another was the control group (n= 30). Yogic training was intervened for 12 weeks on the experimental group from 12-1.30 pm (four days per weeks). But the control group was not involved in the treatment program. VO2max was measured by Rockport Walking Fitness Test. The Analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA) was used to analyze the data. The significance of means was tested at p

The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Philosophy of Language ed. by Alessandro Graheli

The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Philosophy of Language ed. by Alessandro Graheli

Компаративный анализ представлений Джалаладдина Руми, Анри Бергсона и Шри Ауробиндо Гхоша об интуиции и духовной любви

The article analyzes the ideas of the Sufi thinker, poet Jalaladdin Rumi, the prominent Indian philosopher Sri Aurobindo Ghosh, and Henri Bergson about intuition and spiritual love. These thinkers, who lived in different historical eras, who were not familiar with each other’s creativity, expressed a number of similar ideas. These are ideas of spiritual love and intuition. According to Rumi, the idea of a person as God’s slave or servant is significantly lower than the idea of a person as a beloved of God, since it prevents one from seeing the im­age of God in the inner world of a person; the enlightened human soul strives to merge with the world soul. The highest goal of the integral yoga of Aurobindo is the unity of body, soul and spirit, thanks to which a latent spiritual force with a divine nature manifests itself in a person, a person turns into an instrument of action of divine will – Shakti. Rumi sees the meaning of human life in the dis­closure of creative abilities. Bergson defines intuition as the energy of benevo­lence, with the help of which the intellectual limitations of people are over­come. A person, according to Bergson, is a creative being, in whose activity a creative impulse is manifested; in turn, this impulse gives rise to intuition. Comparing the views of three thinkers, we find a pantheistic attitude that makes different worldviews comparable and provides a basis for their comparative study, which was pointed out in the 11th century. outstanding Central Asian en­cyclopedist Abu Rayhan al-Biruni. In our opinion, the ideas of spiritual love and intuition are the bridge that connects Western and Eastern cultures, which are very different from each other.