Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-Cultural Dialogue

Abstract

Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-Cultural Dialogue Dimitry Shevchenko (bio) Introduction The subject of this article is comparative philosophy—its goals and methods—as discussed in the work of Wilhelm Halbfass (1940–2000), a prominent German scholar of Indian philosophy. Halbfass' classical works, such as India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (1988),1 Tradition and Reflection (1991), On Being and What There Is (1992), and Karma und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken (2000) have left a lasting influence on a generation of scholars and students of Indian philosophy. The appreciation of his work and a testimony to its impact can be seen, for instance, in the voluminous study Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies (1997) edited by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, which contains thorough discussions of different aspects of Halbfass' work by twenty-five scholars, with Halbfass' own responses. Karin Preisendanz has also edited a second volume, published after Halbfass' passing, titled Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass (2007).2 Halbfass' distinguished approach is his acknowledgment of the inevitability of prejudices affecting a researcher's understanding of foreign cultures. It is not possible to adopt an impartial vantage point from which one could assess different traditions, nor is it possible simply to adopt the point of view of someone else, to slip into someone else's skin. The process of understanding begins with preconceptions regarding the object of study, which, nevertheless, can be rectified through constant awareness of one's hermeneutic horizon, and through patient attempts to reach the horizon of the other side. Halbfass argues that the privileged position of European conceptual frameworks of understanding does not yet allow us to determine the proper place of Indian philosophy in relation to Western philosophy. At the present stage of the dialogue, our exploration of Indian philosophy must continue without any determinate purpose in view, other than simply trying to understand what the tradition has been saying. As I will argue, Halbfass' contention that Indian and Western philosophers are still found at the preliminary stage of understanding each other,3 [End Page 793] coupled with his methodical demand to exclude purposes from the dialogical pursuit of understanding, should be seen as an obstacle to fruitful philosophical dialogue qua philosophy. Instead, I propose a model of cross-cultural philosophical dialogue, in which the pursuit of understanding is inseparable from the pursuit of human goals. I will focus on the concept of prayojana, the statement of purpose to be achieved by the pursuit of knowledge, formally required in philosophical literature and debates in classical India. Prayojana implies that the accomplishment of understanding is instrumental in bringing about some desirable result. It follows that philosophical dialogue is considered a goal-oriented activity, the initiation of which ought to be motivated by good reasons. This tension between Halbfass' rejection (even if temporary) of purpose as detrimental to understanding and purposefulness of philosophical dialogue in classical India invites some reflection over the role that human goals play or should play in cross-cultural philosophical dialogue. I will further briefly review the reasons Halbfass attributes to the refusal on the part of some Indian traditionalists to engage in a dialogue with Western philosophy. Halbfass examines the "xenological" frameworks of Indian traditions, responsible for various degrees of closure and openness toward foreign cultures prior to Colonialism, its "inclusivism," and the unequal colonial situation—all affecting the Indian side of the encounter with Western philosophy. However, it is not enough to render the isolationist tendencies described by Halbfass as merely defensive reactions to the imposition of European conceptual schemes or as a form of xenophobia. Without denying these external factors, I will argue that purposes as internal factors of philosophizing in India can play a role in the rejection of the inter-cultural dialogue by some participants of the intra-cultural dialogue in India. By reflecting on the role of prayojana in philosophical interaction, I will demonstrate that the resistance to cross-cultural dialogue can be a rational and, in principle, morally justifiable choice. Comparative Philosophy and Dialogic Approach In Halbfass' own words, his book...