Indian Federalism Research Articles

Health policy and federalism in India

ABSTRACT This paper addresses the question of how the position of Indian states in terms of their approach to welfare state policies interacts with the centre–state relationships that characterize health policymaking. In India’s version of federalism, health policymaking has been influenced by four mutually interacting sources: international public health discourses; Indian government programmes and policies; civil society organizations concerned with health; and the political economy of the different states and their associated political regimes. Public health issues sometimes achieve a high policy profile at the government of India, but very rarely do so at state level. This divergence provides fertile spaces for negotiation and conflict. An analysis of the path dependency of the allocation of health functions to different national and subnational levels of government contextualizes a case study of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), 2004–14. This shows the limits to the central government’s ability to implement a universalizing, rights-based programme across the country. An explanation for the different outcomes can be found in the variety of state systems within the country. Finally, the paper assesses whether the changes introduced since 2014 show a new federal order in the making and provides preliminary insights from state responses to the 2020 Covid-19 outbreak.

Combating Capitalism: A Case Study of Left Polity in Kerala

ABSTRACT This paper traces the trajectory of left governments in Kerala, as against that of the government of India, in the context of Indian federalism, and Kerala government’s more recent resistance to the political right-wing upsurge in the state, to draw out strategies and patterns through which left governments in Kerala have survived and persistently deployed socialist policies. In doing so, the paper tries to understand both twenty-first-century capitalism and modes of resistance, drawing from Kerala’s vision and model of socialism. This trajectory is charted by tracing the class–nation–state interactions at the level of both the state and the federation. In this context, the paper tries to understand the democratic processes the state government engaged in, which shaped the political life, public sphere and popular culture of Kerala as such. It does so by analysing the various social, economic, and political measures undertaken at both centre and state levels, and their outcomes, as a means to understand the functioning and survival of democratically elected left governments; and analyse whether through this experience can be derived a way forward for left politics, governance and development.

The Rise of the Panchayati Raj Institutions as the Third Tier in Indian Federalism: Where the Shoe Pinches

The idea of forming a two-tier federal structure in India gathered considerable momentum after the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League came together through a Pact in 1916. But the concept of the third tier which was mooted in the Constituent Assembly through the incorporation of panchayats in the Directive Principles of State Policy after detailed deliberation began receiving attention after the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution in 1992 which coincided with the paradigmatic shift in the policy of the Indian State. This Act signified in clear terms the intention of the State to strengthen the process of third tier federalism in India. This article seeks to critically examine the process of evolution of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) as a new tier in the Indian federal system, excluding the Fifth and Sixth Scheduled Areas. An attempt has also been made to analyse despite constitutionalisation of PRIs where the shoe still pinches and wherein lies the ray of hope.

Policing the federation: the Supreme Court and judicial federalism in India

ABSTRACT This article assesses the role of the Indian Supreme Court in policing the Indian federation. Drawing from the literatures on courts and comparative federalism, it tests three assumptions to evaluate the performance of the Supreme Court in this regard: the political supremacy, the judicial safeguard and the judicial doctrine assumption. Based on a qualitative assessment of 40 judgements related to President's Rule, Centre–State disputes on legislative competence, asymmetric federalism and shared rule arrangements, we find mixed evidence for the political supremacy and judicial safeguard assumptions. The political supremacy assumption holds, but only in relation to cases affecting President's Rule. However, there is no discernible pattern across the other cases. Overall, the judicial doctrine assumption (linked to principles of legal reasoning, legal doctrine and original intent) seems to inform the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on centre–state issues most often. Given that the Indian constitution is comparatively centralized, judgements that rely on judicial doctrine have mostly favoured the centre, thus constraining the extent to which the Supreme Court has operated as a safeguard of federalism and State autonomy.

Federalism in U.S. and India: A Comparative Study

This research work focus on the comparative study of federalism in India and in u. S. The paper analyses the form of state of the federal Indian union, which is typical in the “landscape” of comparative constitutional law. The trend towards centralization of function powers, both at federal and state levels, probably constitutes some sort of quasi-federalism. The constitution of India has not described India as federation. Dr. Ambedkar listed several features of the draft constitution which mitigated the rigidity and legalism of federalism in his historic speech in the constituent assembly in November 1949. The first U. S constitution, the articles of confederation, promoted a confederation of the states with very decentralized power concentrated at the state level and a weak central government. The articles were not successful and the 1787 constitutional convention convened to make changes in our governmental structure. Rather than tweaking the confederation structure, a third option was essentially invented–what we call today a federal system or federalism. The federal design divides power between multiple levels of government–often state and national. As defined, federalism is an institutional arrangement creating relatively autonomous levels of government each able to act directly on behalf of the people with granted authority.

Building a National Economy: Origins of Centralized Federalism in India

AbstractIndia’s post-colonial constitution introduced a new approach to federalism based on a substantial sphere of shared responsibility between Central and State governments, especially in the fields of social and economic policy, and a Central government with strong prerogatives to intervene in provincial affairs. This was qualified at the time as a diminished or “quasi” form of federalism. Existing explanations of the origins of India’s centralized federalism focus on efforts to curb further secession attempts in the aftermath of Partition or the need for a strong Center to consolidate democracy in a highly unequal society. This article draws on archival materials to demonstrate that distinctive elements of Indian federalism were shaped at their foundations by the desire to boost industrial development and lay the foundation for a national welfare state in a post-colonial future by preventing the consolidation of “race to the bottom” dynamics arising from unregulated inter-provincial economic competition.

Revocation of special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; a new dimension to asymmetrical federalism in India

Revocation of special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; a new dimension to asymmetrical federalism in India

Understanding federalism in India through the J&K reorganisation Act, 2019

India is a special case of federalism. With it being termed as quasi federal in Nature, India is a sort of enigma in both political theory and law. In this paper we do three things. First, we talk about the status quo of Indian federalism, and the exceptions to it. Second, we talk and elaborate on the concept of asymmetric federalism as a exception to the generally understood symmetric federalist structure. And third and most importantly, we analyze the particular case of asymmetric federalism in Jammu and Kashmir and the gradual dilution of constitutional and political autonomy vested in the state through article 370 with the process culminating in the Jammu and Kashmir reorganization act of 2019 which diluted the state into a union territory.

Federalism at the Crossroads: Crisis of the Linguistic Minorities in India

Polyglot federations face a challenge in reconciling between the national identities and regional identities. Demand for a second States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) in India in 2015 by some groups bears testimony to this fact. On the question of political remapping in post-independence period, the constitutional ancestors sought to save India from another religious bigotry and the menace of casteism. The emergence of language as a viable alternative gained momentum in Nagpur session (1920) of the Indian National Congress (INC). But subsequent years encountered with a difficulty in adopting territorial solution for accommodating India’s multilingual identities. Pre-constitutional, extra-constitutional and constitutional arrangements have faced the challenge of linguistic accommodation. Dar Commission warned the risk of federal remapping with existing linguistic pocket corridors in the states. Inter-state migration has proliferated the problem over the years. Even the SRC could not provide adequate safeguards for large number of linguistic minorities living in all states (Kerala becomes exception with 97.03% linguistic majorities). There new minority emerged and accommodated but with limits. Census report of 2011 shows India having 19,569 languages which stood 1369 after linguistic scrutiny. Territorial machinations appear inadequate to satisfy all linguistic groups but only to incur huge expenditure. Indian federalism seems deficient in non-territorial power sharing which has succeeded in countries like Belgium in the form of Consociational representation. With its promise of inclusivity by means of a possible alternative it demands the attention of the policy makers as well as the academia.

Federalism and Democracy in India and the European Union

The article is part of the forthcoming volume 'Constitutional Democracy in the European Union and India: Comparing the Law of Demcoracy in Contintental Polities' (Elgar 2021, eds. P. Dann & A. Thiruvengadam). It compares constitutional structures and historical experiences of federalism and democracy in India and the EU along two guiding questions: What effect does the federal order have on constitutional democracy? And what is the ‘federal quality’ of central level decision-making, i.e. how are the subunits’ interests taken into account, when the centre acts? The article argues that while federal democracy in the two polities was initially organized in two starkly different ways (strongly centralized in India, the opposite in the early EU), the federal order triggered profound democratic questions. These were then addressed in different and as such characteristic ways – through bottom-up, popular agitation and electoral federalism in India, and through executive federalism, top-down attempts of mobilization and a partial parliamentarization in the EU. The chapter juxtaposes the two constitutional experiences, mindful of the historical starting points in both systems that continue to shape them and also looking at the transformations. It ends with observations on the effect of federal structures on democratic constitutionalism and current authoritarian challenges in both polities.

Determining Gender Budgeting in Multi-Level Federalism

Gender budgeting is a public policy innovation intended to transform governments’ objectives to women’s empowerment into budgetary commitments. In the multi-level fiscal federalism in India, the political economy process of gender budgeting in India has involved four distinct phases - innovative knowledge networking, building institutional structures, reinforcing state capacity and strengthening the accountability mechanisms, at national and subnational levels. Against these policy processes, we have estimated the sector-wise quantum of gender budgeting in India emphasising the statistical invisibility of the care economy. The State-wise equally distributed equivalent (Xede) estimates of gender development showed that the state of Kerala tops the scale 0-1 scoring 0.72. Though the link between gender budgeting and these Xede scores is beyond the scope of the paper, the fiscal marksmanship (the deviation between what is budgeted and the actual spending) of gender budgeting showed a mixed scenario across sectors.

SWITZERLAND AND INDIA AS DIFFERENT MODELS OF ETHNIC FEDERALISM

The ethnic factor is important in the development of federalism. ethno-linguistic architecture and cultural-religious structure are the main elements. Switzerland and India are diff erent models of ethnic federalism. The Swiss model of federalism is cantonal-communal. Switzerland consists of 26 cantons; there is a multi-ethnic composition of the population. Switzerland escaped ethnic separatism. The state has centuries of experience in reconciling linguistic and cultural diff erences. The Indian model is postcolonial. The state is multi-ethnic. Indian federalism is highly centralized. India has a unique ethnic, linguistic and religious composition.

State Capacity and the Soft Budget Constraint: Fiscal Federalism, Indian Style

In this paper, we explore the effects of India’s federal structure on state-level fiscal responsibility. Drawing from a dataset that covers the period from 1991 to 2019, we argue that a low marginal retention rate, a high level of transfer dependence and a high level of borrowing dependence (soft budget constraints) from the central government facilitates lower levels of fiscal responsibility in intergovernmental relations. Our hypothesis is tested using random effects, and fixed effects panel estimations of regressions on fiscal responsibility outcomes across Indian states. We also account for the effects of the world’s largest employment program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), on subnational fiscal responsibility. We find that the fulfillment of rural public employment measures is conducive to lower levels of fiscal responsibility. Moreover, we argue for the persistence of soft budget constraints as a key structural feature of Indian federalism.

Holding India Together: The Role of Institutions of Federalism

India is a large, heterogeneous and complex nation, with multiple languages, religions and ethnicities, and over one billion people. It stands out in having held together while sustaining a working democracy for over six decades, at relatively low levels of income. An important institutional aspect of managing heterogeneity to preserve national unity is the structure of Indian federalism. This chapter traces some of the features of Indian federal institutions, focusing on their contribution to this ‘holding together.’ It reviews the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of the role of federal structures in sustaining unity, and summarizes historical developments and current institutional structures of the Indian case. It assesses the role of federal dimensions of political, administrative and judicial structures in the holding together function. It also separately focuses specifically on the special treatment of what may be characterized as India’s periphery.

“One nation,” BJP, and the future of Indian federalism

ABSTRACTOn August 5th 2019, the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in New Delhi moved the Indian Parliament to abrogate Article 370 and bifurcate the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories. Months later, as the year came to a close, the Indian parliament passed a controversial amendment to India’s Citizenship Law. Several state governments came out in vocal opposition to the amendment, and some challenged the amendment in the Supreme Court. These events provided confirmation that the reelection of a majority BJP government has heralded far-reaching changes for India’s federal order, compounding shifts in the institutions and practice of federalism during Narendra Modi’s first term (2014–19). In this article, we assess the implications of the 2019 Lok Sabha elections for the future dynamics of federalism in the constitutional, administrative, and fiscal spheres under the second term Modi government.

Federalism in India: Asymmetric in nature

In spite of the fact that is sandwiched in comparative politics. Efforts to study about federalism constitute a part of relative legislative issues i.e. comparative politics or political establishments since federalism isn't just cross-national but a multifaceted i.e. cross-cultural research as well. While the study of federalism has in numerous regards stretched to an advanced stage today, but nevertheless there remains a disturbing absence of arrangement with regards to the exact connotation of the concept. This study analysed basically, some issues and challenges in the concept of federalism in distinctive kind as a system of government in different states and nations of the world. The main objective of this work, however, has been to bring to attention the current new trends in federalism more specifically about the asymmetric nature of the Indian federalism and discover new patterns in federalism as observed by different researchers in different fields in connection to federalism. It isn't an attempt to give a complete scientific account in any case, but this paper would be dealing with some of the issues which would be essential in order to define the real concept of federalism in India. Moreover an attempt has been made to uncover, some of the essential ambiguities in the working of the federalism governance in the present political setting. Additionally, this article to a great extent is an attempt to express our hopeful worry over the capability of the standard of cooperative federalism in Indian conditions instead of a negation of it being the most ideal elective.

COVID-19 and Federalism in India: Capturing the Effects of Voluntary, State and Central Responses on Mobility

In response to rapidly rising COVID-19 cases, nations resorted to two channels to reduce population mobility and ensure social distancing. These channels were government-ordered containment and closure measures; and voluntary reductions in mobility due to rising public awareness. Initially, India’s state governments enacted varying social distancing policies until the Central government overrode states to impose a nationwide lockdown on 24th March. This paper examines the relative impact of state and central level policies on changes in mobility. This is analysed using event study difference-in-differences (DID) and panel GLS regressions of state-level data on closure orders and mobility changes. The first policy enacted by each state was ineffective on average, but some states managed to reduce mobility by imposing further restrictions. In contrast, the national lockdown had a much larger and persistent effect for almost all states. Further, rising awareness about COVID-19 did not lead to any independent changes in mobility.

Indian Federalism: Party System, Ideology and Leadership Interplay

Indian Federalism: Party System, Ideology and Leadership Interplay

The Ache of Amendment – Lesson From the Story of Indian Federalism

The Ache of Amendment – Lesson From the Story of Indian Federalism

New Approaches to Fiscal Federalism in India

Fiscal federalism in India has been impacted considerably by recent events, in particular, the implementation of the award of the 14th Finance Commission (FC), the implementation of Goods and Services Tax, the replacement of the Planning Commission with the NITI Aayog and the terms of reference of the 15th FC. This article examines the issues unfolding from the developments, analyses the new approaches suggested by economists and policymakers and proposes a way forward that synthesises the approaches, while taking account of the lessons of experience. I argue that FC being the bedrock of fiscal federalism in India, it is necessary to strengthen the hands of FC to give an award that is fair and acceptable to the union and states.