Including North Korea Research Articles

1950년대 사회주의진영 국제분업론과 북한의 대응

The economic aid from the socialist camp including the Soviet Union was of huge help in North Korea"s post-war recovery and its process of socialist industrialization policies. But there were some points that both side could not agree with each other. In the economic aspect, socialist solidarity is required for the integration of each state"s economic plans based on trade. Entering the middle 1950s, the socialist theory of the international division of labor was established more clearly around the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Relatively less developed nations in the socialist camp including North Korea resisted the principle of the international division of labor and put a priority on their industrialization. In 1958, North Korea made it"s the First Five-Year Plan containing prospects for its future industrial constructions, and it was accompanied by the decision of the Soviet Union to support the plan. North Korea was able to get the content of support they wanted in some areas. Although it acted in concert with the atmosphere of the socialist camp yet, North Korea began to make its position.

A hybrid of long short-term memory neural network and autoregressive integrated moving average model in forecasting HIV incidence and morality of post-neonatal population in East Asia: global burden of diseases 2000–2019

BackgroundTo forecast the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) incidence and mortality of post-neonatal population in East Asia including North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, Japan and China Mainland and Taiwan province.MethodsThe data on the incidence and mortality of HIV in post-neonatal population from East Asia were obtained from the Global Burden of Diseases (GBD). The morbidity and mortality of post-neonatal HIV population from GBD 2000 to GBD 2013 were applied as the training set and the morbidity and mortality from GBD 2014 to GBD 2019 were used as the testing set. The hybrid of ARIMA and LSTM model was used to construct the model for assessing the morbidity and mortality in the countries and territories of East Asia, and predicting the morbidity and mortality in the next 5 years.ResultsIn North Korea, the incidence and mortality of HIV showed a rapid increase during 2000–2010 and a gradual decrease during 2010–2019. The incidence of HIV was predicted to be increased and the mortality was decreased. In South Korea, the incidence was increased during 2000–2010 and decreased during 2010–2019, while the mortality showed fluctuant trend. As predicted, the incidence of HIV in South Korea might be increased and the mortality might be decreased during 2020–2025. In Mongolia, the incidence and mortality were slowly decreased during 2000–2005, increased during 2005–2015, and rapidly decreased till 2019. The predicted incidence and mortality of HIV showed a decreased trend. As for Japan, the incidence of HIV was rapidly increased till 2010 and then decreased till 2015. The predicted incidence of HIV in Japan was gradually increased. The mortality of HIV in Japan was fluctuant during 2000–2019 and was slowly decreased as predicted. The incidence and mortality of HIV in Taiwan during 2000–2019 was increased on the whole. The predicted incidence of HIV during was stationary and the mortality was decreased. In terms of China Mainland, the incidence and mortality of HIV was fluctuant during 2000–2019. The predicted incidence of HIV in China Mainland was stationary while the mortality was rapidly decreased.ConclusionOn the whole, the incidence of HIV combined with other diseases in post-neonatal population was increased before 2010 and then decreased during 2010–2019 while the mortality of those patients was decreased in East Asia.

현대중국의 正義戰爭論의 형성과 전개 — 항일전쟁에서 항미전쟁까지 —

Since the People"s Republic of China entered the Korean War in October 1950, PRC’s war in Korea has been called a “Just War”. Academia has explained the just war theory only based on the theory of righteous war in the Chinese classics, and few studies investigate the historical formation of the PRC’s just war theory. This paper demonstrated that China"s perception to see the Korean War as a just war was formed by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the course of the anti-Japanese war since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 based on different logical grounds. The Kuomintang accepted the theory of international justice since World War I, which sought to resolve international disputes according to international law and in 1937-38 called the anti-Japanese war a just war. The Communist Party, under the instructions of the Comintern, in 1933-35 called the national revolutionary war a just war based on the revolutionary theory of justice led by the proletariat, which was derived from Lenin"s Socialism and War(1915). Despite these differences, both parties raised and spread the theory of just war widely in order to appeal China"s justice in resisting Japanese imperialism"s invasion at home and abroad. The Chinese Communist Party"s just war theory was applied not only to the anti-Japanese war but also to anti-imperialist wars, including the subsequent anti-American wars(in Korea, Vietnam, etc.). It was a theory of war shared by the communist parties of various countries, including North Korea and the Soviet Union. Since the Korean War, the just war theory has been applied to the perception and narratives of the imperial China’s wars against foreign powers based on the Marxist historiography and was historicized as such.

Review on geology and mineralization of North Korea (I: Precambrian)

AbstractIn this review, we introduce the geology and mineralization of the northern part of the Korean Peninsula based on recently published data in North Korea. Geological characteristics and events are described in order of geological period and the representative mineral deposits are presented according to the geologic period to show the relationship between the geology and mineralization. In particular, we rearrange the stratigraphy of the Precambrian basement and reset the timing of intrusion and mineralization based mainly on the reported zircon U–Pb age data. The Precambrian geotectonic provinces of North Korea contain continental cores and massifs, active continental margins, and rift zones. The Precambrian strata between the eastern North China Craton (NCC) and North Korea are newly correlated considering rearranged stratigraphy in this review. The Precambrian strata of North Korea are characterized by the depletion of the Paleoproterozoic to Mesoproterozoic strata compared to the NCC from 1.8 to 1.5 Ga. It may indicate that the northern part of the Korean Peninsula was the passive continental margin environment during this period. The common occurrences of bimodal igneous suites (mafic‐felsic and alkaline‐subalkaline) are also characteristic of North Korea. The bimodal magmatism is well explained by the progressive tectonic evolution from oceanic crust‐continent subduction (2.0–2.2 Ga) and island arc–continent collision (~1.9 Ga) to post collisional extension (1.82–1.87 Ga) in the NCC including North Korea. The Precambrian geological similarities between Northeastern China and North Korea would have resulted in the same or similar mineralization. For example, Algoma type banded iron formations of the Fe deposits of the Anshan–Benxi area in China and Musan Fe deposit in North Korea were formed during the Neoarchean and Paleoproterozoic. Sedimentary exhalative type Pb–Zn and metasedimentary type magnesite deposits were formed within the Jiao‐Liao‐Ji belt extending from the Liaoning Rift Zone of China (Pb–Zn deposits in the Qingchenzi orefield and magnesite deposits in Dashiqiao magnesite belt) to the Macheollyeong Rift Zone of North Korea (Geomdeok Pb–Zn deposit and Daeheung–Ryongyang magnesite deposits) during Paleoproterozoic. The geotectonic, geological and metallogenic similarities between Northeastern China and North Korea indicate that the Precambrian continental massifs of North Korea might be evolved in accordance with the NCC evolution. This review is expected to be helpful for understanding the geotectonics, geology, and related mineralization of the northern part of Korean Peninsula and correlating with those of the NCC.

Yunjong Wang Comments on COVID-19 in Korea: Success Based on Past Failure

Yunjong Wang Comments on COVID-19 in Korea: Success Based on Past Failure

Terrain Proxy-Based Site Classification for Seismic Zonation in North Korea within a Geospatial Data-Driven Workflow

Numerous seismic activities occur in North Korea. However, it is difficult to perform seismic hazard assessment and obtain zonal data in the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea, when applying parametric or nonparametric methods. Remote sensing can be implemented for soil characterization or spatial zonation studies on irregular, surficial, and subsurface systems of inaccessible areas. Herein, a data-driven workflow for extracting the principal features using a digital terrain model (DTM) is proposed. In addition, geospatial grid information containing terrain features and the average shear wave velocity in the top 30 m of the subsurface (VS30) are employed using geostatistical interpolation methods; machine learning (ML)-based regression models were optimized and VS30-based seismic zonation in the test areas in North Korea were forecasted. The interrelationships between VS30 and terrain proxy (elevation, slope, and landform class) in the training area in South Korea were verified to define the input layer in regression models. The landform class represents a new proxy of VS30 and was subgrouped according to the correlation with grid-based VS30. The geospatial grid information was generated via the optimum geostatistical interpolation method (i.e., sequential Gaussian simulation (SGS)). The best-fitting model among four ML methods was determined by evaluating cost function-based prediction performance, performing uncertainty analysis for the empirical correlations of VS30, and studying spatial correspondence with the borehole-based VS30 map. Subsequently, the best-fitting regression models were designed by training the geospatial grid in South Korea. Then, DTM and its terrain features were constructed along with VS30 maps for three major cities (Pyongyang, Kaesong, and Nampo) in North Korea. A similar distribution of the VS30 grid obtained using SGS was shown in the multilayer perceptron-based VS30 map.

If Not Now, Then When? The Significance of CISG Ratification for Indonesia

Introduction to The Problem: In this 21st century, Indonesia has not ratified the United Nations on Contract for the International Sales of Goods (CISG). Indonesia’s government put several reasons for not becoming part of this critical convention, and the government did not see the ratification as urgent matters. However, these excuses did not find relevant anymore because more and more countries worldwide ratified the CISG, including North Korea. Purpose/Objective Study: The objective of this article is addressing the issue of Indonesia has not yet ratify the United Nations on Contract for the International Sales of Goods (CISG) despite the rise of export and import activities conducted by Indonesian enterprises. Design/Methodology/Approach: The methodology used in this article is based on the literature review of CISG, Indonesian development of CISG, and minor comparative analysis between the signatory and non-signatory countries. Findings: The ratification of CISG would provide more benefits and outweighed its disadvantages because CISG presents legal certainty to international contract law since the Indonesian Civil Code failed to address this issue. CISG ratification will also strengthen the Indonesian legal system, legal institutions, and legal practitioners. Paper Type: Research Article

하산-나진 프로젝트와 한-중-러 삼각 운송물류 분야의 다자간 협력 전망

The Hassan-Najin project was initiated in 2001 by an agreement between the Russian and North Korean leaders. Since then, this project has already been promoted as a trilateral project between North and South Korea and Russia. If the project (Hasan-Najin Project) was successfully completed, all Northeast Asian countries, including North Korea, South Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and Mongolia, would have used Najin Port as a regional complex logistics hub. However, the project has been virtually suspended since 2013, as the United Nations and the United States enforced economic sanctions against North Korea due to North Korea

What the Estimates of the Balance of Foreign Exchange of North Koreans Would Tell Us

We first introduce and summarize preceding research on the balance of foreign exchange (BFE) of North Koreans (1991–2017) based on the method used by Zang (2009, 2013) and Zang and Kim (2019). Then, we present new estimates for the BFE of North Koreans in 2018 (including North Korea’s earnings from cyberattacks). Combining all of the results, we present a new estimate of the current foreign exchange holdings of North Koreans at end-2018. We also discuss how to estimate the foreign exchange holdings of North Koreans in the unofficial sector. Finally, we could present some guidelines to understand the responses from the North Korean authorities on international sanctions as well as North Korea-US dialogues.

Comment on “United Nations Sanctions on North Korea's Luxury Goods Imports: Impact and Implications”

Interest in the effects of economic sanctions on North Korea is growing as international talks regarding its denuclearization unfold. Jeong (2019) is a unique study in that it takes the embargo on imports of luxury goods as its specific focus for examining the effects of UN sanctions against North Korea. Previous studies examining the effects of the luxury goods embargo include Noland (2009), who focuses on North Korea's trade with China and South Korea immediately after the 2006 sanctions resolution that followed North Korea's first nuclear test. However, Jeong's study is distinguished by its comprehensive nature, covering a longer period and a wider range of countries. Jeong's overall conclusion that the sanctions were ineffective in decreasing North Korea's imports of luxury goods is not novel. However, it provides additional food for thought, revealing a number of hitherto little-known facts. These include the rise in China's share of North Korean luxury goods imports from 30.9% in 2004 to 96.6% in 2017, and the fact that even many nations that submitted plans for the implementation of sanctions failed to rigorously implement the provisions of the resolutions concerning the embargo on luxury goods. One factor behind the sanctions’ ineffectiveness was the lack of objective criteria for what constitutes luxury goods. Jeong (2019) persuasively argues that provisions enforcing transparency on sanctioning countries must be strengthened. Nevertheless, the fact remains that UN economic sanctions have limitations from the outset. Ogura (2017) states that rather than forcing or preventing specific actions, namely acts of hostility, the more fundamental objective or purpose of economic sanctions is to maintain and strengthen specific norms in the international community and to bolster solidarity among those who abide by them. While UN economic sanctions vary in their objectives and effects, which include strengthening unity among member countries and encouraging domestic political solidarity, they have a range of constraints and limitations, such as their effectiveness if some countries fail to comply with the sanctions or if alternative supplies are available. There are hardly any historical examples of countries changing their behavior in the face of economic sanctions. While the UN Charter does not use the term economic sanctions, such sanctions are the main pillar of its nonmilitary action. Economic sanctions take various forms; embargoes on luxury goods are a form of what are termed smart sanctions. Smart sanctions were devised to target policymakers, based on the lessons learned from the severe civilian humanitarian crisis that resulted from comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. Although the embargo on supplying luxury goods to North Korea was likely intended to impact on the elite, doubts remain about the effectiveness of an approach that distinguishes between the elite and ordinary citizens in a reclusive state where the civil society is undeveloped and which is willing to bear international isolation in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions. In this sense, Jeong (2019) is right to stress the need for the UN Security Council to devise more intelligent sanction measures, coupled with negotiations to positively alter North Korea's behavior. Economic sanctions alone are not necessarily sufficient to achieve political aims and often only become effective when combined with other political measures. However, deepening rifts between the USA and China over trade and security issues raise the question of whether the international community can be unanimous in offering North Korea acceptable comprehensive incentives. While denuclearization talks between the USA and North Korea are ongoing, there are signs that China intends to revive its traditional bilateral relationship with North Korea. The People's Daily described China and North Korea's relationship as being “as close as lips and teeth.” The analogy signifies not only that they are close, but also that they support each other and that what destroys one will cause the destruction of the other. Similarly, when President Xi Jinping met Chairman Kim Jong-un for talks in May 2018, he made a display of solidarity, trotting out old phrases last used during the Cold War. China's customs authority has not published any detailed data on trade with other countries – including North Korea – since April 2018. Media reports suggest that Chairman Kim was gifted many luxury items as souvenirs by China during his visit the month before. When the USA renewed calls for sanctions on North Korea at a ministerial-level meeting of the UN Security Council in September 2018, China joined Russia in arguing that sanctions needed to be relaxed. Although China began working with the USA in 2017 to impose more rigorous sanctions on North Korea, this cooperation seems unlikely to continue beyond 2019.

A Study on the Improvement plan of Compliance Program (CP) based on the Changes in International Environment

Terrorism in the United States on September 11, 2001, had a huge impact on the world. And this has made the establishment of a global cooperation system a major issue in international trade. This cooperation is intended to deter that were used to develop weapons of mass destruction and the arms are made mainly of past communist countries. In addition, regulations have been tightened recently due to non-standardized international export controls on strategic goods, including the control of intangible technologies. Although the Wassenaar regime is imposing sanctions on rogue states, including North Korea, Iraq and Libya, interest in strategic goods management systems is growing after the North recently declared denuclearization. For this reason, countries around the world need additional administrative resources such as administrative manpower and costs for export control review and regulation. Therefore, it needs to be managed effectively. Therefore, in this study, Compliance Program(CP) presented unreasonable measures to improve the actual operation in order to establish itself as a system that supports businesses and to make the most of the purpose of introducing the system.

Comparative authoritarian institutionalism, regime evolution, and stability in North Korea

The cross-national comparative politics literature on authoritarian regimes has advanced rapidly in recent years, providing fresh insights into regime longevity, potential for successful democratization, and derivative policy choices. The study of North Korea’s politics has likewise advanced, albeit largely without reference to this budding literature. Given the paucity of data on North Korea, this article reviews and leverages the budding comparative literature to bring new perspectives on perennial debates on North Korean regime stability. The article argues the comparative literature fails to capture evolution in authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, suggesting areas for theoretical improvement. It documents political evolution in Kim Jong Un’s North Korea and draws upon cross-national findings to show how and why the one-party political structure, personalist elements, and hereditary succession identified in this analysis are stabilizing elements for the regime.

Law as an equalizer

Law as an equalizer

Posturing the Bomb

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. By Vipin Narang. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. 341 pp., $29.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-691-15983-6). Vipin Narang's Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era is the best political science book published on nuclear strategy in more than two decades. This is mostly because it is an excellent book and partly because nuclear strategy has not received the attention it deserves in recent years. During the Cold War, International Relations (IR) scholars flocked to questions of nuclear deterrence, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, classic works on the subject were published by leading lights, such as Richard Betts (⇓), Charles Glaser (⇓), Robert Jervis (⇓), Robert Powell (⇓), and others. For better or worse, however, the scholarly study of IR tends to follow real-world events, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War scholarship on nuclear deterrence slowed to a trickle. The United States principal foes, such as Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and Libya, did not possess nuclear weapons, and The United States nuclear forces were of little utility against the unconventional challenges these adversaries posed. Policymakers certainly worried about nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist networks, and scholars continued to design rigorous research to analyze these questions, but traditional questions of nuclear deterrence and strategy remained overlooked. In the real world, however, the specter of nuclear confrontation is reemerging. The United States adversaries, including North Korea and Russia, have moved nuclear weapons to the center of their national security strategies, in part as an effort to offset The United States conventional military dominance. India and Pakistan are engaging in the most intense arms race the world has seen since the end of the Cold War, and Iran appears determined to earn admission into the club of nuclear …

Comment on “Let's Go to the Moon”

Things were getting busy on the major flight corridors between the Earth and Mars, or so the casual observer of socialist bloc science fiction from the 1950s might come to believe. While there are no reports of intergalactic traffic jams, Mars was becoming a destination of choice in science fiction from both sides of the Iron Curtain. In her fascinating article, Dafna Zur details the exploits of an international exploratory mission to the red planet, consisting of children from a dozen nations, including North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. It remains unknown whether the explorers from Kim Tong Sŏp's serialized novelYouth Space Expedition Teammet any other socialist space travelers on their way to Mars. But they could have very well run into spaceship #1, commanded by Zhenzhen, the protagonist of Zheng Wenguang's (1929–2003) “Cong diqiu dao huoxing” (From the Earth to Mars) (Zheng 1954a).

A Taxonomic Study on the Burrowing Cricket Genus Velarifictorus with Morphologically Resembled Genus Lepidogryllus (Orthoptera: Gryllidae: Gryllinae) in Korea

The burrowing-cricket genus Velarifictorus Randell, 1964 is reviewed in Korea, comparing with morphologically resembled genus Lepidogryllus Otte and Alexander, 1983 for the first time. First, Velarifictorus aspersus borealis Gorochov, 1985 is confirmed from only restricted area of southern regions in Gyeongsangnam-do and Jeollanam-do. Second, Velarifictorus micado (Saussure, 1877) is confirmed from nearly all around the Korean peninsula including North Korea. Third, the previously not recorded Velarifictorus ornatus (Shiraki, 1911) is newly recognized from South Korea. Relating to the genus Velarifictorus, the resembled genus Lepidogryllus Otte and Alexander, 1983 and its species Lepidogryllus siamensis (Chopard, 1961) com. & stat. nov. is studied and compared with Velarifictorus members. A key, descriptions, tables, photographs, figures, oscillograms and spectrograms of calling sounds are provided to aid identification between the four similar species.

Interdecadal change in North Korean winter mean rainfall

In the present study, it was found that there was a significant climate regime shift in 1993 from average rainfall amounts in winter (December of a year and January and February of the next year) in North Korea over the last 30 years (1982–2011). This significant climate regime shift in 1993 also appeared in empirical orthogonal function analysis conducted using the winter mean rainfall amounts observed at 26 weather observation stations in North Korea. The reason why winter mean rainfall amounts in North Korea were smaller during the period of 1994–2011 than during the period of 1982–1994 was that anomalous anticyclone was reinforced in regions near Lake Baikal while anomalous cyclone was reinforced on the sea on the east of Japan so that the winter pressure system pattern (west high-east low pattern) appeared and thus anomalous cold and dry northerlies were reinforced in most East Asian regions including North Korea. To figure out the reason why anomalous anticyclone was reinforced further in the East Asian continent in winters during the period of 1994–2011, differences in water equivalent of accumulated snow depths between the two periods were analyzed. As a result, more snow was observed in most East Asian regions during the period of 1994–2011. Therefore, anomalous anticyclone could be further reinforced in the East Asian continent because surface air temperature dropped further due to snow-albedo effect. The surface air temperature cooling deepened further in the East Asian continent during the period of 1994–2011 due to snow-albedo effect was identified through differences in sensible heat net flux between the two periods.

The Chinese and Asian impact on Russian nuclear policy

Asia, where nuclear powers already interact (including North Korea), exerts a growing influence on the thinking and policy underlying Russia's current and future nuclear (and overall defense) posture. China's rise is forcing Russia into a greater reliance on strategic offensive weapons and tactical nuclear weapons. These in turn will reinforce its opposition to US missile defenses, not only in Europe but also in Asia. Russia must now entertain the possibility of nuclear use in regional conflicts that would otherwise remain purely conventional. It cannot be postulated blindly that nuclear weapons serve no discernible purpose other than to deter nuclear attacks by other nuclear powers. The strategic equation in Asia and in the Russian Far East convincingly demonstrates the falsity of this approach. Nuclear weapons will be the essential component of Russia's regional defense policy if not of its overall policies – and this also includes contingencies in Europe.

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Derivation of President Barack Obama's North Korea Policy

OverviewThe tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased immediately following the dramatic reconciliation, in June 2000, between Kim Il-Sung, former leader of North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung, president of South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung adopted a policy of engagement toward North Korea called the Policy. Subsequent to President Kim Dae-jung's five-year rule, President Ro Moo Hyun inherited the engagement policy from his predecessor. Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea provided North Korea with generous economic aid on an annual basis from 1998 to 2007.At the beginning of 2008, South Korea switched from a one-way engagement policy to a policy of give-and-take. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, initiated this policy shift. President Lee came to believe that South Korea's engagement policy had failed. In February 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the U.S.Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. attempted to settle disputes through direct dialogue with North Korea. It is reasonable to assume therefore that under the Obama regime, more of a direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. may be pursued to resolve pending issues, including North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and support of rogue terrorist states.North Korea has been excessively provocative in recent years. On October 9, 2006, North Korea test-launched a nuclear missile. Neighboring countries immediately expressed serious concern, and the U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, doubled his efforts to ensure that North Korea fulfill its agreements on denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks countries; namely, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and to dismantle nuclear facilities in the interest of nonproliferation. The international community is watching closely to determine whether North Korea will fulfill its obligations under these agreements. Kim Jong-il has to decide whether he will take further steps to put North Korea in the nuclear power club-which would be likely to invite furious resistance from the Western world-or opt instead to abandon the nuclear program to improve international relations.The purpose of this paper is to envisage President Obama's North Korea policy by applying game theory. In game theory, players try to adopt the best strategy, given their objective function. There have been six major players so far in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear conflict. We point out that interstate differences in the objectives between the national leaders and the party/military leaders have undermined the Six-Party Talks.This paper focuses on the game play between North Korea and the U.S. Although Kim Jong-il can effectively control his military advisers at present, there are potential divergences in their respective viewpoints, which may become more evident in the future.The Game Play in Economic Cooperation between South Korea and North KoreaIn June 2000, Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and Kim Jong-il of North Korea met for the first time to ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Since this meeting, the two Koreas have expanded the scope of reconciliation and economic cooperation. The two countries agreed on the reunion of separated families, the establishment of an industrial complex in Kaesong, and the joint exploration of Kumgang Mountain as a means of promoting tourism. This honeymoon abruptly ended when North Korea fired two nuclear missiles on October 9, 2006. During the period 2000-06, President Kim Dae-jung and his successor President Roh Moo-hyun implemented the engagement policy of reconciliation toward North Korea. With generous economic aid from South Korea, North Korea was able to overcome severe food and energy shortages. In return, North Korea opened Kumgang Mountain to South Koreans, and allowed South Korean businesses to hire lower-wage workers in the Kaesong industrial complex. …

China and the Processes of Cooperation in UN Security Council Deliberations

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted an underground test of a low-yield nuclear device, flaunting a Security Council resolution that had been passed in the wake of that state’s first test two-and-a-half years before. The world waited 18 days for the Council to take concrete action in the form of a new round of sanctions. Although the measures passed were robust, some observers noted that China, with Russia, tried to ‘dilute’ them by making enforcement of financial sanctions non-mandatory, and complicating the practice of cargo inspections. Concerns were also raised about the extent to which China, wary about destabilizing North Korea and protecting its relations with Pyongyang, might be willing to implement the new provisions. 1 More broadly, this case fits into a sequence of misgivings about China’s participation in deliberations on a host of ‘pariah’ states, including North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe. These concerns paint a muddier picture of China’s foreign relations than what scholars have termed as ‘China’s new diplomacy’, characterized by pragmatism, caution, flexibility and cooperativeness. 2 China has complicated the prospects of agreement in the context of Security Council negotiations by resisting the farthest-reaching plans for intervention as conceived by the United States and its allies, even as it has agreed to some proposals.