A Game-Theoretic Approach to Derivation of President Barack Obama's North Korea Policy

IntroductionFluctuating political relations between North and South Korea made it difficult to sustain, at least in past, any meaningful and lasting economic cooperation between two Koreas. This paper reviews history and scope of economic cooperation between two Koreas, leading to conclusion that economic cooperation between North and South Korea should remain unaffected by political turmoil between two Koreas.Historical Background of Economic CooperationThe first official joint statement between two Koreas was released on July 4, 1972, nearly nineteen years after Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. The SouthNorth Joint Communique states that reunification will take place without reliance on or intervention by foreign nations; it will be achieved by a peaceful means; that the two sides shall take measures to stop propaganda broadcasting against other side, stop military aggression and prevent any military clashes; and that the two sides shall institute various exchanges in economic, social and cultural areas; cooperate in holding inter-Korean Red Cross talks; open a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline; and set up a South-North mediation committee.Regardless of cooperative spirit expressed in 1972 communique, economic cooperation between two Koreas did not take place for many more years because of two related reasons: lack of progress on political front and several provocative actions carried out by North Korea. On October 9, 1983, for instance, four South Korean cabinet members were killed by North Korean agents in Burma. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air 858 was exploded by two North Korean agents forty-five minutes away from Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew members aboard. As Soviet Union was dissolved in 1989, ending Soviet Union's economic support to North Korea, focus of North Korean issues shifted to development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. In fact, current nuclear crisis began during 1989 when Yongbyon's nuclear facility was identified through U.S. satellite photos.On October 21, 1994, United States and North Korea concluded four months of negotiations by adopting Framework in Geneva, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that would require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which were still under construction. In exchange, North Korea was promised two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of reactors. The LWRs were arranged for construction through Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On March 9, 1995, KEDO was formed in New York with United States, South Korea, and Japan as organization's original members. On June 1, 2006, KEDO Executive Board announced that it had formally terminated its project to build two LWRs in North Korea due to continued and extended failure of North Korea to comply with its relevant obligations under 1994 Agreed Framework. KEDO was more a political arrangement than an act of economic cooperation. We thus turn our attention to economic cooperation.Dawn of Economic CooperationAlthough trade between two Koreas began in late 1980s, first meaningful event in inter-Korean economic cooperation occurred on January 13, 1998, when Chung Ju-young, founder of Hyundai chaebol, traveled to North Korea through China and signed an agreement with North Korea on what would later be known as Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Chung's visit to North Korea was made possible by election of Kim Dae-jung as President of South Korea in December 1997.During his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, President Kim Dae-jung announced his Sunshine Policy for dramatic improvement of inter-Korean relations, which led to President Kim winning Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. …

Changzoo Song (bio) Perspectives on Korean Unification and Economic Integration, edited by Young Back Choi, Yesook Merrill, Yung Y. Yang, and Semoon Chang. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2001. 193 pp. $85.00 cloth. The collapse of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the consequent unification of Germany in 1990 opened new prospects for Korea's reunification. Especially with the grim economic situation in North Korea, German-style "absorption" unification seemed a natural course for the two Koreas. Nonetheless, the difficulties experienced by Germany after the unification called for more practical assessments of the costs and benefits of Korea's unification. This was the background when unification discussions in Korea actively began to embrace economic, cultural, and social considerations in the 1990s. In the past, the discussions had been very much dominated by political discourse. The book under review reflects such a change in unification discussion. Composed of twelve articles, the book can be roughly divided into three parts: the first three articles examine security issues of the Korean peninsula; the next six articles deal with economic integration and cooperation between North and South Korea; and the last three articles analyze the costs and benefits of unification. While the book covers several different issues from different angles, the contributors have a relatively unified view. This is that an abrupt collapse of North Korea will result in huge costs. They therefore advocate gradual integration. In this respect, the book supports the "Sunshine Policy" of South Korea's former president Kim Dae-Jung. Such a view is well represented in Tony Hall's introduction, in which he observes that North Korean people's perception of foreigners (especially Americans) became much more favourable in the late 1990s after food aid programs. Such changes in "ordinary people's thinking can play an important role in its leaders' reaching out," he states (p. XV). In a similar vein, Young-Sun Lee argues that gradual unification would cost less (chapter 10), and Young-Back Choi suggests immediate unification would not bring any good either to North or South Korea (chapter 12). One of the most controversial articles in the book is "Cost and Benefits of Unification" by Choi. This article argues that, contrary to the belief of Korean nationalists, South Korea would not benefit from unification in terms of natural resources, cheap labor, bargaining power, or defense budget reduction. Choi estimates that South Korea will have to assume all the costs to develop North Korea, to produce welfare provisions, and to solve social conflicts if the two countries are unified. Based on this assessment, Choi carefully, but confidently, contends "no unification" is a "superior alternative" for both Koreas (p. 175). While the idea that unification would be too chaotic and costly is not totally [End Page 140] new, it is rare to see such a daring view openly declared. As most Koreans believe that unification is an absolute necessity, Choi's argument is innovative and makes this book rather special. A further important article is "Can Reindustrialization of North Korea Support a Sustainable Food Supply?" This article maintains that North Korea, in its comparative disadvantage in agricultural production, would be able to import grains if it hosted labor-intensive light industry such as textiles and footwear manufacturing from South Korea (p. 83). By so doing, this article directly supports the Sunshine Policy and South Korea's project to build industrial complexes in North Korea. While the book poses good arguments for a functionalist approach to national integration, it suffers from some defects. Although the book focuses on economic cooperation between the two Koreas, including telecommunication cooperation, the possible benefit of the Trans-Korean Railway if connected to the Chinese and Russian railway systems is not covered. In addition, some of the articles in the book are too short to be able to offer a sustained argument. For example, chapters 3 and 2 are only four and six pages each. In chapter 12 some footnotes are numbered incorrectly. A more serious problem, however, lies in the volume's heavily economic orientation. While this is understandable if we consider that most of the contributors to the book are economists, some readers may find this volume's orientation...

IntroductionThe Korean Peninsula remains a hot spot in international security. A puzzling North Korea has turned its back on the world by its incessant pursuit of nuclear weapons, and despite recent reconciliatory developments, tension remains between the two Koreas that may erupt into military conflict at any time. One area with the greatest potential for conflict is in the West Sea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL).2 South Korea is blaming North Korea for sinking one of its navy ships in the waters near the NLL in March 2010. More recently, South and North Korea exchanged artillery fire soon after North Korea fired on Yeonpyeongdo Island, near the NLL, in November 2010. The causes of these military remain a riddle. Though the NLL is considered a major factor, it alone is not sufficient to explain what brought the two Koreas into conflict.One interpretation posits that North Korea's provocative posture is attributable to South Korea's punitive policy against North Korea. The current Lee Myung-bak government has taken a hard-line policy toward North Korea, making its North Korea policy distinguishable from the unilateral engagement policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. The current government has emphasized reciprocity and thus has showed little tolerance against North Korea's provocations. With this shift in policy toward North Korea, fears of a new conflict with North Korea are growing. As a consequence, some critics now speak about the need to ease military tension in the Korean Peninsula by reintroducing a peace and reconciliation policy with North Korea.3 Then, it is relevant to ask whether the unilateral engagement policies of the Kim Dae-j ung and the Roh Moo-hyun governments have reduced North Korea's provocations in the West Sea.4With these concerns in mind, this paper challenges the widespread belief that conflicts of interest are reduced by interdependence, and that cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems.5 The main argument here is that North Korea's NLL violations do not rise and fall based on South Korea's engagement or containment policy toward North Korea, but rather on North Korea's need to catch more marine products. In order to support the argument of this paper, the second section evaluates the inter-Korean reconciliation process and its impact on North Korea's NLL violations. The third section analyzes why North Korea's economic crisis in the 1990s was conducive to a rise in North Korea's NLL violations. A summary and some policy implications are given in the final section.The Inter-Korean Reconciliation Process and North Korea's NLL ProvocationsThe 1953 Armistice Agreement to end the Korean War included only the landbased military demarcation line (MDL), leaving a maritime border as an unsettled question among the concerned parties, including the U.S.-led United Nations, North Korea, and China. The United Nations military forces, with superior naval and air power, felt urged to control their operations in the West and East Sea, and thus the NLL was set up in 1953 by a unilateral measure of the U.S.-led United Nations military forces. From then on, the NLL became the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas, but the cease-fire did not end military on the Korean Peninsula and in its surrounding waters.6 Arguing for the need to redraw the maritime border, North Korea has instigated numerous provocations around the waters near the NLL by kidnapping or sinking South Korean fishing boats and navy vessels.As the Cold War drew to a close in the 1980s, a turning point was reached in the relations between the two Koreas. In 1991, South and North Korea signed the InterKorean Basic Agreement-the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North-opening a new era of inter-Korean economic cooperation. As for the NLL, the agreement provides that the decision on the maritime demarcation line is final, the nonaggression areas of the sea shall be those that have been followed by each side until the present time. …

Already in 1998 then South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung had articulated the new “Sunshine Policy ” calling for peaceful coexistence of the two nations, including the prospect of aid and bilateral economic cooperation as well as a long-term unification proposal (Ahrens, 2003, p. 53). The historic summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in June 2000 gave additional hope for a gradual and peaceful integration of both the Koreas (Kim, 2003, p. 118). Consequently, political contact between the two Koreas evolved and various cooperative projects were initiated. Two Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been established in North Korea close to the border with the South: the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and the Mt. Kumgang Resort. These SEZs have to be mentioned as the core of the current Korean economic cooperation (Lim and Lim, 2006, pp. 48–49). In contrast to the two other SEZs in North Korea, the Rajin-Sonbong and the Sinuiju SEZ, these two were quite successful during the “Sunshine” period (2000–2007) and hope is still high. But since the 2008 inauguration of the new administration in South Korea, North–South relations have deteriorated dramatically. The Lee Myung-Bak government tied further cooperation to demonstrable steps toward ending the North’s nuclear weapons program . Previous progress made began to unravel further when the Mount Kumgang Special Tourism Zone was closed in the summer of 2008 after North Korean guards shot and killed a South Korean tourist and after the imprisonment of a South Korean staff member in the Kaesong Industrial Complex by North Korea in the spring of 2009.

In the nine years after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, the consensus regarding the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States was that it couldn't be better. Yet with the inauguration of new administrations in both capitals, despite the reaffirmation of each side's commitment to the alliance, there are some concerns and anxieties over North Korea policy, the implications of China's rise for the regional security architecture, and alliance management. In general, the United States is concerned about the possibility that Moon Jae-in will revive Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea as well as adopt a pro-Chinese orientation and encourage anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, the ROK has concerns about the Trump administration's protectionism, hostile policy toward North Korea that eschews dialogue, unilateralism in the military sphere, and demand for greater burden-sharing.To maintain, strengthen, and upgrade the U.S.-ROK alliance, both Seoul and Washington should work very closely to increase trust and mutual respect and to iron out possible differences over the aforementioned issues. The following discussion will examine the two allies' areas of convergence and divergence on North Korea policy, China's rise, and alliance management. It will then conclude by assessing the prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance in the aftermath of political transitions in both countries.Consultation and Coordination on North Korea PolicyFor both Washington and Seoul, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains the most urgent and important challenge. The overall situation in and around the Korean Peninsula is very unstable and intense, as North Korea seeks acceptance as a nuclear state and relevant parties try to force the Kim Jong-un regime to give up its nuclear weapons.At the moment, Washington and Seoul appear to be on the same page in their commitment to a strategy of pressure and engagement. However, each side seems to have some suspicion about the other. The United States is concerned about the possibility that the new ROK government will revive Roh's Sunshine Policy, which strongly emphasized engagement and positive incentives. On the other hand, the Moon administration might have anxieties that the Trump administration's policies will be too militant and aggressive, potentially inducing a series of crises and confrontations without the possibility of dialogue and negotiation.1 Nonetheless, given North Korea's ongoing missile tests and threats to stage another nuclear test, both the United States and ROK are in a common stance of mounting more pressure on North Korea until it shows meaningful signs of denuclearization.At the moment, despite its desire to have some degree of autonomy in dealing with North Korea, South Korea does not have much room to maneuver. It would be difficult for the Moon government to go against the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement and pursue a completely new policy. From the South Korean perspective, the threat posed by North Korea goes beyond nuclear weapons and missiles. Human rights violations, as well as economic and social instability, are among the conventional security issues that must be resolved. Therefore, the United States must not restrict its North Korea policy to the nuclear and missile threats but should adjust its policy to address all of these issues. To gain the support and cooperation of the United States, and to reduce suspicion between the two allies, South Korea should also clarify its vision, strategy, and action plans to handle and solve the North Korea problem.At the same time, the United States and South Korea should discuss and come to an agreement on the level and scope of pressure to be applied and on the conditions, procedures, and agenda for dialogue. The United States is concerned that the Moon administration will rush into a dialogue with Pyongyang and has reservations about reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours regardless of the progress toward denuclearization. …


 
 
 North Korea is a tinderbox where pride and paranoia go hand in hand. The gung-ho confrontational approach and creation of a new world order divided into good and evil, those for us and those against us, as adopted by the Bush administration, is surely the last thing the world needs in dealing with the DPRK. 
 
 One thing I did learn from two brief visits there in l994, just three months after Kim Il Sung’s death virtually paralyzed the country, and again in 1996, after floods and famine, was that the people are exceedingly nationalistic and determined to defend their notions of independence and self-reliance, however little is left of these visions in reality. Predictions of a collapse of North Korea have been made for the past ten years, but it still has not happened. They are a very resilient people. South Koreans know this and a sudden collapse of the North is the last thing they want.
 
 My contact was admittedly limited and mainly through the arts. (I was there twice as a guest of the biannual Pyongyang International Film Festival of Non-aligned and Other Developing Countries, showing my feature film Aya in 1994.) North Korean film and performance is often focused on the threat from outside. The belief in such a threat was echoed by people I met, and when constantly reinforced through state-controlled media, it becomes part of a nation’s psyche. To use such a threat to boost the need for unity under one strong leader is, however, a strikingly familiar practice of the DPRK’s enemy number one, the US.
 
 Few North Korean films have achieved distribution in the West. One exception is Hong Kil Dong (1985), a popular tae kwan do romance story, based on a legend well-known both in North and South Korea. It was released in France and Finland. A long-running series, The Nation and Destiny, described as ‘a multi-part feature film’ is akin to a string of linked mini-series of feature films, each bloc focussed on a fictionalized character from recent history. The heroes are often people who have served the dictatorship in the South and become disillusioned and defected to the DPRK. Or Korean War heroes such as Ri Jong Mo, who served 34 years in prison in South Korea before he was freed and allowed to return to the North. 
 
 Most North Korean films end with a suggestions that whatever heroic deed or sacrifice the hero(ine) made, it was all for the sake of the Great Leader, and an exhortation to fight to defend the country and its honour. They may conjure up old Soviet films, hardly the trendy programming our festivals or SBS want in order to boost their ratings. But we should be allowed to see them. The very propaganda that the North Korean people are subjected to can tell us much about the attitudes in the North toward the South and the outside world. However flawed or limited, this is a perspective we never hear or see.
 
 It struck me when I watched the South Korean blockbuster Swiri four years ago that the portrayal of the North Korean agents bore a striking resemblance to those of South Korean agents that appear in so many of the North Korean films I had seen. If we look at older films made in Seoul that deal with the divided nation, their melodramatic stories and caricature portrayal of the communist villains are not dissimilar to those we see in North Korea. In the context of much publicized account of the kidnapping of South Korean filmmakers, a story that has been around for some time, and has been questioned by many film industry insiders in Seoul, and the more recently admitted kidnappings of Japanese, we forget that kidnappings were widely practiced by the dictators in Seoul as well. Well-known composer Isang Yun was kidnapped in Germany, transported to Seoul, imprisoned, tortured and released only after international intervention. He is only one example. Former president Kim Dae-jung is another. Isang Yun’s story has also been fictionalized in four episodes of The Nation and Destiny.
 
 In the last couple of years South Korean films have come a long way in their more nuanced portrayal of characters from both sides. And films dealing with the Korean War now attract audiences in Korea, which was not the case some years ago. But we forget that a film such as JSA – Joint Security Area (directed by Park Chan-wook and shown in the Melbourne International Film Festival 2001) could not have been made before the introduction of Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ and that it is only in recent years that South Koreans can express their opinions openly about North Korea. To make direct contact with North Koreans still requires permission. 
 
 SBS has in the past four years belatedly jumped on the bandwagon and shown several films of the South Korean new wave, after ignoring Korea for years. Yet, despite a substantial film industry in North Korea, including animation both locally made and on commission for countries like France, Italy, Japan, we have not to date seen a single North Korean feature film on our multicultural broadcaster, or on any other channel or in any of our film festivals in recent years. 2003, marking the 50th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, would have been the perfect opportunity to show films from both sides. It does seem extraordinary that no festival or broadcaster here has attempted to take up the challenge. 
 
 Of course it is not the filmmakers or artists who decide on reactivating the nuclear weapons program, and this is not usually what their films deal with. But seeing their work, however controlled it might be by the system, can help us in some small way to understand that we are dealing with an enormously proud people who feel under siege, even more so after being designated as part of ‘the axis of evil’. 
 
 It can also give us a perspective on their sense of history through the stories that the people are subjected to in their media. It is not only they who are subjected to propaganda, but our audience, as well, when we are deprived of such insight in this climate of a new world order.
 
 
 Citation reference for this article
 
 MLA Style
 Hoaas, Solrun. "The Celluloid Divide." M/C Journal 7.6 (2005). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0501/12-hoaas.php>. APA Style
 Hoaas, S. (Jan. 2005) "The Celluloid Divide," M/C Journal, 7(6). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0501/12-hoaas.php>. 

In 2010, with the implementation of the May 24th measures, inter-Korean economic cooperation was suspended in all areas except the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Then, in 2016, with the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, all inter-Korean economic cooperation came to a halt. The joint venture enterprises in inter-Korean economic cooperation were mainly concentrated in the Pyongyang region. However, there was a case of inter-Korean economic cooperation in the form of a joint venture enterprise outside the Kaesong Industrial Complex that could be accessed using the entry and exit procedures of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. South-North Equity Joint Venture Enterprise in Kaesong can utilize the industrial, transportation, and transit facilities of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and has the advantage of active participation by North Korea, which holds shares. In the Equity Joint Venture Act, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for setting land usage fees, ease the all-out agreement system, and ensure education for workers. In addition, it is necessary to fairly define subsequent procedures in cases where consultation is impossible. Under the North-South Economic Cooperation Act, it is necessary to simplify the North's project approval process and stipulate that the North should manage its property in good faith, at least to a minimum extent, in special circumstances. The law on the development of inter-Korean relations needs to clearly define the special relationship between North and South Korea and elevate the legal status of the inter-Korean agreements to the level of general treaties. The law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation should clearly stipulate in writing the procedures for obtaining North Korean visit approvals and for importing and exporting goods, and should minimize the time required for these processes. The agreement on investment protection between North and South Korea should specify in detail the abnormal issues that impede economic cooperation and provide for step-by-step investment protection accordingly. Regarding the agreement on the resolution of commercial disputes between North and South Korea, the follow-up procedures of the agreement should be promptly carried out, and the establishment of a governing law that applies to both North and South Korea is necessary. The inter-Korean agreement went through the legislative approval process outlined in Article 60, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, thereby establishing its legal validity. However, due to North Korea's non-compliance, it has become practically ineffective. However, as North Korea has not explicitly rejected the validity of the agreement, it is not advisable to disregard the agreement and its provisions in preparation for future inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea has been attempting to improve its external economy through scientific and technological exchanges, economic development zones, and other means since the 2010s. However, the situation has worsened due to North Korea's nuclear tests leading to U.S. sanctions and the impact of COVID-19. Due to COVID-19, there have been zero exchanges of people between North and South Korea for a period of two years starting from 2021. In the current tense situation of strained inter-Korean relations, inter-Korean economic cooperation should be carried out flexibly and adaptively, taking into account the interests of both North and South Korea and contributing to their reunification, in accordance with the dynamics of inter-Korean and international relations.

No end in sight for North Korea's malnutrition crisis

Liberalists has declared that economic trade brings about political cooperation and peace between two countries through enhancing the economic benefits, promoting conversation, and removing misunderstanding. On the basis of this declaration, the policy on North Korea has been pushed ahead by the Korean government which tries to transform the relationship with North Korea from mistrust and hostility to reconciliation and cooperation. It has been twenty three years since the economic trade between South and North Korea began in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo which was triggered by the Declaration of July 7 and the North-South Korean Economic Relation Measure of October in 1988. The total turnover between South and North Korea was about 15.9 billion USD during the period from the beginning of January, 1989 to the end of September, 2011, out of which 13.2 billion USD is for commercial trade and 2.6 billion USD is for economic aid. However, the controversy is being aroused in South Korea about the policy on North Korea because North Korea tends to keep hostility towards South Korea through nuclear experiment, blowing up the Cheonan ship, shooting a South Korean tourist in Keumkang Mountain, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. It seems to the realists that the economic trade between South and North Korea brings about reinforcing the North Korean military power and weakening the security in South Korea, which results in hindering the peace in Korean Peninsular. From the point of this issue, this paper aims to analyse the effect of trade and economic aid on easing conflicts between South and North Korea empirically. The result of this study can be summarized as follows. First of all, the increase of total turnover is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, which means that the increase of total turnover will decrease the conflict index. Secondly, the increase of commercial trade does not significantly affect the conflict index. Thirdly, the increase of non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, which means that the increase of non-commercial trade will bring about creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea. Finally, the multi-variable analysis shows that rate of change in non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, but rate of change in commercial trade is not. To sum up the results of the empirical analysis, the increase of total turnover and/or non-commercial trade is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, but not in the case of the increase of commercial trade. In other words, the economic trade between South and North Korea does not necessarily reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular. In fact, it has been happening in the real world since fifty years ago. Social welfare in North Korea should be enhanced to reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular through the economic support and trade from South Korea. The amount of social welfare increase in North Korea should be enough to offset the amount of social welfare decrease due to the cessation of the economic support and trade. Therefore, the economic trade between South and North Korea needs to be vitalized more and more so that North Korea be economically dependent upon South Korea. Limits of this paper, which are left to be studied in the future, are as follows. First of all, it needs to be analyzed how much social welfare has been enhanced in North Korea through the economic trade between South and North Korea for the past twenty three years. Secondly, it also needs to be studied what is the level of dependence of North Korea on South Korea, and whether the economic sanction toward the North Korea of the Lee Myung-bak administration is significantly effective or not.

IntroductionNorth Korea remains one of the last economies in the world modeled after the Stalinist economic planning model. Despite its small size North Korea is a major concern in both Asia and the world because of its nuclear ambitions and achievements, its provocative rhetoric, its relationship with Iran and Syria, and its isolation from much of the world. The socialist experiments of the last half of the twentieth century, ranging from the Stalinist central planning model to the milder forms of socialism in the United Kingdom and the United States, began to collapse in the 1970s, and by the end of the 1980s an economic liberalization process dominated much of the world. North Korea is the notable exception.Cargill and Parker (2005) provide a brief review of North Korean economic growth based on various sources and note that the socialist economic institutions appeared to serve North Korea in the 1950s and 1960s, but the North Korean economy began to stagnate by the 1980s. North Korea then experienced a decade of intense economic distress during the 1990s combined with famine in 1995 and 1996. This occurred because of inherent inefficiency of North Korea's economic institutions, especially agriculture and the distribution system; the military policy of the North Korean government; and bad weather and shortages of energy (Kim, 2003). In response, North Korea began to reform its economic institutions toward more decentralized decision making in general and relaxation of constraints on the agricultural sector. There was some evidence that the economy began to recover in the first few years of the new century: external trade expanded (Haggard and Noland, 2008a) and economic interactions with China and South Korea increased.Four events, however, reduced hope that North Korea was ready to become part of a world trading system. First, North Korea continued to play the nuclear trump card, detonating a nuclear reaction in July 2006, testing long-range missiles, providing nuclear technology to Syria and in general, rhetorically threatening the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Second, North Korea reversed some of the policy reforms of 2002 and moved to restrict market activity, especially in the agricultural sector. Third, according to a detailed review of North Korea's food balance by Haggard and Noland (2008b) and Haggard, Noland and Weeks (2008), North Korea again appears at the brink of famine, though not yet as serious as in the mid-1990s. According to the Bank of Korea, GDP growth declined in 2006 and 2007 after being positive since 1999. Fourth, the election in December 2007 of Lee Myung-bak as President of South Korea has hardened relations between the North and South. Lee's government has been critical of the previous decade of sunshine policy in which unconditional aid and money were given to the North, and has indicated that future aid will require North Korea to cease its nuclear ambitions and improve its human rights record. North Korea responded negatively to the change in political environment in the South and other activity such as balloon diplomacy1 and threatened to close the border in early November 2008. On November 24, 2008, North Korea closed tourism to the Kumgangsan resort area (also referred to as Mt. Kumgang or Mt. Diamond), closed a seldom-used rail line to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and limited access to the KIC by South Korean managers. Most important however, North Korea did not close the KIC and in fact, stated it intended to continue and support commercial activity in the KIC.Despite these events, the October 2008 decision by the Bush administration to remove North Korea from the list of terrorist states and the possible regime change because of the potential physical/cognitive impairment of Kim Jong Il offers some degree of hope that North Korea will continue on the path established in 2002. The public delisting is a major change in official U. …

Economists have expressed their opinion that the economic trade between countries brings about economic prosperity as well as peace. Their opinion is based upon that the trading countries do not want to face the situation of decline in their welfare and benefits due to not participating in economic trade. They argue that economic trades between countries give them the opportunities of conversation, decrease misunderstanding, and leads them to peaceful mind and behavioral attitude to adjust the political conflicts. On the basis of this kind of opinion and the reunification of Germany, the economic trade between South and North Korea has been suggested as the most efficient measure to maintain the peace in Korean Peninsula. It has been twenty four years since the economic trade between South and North Korea was triggered in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo’s Declaration of July 7 in spite of several crises. The total turnover between South and North Korea is about US$ 18.3 billion from 1989 to 2012, out of which US$ 9.2 billion is the export to the North and US$ 9.1 billion is the import from the North. Since the end of cold war, South Korea and China have established diplomatic relations on July 24, 1992, and they have become strategic cooperative partners. The total turnover between South Korea and China was US$ 6.4 billion in 1992, and it increased to US$ 215.2 billion in 2012. On the other hand, the total turnover between North Korea and China amounts to US$ 5.9 billion in 2012, which is around three times as much as that between South and North Korea. The results of theoretical analyses are summarized as follows. First of all, exports and imports between South and North Korea turned out to ease the conflicts between two countries. Therefore, ‘theory of peace through trade’ by the liberalists was supported here. Secondly, it turned out that the economic trade between North Korea and China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if South Korea and China are in friendly partnership. It implies that China induces North Korea to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. Thirdly, exports from South Korea to China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are friendly partners politically. Imports from China to South. Korea affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are in antagonistic relationship politically. Empirical analysis shows that the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea turned out to have a significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It implies that the increase of the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea is likely to ease the conflicts between two countries. On the other hand, the difference quotient in the imports turned out to have significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It tells that the increase of the imports is likely to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. While the expand of trade with China will ease the conflicts in Korean Peninsula from the theoretical viewpoint, empirical analyses present opposite results. It implies that the relationship between North Korea and China since the end of cold war is not the same as that before the end of cold war. It also tells that North Korea puts the higher political priority to developing the nuclear weapon and long-range missile. Inter-Korean policy has to keep consistency focusing economic cooperation apart from political issues. Long-term goal of inter-Korean policy should be unification, although short-term one is peace and stability in Korean Peninsula.

How to engage North Korea has always been a key concern of South Korea's foreign policy makers since Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy era. Instead of provoking political or military confrontations in the traditional security arena, the engagement policy is believed to allow South Korea to seek possible breakthroughs in the nontraditional security arena. Moreover, engagement is expected to generate a spillover effect of enhancing inter-Korean mutual political trust and in turn promote political cooperation in long term. Through analyzing statistical data and political events in the past decade, this article examines South Korea's engagement policy in the nontraditional security arena and argues that the inter-Korean relationship still highly depends on political trust and regional political dynamic. The economic and cultural cooperation initiated by South Korea primarily targets to support North Korea in a patronizing manner instead of promoting equal cooperation, with the weak political trust foundation that any readjustment of regional political powers could generate chain effect on the inter-Korean cooperation dynamic. In the foreseeable future, improvement of mutual political trust and mindfulness to the regional power shift still present as the key to a peaceful and successful engagement of North Korea.

The objective of this research is to analyze the factors for the private sector to invest in Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), to study the role of the South Korean private companies investing in the industrial complex, and to study the possibility of the reunification of the Korean peninsula through the cooperation between South and North Korea. This research uses several data sources including historical documents, statistical data in the form of books, academic articles, newspapers, Thai and English electronic sources concerning the economic cooperation between South and North Korea, Kaesong Industrial Complex, and the reunification of Korean, an interview with representatives of Korean companies in Thailand and Thai professors who are experts on Korean studies. According to the research, the economic cooperation in the establishment of Kaesong Industrial Complex came after a summit between President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea and the North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong il. Kaesong Industrial Complex is deemed as a model of the economic cooperation to reduce the economic gap between the two countries. During the operation of the industrial complex, even though there was production and exportation to South Korea, the economic gap was not reduced. This was against both leaders’ views on the Kaesong Industrial Complex as a model for further cooperation on other projects. The operation of Kaesong Industrial Complex was not stable because of the political atmosphere in the relationship between the two Koreas, as seen from the tense situation during the period of the President Lee Myung-Bak. Therefore, the role of the private sector in the reunification of Korea may also depend on the political factor.

Degradation, urbanization, and restoration: A review of the challenges and future of conservation on the Korean Peninsula

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