Comment on “United Nations Sanctions on North Korea's Luxury Goods Imports: Impact and Implications”

Abstract

Interest in the effects of economic sanctions on North Korea is growing as international talks regarding its denuclearization unfold. Jeong (2019) is a unique study in that it takes the embargo on imports of luxury goods as its specific focus for examining the effects of UN sanctions against North Korea. Previous studies examining the effects of the luxury goods embargo include Noland (2009), who focuses on North Korea's trade with China and South Korea immediately after the 2006 sanctions resolution that followed North Korea's first nuclear test. However, Jeong's study is distinguished by its comprehensive nature, covering a longer period and a wider range of countries. Jeong's overall conclusion that the sanctions were ineffective in decreasing North Korea's imports of luxury goods is not novel. However, it provides additional food for thought, revealing a number of hitherto little-known facts. These include the rise in China's share of North Korean luxury goods imports from 30.9% in 2004 to 96.6% in 2017, and the fact that even many nations that submitted plans for the implementation of sanctions failed to rigorously implement the provisions of the resolutions concerning the embargo on luxury goods. One factor behind the sanctions’ ineffectiveness was the lack of objective criteria for what constitutes luxury goods. Jeong (2019) persuasively argues that provisions enforcing transparency on sanctioning countries must be strengthened. Nevertheless, the fact remains that UN economic sanctions have limitations from the outset. Ogura (2017) states that rather than forcing or preventing specific actions, namely acts of hostility, the more fundamental objective or purpose of economic sanctions is to maintain and strengthen specific norms in the international community and to bolster solidarity among those who abide by them. While UN economic sanctions vary in their objectives and effects, which include strengthening unity among member countries and encouraging domestic political solidarity, they have a range of constraints and limitations, such as their effectiveness if some countries fail to comply with the sanctions or if alternative supplies are available. There are hardly any historical examples of countries changing their behavior in the face of economic sanctions. While the UN Charter does not use the term economic sanctions, such sanctions are the main pillar of its nonmilitary action. Economic sanctions take various forms; embargoes on luxury goods are a form of what are termed smart sanctions. Smart sanctions were devised to target policymakers, based on the lessons learned from the severe civilian humanitarian crisis that resulted from comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. Although the embargo on supplying luxury goods to North Korea was likely intended to impact on the elite, doubts remain about the effectiveness of an approach that distinguishes between the elite and ordinary citizens in a reclusive state where the civil society is undeveloped and which is willing to bear international isolation in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions. In this sense, Jeong (2019) is right to stress the need for the UN Security Council to devise more intelligent sanction measures, coupled with negotiations to positively alter North Korea's behavior. Economic sanctions alone are not necessarily sufficient to achieve political aims and often only become effective when combined with other political measures. However, deepening rifts between the USA and China over trade and security issues raise the question of whether the international community can be unanimous in offering North Korea acceptable comprehensive incentives. While denuclearization talks between the USA and North Korea are ongoing, there are signs that China intends to revive its traditional bilateral relationship with North Korea. The People's Daily described China and North Korea's relationship as being “as close as lips and teeth.” The analogy signifies not only that they are close, but also that they support each other and that what destroys one will cause the destruction of the other. Similarly, when President Xi Jinping met Chairman Kim Jong-un for talks in May 2018, he made a display of solidarity, trotting out old phrases last used during the Cold War. China's customs authority has not published any detailed data on trade with other countries – including North Korea – since April 2018. Media reports suggest that Chairman Kim was gifted many luxury items as souvenirs by China during his visit the month before. When the USA renewed calls for sanctions on North Korea at a ministerial-level meeting of the UN Security Council in September 2018, China joined Russia in arguing that sanctions needed to be relaxed. Although China began working with the USA in 2017 to impose more rigorous sanctions on North Korea, this cooperation seems unlikely to continue beyond 2019.