Abyssinia Research Articles

The ak’aat k’aal movement among the Aari people of south-west Ethiopia

Students of African studies have reported a variety of religious movements under the rubric of independent churches. These include the Cherubim and Seraphim, the Church of the Lord, the Church of Simon Kimbangu, the Zionist and Ethiopianist’s independent churches in southern Africa. Most of these churches emerged in those countries that were under European colonial domination. Ethiopia did not experience European colonialism. Indeed, imperial Ethiopia conquered militarily less powerful kingdoms and chiefdoms that were located to the south and south-western of the then Abyssinia. The conquest of formerly independent populations in southern Ethiopia during the late nineteenth century introduced unequal power relations between the indigenous people and the new settlers. This paper examines the evolution of a religious movement referred to as ak’aat k’aal among the Aari people of south-west Ethiopia in the context of the indigenous forms of domination. Although the movement was short-lived, it was meant to enable the Aari to cope with the social psychological stress that the serfdom system generated. The Aari were not able to practice their traditional religion because of the serfdom. Therefore, they had to abandon their religion. However, doing this without finding a substitute was incompatible with Aari religious ideology. The ak’aat k’aal was a substitute just for a short period. ATTENTION: Due to copy-right no online publication is provided.

The Intimate Violence of Political and Economic Change in Southern Ethiopia

In 1960, women in southern Ethiopia's rural Konso district faced a violent campaign by local men to eradicate leather clothing following a ban imposed by the local governor, Tesfaye Hailu. Tesfaye, a man of the northern Amhara ethnic group, banned leather clothes along with bead necklaces and arm bracelets as part of imperial Ethiopia's “modernization,” which was influenced by disparate sources, including the United States. Tesfaye saw women's attire as “backward” and “unhygienic” and as obstructing modernization; its elimination was a means to improve Konso culture and help the empire join the community of modern nations. The “culture” of “the Other” has often been cast as impeding “modernity” and requiring elimination or change, particularly the practices of women, from genital cutting in eastern Africa to veiling among Muslim women in the Middle East and Europe (Hodgson 2009; Masquelier 2005; Merry 2009a). So it was with the widespread, politicized transition to cotton clothing in nineteenth- and twentieth-century eastern Africa. The target was clothing worn by all women in Konso and made by women in the low-status category of “Xauta,” sometimes referred to as a “caste.” Leather skirts signaled important stages in women's lives, and became extensions of individual women's tastes, experiences, and identities. Women today recall the violence and punishments of the campaign, including being chased, beaten, imprisoned, and fined, and even having their skirts forcibly removed at home and in public. They offer contradictory explanations of who initiated the ban and the reasons for it, but they remember clearly the local men involved in eradication efforts.

Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since 1800 (review)

Reviewed by: Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since 1800 Edmond J. Keller (bio) Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since 1800, by Richard J. Reid New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; pp. 310. $99.00 hardcover. This is an excellent exercise in the historical interpretation of one of the most significant contemporary regions of Africa. Not only does Richard Reid focus on the states of the region, but more importantly he focuses on its peoples. Others have written about these matters, but the author approaches his subject in a novel and refreshing manner. He relies on both primary and secondary data to write about state formation and the construction of expanded political communities in the Horn of Africa throughout history. Reid uses as his analytical focus the violent way in which these polities were historically constructed. He concentrates on military struggles that took place in broadly conceived frontier zones—domestic and regional. The book begins with a prologue that lays out the broad outlines of the theory that guides Reid's analysis. He argues that we clearly need a fuller appreciation of la longue durée (the long view of history) in terms of the history of violent conflict in the Horn of Africa region. This is portrayed as a history that represents the evolution of several cultures of violence among the peoples of the region. To an extent this is a useful approach to reinterpreting history as it highlights the fact that most if not all states were formed through conquest and violence. In a sense, there is nothing new here; but this is the first time that the Horn region has been framed from such a comprehensive perspective. Part 1 of the book lays out the context of the analysis that follows and focuses on the relevant extant literature on the subject. Reid seeks to interpret the region by concentrating on its peoples from an innovative historiographical perspective. He paints a picture that places at the center of the "zone of violence" the Tigrinya of highland Eritrea and northern Ethiopia, the Amhara of central Ethiopia, and the Oromo and Somali of southern and eastern Ethiopia. He argues for a new historiography, based not on the typical "center-based" analysis but on the "peripheries" or the borderlands of the historic Ethiopian Empire. Reid argues that frontiers frequently produce highly militarized societies—they are fault lines or contested zones. Further, he contends that the Eritrean-Ethiopian frontier zone is the epicenter of much of the region's violence. One is left wondering what [End Page 139] Reid means by "epicenter." This is a matter of perspective. However, what is revealed is the author's continued bias toward state-centered research. In this case, he is most interested in the manner in which the Ethiopian state was consolidated and changed over time. Like a good number of books focusing on this region, this book traces the history of the region to antiquity: the Axum city state, the development of the habasha polity (the nation of the chosen people), and the new Zion. Ethiopian mythology claims that the habasha people are the descendants of the Israelites and the House of David. The new center of Zion, then, has become the Ethiopian heartland. The book goes on to focus on the interaction of the heartland with peripheral regions including the Oromo frontier. Reid, however, seems not to view as important, as others have, the way that the inhabitants of the Oromo frontier penetrated or were invited into the Ethiopian heartland and in fact became central to it rather than peripheral. One exception is Reid's treatment of Lij (Prince) Yasu and his endorsement of Islam. This made Yasu a heretic in the eyes of the Ethiopian (Abyssinian) nobility (129-31), and thus unfit to inherit the throne. Part 2 of the book focuses on the "long" nineteenth century and the emergence and consolidation of the imperial state, beginning with Emperor Tewodros in the middle of the century and continuing on for almost 100 years to the demise of the last Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie I, in the late twentieth century. Reid in rich historical...

Empire des Nègres Blancs: The Hybridity of International Personality and the Abyssinia Crisis of 1935–36

AbstractThe ‘Abyssinia Crisis’ of 1935–36 – in which one League of Nations member (imperial Ethiopia) was annexed by another (Fascist Italy) – presents one of the clearest twentieth-century illustrations of international law's ‘progress narrative’. International lawyers are encouraged to draw a salutary lesson from the crisis: namely that Ethiopia's sovereignty – and, indeed, the peace of the entire world – might have survived the 1930s if only international law had been properly enforced. Yet, the assumption upon which this lesson depends – to the effect that Ethiopia'sonlydiscursive contribution to the crisis was passively to regurgitate the relevant clauses of the Covenant – is profoundly ideological. For this assumption effects a double suppression: erasing Ethiopia's strategic construction of a hybrid, partially Abyssinian international law from the discipline's memory; and concealing from scholarly view the possibility that Ethiopia's annexation might have resulted from actions that werein accordance with, rather than in violation of, interwar international legal norms regarding sovereignty and the use of force.

Land Tenure, Land Reform and the Qalad System in Ethiopia, 1941–1974

Ethiopia has been both enriched and burdened by its past, including its land tenure system. ‘Land to the Tiller’ was one of the main factors for the decline and fall of the imperial period, the reign of Emperor Haile-Sellase (1941–1974). This study is essentially based on archival materials from the Wolde-Mesqel Research Center at the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University. I consulted material from the Center that deal with the subject of this article. The article examines the essential features and elements of land reform, land tenure and the qalad system (land measurement) in Ethiopia. It also tries to analyze the factors that made land measurement and land reform complex and difficult during Imperial Ethiopia. The findings suggest that most of the available literature on the government of Haile-Sellase’s land tenure system lacks a sense of critical scholarship, and needs to be more comprehensive and balanced in its judgements and interpretations. It has no depth or objectivity and seems to have been written for political consumption. This article concludes by giving a comparative and contrastive analysis of some of the existing literature on land tenure, reform and measurement, using the archival materials of the Research Center.

Empire and modernity: dynastic centralization and official nationalism in late imperial Ethiopia

Conventional accounts of modern state-formation either underplay its contradictory and variegated character or neglect its international dimensions. Against these approaches, alternative theories of state-formation have emerged centred on the constitutive significance of intersocietal relations and differential temporalities. This article develops the latter approaches in relation to the Ethiopian state. Contrary to widespread assumptions of Ethiopia's political insularity, it suggests that at three crucial turning points geopolitical exigencies provided the critical impetus for the political and cultural reconstitution of the state. Late nineteenth century European colonial encroachment triggered a reaction in the form of an Ethiopian imperial expansion to rival them. And the political shock of Italian occupation 40 years later provoked a concurrent project of dynastic centralization and official nationalism in the post-restoration period. But precisely because divine monarchy and nationalism are antithetical orders by virtue of their opposed principles of sovereignty, the attempt to conjoin them generated deep social and cultural contradictions that erupted in two successive revolutions that were internationally overdetermined and resulted in a profound reconstitution of the Ethiopian state.

Ethiopia and India

IntroductionThe relationship between Ethiopia and India is characterised by close cultural affinity, economic complimentarity and cordial political ties. Ethiopia is home to a mosaic of nations, nationalities and people with more than 80 different spoken languages. The vast majority of the languages are the Semitic, Cushitic and Omotic. Semitic language speakers live predominantly in the highlands and lowlands of the south-central region as well as in the north-central area. Omotic language speakers live predominantly in the south. The Nilo-Saharan super languages family accounts for about 2 percent of the population, and these languages are spoken near the Sudanese border. Amharic is used as a working language for the last 150 years and English is used as medium of instruction in secondary schools and universities (Embassy of Ethiopia, New Delhi, 2011).Ethiopia has some of the earliest hominid populations and possibly the region where Homo erectus evolved and expanded out of Africa. The most notable pale anthropological find in the country was 'Lucky' a female Australopithecus aphaeresis discovered in 1974 and referred to as Dinqnesh (you are marvelous) by Ethiopians. The Country is one of the oldest civilizations with a rich diversity of its people and culture which includes the unique letter of the alphabet, calendar and clock. Ethiopia was ruled by successive kings, emperors until 1974 where the military took over. In 1991, the military rule was ousted by the struggle of the Ethiopian people; hence in 1994 Ethiopia ratified a new constitution and declared a Federal Democratic Republic (Pankhurst, 1997).The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is composed of nine Regional States that are; Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Southern Nation Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harari; and two City Administration council of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. The regional states and city administrations are subdivided into 817 administrative Woredas (districts). A Woreda/District is the basic decentralised administrative unit and has an administrative council composed of elected members. Following a democratic system, election is held every 5 years thus, the fourth election was held in May 2011. There are more than 50 National and Regional Political Parties as well as private media that enhances the democratisation process that is under way.As both Ethiopia and India are old civilizations with 3,000 and 5,000 years of history respectively, their relations go back to thousands of years. During the Aksumite Kingdom of Ethiopia, Indian traders used to bring to Abesenia (the former name of Ethiopia) spices and silk and take back gold and ivory (Ethiopian Embassy, UK, 2011). The present Ethiopia has embraced upon a development effort to eradicate poverty and democratise its society. In so doing it has recorded tremendous achievements in economic and social development as witnessed by the 2010 human development index.According to the 2010 Human Development Report (HDR), Ethiopia is rated among the 'top movers' at rank 11 out of the 135 which registered improvement in Human Development Index that stretched between 1970 and 2010. The achievement status of Ethiopia indicates that life expectancy at birth increased by almost 5 years, GNI per capita increased by 75 percent, expected years of schooling increased by 4 years. This progress would have been difficult if not impossible without the assistance and cooperation of friendly countries like India.RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND INDIA - TODAYAccording to some historians, Indians came into direct contact with Ethiopia and exchange commodities between the two countries in ancient times. In 16th century, Indian technicians came to Ethiopia from Goa with Portuguese missionaries and contributed much in the fields of construction and craft. The influence of Indian Architecture is visible in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia (Rashidi, 2007). …

Cultural contact and change in naming practices among the Aari of southwest Ethiopia

When people of different cultures interact, a degree of linguistic and/or cultural adaptation is expected. This paper examines the implication of the relationship between the Aari and the Gama for the naming practices of the former. The Aari people, who speak Araf, came into contact with Amharic-speaking migrants from central and northern Ethiopia (collectively called the Gama) during the southward expansion of Emperor Menelik in the late nineteenth century. Traditionally, the Aari people used names to express their collective history, shared life experiences, major events, and their environment. The incorporation of Aariland into the Ethiopian empire led to economic, political, and cultural domination as well as resistance on the part of the Aari. Personal names that characterize the period of struggle against the dominant migrants became common until the 1974 revolution that ended the Gama hegemony. Afterwards, however, the naming tradition suffered a setback as evidenced in the decline of Aari personal names in favour of Amhara names and the alteration of the spelling and pronunciation of Aari names. The new changes in naming practices compromised the role of the Aari language as an expression of culture and a marker of identity.

The Gaz Raids and Reconstruction of the Ethiopian Empire: The Final Gaz in Tigray and Northern Wollo, 1941–1942

The<i> Gaz</i> Raids and Reconstruction of the Ethiopian Empire: The Final <i>Gaz</i> in Tigray and Northern Wollo, 1941–1942

Catholic Action and Ugandan Radicalism: Political Activism in Buganda, 1930-1950

[Various scholars have shown that dreams and visions constituted an important means for apprehending religious truths in Ethiopian society. Drawing on these works, the present study focuses on the role of dreams and visions in the process of Christian Ethiopians' conversion to Catholicism during the early 1600s. In the first three decades of that century, the Jesuit mission sought—albeit with mixed results—to implant Catholicism into the Ethiopian Empire. Dreams and visions helped neophytes cope with the crises that were triggered by the new religion, as individuals turned to them in order to bridge the demands laid down by the missionaries and the norms of their own community and thereby intensify their devotion to their newfound faith. Alternatively, others used dreams and visions to resist the encroachment of the European missionaries., In late colonial Uganda, Catholic individuals, communities, institutions and ideals shaped the rise of a popular politics that rejected the colonial alliance between Britain and Baganda oligarchs and called for change. Catholics valued and worked effectively with hierarchies, used elaborate catechisms and questioning in their calls for action, and deployed networks of activist cells and intelligence gathering as they sought community solidarity around their central goals. These methods provided a template for action for the more directly political initiatives of Catholics and lapsed Catholics of the late 1940s in the Bataka Union and the mobilized cotton communities of Masaka and Kampala. The Catholic antecedents of 1940s and 1950s activism help explain elements of activists' initiatives that fail to fit more conventional analytic structures assessing politics through the lenses of class or nationalism.]

ETHIOPIA: FROM A CENTRALISED MONARCHY TO A FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Although the Ethiopian state traces its roots back to the empire of Axum in the first centuries AD, the modern Ethiopian state took shape in the second half of the 19th century. During that period the territory of the Ethiopian empire expanded considerably. Several ethnic groups were incorporated into the empire and the foundations for a strong, centralised state were laid. Centralisation of authority in the hands of the emperor and a strategy of nation building that denied the ethnic diversity of Ethiopian society characterised the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie. At the same time, these elements contributed to its decline. Haile Selassie was ultimately deposed by a military committee in 1974. This announced the end of the Ethiopian monarchy and the transformation of the Ethiopian state, following the Marxist model. In spite of Marxist-Leninist attention to the 'nationalities issue', Ethiopia remained a centralised state, dominated by one ethnic identity. This gave rise to increasing resistance from various regional and ethnic liberation movements. The combined effort of these movements caused the fall of military rule in May 1991. The new regime, which was dominated by ethnically organised parties, initiated a radical transformation of the Ethiopian state structure that leads to the establishment of a federation in 1995.Key Words: Ethiopia, Political Development, Constitutional Development, State Structure

Ethiopia: From a Centralised Monarchy to a Federal Republic

Ethiopia: From a Centralised Monarchy to a Federal Republic Although the Ethiopian state traces its roots back to the empire of Axum in the first centuries AD, the modern Ethiopian state took shape in the second half of the 19th century. During that period the territory of the Ethiopian empire expanded considerably. Several ethnic groups were incorporated into the empire and the foundations for a strong, centralised state were laid Centralisation of authority in the hands of the emperor and a strategy of nation building that denied the ethnic diversity of Ethiopian society characterised the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie. At the same time, these elements contributed to its decline. Haile Selassie was ultimately deposed by a military committee in 1974. This announced the end of the Ethiopian monarchy and the transformation of the Ethiopian state, following the Marxist model. In spite of Marxist-Leninist attention to the 'nationalities issue', Ethiopia remained a centralised state, dominated by one ethnic identity. This gave rise to increasing resistance from various regional and ethnic liberation movements. The combined effort of these movements caused the fall of military rule in May 1991. The new regime, which was dominated by ethnically organised parties, initiated a radical transformation of the Ethiopian state structure that leads to the establishment of a federation in 1995.

The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology (review)

Part I. The making of an imperial state: 1. Old Abyssinia and the new Ethiopian empire: themes in social history Donald Donham Part II. Renegotiating power and authority: 2. Nekemte and Addis Abeba: dilemmas of provincial rule Alessandro Triulzi 3. From ritual kings to Ethiopian landlords in Maale Donald Donham 4. Institutionalizing a fringe periphery: Dassanetch-Amhara relations Uri Almagor Part III. Reorienting kinship and identity: 5. Lifelines: exchange marriage among the Gumuz Wendy James 6. A problem of domination at the periphery: the Kwegu and the Mursi David Turton Part IV. Expanding tribute and trade: 7. Coffee in centre-periphery relations: Gedeo in the early twentieth century Charles W. McCellan 8. Vicious cycles: ivory, slaves, and arms on the new Maji frontier Peter P. Garretson 9. On the Nilotic frontier: imperial Ethiopia in the southern Sudan, 1898-1936 Douglas H. Johnson Epilogue Wendy James.

National Identity and Historical Mythology in Eritrea and Somaliland

National Identity and Historical Mythology in Eritrea and Somaliland Patrick Gilkes The 1990s saw the appearance of two new states in the Horn of Africa—Eritrea and Somaliland. Eritrea achieved de facto recognition in 1991 after a 30-year struggle against the central government of Ethiopia, and its existence was formally recognized by the international community two years later.1 Somaliland also declared itself independent in 1991 after a ten-year struggle against the regime of Siad Barre in Mogadishu; it has yet to be internationally recognized though its existence is widely accepted. Eritrea's struggle for independence has been largely portrayed as a struggle within the framework of decolonization in Africa, albeit slightly delayed (see Iyob 1995, Sherman 1980, Markakis 1987). Somaliland has used the existence of a five-day period of independence from the colonial power, Britain, to put forward an anticolonial argument for its right to independence from the former Italian Somaliland, with which it was united in the Republic of Somalia from 1960 to 1991 (see Trouval 1963, Contini 1969, Rajagopal and Carroll 1992). Both Eritrea and Somaliland won their independence by military means, and both have made much of their successes in this area, especially Eritrea. Indeed, it might be argued that the Eritrean emphasis on this contributed largely to the hubris that appears to have been a major cause of its defeat in 2000 by Ethiopia; subsequent events suggest that no lessons have been learnt (see Gilkes 2002). In fact, it was the collapse of the central power in both cases that was the major factor in the guerrilla successes, and while the military victories of the fronts certainly contributed, they were only one among a number of significant factors. [End Page 163] In pursuit of state creation, both Eritrea and Somaliland have embarked, if not always systematically, on the creation of separate histories to buttress their claims to independence. In Eritrea this has involved the invention of a previously unknown Eritrean identity prior to Italian colonialism as well as an equally unacknowledged resistance to the Italian colonial conquest (see Jordan Gebre-Medhin 1989, Okbagzhi Yohannes 1991). It was, in part, a necessity. Three of Eritrea's nine ethnic groups straddle its border with Ethiopia. The largest group is made up of Tigrinya speakers, who constitute about 50 percent of the Eritrean population and have historically been major players, indeed an integral element, in all of the "Ethiopian" empires to the south, from Axum in the first century AD to Haile Selassie and Mengistu in the twentieth century. Eritrea in its entirety was incorporated in the Ethiopian Empire between 1962 and 1993, enlarging the empire to its greatest extent. The creation of an acceptable history of the new Eritrean state is a process that started, understandably, within the guerrilla struggle before independence. It was an integral part of the propaganda war and military conflicts between the original Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). These split the Eritrean liberation movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and the divisive process has continued since 1991. The effects have become very clear since Ethiopia's victory in 2000, and to a considerable degree they underpin the divisions within the EPLF, now the ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). The insistence by the EPLF, the victor in the second Eritrean civil war with the ELF in 1981–1982, on the independence war as an anti-colonial struggle was, perhaps, a necessity at the time, but it was more of an issue for debate than an intellectual certainty. A central problem for the EPLF was that the historic identity of a substantial part of Eritrea's population and land area was identical to that of northern Ethiopia. Eritrea, as an entity in its own right, was given territorial definition by colonialism, and an Eritrean identity was forged during the colonial period. Nevertheless, a significant element in the colony of Eritrea, the Kebessa, has its own potential "motherland" in the Ethiopian empire state of which it had historically been a part for centuries. The Kebessa [End Page 164] was where the Christian, highland, agricultural, and Tigrean elements of the population were concentrated...

The Italian Invasion, the Ethiopian Empire, and Oromo Nationalism: The Significance of the Western Oromo Confederation of 1936

The Italian Invasion, the Ethiopian Empire, and Oromo Nationalism:The Significance of the Western Oromo Confederation of 1936 Ezekiel Gebissa Background In 1916, a palace coup d'état led by the Shewan nobility brought to power Ras Taffari Mekonnen as the regent and heir apparent to the throne of the Ethiopian empire.1 Soon Taffari began to take measures to make himself the de facto ruler of the empire. In the 1920s, he focused on removing Menelik's stalwarts from office and cutting them off from their power base. After his accession to the throne in 1930 as Emperor Haile Sellassie, he embarked on a program of political centralization to end the limited autonomy of the regions that had maintained semi-independent status since their incorporation into Ethiopia. As he worked to concentrate power in his own hands, Haile Sellassie reversed the political arrangements of Emperor Menelik. The latter had ruled through a combination of coercion and consent, appointing military rulers where he encountered resistance and granting internal autonomy to hereditary rulers who agreed to accept his suzerainty peacefully and pay annual tributes.2 Haile Sellassie found his predecessor's administrative system incongruent with his vision of an empire ruled from the center by an all-powerful sovereign. He abolished the semi-independent status of such regions as Tigray, Gojjam, and Jimma, and appointed only Shewans to rule the subordinate regions.3 [End Page 75] When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the deposed hereditary rulers felt that their time had come to settle scores. They defected to the Italian side in the hope of regaining their positions. Indeed, the Italians appointed them as governors of their former domains. In 1941, when Haile Sellassie returned to power, they were once again excluded from power. In response, they made common cause with the oppressed people in their regions and rebelled against an apparently "irreversible centralization under the hegemony of the Shewan Amhara nobility."4 In Oromo areas, grievances against the initial conquest and loss of autonomy ran deep. Ever since they had been conquered by Menelik, Oromos had expressed their rejection of Abyssinian rule through acts of defiance, ranging from embracing Islam to outright rebellion. When Italy invaded Abyssinia, Oromos seized the moment to reclaim their lost freedom and sovereign existence. In 1935, the Raya and Azeboo Oromos attacked the Abyssinian armies going to and returning from the Battle of Maichew. Even the fleeing emperor felt threatened enough to avoid passing through their land. In 1936, the Oromo of Jimma attacked and expelled Amhara officials and thereby demonstrated their rejection of colonial rule. In western Abyssinia, the hereditary rulers of the Oromo declared the establishment of an independent polity called the Western Oromo Confederation (WOC) and offered themselves as a mandate territory of the League of Nations.5 These acts of resistance have not been adequately documented in Ethiopian historiography. The neglect is not due to a lack of adequate sources. Contemporary observers have left a thorough record of events in the Oromo areas during the Italian invasion. British consular reports from Goré, for instance, maintain that several Oromo regions took advantage of the Italian invasion to reclaim their lands. According to one such report, the various factions (provinces) were always on the point of open war . . . with the Taffari party which was only a family government operating in Addis Ababa as events clearly proved on the Italian invasion every single province either going into open rebellion like GOJAM-TIGRE and OGADEN or passive rebellion by refusing to take part in the war like the western Galla provinces and the [End Page 76] southern provinces held in subjection with a light Amhara garrison of feudal soldiery holding the occupied provinces in serfdom. These Amhara garrisons were withdrawn to Northern front and the whole country has been seized by whatever tribe the province contains.6 As the above statement shows, most of the Oromo resistance movements have always sought freedom from Amhara domination, restoration of their land, and recognition of their cultural identity and political autonomy. These objectives ran contrary to the political desires of the Ethiopianist elite to maintain Ethiopia as a unified country. Documenting Oromo-led movements as worthy historical phenonema...

Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide against the Oromo: A Historical Assessment of Human Rights Conditions in Ethiopia, ca. 1880s–2002

Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide against the Oromo:A Historical Assessment of Human Rights Conditions in Ethiopia, ca. 1880s–2002 Mohammed Hassen This article attempts to assess the human rights conditions of the Oromo people under four Ethiopian regimes. Beginning with the conquest and incorporation of Oromia into the Ethiopian empire, it provides an overview of the brutality and depredations that Oromos suffered at the hands of Ethiopian soldiers and administrators under Menelik (r. 1880s–1913) and the concerted attacks on the Oromo cultural heritage, language, and national identity during the six decades when Haile Sellassie dominated the Ethiopian political landscape (1916–74). Then it examines the violence against the Oromo national identity and the attempt to alter the demographic makeup of Oromia by the Ethiopian military-socialist regime (1974–91) and the massive human rights violations perpetrated against the Oromo since 1992 in the name of democracy and federalism. In all, the article shows that for more than a century, the Oromo have endured unrelenting attacks on their individual rights, their national identity and cultural institutions, and their independent organizations. Ethiopia has yet to produce a government that respects Oromo human rights. Before I proceed, a few caveats are in order. First, the definition of human rights varies depending on cultural, historical, political, economic, and ideological considerations. In this article, I will follow the definition of Mahmood Monshipuri: [End Page 15] The concept of human rights . . . refers to . . . civil and political rights; rights to life, privacy, a fair trial, humane treatment, prohibition of torture and slavery, freedom of movement and residence; the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained; freedom of association, political participation, and equal protection under the law.2 Second, "Historians, in general, are most at home when dealing with events that have been allowed to settle over time."3 It is easier to discuss Oromo human rights conditions before 1991, an era that belongs to history, than in the period since 1991, a highly contested period of history in the making. As I have noted elsewhere, "the present is an emotionally charged psychological moment."4 While it is possible to present a relatively objective picture of Oromo human rights conditions based on the record produced by both Ethiopian and foreign writers,5 one cannot escape being accused of exaggerating the Oromo people's plight and indulging in anti–Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) propaganda. My purpose is nevertheless to document the human rights conditions of the Oromo as a scholar loyal to the canons and standard practices of my discipline. If this article encourages others to write about human rights conditions in Ethiopia, its purpose will have been served. Third, the Oromo do not have influential friends in positions of power among Western governments and the Western media. Diaspora Oromos do not have the numerical strength and resources necessary to capture the attention of either the governments or the media. Consequently, the sufferings of the Oromo have received little international attention. The apparent Western indifference to the misery of the Oromos has encouraged the TPLF authorities to continue their Oromo human rights violations with impunity. I believe my duty to the victims of human rights violations is "to record their plight so that they are not forgotten by history, and that history is not rewritten to conceal or distort embarrassing facts."6 This article is an attempt to contribute in a small way to the effort of recording the past in its totality so that future generations will not have to relive their tortured past. Space does not permit me to provide a thorough account of human rights conditions in Ethiopia between the 1880s and 2002. Instead of a detailed discussion, I will outline the salient features of the human rights conditions experienced by the Oromo people [End Page 16] during the century after Menelik's conquests in the 1880s, and I will focus especially on the period after 1991. Conquest, Exploitation, and Deculturation: The Imperial Period, 1880s–1974 During the second half of the nineteenth century, the steady flow of European warfare technology into Abyssinia and its virtual absence from Oromia facilitated and increased Abyssinian raids for slave and cattle into Oromo territory. This...

Book Reviews

Book Reviews

Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia: From the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century

Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia: From the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century

Property Rights and the Role of the State: Evidence from the Horn of Africa

This study applies extant theories of property rights change to three land tenure systems in Imperial Ethiopia. Two of the areas underwent changes in property rights after experiencing changes in the value of land; one did not. A data set of litigation over land rights is used in conjunction with case studies to understand the mechanisms motivating or impeding property rights change. Amendments to the role of the state are suggested and two conclusions are reached: (1) that movement towards greater specificity of land rights did not always occur; and (2) the changes in property rights that occurred were imposed from above, rather than occurring endogenously. Where property rights changes did not occur, they appear to have been blocked by the state, which was more concerned with political survival than with revenue maximisation.

Property rights and the role of the state: evidence from the Horn of Africa

This study applies extant theories of property rights change to three land tenure systems in Imperial Ethiopia. Two of the areas underwent changes in property rights after experiencing changes in the value of land; one did not. A data set of litigation over land rights is used in conjunction with case studies to understand the mechanisms motivating or impeding property rights change. Amendments to the role of the state are suggested and two conclusions are reached: (1) that movement towards greater specificity of land rights did not always occur; and (2) the changes in property rights that occurred were imposed from above, rather than occurring endogenously. Where property rights changes did not occur, they appear to have been blocked by the state, which was more concerned with political survival than with revenue maximisation.