The article provides an overview of complex and ambiguous relations of the philosophy of law and legal scholarship with science, as well as tries to cover their similarities and differences. Consequently, the article provides critical analysis of contemporary radically opposite approaches to the interpretation of this issue present in philosophical and legal academic literature. The article criticizes both the approaches denying the alliance between the science and philosophy of law thus reducing it to ideology only, as well as those viewing philosophy of law an academic discipline principally different from legal scholarship attributing the latterto “legal dogmatics” only. Contemporary postmodern (postnonclassical) ideas about science (scholarship) focusing on inseparable links between cognitive, anthropological (applying human as the unit of measurement) and axiological sides of the reflection of reality do not provide groundsfor sharp differentiation between the object of the study and its subject, which is the basis for the abovementioned approaches. In fact, they are relatively autonomous elements of whole, integrated developing systemsincluding law generally, as well as legal scholarship and the philosophy of law. The abovementioned arguments provide basis for the article to differentiate common features of the philosophy of law with modern legal scholarship (those being the existence of creative subject, common goal, application of rational and logical evidence in objectivation of рhilosophical and legal hypotheses, concepts, theories etc.), as well as difference between them (e.g. instability of its relation to practice, frequent absence of actual real life corresponding features, special cognitive activities built on self-analysis, ideas and special world perception (philosophical reflection), tight connection to art in addition to science etc.). These ideas get proof from the short analysis of science and art correlation specifics pointed out in major modern philosophical and legal concepts (doctrines of natural law, legal positivism,sociological jurisprudence and their variations). The article stipulates that they have to be judged not by application of scientific criteria of “true-false” but by application of their interdependence concept.Finally, the author stipulates that unlike legal scholarship being more international than national, the ideas of legal philosophy (including those accepted widely by different nations) are viewed through the prism of national traditions, national legal culture, mentality and cognitive abilityof the nation, thus accepting solid national features, providing also grounds for differentiation of the philosophy of law from legal scholarship thus making it a special method of world perception being distinct from science.