IAEA Safeguards Research Articles

Features of applying safeguards to Optimized Floating Power Unit spent nuclear fuel handling

After the Floating Power Unit Akademik Lomonosov with the KLT-40S reactor plant had been successfully commissioned, the next step for ROSATOM was to develop optimized floating power units (OFPU). OFPUs powered by the RITM reactor plant are an export-oriented product, and they designed to operate on sites outside Russia. OFPU engineering solutions are based upon the practical design and operation experience in nuclear-powered icebreakers and upon problem solving to assure safety for operation of nuclear plants under severe northern conditions. At the nuclear fuel enrichment lower than 20%, the refueling interval for the OFPU may be up to 10 years depending on Loadings. The RITM reactor refueling process has a number of differences compared to the refueling process of other nuclear power plants fitted with water-cooled water-moderated power reactors. RITM plants have never been placed under the IAEA Safeguards, and capabilities and features of applying the IAEA Safeguards to such plants require an additional analysis. The developed operation model assumes that the OFPU be operated on a deployment site for a long period, and all fuel handling operations will be done at a specialized facility in the Russian Federation (RF). This paper is discussing the major fuel handling features in the life cycle of the OFPU fitted with RITM-200M—these are the critical features in terms of the IAEA Safeguards. Also, the paper is providing the designers’ perspective on solving the key non-proliferation problems through adapting the Safeguards approaches with account of the OFPU technical features.

A new era of plutonium assay and isotope ratio measurements at ultra-low levels in IAEA safeguards environmental swipe samples by isotope dilution MC-ICP-MS using a 244Pu spike

A new era of plutonium assay and isotope ratio measurements at ultra-low levels in IAEA safeguards environmental swipe samples by isotope dilution MC-ICP-MS using a 244Pu spike

Comparison of existing and new optical fiber-based scintillation detectors for spent-fuel verification equipment

The Wolsung Nuclear Power Plant in Korea is under IAEA safeguards. During IAEA physical inventory verifications, the Optical Fiber radiation Probe System has been used since 2007 as the official instrument for verification of spent fuel. Its low sensitivity requires excessive time and labor to perform the IAEA safeguard activities and increases the operator load for preparing a dangerous and time-consuming secondary inspection. The objective of this paper is to develop a superior new optical fiber-based scintillation detector to deal with such issues. To increase the sensitivity of the instrument, a new optical fiber-based scintillation detector was developed by combining a p-terphenyl scintillator with a new type of optical fiber. A field test was carried out in the CANDU Wolsung Unit 1 to characterize the performance of the new detector. The field test showed that the OFPS using the new optical fiber-based scintillation detector has at least 100-times higher sensitivity and can also measure even very weak signals not measurable by the existing detector. From the experimental results, we can conclude that the newly developed OFPS detector would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of nuclear safeguards for verification of spent fuel in wet storage pools of CANDU reactors.

IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN A STATE WITH AN IMPORTED FAST REACTOR AND A CLOSED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

The implementation of the IAEA safeguards in the non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) that has imported the fast-neutron reactor with nuclear fuel cycle facilities is considered. The features of fast reactors that should be taken into account when preparing them for export together with CNFC technologies considering the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the importing state, are noted. These include high mass fraction of plutonium in fresh fuel loads and handling of a large amounts of fissile materials in the technological cycles of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. It is concluded that it is possible to implement the effective IAEA safeguards in the state importing such reactor and nuclear fuel cycle facilities considering their physical and design features and innovative technologies, including those used in the IAEA safeguards implementation.

Floating Power Units and IAEA Safeguards

Floating Power Units and IAEA Safeguards

Detection of Indications of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Breaches By States Importing Fast Reactors with Closed NFC Installations

The possibility of a state, which has imported a fast reactor with closed fuel cycle enterprises, breaching the nuclear non-proliferation regime and secretly using the acquired equipment, technologies, and nuclear materials to originate nuclear weapons is discussed. It is assumed that the most likely development of events could be an importing state combining clandestine and overt scenarios: clandestine for the preparatory period of development of the non-nuclear components of a nuclear device, accumulation of experience and knowledge, and obtaining the required amount of weapons-grade nuclear material and overt for testing the developed device and its replication. Possible tools for detecting signs of breaching of a nuclear non-proliferation regime when IAEA safeguards are used in an importing state using information technologies are considered.

BARRIERS TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE EXPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FAST REACTORS WITH CLOSED NFC (USING EXAMPLE BREST-OD-300)

In the coming decades, it is possible to start exporting fast reactors with a closed nuclear fuel cycle to non-nuclear-weapon countries, which will require strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and increasing the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. This can be achieved both by creating technical barriers and by improving the system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and ensuring their reliable physical protection. Using the example of the BREST-OD-300 reactor under construction as part of a pilot demonstration power complex, the analysis of design and technological features that prevent or seriously hinder the switching of nuclear materials or the use of technologies by the importing State in violation of its international obligations to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices has been carried out.

Technical and Economic Features of IAEA Safeguards Application at NPPs with a Fast Reactor and On-Site Fuel Cycle

Technical and Economic Features of IAEA Safeguards Application at NPPs with a Fast Reactor and On-Site Fuel Cycle

Investigation of a novel on-site U concentration analysis method for UO2 pellets using gamma spectroscopy

As the IAEA has applied integrated safeguards and a state level approach to member states, the importance of national inspection has increased. However, the requirements for national inspection for some member states are different from the IAEA safeguards. In particular, the national inspection for the ROK requires on-site U concentration analysis due to a domestic notification. This research proposes an on-site U concentration analysis (OUCA) method for UO2 pellets using gamma spectroscopy to satisfy the domestic notification requirement. The OUCA method calculates the U concentration of UO2 pellets using the measured net X-ray counts and declared 235U enrichment. This research demonstrates the feasibility of the OUCA method using both MCNP simulation and experiment. It simulated and measured the net X-ray counts of different UO2 pellets with different U concentrations and 235U enrichments. The simulated and measured net X-ray counts were fitted to polynomials as a function of U concentration and 235U enrichment. The goodness-of-fit results of both simulation and experiment demonstrated the feasibility of the OUCA method.

Security of Export Deliveries of Regenerated-Uranium Light-Water Reactor Fuel from the Standpoint of IAEA Safeguards

The nonproliferation of nuclear materials is the key issue in supplying nuclear fuel to foreign countries. This article discusses the use of regenerated uranium to enhance the security of exports of fresh fuel for light-water reactors. It is shown that if the removal of fuel and its replacement with, for example, natural uranium go undetected, the criminals have long periods of time available to obtain a significant amount of highly enriched uranium, having only several tens of separation devices. The nonproliferation regime can be strengthened by using regenerated uranium, which contains in its decay chain 208Tl (2.61 MeV γ-line) and is advantageously distinguished from 235U (186 keV γ-line). It is shown theoretically that by controlling the thallium content the uranium content in the fuel rods can be quickly analyzed before a fuel assembly is loaded into the core.

Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation via Nuclear-Submarine Programs

ABSTRACT Brazil is building a nuclear-powered attack submarine, South Korea has in the past asserted its need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to deal with the threat of North Korean nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Iran has asserted more vaguely its need for naval nuclear propulsion. All three countries are non-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Their interest in naval reactors brings with it two challenges to the NPT: (1) The safeguards “loophole” under which a country can withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards indefinitely for allowed “non-peaceful activities”; and (2) A justification for the acquisition of national uranium-enrichment facilities because the international suppliers of enrichment services have peaceful-use requirements. In fact, Brazil’s acquisition of enrichment was driven by its navy. It is argued, however, that nuclear-powered attack submarines have advantages over modern conventional attack submarines primarily in their ability to transit great distances at high speed whereas only a few countries have foreign military commitments requiring such capabilities. For defense of nearby waters against foreign navies, attack submarines are merely one component of a complex system of anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels and underwater sensor networks. Conventional attack submarines are no less effective and much less costly than nuclear-powered attack submarines in this role.

Features of light-water reactor fuel made of reprocessed uranium in terms of IAEA safeguards implementation

One of the main priorities of nuclear power development is Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. So, the possibility of nuclear materials illicit diversion must be ruled out. This study aims to assess the chance of producing significant quantity of Highly enriched uranium (HEU) in case of covert diversion of fresh fuel. Analysis is carried out on the assumption that stolen reactor-grade Low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel was made of reprocessed uranium and got to be enriched to 90% 235U in gas centrifuges. As its isotopic composition contains a set of even-numbered minors 232,234,236U, such operation for producing the main component of nuclear explosive device is harder comparing to one when fuel was made of natural uranium. Despite the higher proliferation resistance of reused fuel, there is a chance that it could be used in undeclared nuclear weapons programs. So, we are highlighting the importance of timely detection of nuclear materials diversion, especially for the LEU, which is the most sensitive to proliferation. Fortunately, due to unique physical properties of reprocessed uranium, such detection is possible with a quick NDA test even in case of a single fuel rod replacement.

Detecting Clandestine Reprocessing Activities in the Middle East

ABSTRACTRemote monitoring of krypton-85 from undeclared reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel could be part of a fissile material cut-off treaty, could serve as an additional measure for the IAEA safeguards system to monitor compliance with the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, and could be an important verification tool of a reprocessing moratorium or Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East or East Asia. Atmospheric transport modelling is applied to determine the area over which krypton-85 emissions from undeclared reprocessing activities at various levels in the Middle East would still be detectable against the high krypton-85 background from reprocessing in historical weapon programs in the United States and USSR as well as more recent and ongoing commercial reprocessing in France and the U.K. Analysis of annual wind flow over Israel's Dimona facility, the only operating reprocessing site in the region, suggests that a known reprocessing plant could be monitored with one or a few fixed monitoring stations. Random air sampling for krypton-85 analysis, perhaps using drones, may be feasible for reliable and timely detection of clandestine reprocessing plants against the krypton-85 background but would require on the order of 50–100 air samples per day. Ending reprocessing at La Hague in France and at Sellafield in the UK and the resulting decline of the krypton-85 background over time would reduce to about 10 the number of daily samples required to monitor the Middle East.

IAEA safeguards: patterns of interaction and their applicability beyond the Cold War

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

The establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

Lessons for the future

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

Negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

Negotiating and sustaining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: challenges and lessons for US–Russia cooperation

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

The origins of US–Soviet non-proliferation cooperation

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.

The 1977 South Africa nuclear crisis

Relations between the United States and Russia today are beset by rivalry in almost every sphere, and mutual suspicion reigns. Both parties have shunned arms-reduction talks and are pursuing nuclear modernisation programmes; a new nuclear arms race looms. Yet the two leading nuclear powers have shared interests in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, as did the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.This Adelphi book reaches back to episodes of US–Soviet cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to identify factors that permitted successful joint action, even in circumstances of profound geopolitical rivalry. It includes essays on the collaboration that prevented South Africa from conducting a nuclear-weapon test in 1977; Cold-War-era discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions and the developments that led from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT); negotiating and sustaining the NPT; the establishment of the London Club and nuclear-export controls; bolstering IAEA safeguards; and negotiating the draft Radiological Weapons Convention. From these case studies, the editors identify seven lessons for contemporary policymakers and three immediate challenges that can only be overcome through bilateral cooperation.