IAEA Safeguards Research Articles

IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

A former UK representative on the IAEA Governing Board gives a personal view of IAEA safeguards. He suggests that criticism of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System some of it appearing in Phys. Tech., often reflects a misunderstanding of the role of IAEA safeguards and an underestimation of what safeguards have achieved. The limitations and strengths of IAEA safeguards are assessed and the balance in their favour is found

IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety analyst considers from an international perspective safeguards necessary to prevent proliferation.

United Nations: Consideration of the Military Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Center and IAEA Safeguards Regime

United Nations: Consideration of the Military Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Center and IAEA Safeguards Regime

Breaking the rules without quite stopping the bomb: European views

While nonproliferation is no longer in the focus of international attention in the aftermath of the Afghanistan crisis, the problem of checking the spread of nuclear weapons was the subject of an intense controversy between the United States and Europe throughout the 1970s.Beginning with the Ford administration policy and continuing with the new Carter nonproliferation policy, a major nuclear controversy opposed the American and European nuclear suppliers.The first area of controversy was the question of technological transfers to the Third World and the conditions for such transfers (embargoes on sensitive technology, IAEA safeguards). The controversy also spread into the area of the plutonium economy—i.e., breeders and reprocessing. On both of these questions, most of the problems raised in the 1970s are still open despite some rapprochement between European and American positions. Major points of disagreement remain in the aftermath of the INFCE: full scope safeguards, the question of breeder reactors, and plutonium economy. The major uncertainty for the future will be whether nuclear energy as a whole will remain in the present state of depression or whether nuclear programs throughout the world will grow again.

Nuclear power proliferation — no case for anguish

Brain Johnson's article ‘Nuclear power proliferation: Problems of international control’ ( Energy Policy, Vol 5, No 3, September 1977, pp 179–194) has provoked the rejoinder below from the IAEA. It is maintained that IAEA safeguards have not been inadequate, but that the risk of proliferation is high whenever IAEA safeguards are absent.

The US-India safeguards dispute

The current U.S.-India dispute over nuclear safeguards is likely to be the single most important test of the Carter administration's anti-proliferation policies. The Carter administration wants India to accept comprehensive safeguards that would bar further production of nuclear explosives. The Desai government wants to maintain unsafeguarded facilities, in effect keeping the weapons option open. It has been a basic tenet of Indian nuclear policy since the mid-1950s that the big powers must disarm if the small powers are to renounce acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a matter of practical policy, India is willing to forego a nuclear deterrent only if sustained world pressure keeps China's nuclear aspirations in check. As a matter of basic principle, India regards it as unfair and imperialistic that the heavily armed big powers ask for special assurances from the lightly armed small powers. India takes the position that it will cooperate with the United States only voluntarily and only if the nuclear weapon states or at least the superpowers start to clean up their own act. The superpowers must (1) negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; (2) accept full-scope safeguards themselves, which would be tantamount to a ban on any further production of weapons-grade materials;more » and (3) make significant moves toward total nuclear disarmament. The dependence of India on the United States for nuclear supplies is almost negligible. India's major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction include five research reactors, seven power reactors and three reprocessing facilities. Of these 15 facilities, the United States supplied only one (the Tarapur reactor) and 12 of them are not under IAEA safeguards. The United States, in short, is threatening to terminate supplies of low-enriched uranium for just one reactor unless India places these 12 facilities under IAEA safeguards. (MCW)« less

Controlling weapons-grade fissile material

The forthcoming colossal increase in nuclear power capacity in both developed and developing countries during the next few decades will require strict international control of weapons-grade material in all stages of processing and storage. The elementary mechanics of weapons-grade materials and of their detonation are described. The stages of the fuel cycle and their vulnerability are also described. The development of the IAEA safeguards system is discussed. Present IAEA efforts are adequate, but they will need to be stepped up in the future as nuclear power spreads. Measures to improve safeguards are recommended. (DLC)

The United Nations, the Superpowers, and Proliferation

Although nuclear weapons are likely to spread to small and medium powers, the main problem for inter national security will be the effect of proliferation on the avoidance of nuclear war between the superpowers. It is therefore from their vantage point that this essay assesses the role of international organizations in a nuclear-armed world. A new class of disputes caused by violations of IAEA safe guards and permissible withdrawals from the NPT is destined to be placed on the Security Council agenda. These disputes, moreover, may provide the superpowers with the opportunity to cement their common interests in controlling the effects of proliferation. Further periodic Soviet-American confrontations of nuclear-crisis proportions are to be expected, albeit in a new political context complicated by proliferation. The UN can help resolve these, as it has past crises, by pro viding an organ of last resort, registering, implementing particular provisions of these agreements, and above all cap italizing on them to advance new resources for the promotion of international security. All of these roles could be better played if the UN established an International Nuclear Security Planning Group, to devise, plan for, and supervise the execution of measures which command great support— and superpower agreement. Anything more radical, un fortunately, would require a significant upsurge of insecurity which could only result from a boundary event such as the first use of nuclear weapons.