Hegel's Work Research Articles

A Hegelian approach to resilient communities.

This theoretical study draws on the insights of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel to suggest certain aspects of communities and other groups that would tend to make them more resilient in the face of climate change. While Hegel addresses resilient dimensions at the societal level, this study interprets Hegel's work to derive aspects of groups within society that would tend to make them resilient.

The Hegelian Art of the Table of Contents: On the logic, and tradition, of Hegel's organizational practices

Abstract: During the early 19th century, a peculiarly systematic way of organizing books emerged in Germany. This systematization, which purported to be a rational organization of subject matter, was an outgrowth of the philosophy of Hegel. This article attempts to outline Hegel's organizational practice. It argues that Hegel's encyclopedia was a reaction against the Enlightenment encyclopedia, and that it attempted to restore the systematic mindset of pre-modern reference books. Yet it did this, not in a straightforward fashion, but by developing a method for organizing material that both stresses the interconnectedness of knowledge and promises to be highly scalable. In its attempt to trace the Hegelian organizational method, this article revisits and calls attention to a forgotten work in Hegel scholarship by Michael John Petry, who was the first writer to seriously stress the importance of classification in Hegel's work. This article is an attempt to demonstrate that Hegelianism and information organization can be brought into fruitful and mutually beneficial dialogue.

Becoming No‐Thing: Eckhart and Hegel on Identity and Difference

Abstract: My goal in this paper is to draw productively on Meister Eckhart's concept of the ‘no‐thing’ in order to illuminate Hegel's ontotheological account of both human and divine kenosis. I advance the view that just as divine kenosis is understood as the outpouring of the divine which includes the death of Christ in its economic activity, human kenosis also requires an engagement with death, namely, a spiritual death to the finite. It is via this species of death which is a becoming ‘no‐thing’ that the reconciliation between the human and the divine is disclosed as a unity that relies on the shared identity of the divine and the human while simultaneously respecting the integrity of both. Indeed, it is in and through their parallel activity of kenosis that finite and infinite being achieve their respective transcendence by necessarily engaging with the being of the other. Hence, Hegel's ontotheological work is not reducible to sheer immanentism as some scholars suggest, but instead upholds the genuine transcendence of the divine.

Hegelian Conjunction, Hegelian Contradiction

Understanding what is the strictly formal import of Hegel's view is something on which few analytic philosophers have seen time worth spending. Still in our view there is enough in Hegel's work to suggest that a formal account of his dialectial process might be profitable both for better understanding Hegel's ideas and for introducing a new sort of glutty logic. The focus of our analysis is Hegel's Conjunction, which, in our view, is the crucial dialectical operation, on which all others are ultimately based.

The “event-tragedy” of war in the figures of Badiwan’s reflections as a condition of philosophy

Claiming our share in discursive positions, ideas and assessments of Russian aggression in Ukraine, reflections on it, we investigate this tragic event through heuristic value and "social relevance", influences on internal determinants — "life of mind" and spirit of man and communities, the formation of which is determined by the course of the war. Hegel's work "Phenomenology of the Spirit" was used to operationalize his position on the gestalts of the spirit, the appeal to which was stimulated by Slavoj Žižek's analysis and evaluation of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, in which he appealed to the Hegelian understanding of freedom, "for which Ukrainians are fighting today" (Žižek). In the analysis of the eventtragedy as the external world of human existence, emphasis is placed on the scientific content of the concept of the Event in the philosophical explorations of A. Badiou, S. Žižek, the heuristic fruitfulness of which is that they act as meaninggenerating factors in the configuration of the external and internal world of human life in a war situation. Regarding the latter, reflection is carried out through the prism of the psychoanalytic method, represented by the psychoanalytic model of thinking of Wilfred Bion and through the existential analysis of being by Karl Jaspers and Paul Tillich. The substantiation of the cognitive function of the life of the mind, which generates gestalts of the spirit and needs emotional coloring, required additional work by Hannah Arendt. The Deleuzian version of the event was used as a source for the formation of the concept of immediate existence for decision-making in the situation of a tragic event. It is noted that such searches are a significant part of the life of the mind and spirit, anxiety and resistance. Fichte's Ukrainian lamentation, his "Speech to the German Nation" during the time of Napoleon's invasions, is accompanied by references to M. Espany's theory of cultural transfer. Using the work of V. Frankl. P. Tillich, K. Jaspers in relation to Real Death allows us to apply Real Death as a marker of war to the conditions of modern philosophy.

“Phenomenology of Spirit” and the Hegelian Triad

The Phenomenology of Spirit summarizes Hegel's previous philosophical research and announces the outline of the future philosophy. Phenomenology of Spirit is the science of mental reality, which reduces the whole diversity of life and history to the relation of "consciousness" to "object" and inverts this relation to explain the mental movement and history of human beings. The Phenomenology of Spirit is not only an original work among all Hegel's works, but it is also one of the original works of the whole Western philosophy. This paper shows that Hegel, however, insists on the consistency of the development of thought and focuses on the study of appearances and the pure process of knowing.

Die verwerwing van absolute wete as louterings-proses in Hegel se Fenomenologie van de Geest

Hierdie artikel ondersoek die absolute wete as sleutelbegrip in Hegel se Fenomenologie van de Geest (2013). Die vermyding, onderbeklemtoning en wanbegrip van die absolute wete in veral 20ste-eeuse interpretasies van Hegel se werk sal met behulp van sy eie uiteensetting bevraagteken word. Eerstens is die absolute wete nie 'n klaargemaakte bloudruk wat kritiekloos op die werklikheid toegepas kan word nie, maar 'n moeisame proses wat mens nie van 'n afstand kan betrag nie en waardeur 'n mens self moet werk. Tweedens word aangevoer dat die absolute wete slegs die resultaat kan wees van die strengste moontlike beproewing,1 in die vorm van 'n "sich vollbringende Skeptizismus"; en derdens gaan dít wat deur die beproewing opgehef word, steeds gekoppel bly aan die absolute as deel van die prosesmatige aard daarvan. Die proses dui daarop dat selfverlies in die vorm van die uitwys van tekortkominge en selfverowering as die selfbewuswording van die gees twee kante van dieselfde muntstuk verteenwoordig, naamlik wat Hegel as die "loutering tot gees" beskryf.

Liefde en refleksiewe denke: Die vroeë Hegel oor die lotgevalle van die moderne mens

In hierdie artikel val die fokus op hoe Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel se vroeë denke en vroeë teologiese geskrifte die tema van die historiese lotgevalle van die moderne mens in die moderne wêreld hanteer. Meer spesifiek fokus die artikel op Hegel se begrip van die liefde soos hy dit in sy essay "Die Gees van die Christendom en sy lotgevalle"2 (1797-99) weergee, en op die epistemologiese, eties-politiese, ontologiese en krities-historiese implikasies daarvan. Hierteenoor word begrippe soos refleksiewe denke, eiendom en abstrakte reg in 'n sekere vroeëre dialektiese verhouding by Hegel in spel gebring. Die bydrae bestaan basies uit vier dele. Eerstens word, ter wille van die leser, 'n bondige biografiese skets van Hegel gegee. Tweedens word Hegel se vroeë teologiese geskrifte oor die verhouding van die moderne mens en sy diepste bronne, wat gedurende sy jare in Tübingen en Bern geskryf is, bondig gerekonstrueer. Dit bied derdens die agtergrond waarteen hierdie denkmotiewe by wyse van 'n fokus op sy belangrike essay "Die Gees van die Christendom en sy lotgevalle", uit sy Frankfurtse periode (1798-1799), verdiep word. Hierdie bespreking, waarin Hegel se argument in 'n aantal stappe gerekonstrueer word, vorm die kern van die bydrae. Laastens word aangetoon hoe die denkmotiewe in hierdie belangrike vroeë essay in Hegel se latere werke weerklank vind.

Hegel’s Interpretation of the Liar Paradox

In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel develops a subtle analysis of Megarian paradoxes: the Liar, the Veiled Man and the Sorites. In this paper, we focus on Hegel's interpretation of the Liar. We note that in Hegel's treatment there are positive suggestions for a new analysis of the paradox. Faced with the Liar's sentence ‘µ’ that says ‘“µ” is false’, Hegel's idea is that the conjunction ‘µ and not µ’ is to be held true, but the two conjuncts ‘µ’ and ‘not µ’, separately taken, are untrue. Other parts of Hegel's work confirm the idea that a true contradiction for him is made of two untrue sentences, which is an interesting but unusual account of inconsistency. In this paper, we explore the plausibility of the hypothesis with the lens of the contemporary theories of paradoxes. We compare Hegel's view with standard dialetheism, and we present Hegel's idea of truth which underlies the theory.

Hegel's Concept of the Familiar: Toward a Philosophical Study

AbstractOne of the most memorable lines of Hegel's oeuvre is from the preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit: ‘Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood.’ Surprisingly, relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to the notion of ‘the familiar’ in Hegel scholarship. This essay aims to rectify this lack by offering a preliminary inquiry in what the notion means across Hegel's work. It does so by focusing on three underexplored moments in Hegel's work: (1) the exposition of the logic of appearance in the description and diagnosis of seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch painting in the lecture notes from the 1823 Berlin lectures on the philosophy of fine art; (2) the function of institutionalized practice in Hegel's Tübingen essay of 1793; and (3) the conjunctural relation of the familiar with philosophical terminology in an entry from the ‘Aphorisms from the Wastebook.’ Through a careful reading of these three moments, I will show that the familiar is a point that constellates multiple processes, mechanisms and apparatuses that, when grasped in their complex totality, functions as the ‘prius’ (priority/prioritization/first moment) of Hegel's speculative philosophy.

Онтология символической реальности в философии Ф.Т. Михайлова

This paper addresses one of the main topics of the works of the famous Russian philosopher F.T. Mikhailov aimed at overcoming the oversimplified conception of the relation between the biological and the social origins of human being, in the context of the methodological problems in the social sciences that have characteristic representations of the transcendence of society over individual. It is shown that the solution proposed by the philosopher was related to the revision of the dominant notions about the ground of the subject-subject unity and the ontology of the symbolic objects that provide this unity. In particular, the disintegration of the ‘activity approach’ in psychology into the concepts of A.N. Leontyev and S.L. Rubinstein, that are called by Mikhailov ‘antinomical’, is associated with the limited reliance on the methodological traditions of Spinozism, in which there was no idea about the reflexive type of subject-subject relation as opposed to the methodology of "late Fichte", with his characteristic position on the initial identity based on multiple selves. It is argued that the most adequate categories for description of the ontological connections between the ideal content and the material form in symbolic objects that provide such an identity can be found in Hegel's aesthetic works.

O Conceito de Esperança (Hoffnun) na Filosofia de Hegel

The objective is to expose and analyze the concept of hope (Hoffnung) in Hegel's Philosophy, in relation to his concepts of hopelessness (Hoffnungslosigkeit), fear (Furcht), despair (Verzweiflung) and suicide (Selbsttotung - Selbstmord). These are concepts and problems that concern us and about which there is little research, besides being current in the face of the historical moment (2020) of a pandemic, of so much illness or of lack of health. They are research, exposure and critical-philological, historical and hermeneutic analysis of Hegel's work, based on classical and interpretative texts, seeking to properly understand the concepts cited. With this, in short, we try to quote and understand, in an appropriate way, the Hegelian thought, examining his work before the real circumstances in which it was exposed, avoiding the many expositions and misinterpretations, because there is a dispute, at first, between what Hegel said and what they say he said and/or what he should or could have said. In summary, the main objective is to expose and analyze, in a judicious way, what Hegel really said and, therefore, the work will purposefully have many quotations, notes and quotes.

Dialéctica: método y sujeto

Rubén Dri es uno de los pensadores excepcionales de nuestro tiempo y uno de los más rigurosos conocedores de la obra de Hegel. En el marco de la concepción de la dialéctica hegeliana y de su influencia en el pensamiento de Marx que presenta Dri, el artículo se enfoca en dos aspectos centrales para el pensamiento político contemporáneo: la cuestión del método y el problema del sujeto. El tratamiento de estas cuestiones aporta al debate sobre el lugar de la dialéctica en la teoría crítica y contribuye a establecer bases para indagar sobre estos aspectos en clave contemporánea.

Do We Need Hegel? (Reader’s Notes to the Ukrainian Translation of “The Phenomenology of Spirit”)

The article considers the Ukrainian translation of the latest edition of Hegel's work “The Phenomenology of Spirit” (2019). The analysis focuses on the conformity of this translation with the generally accepted world requirements and norms that put forward the translation and publication of classical philosophical texts. The historical circumstances of the appearance of “Phänomenologie des Geistes” (1807) are briefly considered, as well as the history of its editing and republishing in the 19-20th cent., and it is shown that without this history any translation cannot be considered as acceptable.Manuscript received 01.03.2020

Taking the System Seriously: On the Importance of 'Objective Spirit' for Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

In his Encyclopedia, Hegel's section “Objective Spirit” is crucial for our understanding his more elaborated ethical and political philosophy in the Philosophy of Right. The latter assumes a familiarity with key ideas found only in the Encyclopedia, including: (a) a proof of the free will and the need to develop a philosophical account for distinguishing between a free will and an arbitrary will, (b) the wider context of how ethical and political philosophy sits within his philosophical system and (c) its link beyond itself to other parts of Hegel's philosophy. Unlike other philosophers, Hegel's work is systematic and a deeper appreciation of Objective Spirit and its place within the system - made clear in the Encyclopedia - illuminates crucial ideas in his Philosophy of Right.

A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology by Robert B. Brandom

Reviewed by: A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology by Robert B. Brandom Rolf-Peter Horstmann Robert B. Brandom. A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 836. Cloth, $45.00. In order to be successful in philosophy, you must have the right kind of followers. Ideally, they should be able to perform either or both of these tasks: (1) to translate your teachings into an idiom that is accessible to an audience coming from different intellectual backgrounds, and/or (2) to integrate your philosophical message into a contemporary discourse in such a way that it proves to be productively connectable to what is discussed there. Kant was lucky enough to have had such ideal followers in abundance, both as exegetical interpreters and as modernizers of his ideas. They stretch from the post-Kantian idealists via the Neo-Kantians to twentieth-century epistemologists, moral philosophers, and aesthetical theorists. The result is a very vivid presence of Kant's ideas throughout the (academic) world. The opposite is true with those post-Kantian philosophers who came to be labeled "German idealists." The major figures of this cluster (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) had the bad luck either to have had few followers (as in Fichte's and Schelling's case) or (as in Hegel's case) to have been followed by a bunch of unconvincing disciples (e.g. Rosenkranz and Michelet), who were not sufficiently talented or prepared for the task of maintaining the philosophical legacy of their paragon in a different cultural climate. It was this unfortunate accident that can be partly blamed for the prejudiced reception of Hegel's, as well as Fichte's and Schelling's, doctrines on both sides of the Atlantic divide, denying them intellectual respectability and stigmatizing them as hopelessly obscure and not worth the trouble. This situation has changed considerably in the last seventy years, especially for Hegel's work, which draws new attention inspired by the scholarly efforts of people like Michael Theunissen, Dieter Henrich, Jean Hyppolite, Bernard Bourgeois, Franco Chiereghin, and Claudio Cesa on the Continental side, Charles Taylor, Michael Inwood, Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, and others on the English-speaking side. These persons have succeeded in initiating what could be called a new Hegel-renaissance. In particular, their efforts helped to lift the discussion of Hegel's work to a new level with respect to five important aspects: (1) exegetical transparency, (2) historical accuracy, (3) problem-awareness (Problembewusstsein), (4) intelligible reasoning, and (5) critical assessment. Robert Brandom's monumental book A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology is a brilliant testament to what has been achieved so far, at least as far as Hegel's epistemology is concerned. Though it is literally a monument by virtue of its size, it also is a monument to what can or should be done with Hegel's philosophical œuvre in order to keep his way of thinking alive in a contemporary context. According to Brandom, Hegel's Phenomenology must be understood as "a story about the development of… higher-level concepts in terms of which his readers… can be brought to comprehend discursive activity in general" (103, cf. 636). He takes this story to be an allegorical presentation of a theory about the establishment of conceptual content. Consequently, he declares right at the beginning that "The defining subject that serves as both lens and filter for the present account is conceptual content" (2), where conceptual content, as it turns out, has to be understood as the result of our normative practices that consist in an intricate interplay between normative attitudes and statuses. Although this is admittedly not the most obvious characterization of Hegel's phenomenological project, it is fascinating to witness Brandom's success in presenting one of the most penetrating and illuminating readings of central parts of the Phenomenology to date, all while relying on his rather un-Hegelian framework. One cannot but deeply admire the virtues Brandom's work puts on display in an exemplary way. Among these, his profound familiarity with even the minutest details of (large parts of) Hegel's text, the vast knowledge of both historical and...

The Actual and the Rational. Hegel and Objective Spirit by Jean-François Kervégan

Reviewed by: The Actual and the Rational. Hegel and Objective Spirit by Jean-François Kervégan Allegra de Laurentiis KERVÉGAN, Jean-François. The Actual and the Rational. Hegel and Objective Spirit. Translated by Daniela Ginsburg and Martin Shuster. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018. xxxiii + 384 pp. Cloth, $55.00 Kervégan's study of the (in)famous Hegelian statement reflected in the book's title ("What is rational, that is actual; and what is actual, that is rational") centers on three major themes: the existence and nature of "objective spirit," the meaning of "right" (or, as Kervégan prefers, "law"), and the (controversial) logical-metaphysical foundations of both. The book is organized into four parts: I, "The Law: the Positivity of Abstraction;" II: "The Vitality and Flaws of the Social;" III: "The State and the Political;" IV: "Figures of Subjectivity in Objective Spirit: Normativity and Institutions." In a brief disclaimer Kervégan specifies that this massive undertaking is intended not as a systematic interpretation of Hegel's political philosophy but as an explication of basic tenets and conundrums. A preface and preliminary open the volume; an epilogue closes it. In the preface, Kervégan declares his noncommitment to a metaphysical reading of Hegel's Realphilosophie in general, and of Objective Spirit in particular. But the immediately following discussion of "actuality," "reality," and "rationality" in Hegel indicates otherwise, showing Kervégan's thorough familiarity with and reliance on the Science of Logic. Part I (chapters 1–3) discusses various employments of Recht in Hegel's work between 1807 and 1830, with particular attention given to the [End Page 370] 1817/18 Natural Right Lectures and the 1820 Philosophy of Right (PhR). Kervégan's decision to use "law" (German Gesetz) instead of "right" to render Recht underestimates Hegel's reliance on the fundamental distinction between jus and lex in the Roman Corpus. This does not diminish the value of Kervégan's discussion, which encompasses not just Hegel's works but also 200 years' worth of literature (from Haym and Rosenzweig to Peperzak and Losurdo). Kervégan references to Kant's Doctrine of Right, indispensable for an appreciation of Hegel's, indulge the generic interpretation of Kant's juridical thought as "legalism." (This may be due to the conflation of Gesetz and Recht.) One consequence is that "fiat justitia, pereat mundus" (from Perpetual Peace) is understood as expressing rigorism, while Kant's mundus refers instead to the worldly interests of pseudo-politicians intent on undermining human right. Chapter 1 explicates Hegel's plan to deliver "the idea of right—the concept of right and its actualization" (PhR §1). Chapter 2 discusses the natural cum historical essence of right. Chapter 3 examines "right" as contract, both in its state-foundational role ("Social Contract") and as regulator of interactions in civil society. The strength of this section lies in Kervégan's thorough familiarity with the evolution of Hegel's thought. It is therefore surprising to find Hegel being credited in the end for theorizing a "law below and beyond law," suggesting a Hegelian pedigree of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. Part II (chapters 4–6) first presents the role of Rousseau's distinction of bourgeois and citoyen in German Idealism. The underlying theme here is a reinterpretation of Hegel's notion of civil society in a liberal key, or as "anticipation" of future liberal doctrines. This "liberal Rechtsstaat" would even harbor an "antistate orientation." From Hegel's diagnosis of a conflict between modern individuals' "right to particularity" and their claims to universality, Kervégan further sees Hegel as also prefiguring Hayek's work. In the end, since Hegel's bürgerliche Gesellschaft is construed as a realm of relativism, and juridical personhood is understood as anchored in it—rather than in the Rechtsstaat—Kervégan reaches the unlikely conclusion that for Hegel "the rights of man . . . , their scope and value are relative." Part III (chapters 7–9) centers on aspects of "objective spirit" that are of contemporary resonance: Hegel's characterization of modernity (chapter 7); his critical appraisal of democratic representation (chapter 8); his criticism of democracy as such (chapter 9). The first is approached by putting...

Hegel and Right. A Study of the Philosophy of Right by Philip J. Kain

Reviewed by: Hegel and Right. A Study of the Philosophy of Right by Philip J. Kain Mark Tunick Philip J. Kain. Hegel and Right. A Study of the Philosophy of Right. Albany: SUNY Press, 2018. Pp. x + 243. Cloth, $90. There are many studies of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Philip Kain does not break new ground in Hegel and Right. Nor does he deal with the German scholarship that did, by posing the possibility of an esoteric Hegel belying the exoteric author caving to censorship pressure. Still, he has provided us a worthwhile book that touches on some controversial issues. Kain professes to be a Marxian and social democrat who opposes capital punishment and supports same-sex marriage and, perhaps not coincidentally, his Hegel is open to at least the latter three positions. Some scholars of Hegel may be dismayed that there is little reference to Hegel's Logic, though they should appreciate Kain emphasizing how the Absolute is the final stage in Philosophy of Right, and connecting the Phenomenology and Philosophy of Right in claiming that the former work proves the Absolute, a proof Hegel is said to take for granted in the latter work (32–38). While Kain's review of Abstract Right, Morality, and Ethical Life may not uncover anything new, he does offer several illuminating ways of understanding key elements of Hegel's work. His discussion of corporations is quite helpful. Kain emphasizes how Hegel wants the corporations back after they had been "abandoned," to fulfill a function similar to labor unions in helping address the problem of poverty (122–24). In explaining how Hegel finds Kant's formula of universal law lacking in content, Kain supposes I pocket an apple from a fruit stand: "How do I tell whether [that] was an act of theft?" It depends on if I live in a market or communist society. Kain's simple example powerfully and effectively makes his point: we must have a world with content to know what is right (60). Kain's discussions can illuminate, but not always. I will focus on what he says about Hegel's theory of punishment. Kain says that Hegel's justification of punishment "fails" and that he gives a valuable argument against punishment despite himself (43). He quotes Hegel echoing Kant, that in committing the crime the criminal lays down a principle and we punish him by universalizing that principle and turning it back on the criminal. Kain finds that view unsatisfying: "If the criminal's principle is a crime for the criminal, if it is wrong for the criminal, if it is irrational for the criminal, how can it flip into being right, just, and rational for us?" (44–45). But I think he has misunderstood Hegel. For Hegel, we punish to vindicate right: if we did not punish in some way, it is as if what the criminal did was not wrong (and Kain is aware of this justification, 50–51). Hegel also says the criminal's will is split: the thief's particular will is to steal, but his implicit will is the universal—to respect property. The criminal, after all, does not want someone else to steal what he illicitly took and now possesses. Hegel's argument is not that we should universalize the principle that theft is right, as Kain says. Rather, it is that in committing the crime, the criminal goes against his implicit will: the criminal, insofar as he is rational, knows that respecting property is right, and punishment is merely turning the universal will, which is the criminal's implicitly, [End Page 355] back on himself. Kain then says we do not need to establish a right to punish because there is a right of self-defense: we can exclude the criminal, rather than impose what he calls "San Quentin" punishment (48–49). Yet punishment is not essentially that. For Hegel it annuls crime and vindicates right, and how we inflict it depends on custom and objectives like deterrence and reform. Hegel may well criticize "San Quentin" punishment in a stable society, but not punishment per se. Perhaps the biggest challenge in interpreting the Rechtsphilosophie is explaining Hegel's account...

Reading the Second Sex: Influence of Hegel’s Master and Slave Dialectic

The present paper aims to bring out the influence of Hegel's work in Beauvoir's philosophy. It tries to understand the philosophical relationship between Beauvoir and Hegel where their texts act as a mediator in order to establish this invisible philosophical link.

Dewey in His Skivvies: The Trouble with Reconstruction

ABSTRACTIn this essay, Robbie McClintock argues that educational theorists have inflated John Dewey's deserved reputation beyond what the quality of his work can sustain. He briefly recounts how Dewey developed a program for reconstruction in philosophy, education, and social life with the aim of overcoming chronic dislocations in social life. McClintock sees two parts to Dewey's reconstruction: a negative program, in which Dewey rejects the metaphysical heritage that had induced these social dislocations; and a positive program, in which he advances scientifically grounded instrumentalities for a more humane conduct of life. McClintock hypothesizes that Dewey's negative reconstruction, based on facile historical reasoning, dismissed historical resources that could have strengthened his positive program to develop a naturalistic humanism, one more instrumental in the art of living. To explain his hypothesis, McClintock selectively shows how, in numerous works, Dewey rejected prior thinking unnecessarily as a means to advance his ideas, focusing in particular on Dewey's dismissive assessment of Immanuel Kant's and G. W. F. Hegel's work. McClintock criticizes Dewey's historical views to encourage present‐day educational thinkers to avoid emulating them and to make full, creative use of the philosophical tradition instead. He closes the essay by suggesting how historical reason can anticipate future possibilities and thus inform present action, and by calling on all to use it in humanizing the lifeworld we share.