Die verwerwing van absolute wete as louterings-proses in Hegel se Fenomenologie van de Geest

H Boshoff

doi:10.17159/2224-7912/2021/v61n3a12

Abstract

Hierdie artikel ondersoek die absolute wete as sleutelbegrip in Hegel se Fenomenologie van de Geest (2013). Die vermyding, onderbeklemtoning en wanbegrip van die absolute wete in veral 20ste-eeuse interpretasies van Hegel se werk sal met behulp van sy eie uiteensetting bevraagteken word. Eerstens is die absolute wete nie 'n klaargemaakte bloudruk wat kritiekloos op die werklikheid toegepas kan word nie, maar 'n moeisame proses wat mens nie van 'n afstand kan betrag nie en waardeur 'n mens self moet werk. Tweedens word aangevoer dat die absolute wete slegs die resultaat kan wees van die strengste moontlike beproewing,1 in die vorm van 'n "sich vollbringende Skeptizismus"; en derdens gaan dít wat deur die beproewing opgehef word, steeds gekoppel bly aan die absolute as deel van die prosesmatige aard daarvan. Die proses dui daarop dat selfverlies in die vorm van die uitwys van tekortkominge en selfverowering as die selfbewuswording van die gees twee kante van dieselfde muntstuk verteenwoordig, naamlik wat Hegel as die "loutering tot gees" beskryf.

Highlights

Absolute knowing as a process of sublimation in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit This article examines the nature and importance of the notion of absolute knowing in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
Hegel was sensitive to the claims emanating from a sceptical approach to overarching truth and incorporated the critique expressed by that approach into his account of truth, along with his own critique of scepticism
Hegel’s critique of modern scepticism’s denial of truth does not mean he regards it as being without merit

Summary

Introduction

Absolute knowing as a process of sublimation in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit This article examines the nature and importance of the notion of absolute knowing in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Some take Hegel’s explicit reference to truth, with which his philosophy is preoccupied, to be bold and too arrogant. Hegel’s critique of modern scepticism’s denial of truth (in this case modern philosophy since Descartes) does not mean he regards it as being without merit.

Results

Conclusion