Code-based cryptosystems are a promising option for Post-Quantum Cryptography, as neither classical nor quantum algorithms provide polynomial time solvers for their underlying hard problem. Indeed, to provide sound alternatives to lattice-based cryptosystems, U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) advanced all round 3 code-based cryptosystems to round 4 of its Post-Quantum standardization initiative. We present a complete implementation of a quantum circuit based on the Information Set Decoding (ISD) strategy, the best known one against code-based cryptosystems, providing quantitative measures for the security margin achieved with respect to the quantum-accelerated key recovery on AES, targeting both the current state-of-the-art approach and the NIST estimates. Our work improves the state-of-the-art, reducing the circuit depth by 2 19 to 2 30 for all the parameters of the NIST selected cryptosystems, mainly due to an improved quantum Gauss–Jordan elimination circuit with respect to previous proposals. We show how our Prange’s-based quantum ISD circuit reduces the security margin with respect to its classical counterpart. Finally, we address the concern brought forward in the latest NIST report on the parameters choice for the McEliece cryptosystem, showing that its parameter choice yields a computational effort slightly below the required target level.