Graph Model For Conflict Resolution Research Articles

Investigating an Aggregate Mine Proposal Using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

Aggregates are critical resources for infrastructure and development, but mining operations can be disruptive to nearby communities. We examine a conflict arising in response to a proposed aggregate mine in the Region of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Drawing on participant observation, interviews, and a review of publicly available materials related to the conflict, we gain insight into the regulatory constraints and decision makers driving this conflict. We then model the ongoing conflict using the graph model for conflict resolution. A set of conflict models developed as part of in-depth sensitivity analysis are described and analyzed. Individually, the models capture possible preferences of different decision makers. A comparison of model results reflects the dominance of provincial authority in aggregate mining decisions and adds clarity to the influence of different decision makers. These models provide a basis for conducting future advanced analyses of decision-maker motivations, perceptions, and strategies.

A graph model for conflict resolution with inconsistent preferences among large-scale participants

A graph model for conflict resolution with inconsistent preferences among large-scale participants

Modeling and Analysis of a Complex Real World Conflict, Using Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

Conflict among stakeholders may be a barrier to the progress of projects and a major cause for significant waste in capital. This research explores modeling and analysis of a conflict over the stakeholders of a high-technology corporation. The interaction among the stakeholders is modeled as a game. In this research, we employ a system's engineering approach for modeling and analysis of this intra-organizational conflict, using Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR+). It is an advanced methodology driven from conflict analysis which has routes in non-cooperative game theory with a non-quantitative approach. This article focuses on a conflict among three parties. The socially optimal solution happens when one player, who has the technical knowledge, finds another investor. Using sensitivity analysis, we find an alternative, more favorable solution to reach a new agreement in setting up two plants (instead of seven) in Tehran and Kermanshah, launching the project with the remaining capital. We demonstrate that taking the case to court does not result in a favorable outcome for the players.

An Integer Programming Approach to Solving the Inverse Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Two Decision Makers

An Integer Programming Approach to Solving the Inverse Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Two Decision Makers

Conflict resolution in the multi-stakeholder stepped spillway design under uncertainty by machine learning techniques

The optimal spillway design is of great significance since these structures can reduce erosion downstream of the dams. This study proposes a risk-based optimization framework for a stepped spillway to achieve an economical design scenario with the minimum loss in hydraulic performance. Accordingly, the stepped spillway was simulated in the FLOW-3D® model, and the validated model was repeatedly performed for various geometric states. The results were used to form a Multilayer Perceptron artificial neural network (MLP-ANN) surrogate model. Then, a risk-based optimization model was formed by coupling the MLP-ANN and NSGA-II. The concept of conditional value at risk (CVaR) was utilized to reduce the risk of the designed spillway malfunctions in high flood flow rates, while minimizing the construction cost and the loss in hydraulic performance. Lastly, given the conflicting objectives of stakeholders, the non-cooperative graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) was applied to achieve a compromise on the Pareto optimal solutions. Applicability of the suggested approach in the Jarreh Dam, Iran, resulted in a practical design scenario, which simultaneously minimizes the loss in hydraulic performance and the project cost and satisfies the priorities of decision-makers.

Social Choice Rules, Fallback Bargaining, and Related Games in Common Resource Conflicts

Due to the lack of resources, individuals, groups, or countries are more involved in common resource conflicts. This paper uses the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution methodology to model a conflict based on the Nash solution concept, General Meta-Rationality, Symmetric Meta-Rationality, Sequential Stability, Limited h Move Stability, and Non-Myopic Stability definitions and then sieve the socially optimal outcomes from the results of the graph model. We propose to add a new analytical stage as a sequential next step to the equilibria in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and utilize social choice voting rules such as the Borda score, the Plurality rule, the Median voting rule, Copeland’s method, Simpson’s rule, and Fallback bargaining. We also apply a new approach called Related games, where we show how the Leading game impacts the Consequential game’s outcome and equilibria. To demonstrate the proposed concepts, we applied these ideas to two case studies; (1) the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers conflict between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, and (2) the Shatt al-Arab, which is on the border of Iran and Iraq. Results confirm that adding analytical stages in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and considering the Related games concept help decision and policy makers to gain a clearer insight into the conflict.

Resolving Transboundary Water Conflicts: Dynamic Evolutionary Analysis Using an Improved GMCR Model

Accurately simulating the dynamic evolution of the behaviors of different decision-makers (DMs) is essential for identifying solutions to transboundary water conflicts. The purpose of this study is to present a dynamic evolutionary analysis model for simulating the behavior of different water users and solving the problem of transboundary water conflicts. To accomplish this goal, a revenue function, which can objectively evaluate the relative preferences of different DMs in water conflicts, was constructed to improve the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) model. A demonstration area in the Yangtze River Delta on ecologically friendly development (DAYRD) in China is applied to demonstrate the applicability of the improved method. The results show that the improved GMCR model based on the revenue function can accurately simulate the dynamic evolution of transboundary water conflicts and avoid the influence of subjective factors of researchers or experts in the traditional method. Additionally, the results indicated that water conflicts in the DAYRD can be transformed from the status quo (conflict) to the target state (cooperation) by effectively controlling the intensity of third-party intervention. These findings provide useful insights for the resolution of transboundary water conflicts and enhance our understanding of the role of third parties in transforming conflict into cooperation.

Inverse Preference Optimization in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution based on the Genetic Algorithm

Inverse Preference Optimization in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution based on the Genetic Algorithm

Managing environmental quality in Pakistan through sustainable development of energy–economy–environment (3E): insights from graph model of conflict resolution (GMCR)

PurposeThe sustainable development of the energy–economy–environment (3E) needs to ensure the balanced interplay between the energy–economy and the environment. Likewise, creating such balance has become a critical policy issue among countries worldwide. However, in the past, studies have ignored to create a balanced interplay of the energy–economy and environment. Therefore, to address said research gap, this paper aims to develop a graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR)-based strategy for the sustainable development of the 3E to ensure better environmental quality.Design/methodology/approachTo develop a strategic framework for the balanced interplay between the energy–economy and the environment, the study used the GMCR approach and designed a mechanism for the sustainable development of the 3E to ensure better environmental quality in the context of Pakistan.FindingsThe results from the GMCR indicate that sustainable development of the 3E to ensure better environmental quality is possible when government focuses on the sustainable growth of the economy through environmental policies and the use of renewable energy.Practical implicationsBy solving the 3E conflict, this study provides policy insights for the government of Pakistan for the sustainable development of the energy economy and the environment to ensure better environmental quality in the country.Originality/valueFor the first time, this paper tried to put forward a way through which conflicting objectives can be achieved together for the sustainable development of the 3E to ensure better environmental quality.

A graph model analysis of the conflict in the irrigated perimeter in Chapada do Apodi-Brazil

A conflict situation arises whenever there is a dispute between two or more individuals or groups of individuals with different decision-making powers and interests. In this context, this research aims at analyzing the application of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) in disputes over the use of water resources in the irrigated perimeter located in Chapada do Apodi/CE, Brazil. Chapada do Apodi has great economic development potential for the State of Ceará in Brazil since there is high quality soil for agricultural practice. This potential made it possible to implement a public irrigation perimeter in this region. The water supply has become decisive for the full development of the region and, due to the low water supply, conflicts between small, medium and large producers have intensified. In this paper, we provide some insight into this conflict through a stability analysis using the GMCR. The stability analysis points out as a conflict resolution a scenario representing the situation where governmental organizations require the implementation of a water reuse system by large companies and do not increase the water pumping tariff for producers, small farmers drill deep water wells, agribusiness does not grow crops that consume less water, and civil society offers political training and social mobilization in support of small farmers. In particular, the stability analysis carried out suggested as a conflict resolution a scenario which comprises both water consumption reduction from small and large farmers and also political training and social mobilization of the small farmers.

Resolution of Internal conflicts for conservation of the Hour Al-Azim wetland using AHP-SWOT and game theory approach

Drying of Hour Al-Azim wetland, dust storm phenomenon in western and southwestern of Iran in recent years and their effects on human health, social and economic security has led to a crisis in the region. In addition to effects of the transboundary factors, internal factors such as management disputes, contradiction of goals in different organization and ministries has resulted to eliminate some area of Hour Al-Azim wetland and dust storm phenomenon. In this study, the non-cooperative game theoretic and conflict model GMCR II (Graph Model for Conflict Resolution) were used to resolve the internal management conflicts. After determining players, strategies and priorities of each player were identified by using of the AHP-SWOT model (Analytic hierarchy process (AHP), The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT)). Then, with respect to the required limitations, 120 states were created in the conflict. In the following, appropriate solution approach was selected by running the model and determining equilibrium points. According to the results, endorsing supporting ideas for farmers, improving of crop pattern, imposing crop cultivation limitation by Ministry of Agriculture, preventing from oil field expansion and better agricultural water supply for integrated management of the region were identified as solutions to resolve conflicts among players. On the other hand, Department of Environment should also impose more rigorous regulations on development of oil fields in the region.

Study of the Urmia Lake Dispute Using Incorporation of System Dynamics and Graph Model for Conflict Resolution Approaches

AbstractThe complex and complicated dispute over Urmia Lake is systematically studied in this research using an innovative methodology that incorporates the graph model for conflict resolution (GMC...

Matrix Representation of Solution Concepts in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Probabilistic Preferences and Multiple Decision Makers

In this paper, matrix methods are developed to determine stable states in the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) with probabilistic preferences with n decision makers. The matrix methods are used to determine more easily the stable states according to five stability definitions proposed for this model, namely: $$\alpha $$ -Nash stability, ( $$\alpha $$ , $$\beta $$ )-metarationality, ( $$\alpha $$ , $$\beta $$ )-symmetric metarationality, ( $$\alpha $$ , $$\beta $$ , $$\gamma $$ )-sequential stability and ( $$\alpha $$ , $$\beta $$ , $$\gamma $$ )-symmetric sequential stability. With the help of such methods, we are able to analyze for which values of parameters $$\alpha $$ , $$\beta $$ and $$\gamma $$ the states satisfy each one of these stability notions. These parameters regions can be used to compare the equilibrium robustness of the states. As a byproduct of our method, we point out an existing problem in the literature regarding matrix representation of solution concepts in the GMCR.

Inverse Engineering Preferences in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

In this paper, algorithms for inverse engineering preferences based on observable behavior are developed. The algorithms are based on the most commonly used stability concepts in the graph model for conflict resolution methodology and function by reducing the set of possible preference rankings for each decision-maker (DM). The reduction is based on observable moves and counter-moves made by DMs. This procedure assists stakeholders in optimizing their own decision-making process based on information gathered about their opponents and can also be used to improve the modeling of strategic interactions. A simple case study is used to illustrate the applicability of the algorithms.

A Three-Level Hierarchical Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

A novel hierarchical graph model is developed to analyze conflicts interrelated on three levels. As an extension of the two-level hierarchical graph model, this new structure contains several smaller graph models, called local graphs, nested at three levels. Decision makers (DMs), states, moves, and preference relations in the three-level hierarchical graph model (3LHGM) are defined. The interrelationships between stabilities in local graph models and the overall graph model are investigated and utilized in developing algorithms to calculate stabilities in the hierarchical graph model. This novel methodology is then illustrated using a generic model of hierarchical climate change governance disputes. Stability calculations can uncover profitable courses of action. The 3LHGM aims to provide insightful resolutions for DMs with a broader vision of the hierarchical conflict they are participating in.

Will Peaceful Waters Flow Again? A Game-Theoretic Insight into a Tripartite Environmental Conflict in the Middle East.

A tripartite environmental conflict over the Al-Hawizeh-Azim Marsh located in the Tigris River Basin is strategically investigated as an instance of a higher-level hydro-political conflict, using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). The GMCR+ Decision Support System is employed to investigate this intriguing dispute under the status quo and a potential hydro-political scenario considered to assess the efficacy of employing a suggested water diplomacy tool (option) as an alternative mechanism for resolving the conflict. The results of this exploratory conflict analysis study highlight the importance of the policy systems dominating the strategic behavior of the decision makers. Utilizing the option for water diplomacy would create new equilibria for equitably resolving this complex dispute, which would be beneficial for all decision makers if the proposed option and policy systems were adopted.

Reviewing the strategies for climate change and sustainability after the US defiance of the Paris Agreement: an AHP–GMCR-based conflict resolution approach

In the landmark Paris Agreement, the global economies agreed to put forward their best efforts in mitigation and adaptation of climate change. The member countries set their international and national targets to limit global temperature rise within 2 °C. The major and developed economics play a productive role in achieving the goals set in the Paris Agreement and failing would make it hard for the global community to limit the global temperature within the targeted range. The announcement of the USA to back out of the Paris Agreement has caused uncertainty in the global climate governance (GCG) regime. The present study overviews how the US defiance is likely to affect emission space, carbon prices, and macroeconomic conditions of the economies. It also focuses on the objective to analyze multiple strategic scenarios regarding GCG considering the role of three major contributors to GHG emissions—the USA, the EU, and China. An integrated conflict resolution strategy has been proposed by combining the analytical hierarchy process and attitude-based graph model for conflict resolution. The possible post-withdrawal scenarios based on possible alternatives for the GCG regime has been examined. This study incorporates influence power-based and attitude-based approaches to generate preference rankings of the alternative GCG strategies. The influence power-based and attitude-based preferences are used in general stability and attitude-based stability analyses to explore equilibrium GCG strategies. The analyses reveal that influence power and attitudes of the decision-makers (DMs) influence the preferences of DMs. This influence on preferences has implications on the outcomes of the GCG scenarios. The results of the influence power-based and attitude-based analyses imply that the collective GCG strategies are indispensable to protect the shared natural climate for environmental sustainability and development.

The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and Decision Support

A survey of the design, development and implementation of a flexible decision technology called the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) is discussed for systematically investigating real world conflicts within a system of systems engineering outlook. This encompassing GMCR methodology has been constructed during the past three decades by the authors, their colleagues and students from many countries for addressing a rich range of conflict situations. GMCR can be used for studying large and small conflicts and includes methods for preference elicitation, preference uncertainty (unknown, fuzzy, grey numbers and probabilistic). Many kinds of definitions exist for possible human behavior under pure competition which can be transformed for utilization in coalition analysis. GMCR can handle emotions, attitudes, and misperceptions. Within inverse GMCR, one can calculate the preferences needed by decision makers (DMs) to reach a desirable equilibrium. Under behavioral GMCR one can ascertain the strategic thinking of DMs when the input and output are known. Decision support systems can be built for implementing the array of GMCR advancements. Future expansions of GMCR can be guided by key characteristics of actual disputes. Artificial intelligence (AI) GMCR is a promising subfield of study within GMCR.

Optimizing the cost of preference manipulation in the graph model for conflict resolution

Conflicts occur when different parties have different evaluations regarding the resolution of some issue and each one of them can change the conflict scenario in more than one way. These conflicts may occur at various levels from the personal scale to conflicts involving large blocks of countries and various types of conflict costs might be involved, such as: economic, social and environmental. In many situations, offering incentives to alter the preferences of some decision makers (DMs) might be an effective way to achieve desirable stable scenarios. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is a model that has long been used to model and analyze conflicts because it is flexible and easy to calibrate. The purpose of this paper is to present ideas on how to work with the inverse GMCR to optimize costs in changing the preferences of each DM to achieve desired equilibrium states within the conflict. We propose some methods to aggregate costs of changing DMs’ preferences. The purpose is to determine the lowest aggregate cost of preference changes that makes a given desired state an equilibrium according to a given stability notion. Besides formally describing the problem, we study some properties of the minimum costs for different stability notions and show that the computational complexity of the optimal preference manipulation problem is NP-hard. We apply this method to analyze the Cuban missile conflict.

Construction and application of hyper-inverse conflict models based on the sequential stability

Based on the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR), an analytical framework is proposed to assist the focal decision maker (DM) with an informational advantage in resolving real-world hyper-inverse conflict situations considering the sequential (SEQ) stability. The hyper-inverse conflict resolution aims to obtain the opponent’s misunderstanding preferences of focal DM, which can assist the focal DM in taking the initiative in a conflict. Among all stabilities in GMCR, the SEQ stability is selected in the present study, because this stability concept provides a logical basis for a DM to sanction the opponent, which reflects the case for many conflicts. Moreover, a nonlinear binary optimization model rooted in the matrix representation of SEQ stability is constructed to capture the cause and process of the abnormal individual stability (or stabilities) in the hypergame. Then, a solution procedure is designed for solving the optimization model to obtain the preferences that are misunderstood by the opponent. Finally, an illustrative example of two DMs in an environmental management conflict is studied to demonstrate how the proposed framework can be conveniently employed in practice.