Social Choice Rules, Fallback Bargaining, and Related Games in Common Resource Conflicts

Abstract

Due to the lack of resources, individuals, groups, or countries are more involved in common resource conflicts. This paper uses the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution methodology to model a conflict based on the Nash solution concept, General Meta-Rationality, Symmetric Meta-Rationality, Sequential Stability, Limited h Move Stability, and Non-Myopic Stability definitions and then sieve the socially optimal outcomes from the results of the graph model. We propose to add a new analytical stage as a sequential next step to the equilibria in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and utilize social choice voting rules such as the Borda score, the Plurality rule, the Median voting rule, Copeland’s method, Simpson’s rule, and Fallback bargaining. We also apply a new approach called Related games, where we show how the Leading game impacts the Consequential game’s outcome and equilibria. To demonstrate the proposed concepts, we applied these ideas to two case studies; (1) the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers conflict between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, and (2) the Shatt al-Arab, which is on the border of Iran and Iraq. Results confirm that adding analytical stages in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and considering the Related games concept help decision and policy makers to gain a clearer insight into the conflict.