Governance Of Common-pool Resources Research Articles

Value capture in protected areas from the perspective of common-pool resource governance: A case study of Jiuzhai Valley National Park, China

Central government budgets are generally accepted as being a crucial source of financial support for most protected areas because the entire population is deemed to be the beneficiary of heritage protection. In value capture theory, however, the benefit redistribution (including value capture and compensation) inside protected areas also merits attention. In this paper, we first structure the value capture mechanism inside protected areas and compare four resource governance models (Leviathan, privatization, self-organized governance and self-organized governance in which local government intervenes) based on the capture approach, transaction cost and application condition. Theoretically, as a new resource governance model, self-organized governance in which local government intervenes is more suitable for the value capture of protected areas in developing authoritarian countries. We use Jiuzhai Valley National Park in China as an empirical case study. After reviewing the institutional changes and value capture mechanism, we evaluate the equity and benefit of value capture in Jiuzhai Valley National Park and argue that self-organized governance in which local government intervenes achieves the goals of social justice and heritage protection.

The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan

The governance of common-pool resources, such as irrigation systems, is a highly debated topic in research. Numerous studies suggest that actors can successfully manage these resources through cooperation, especially in hybrid governance structures, if they are able to design and enforce their own rules. Thereby, certain factors, such as the composition of a group of resource users, influence the likelihood of cooperation and the performance of self-managed resource systems. This study employed an economic framed field experiment to compare the effects of externally imposed and self-set rules of water distribution on homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of irrigation users who differ in their economic endowment. The experiment was conducted with 20 farmers in an Uzbek community. Furthermore, questionnaires, group discussions and interviews complemented the analytical method. The results show that groups, homogeneous in their economic endowment are more inclined to comply with self-designed rules than groups that are economically heterogeneous. Thus, homogenous groups achieve a better performance in terms of resource maintenance and water harvest under self-governance. However, water distribution was more equal and the illegal activities decreased in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous groups with self-implemented rules. It was found that trust was a crucial factor regarding both greater individual rule adherence and more cooperative behavior within homogeneous entities compared to heterogeneous groups of irrigation users. Finally, the results support the argument that economic heterogeneity among resource users lowers the likeliness of cooperation in self-governed common-pool resource systems.

The Firm as a Common. Non-Divided Ownership, Patrimonial Stability and Longevity of Co-Operative Enterprises

Contemporary literature dealing with the governance and exploitation of common-pool natural resources was initiated by Elinor Ostrom in 1990, and has been growing fast ever since. On the contrary, within the same research stream, the study of the presence and economic role of common resources in entrepreneurial organizations is, to date, under-researched. This work endeavors to fill some theoretical gaps in this research perspective by: (i) spelling out a new-institutionalist framework for the analysis of the accumulation and governance of common capital resources within organizational boundaries; (ii) considering co-operative enterprises as the organizational form that, on the basis of historical record, and of behavioral and institutional characteristics, demonstrated to be most compatible with a substantial role for common and non-divided asset-ownership and with its governance thereof; and (iii) evidencing and explaining the theoretical connection between cooperative longevity and the presence of non-divided asset ownership. The economic forces influencing the optimal level of self-financed common capital resources in co-operatives are enquired. Conclusions to the paper evidence the main reasons why the new approach can better explain than preceding ones the economic sustainability and longevity of cooperative enterprises.

Augmenting the IAD framework to reveal power in collaborative governance – An illustrative application to resource industry dominated processes

Abstract Collaborative governance is often used as a strategy to address seemingly intractable common pool resource (CPR) problems. However, significant power imbalances can constrain the creation, adoption and implementation of socially and environmentally desirable policies. This study integrates theory on power with the institutional analysis and design (IAD) framework in order to provide a conceptual framework for examining power that is not captured through the IAD’s focus on action situations. We examined the use of collaboration in CPR governance contexts characterized by significant power imbalances. Two Canadian collaborative processes that involve large energy industry interests were studied. We assessed the ability of these collaborative processes to address social and environmental goals. Results revealed significant hidden power dynamics related to inaction and non-decisions. Collaboration was unable to produce progressive outcomes because of i) the restriction of the collaborative agenda by powerful actors; ii) selective enforcement of rules; and; iii) a broader neoliberal context that inherently favoured increasing resource extraction. These findings indicate that the achievement of progressive social and environmental outcomes through collaboration is constrained where powerful resource industries are present as participants.

Culture as commons: theoretical challenges and empirical evidence from occupied cultural spaces in Italy

ABSTRACTWhat happens when we try to understand art as a commons? Elinor Ostrom [(1990/2012). Governing the commons. Cambridge University Press] challenged Hardin’s “The tragedy of the commons” [(1968). Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248] demonstrating that the governance of common pool resources is not always destined to failure. Ostrom’s analysis was initially applied to the management of shared natural resources; however, over time the term “commons” has also been used to describe non-tangible resources, specifically knowledge. Can Ostrom’s theory of the commons inform artistic practice? This article investigates some challenges presented by these research questions and their implications for cultural policy. In order to provide an empirical ground for the discussion of this topic, this paper will analyse the case studies of two cultural spaces in Italy, Teatro Valle (Rome) and Asilo Filangieri (Naples), which were occupied by groups of cultural professionals and managed as commons between 2011 and 2016; the outcomes of these occupations indicate possible ways to develop a commons-oriented approach to culture.

Assessing the influence of social capital on water point sustainability in rural Ethiopia

Abstract Despite considerable investment, sustainability of rural water resources remains a critical challenge in Ethiopia. Evidence suggests social capital – the networks, norms, and trust that facilitate cooperative behaviors – influences a community's ability to manage communal water resources. In turn, strong community governance of water resources may lead to sustainable resource management. Existing evidence provides a framework for exploring the relationship between social capital and governance of common-pool resources. However, there is a dearth of quantifiable evidence demonstrating the relationship between social capital, collaborative governance, and, in turn, sustainability of communal water resources. In 32 communities in rural Ethiopia, we employed a validated survey tool, developed by the World Bank, to quantify social capital and explore these relationships. We found associations between governance and several social capital domains: groups and networks, trust and solidarity, and information and communication. All governance indicators were associated with functionality. Identifying domains of social capital that influence governance can inform institutional efforts to target community-based water resource programming, foster social capital to improve water point sustainability, and diagnose issues related to resource management. Additional research examining the influence and directionality of social capital and other social constructs on water resource governance and functionality is warranted.

Using Ostrom’s DPs as Fuzzy Sets to Analyse How Water Policies Challenge Community-Based Water Governance in Colombia

Ostrom’s design principles have been broadly used to analyse the governance of common pool resources. However, they are normally assessed as present or absent. We challenge this assumption by considering them as fuzzy sets where membership scores range from 0 to 1, because, in real situations, the design principles can be present at a certain level. We define categories to assess the level of membership and apply it to a single case study analysing how changes in water policy can affect the community-based management of the Water User Association of Mondomo (Colombia). In rural areas of Colombia, most water and sanitation services are provided by water user associations, wherein civil society has developed governance systems based on active citizen involvement and community-based management. Some of these associations have been operating for decades and are essential pillars of the local social fabric. However, recent changes in the country’s policy and legal framework threaten these long-lasting governance systems. The results show that most of the design principles would suffer important changes that undermine the governance system. Essential principles for sustainable community-based governance, such as the congruence of the rules with local conditions, the local monitoring and sanctioning capacities, the internal conflict-resolution mechanisms and the recognition of the rights to organize, are dramatically reduced after the policy implementation.

A novel framework for analyzing conservation impacts: evaluation, theory, and marine protected areas.

Environmental conservation initiatives, including marine protected areas (MPAs), have proliferated in recent decades. Designed to conserve marine biodiversity, many MPAs also seek to foster sustainable development. As is the case for many other environmental policies and programs, the impacts of MPAs are poorly understood. Social-ecological systems, impact evaluation, and common-pool resource governance are three complementary scientific frameworks for documenting and explaining the ecological and social impacts of conservation interventions. We review key components of these three frameworks and their implications for the study of conservation policy, program, and project outcomes. Using MPAs as an illustrative example, we then draw upon these three frameworks to describe an integrated approach for rigorous empirical documentation and causal explanation of conservation impacts. This integrated three-framework approach for impact evaluation of governance in social-ecological systems (3FIGS) accounts for alternative explanations, builds upon and advances social theory, and provides novel policy insights in ways that no single approach affords. Despite the inherent complexity of social-ecological systems and the difficulty of causal inference, the 3FIGS approach can dramatically advance our understanding of, and the evidentiary basis for, effective MPAs and other conservation initiatives.

How do transnational grassroots networks reframe the global norms of water and forests governance?

The current era of globalization and commodification has had a substantial impact on common-pool resources governance. In direct response to this, community-based organizations managing water and forests at the local level began to create their own transnational networks. Primarily, these organizations aim to achieve direct representation in international decision-making arenas in order to promote their model of collective governance. By reframing the representations of common-pool resources (from commodities to human rights or collective goods), they seek to influence norm-building processes and establish specific scales of community-based governance (local, regional or global).To what extent does the reframing of common-pool resources impact the scales of water and forests governance? This paper addresses the question by adopting a geographical approach of transnational social movements and undertaking a discourse analysis. The study focuses on two case studies: the Latin-American Confederation of Community Organizations for Water Services and Sanitation (CLOCSAS), and the Mesoamerican Alliance of Peoples and Forests (AMPB). On one hand, CLOCSAS frames water as a global common good and a universal human right compatible with an economic value. It aims to become an alternative expert on water issues. On the other hand, AMPB frames forests as a local common good and a territorial right. It aims to be differentiated from technical experts and works to consolidate territorial authority.

Harnessing the State: Social Transformation, Infrastructural Development, and the Changing Governance of Water Systems in the Kangra District of the Indian Himalayas

Despite a proliferation of programs and policies aimed at promoting local resource management, we still have limited knowledge of the conditions under which state interventions can be a supportive force in everyday aspects of common pool resource governance. This article explores growing state involvement in community-managed irrigation systems of the Kangra District of Himachal Pradesh, India. Here, agriculture is dependent on water channeled from glacial streams through networks of irrigation canals that have been sustained by local traditions of collective action for centuries. In recent years, however, growing off-farm employment has shifted the center of the agrarian economy and undermined shared norms of collective resource governance, just as state institutions have increasingly identified water systems as an object of development intervention. In this article, I document how irrigation management has been incrementally reinvented through changing institutional arrangements and new infrastructural forms over the past three decades, as existing patterns of collective action have increasingly found expression by leveraging development resources of the state. To the extent that socioeconomic changes associated with broader processes of development are likely to strain commons governance systems in mountain and other regions in the coming years, such collaborative engagements between local collective management and state support systems could become increasingly prevalent. This case suggests the need for new theoretical tools to guide analysis of evolving relationship between communities and state institutions in common pool resource governance.

Collective action in China’s recent collective forestry property rights reform

China’s recent collective forestry property rights reform (CFPRR) is regarded as the third Land Reform and has been implemented to accelerate China’s rural restructuring. In departing from previous top-down policy changes, the CFPRR has focused on local collective practices and actions. It indicates a shift in China’s rural governance, away from direct intervention towards support for local collective actions. Based on a case study of Hongtian Village, the origin of the CFPRR, this article analyses the process of insinuating collective action and the impact that this has had in creating a new cultural understanding and acceptance of collective forestry property rights. In contrast to the relative insecurity of tenure that can accompany many reforms of the governance of common pool resources, the paper suggests that the success of the ‘Hongtian model’ mainly lies in high levels of process engagement by local people and effective interaction between villagers and the government. While not addressing all the issues associated with the inefficiency of the previous collective approach to forestry, the paper suggests that there are many transferable lessons to be learnt from the CFPRR, both within and beyond China.

The Daudkandi model of community floodplain aquaculture in Bangladesh: a case for Ostrom’s design principles

Floodplain water-bodies are major common-pool resources (CPRs) of Bangladesh and constitute more than fifty percent of inland open water bodies. Throughout the British colonial period, Pakistani rule and the first one and half decades of independent Bangladesh, a majority of inland water-bodies remained under direct government management, though the floodplains by getting heavily inundated during the monsoon turn into open access resource. In the mid-1980s co-management was introduced on a small scale with the help of NGOs as providers of management styles and credit to communities of fishers or villagers. NGOs also got involved in floodplain water-bodies and came up with different models of user-managed fishery bodies. This paper examines a specific management system of community-governed floodplain aquaculture (FPA) known as the Daudkandi model, developed by a local NGO in the Daudkandi sub-district of the Comilla district. Applying the design principles developed by Ostrom (1990) characterizing long surviving successful user-managed common-pool resource institutions, this paper explores the rules devised by partners in the management of a FPA under the Daudkandi model. Though the FPA management model is relatively new as it has been adopted in 1996, it has been found to follow the design principles in devising its management rules. However, because of its unique features in terms of seasonality, NGO-community partnership, exclusion of past users, and numerous replications, etc. the future of the model as a CPR governance system holds many challenges and deserves continuous research focus.

An iterative approach to case study analysis: insights from qualitative analysis of quantitative inconsistencies

Large-N comparative studies have helped common pool resource scholars gain general insights into the factors that influence collective action and governance outcomes. However, these studies are often limited by missing data, and suffer from the methodological limitation that important information is lost when we reduce textual information to quantitative data. This study was motivated by nine case studies that appeared to be inconsistent with the expectation that the presence of Ostrom’s Design Principles increases the likelihood of successful common pool resource governance. These cases highlight the limitations of coding and analysing Large-N case studies. We examine two issues: 1) the challenge of missing data and 2) potential approaches that rely on context (which is often lost in the coding process) to address inconsistencies between empirical observations theoretical predictions. For the latter, we conduct a post-hoc qualitative analysis of a large-N comparative study to explore 2 types of inconsistencies: 1) cases where evidence for nearly all design principles was found, but available evidence led to the assessment that the CPR system was unsuccessful and 2) cases where the CPR system was deemed successful despite finding limited or no evidence for design principles. We describe inherent challenges to large-N comparative analysis to coding complex and dynamically changing common pool resource systems for the presence or absence of design principles and the determination of “success”. Finally, we illustrate how, in some cases, our qualitative analysis revealed that the identity of absent design principles explained inconsistencies hence de-facto reconciling such apparent inconsistencies with theoretical predictions. This analysis demonstrates the value of combining quantitative and qualitative analysis, and using mixed-methods approaches iteratively to build comprehensive methodological and theoretical approaches to understanding common pool resource governance in a dynamically changing context.

Organising collective reputation: An Ostromian perspective

What do collective reputation and communal pastures have in common? Collective reputation is an important type of collective good produced by many business networks. We argue that it has the structure of a common-pool resource, which points to the relevance of Elinor Ostrom’s theory about the community governance of natural common-pool resources. After adapting the Ostromian framework to the phenomenon of collective reputation, we explore the experience of two groups of winemaking enterprises in Hungary who set up systems of quality assurance in order to protect and improve their joint reputation. We examine if the conditions identified by Ostrom as favourable for the self-governance of commons are also conducive to the governance of collective reputation. Our findings validate our conjecture that research on goal-oriented business networks may use insights from the mature theory of ‘governing the commons’. Potential pathways for further research are outlined.

Explaining success and failure in the commons: the configural nature of Ostrom's institutional design principles

Governing common pool resources (CPR) in the face of disturbances such as globalization and climate change is challenging. The outcome of any CPR governance regime is the influenced by local combinations of social, institutional, and biophysical factors, as well as cross-scale interdependencies. In this study, we take a step towards understanding multiple-causation of CPR outcomes by analyzing 1) the co-occurrence of Destign Principles (DP) by activity (irrigation, fishery and forestry), and 2) the combination(s) of DPs leading to social and ecological success. We analyzed 69 cases pertaining to three different activities: irrigation, fishery, and forestry. We find that the importance of the design principles is dependent upon the natural and hard human made infrastructure (i.e. canals, equipment, vessels etc.). For example, clearly defined social bounduaries are important when the natural infrastructure is highly mobile (i.e. tuna fish), while monitoring is more important when the natural infrastructure is more static (i.e. forests or water contained within an irrigation system). However, we also find that congruence between local conditions and rules and proportionality between investment and extraction are key for CPR success independent from the natural and human hard made infrastructure. We further provide new visualization techniques for co-occurrence patterns and add to qualitative comparative analysis by introducing a reliability metric to deal with a large meta-analysis dataset on secondary data where information is missing or uncertain.

Synthesizing theories of natural resource management and governance

Abstract A variety of disciplines examine human-environment interactions, identifying factors that affect environmental outcomes important for human well-being. A central challenge for these disciplines is integrating an ever-increasing number of findings into a coherent body of theory. Without a repository for this theory, researchers cannot adequately leverage this knowledge to guide future empirical work. Comparability across field sites, study areas and scientific fields is hampered, as is the progress of sustainability science. To address this challenge we constructed the first repository of theoretical statements linking social and ecological variables to environmental outcomes. Stored in a relational database that is accessible via a website, this repository includes systematically formalized theories produced from researchers studying resilience, environmental conservation, common-pool resource governance, environmental and resource economics and political ecology. Theories are explicitly linked together in the database to form the first coherent expression of the types of human-environment interactions that affect outcomes for natural resources and, by extension, the people who use them. Analysis of this repository shows that a variety of types of theories exist, from the simple to the complex, and that theories tend to thematically cluster by scientific field, although the theories of every field were related in at least some way to theories from other fields. Thus there is much potential for increased interaction across these fields, hopefully with the help of resources such as this repository. The theories and variables employed to express their arguments are publicly viewable in a wiki-like format, as a resource for the scientific community.

Power in the Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A comparative analysis of irrigation management decentralization in Turkey

ABSTRACTThe global trend in common‐pool resource (CPR) governance is to decentralize resource use management to local user groups. Since the survival and sustainability of self‐governing organizations are closely linked to the satisfaction of its members, listening to users who have the largest stake in CPR sustainability is crucial. The literature on CPR governance has two shortcomings: its analyses are restricted to the local community, excluding higher institutional and government levels; and power asymmetry among users is neglected, even though it can undermine collective action and hinder effective CPR management. In this study, multiple governance levels were linked, and the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework – which contextualizes how interactions among local actors lead to institutional outcomes that shape both individual and collective actions – was extended by controlling for the impact of power relations on institutional performance. The outcomes of irrigation management decentralization were assessed via three case studies on locally managed irrigation institutions from two provinces in Turkey. It was found that power asymmetries have a significant impact on user satisfaction across the cases, albeit in different directions. The implication of this finding is that, in contexts where land distribution is highly unequal, inequalities may have contradictory effects depending on how power operates and is reflected in CPR management. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Covenants with broken swords: Corruption and law enforcement in governance of the commons

Insights into how corruption hampers law enforcement in the governance of common-pool resources are currently limited. This article develops our understanding of this process through confidential interviews with enforcement officials in South African fisheries. First, it outlines how inspectors become “blind and corrupt”: They receive bribes from fishermen in the form of finance, food, or friendship, which they pay back through inadequate enforcement, information sharing, or involvement. Second, it shows that widespread bribery increases the costs of remaining honest: Inspectors face corruption in the judiciary, which makes the writing of fines useless because these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Moreover, they face corruption in their organization, where substation managers and actors in top management are engaged in bribery, sending signals that corruption has small consequences. The article concludes by discussing how corruption distorts regulations and the implications for governing the commons.

Using Common‐Pool Resource Principles to Design Local Government Fiscal Sustainability

This article analyzes local government fiscal sustainability as a common‐pool resource (CPR) problem. Comparing the experiences of Los Angeles County, San Bernardino City, and San Bernardino County, California, the analysis applies a framework developed from three decades ofCPRresearch to show the importance of six micro‐situational variables—communications with the full set of participants, known reputations of participants, high marginal per capita return, entry or exit capabilities, longer time horizon, and agreed‐upon sanctioning capabilities—in shaping collective action dynamics and building the trust and reciprocity among stakeholders needed to achieve fiscal sustainability. The underlying contextual conditions for these micro‐situational variables vary based on specific socioeconomic and political settings, but the findings suggest that institutions and processes can be designed based on several well‐tested principles inCPRgovernance to encourage stakeholders to look beyond their immediate self‐interests and make decisions that account for the community's long‐term fiscal sustainability.

Governing large-scale social-ecological systems: Lessons from five cases

This paper compares lessons drawn from five case studies of large scale governance of common-pool resources: management of forests in Indonesia, the Great Barrier Reef in Australia, the Rhine River in western Europe, the Ozone layer (i.e. the Montreal Protocol), and the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (i.e. the International Convention on the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna). The goal is to assess the applicability of Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable resource governance to large scale systems, as well as to examine other important variables that may determine success in large scale systems. While we find support for some of Ostrom’s design principles (boundaries, monitoring, sanctions, fit to conditions, and conflict resolution mechanisms are all supported), other principles have only moderate to weak support. In particular, recognition of rights to organize and the accountability of monitors to resource users were not supported. We argue that these differences are the result of differences between small and large scale systems. At large scales, other kinds of political dynamics, including the role of scientists and civil society organizations, appear to play key roles. Other variables emphasized in common-pool resource studies, such as levels of dependence on resources, group size, heterogeneity, disturbances, and resource characteristics also receive mixed support, pointing to the need to reinterpret the meaning of common-pool resource theories in order for them to be applicable at larger scales.