Abstract
This paper compares lessons drawn from five case studies of large scale governance of common-pool resources: management of forests in Indonesia, the Great Barrier Reef in Australia, the Rhine River in western Europe, the Ozone layer (i.e. the Montreal Protocol), and the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (i.e. the International Convention on the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna). The goal is to assess the applicability of Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable resource governance to large scale systems, as well as to examine other important variables that may determine success in large scale systems. While we find support for some of Ostrom’s design principles (boundaries, monitoring, sanctions, fit to conditions, and conflict resolution mechanisms are all supported), other principles have only moderate to weak support. In particular, recognition of rights to organize and the accountability of monitors to resource users were not supported. We argue that these differences are the result of differences between small and large scale systems. At large scales, other kinds of political dynamics, including the role of scientists and civil society organizations, appear to play key roles. Other variables emphasized in common-pool resource studies, such as levels of dependence on resources, group size, heterogeneity, disturbances, and resource characteristics also receive mixed support, pointing to the need to reinterpret the meaning of common-pool resource theories in order for them to be applicable at larger scales.
Highlights
Common pool resource (CPR) theory emerged in response to arguments that collective action for mutually beneficial goals, including resource management, is unfeasible in large groups (Olson 1965) without coercion (Hardin 1968) or private property rights (Gordon 1954)
Three of our cases present wellknown success stories: management of the Great Barrier Reef, pollution control in the Rhine River, and international regulation of ozone depleting substances via the Montreal Protocol. We find that these successes are incomplete: the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park has demonstrated significant improvements in fisheries management and reef resilience but faces considerable threats from land-based pollution and climate change; the governance regime of the Rhine River has successfully alleviated point-source pollution but is less successful in resolving non-point source pollution and cleanup of river sediments; the Montreal Protocol has reduced the emissions of ozone depleting substances, but the residence time of these chemicals means that the ozone-related response remains to be seen
We find that the least successful cases (ICCAT and Indonesian forests) share the absence of three design principles: clearly defined social boundaries (1A), monitoring (4A), and nested enterprises (8)
Summary
Common pool resource (CPR) theory emerged in response to arguments that collective action for mutually beneficial goals, including resource management, is unfeasible in large groups (Olson 1965) without coercion (Hardin 1968) or private property rights (Gordon 1954). Ostrom (1990) identified eight “design principles” which are key conditions that facilitate successful collective action for resource governance The purpose of this paper is to use the evidence from the five case studies presented in this special issue to generate a set of initial hypotheses and directions for further research on the applicability of the design principles and other core components of the CPR literature to large-scale social-ecological systems. We evaluate six other variables identified in the literature and discussed within each case paper This comparison provides the basis for generating a series of questions and propositions for future investigation. The intention of the social-ecological systems meta-analysis database (SESMAD) (described by Cox 2014) is to provide a basis for larger-n comparative studies of large-scale social-ecological systems, and the questions and propositions generated from these five case studies serve as a starting point for future analyses
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