With the advent of globalization a complex web of institutional configuration has emerged. A considerable number of international bodies have been mandated by states to formulate policies in their specialized fields to tackle global issues. Invariably, these institutions formulate rules and regulations with the participation and consultation of member states which are made part of their national laws through ratification. This mechanism has led to continuous emergence of global governance where concept of statehood is on a perennial track of dilution. The peculiar feature of this phenomenon is that states have volunteered to facilitate its growth for mutual benefit of the global community. ICSID, an important member of the global institutional club, in contrast has not earned a wider recognition and has been at the center of a severe criticism, particularly for its jurisprudence on the cases of indirect expropriation. Thematic subject of this paper is to analyze ICSID jurisprudence in this area and to evaluate whether judicial review of host states’ regulatory powers generates global administrative law or not. This essay builds upon the argument that ICSID jurisprudence on the subject has serious implications for a state’s liberty of regulating its internal affairs but principles produced and discussed in various arbitral awards fall short of contributing in smooth and soft emergence of global administrative law. Many shortcomings of the same have been examined and some recommendations have been included in the final chapter to alleviate the criticism accredited to the ICSID jurisprudence for its failure to strike a balance between the rights of investors and powers of a host state.