Taking more than two years to negotiate, the Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, by the United States, representing the United Nations forces, and by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which also acted on China's behalf. armistice went into force on the same day. Article IV, paragraph 60 in the armistice called on both sides to recommend to their respective governments that a conference be held within three months that would settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.1 Besides a considerable delay in beginning the conference, Cold War problems, including the issue of foreign troops on the Korean Peninsula, prevented any consensus at the Geneva Conference. Thus, the Geneva Conference on Korea (another part dealt with Indochina) failed to produce a peace treaty.The Korean part of the conference lasted for nearly two months, from April 26 to June 15, 1954. On one side were representatives from sixteen allied countries, which during the Korean War had troops in Korea that were led by the United States under the authority of the United Nations; on the other side were the communist delegates, officials from the DPRK, China and the Soviet Union. Nothing positive happened during the conference.According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The U.S. delegate deliberately obstructed the Geneva Conference from reaching any agreement on the question of maintaining and consolidating peace in Korea.2 DPRK claimed that the United States stood in the way of an all-Korean election by insisting that the process follow the constitution of South Korea and be monitored by the United Nations, which Pyongyang and its allies saw as anything but a neutral arbiter.3The United States, on the other hand, stood by two principles, both of which the communist delegates to the conference refused to accept: free elections (as defined by Washington and its allies) and that the United Nations, including its armed forces, would be the ultimate authority on the Korean Peninsula. Showing their tenacity, the United States and its allies issued a declaration on June 15, 1954, the last day of the conference, stating, So long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the Conference would serve no useful purpose.4The Geneva Conference on Korea, in short, was marred by the bitter and heated divisiveness that characterized the early Cold War years. That a permanent peace treaty never materialized years later is a very good indicator that the Cold War continued to leave its massive footprint on Northeast Asia-indeed, even after the Cold War was officially declared to be over.Nothing from the Four-Way TalksThe failure of the four-way talks between the United States, the two Koreas and China, which took place between 1997 and 1999, to produce a peace treaty made clear that while the ideal of such an accord existed none of the participants, especially Washington and Pyongyang, knew how to bring it to fruition. For example, while Pyongyang desired a peace treaty with the United States, it wanted to exclude South Korea, which of course was not what Washington or Seoul wanted to hear. On the other side, Washington was not about to yield to Pyongyang's desire to U.S. troops removed from South Korea, claiming, like Seoul, that the presence of American forces have helped to maintain peace and stability for decades.Both Washington and Pyongyang maintained that their ultimate objective was to establish a permanent peace in a practical manner. However, the four-way talks consistently had agenda problems. Washington remained committed to confidencebuilding measures, which incorporated U.S. and South Korean interests. Clinton administration stressed that the United States wanted the four-way talks to reduce tensions and build confidence on the Korean Peninsula with the aim of putting a formal end to the hostilities of the Korean War. …
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