Geneva Conference Research Articles

Traffic Accidents: A Historical and Socio-Legal Analysis of Road Safety Challenges

Abstract This article examines the socio-legal aspects of the formation of the concept of a traffic accident, exploring its evolution from the late 19th century to the present day. The rapid growth of motor vehicles and the increasing complexity of road systems have necessitated the development of legal frameworks and safety regulations to address the risks posed by traffic accidents. The study highlights key legal milestones, such as the official introduction of the term “traffic accident” at the 1949 Geneva Conference, and analyzes the role of societal attitudes toward road safety and personal responsibility. It also delves into the cultural factors influencing traffic behavior, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive safety culture that involves drivers, pedestrians, and state regulation. By assessing the socio-legal dynamics, the article provides insights into the challenges of ensuring road safety and reducing the social and economic consequences of traffic accidents.

The United States, the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, and the failure of military intervention

The Geneva Conference of 1954 was supposed to reach a diplomatic solution between the states involved in the First Indochina War. However, the United States, because of its foreign policy, was not going to accept a political solution, and therefore favored multilateral military intervention called United Action. But historiography is still grappling with the question of whether the president of the United States Dwight David Eisenhower was considering sending troops, or whether it was only a threat of intervention to improve the negotiating position in Geneva. As the study shows, Eisenhower undoubtedly considered moves toward intervention.

Diplomatic Efforts of the Soviet Union in Seeking a Path to Conflict Resolution and Organizing the Geneva Conference (1954) – An Approach Through the Notes of the Soviet Delegation

The 1954 Geneva Conference was one of the most notable international conferences during the Cold War, addressing the end of war and restoration of peace in three Indochina countries and the Korean Peninsula. Major powers, including the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, represented the two blocs of socialism and capitalism, and played significant roles in this conference. The Soviet Union, as a major power and representative of the Warsaw Pact, was pivotal in balancing the power between the two international superpowers at the time (the Soviet Union and the United States). This paper presents the Soviet Union's diplomatic efforts in seeking ways to resolve conflicts in Indochina and the Korean Peninsula. From the notes of Soviet diplomats, both secret and public meetings of foreign ministers and embassies reflect the challenging path to holding the conference according to the principles of an international peace conference. The Soviet Union, in its role, consistently acted as a conference designer, crafting a front for a known "battle" full of challenges.

Innovative Curriculum Model for Person Centered Medical Education

The academic medical education model of Francisco de Vitoria University (UFV) was presented at the Jim Appleyard Memorial 14th Geneva Conference on person cenetred medicine in April 2022. The objective of creating a new medical education model aimed at training person-centered physicians and how it was articulated in the curriculum is the main purpose of this short manuscript. The main characteristics and foundational ideas inspiring this model are presented.

Self-Care and Mutual Care in the Context of Person Centred Medicine

Introduction: The Geneva Declaration emerging from the 13th Geneva Conference on Person-Centred Medicine dealt with self-care, inter-care, and well-being during COVID-19 pandemic times. For the first time since the inception of the Geneva Conferences, the main theme involved self-care and inter-care. Not only these important healthcare strategies were innovative but also their specific relevance to person-centred care was implicitly assumed but had not been pointedly articulated. There has been significant literature available on self-care and only recently on inter-care, a concept sometimes referred to as mutual care. Objectives: The main objective of this paper is to examine systematically the place of self-care and mutual care within the framework of person-centred medicine (PCM) and thus help substantiate academically the main theme of the 2021 Geneva Declaration from the International College of Person-Centred Medicine. Methodology: The main approach involved an exploratory review of the literature aimed at clarifying the extent to which self-care and mutual care are related to the core concepts and to the key principles of PCM. Results: The relationship of the self-care and mutual care health strategies to the core concepts and key principles of PCM is tabularly appraised. It was found that both health strategies were related to the three core concepts of PCM and to virtually all key principles of PCM, except the holistic framework. Conclusions: Self-care and mutual care are related to and substantiated by the core concepts and key principles of PCM. The value of these findings could be extended through the identification and analyses of best practices and the performance of systematic research studies.

13th Geneva Conference on Person Centred Medicine Summary Report

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The Rise and Fall of the ‘World Economy’ in Weimar Germany

Abstract Recent studies have emphasized the role of international institutions in the emergence of a transnational culture of economic experts in the interwar period. According to this view, collaboration over the difficulties of international trade in goods and finance was driven by a common language of problem diagnosis and solution finding. This interpretation has pushed the relevance of the domestic context for ‘agents of the international’ into the background. The World Economic Conference in Geneva organized by the League of Nations in 1927 shows that Weimar business representatives saw their participation as an opportunity to improve their position in their national federations and vis-à-vis the Reich government. Therefore, on the one hand, they sought to be appointed by state authorities to participate in the Geneva discussions. On the other hand, they stressed the relevance of the World Economy as well as their competence in solving world economic problems. As a consequence, immediately before and after the meeting in Geneva, the World Economy was a prominent topic among Weimar’s business representatives. However, this strategy counted on the implementation of the conference’s economic policy proposals by national governments. As it became apparent that the Geneva recommendations would not have lasting impact, interest in the World Economy waned and its spokesmen turned to other forms of international cooperation, in particular regional customs alliances and cartel agreements. The rise and fall of the topic of the World Economy among German business representatives cannot be understood independently of its interaction with the domestic context of Weimar Germany.

Strategic Plan Of The Major Countries At The Geneva Conference On Indochina And The Position Of The Democratic Republic Of Vietnam On The Issue Of Restoring Peace In Indochina In 1954

On July 21, 1954, the Geneva Accords on Indochina was signed in Geneva, Switzerland, ending the Vietnamese people's long-term resistance war against the French colonialists, completely liberating North Vietnam, opening a new phase of the Vietnamese revolution with the aim of reunifying the country. The signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina confirmed the first international legal recognition of the three Indochina countries signed and recognized by the major countries attending the Conference. In particular, for Vietnam, this is also the first time that major countries have had to recognize Vietnam's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, creating a very important premise and legal basis for Vietnam to continue its struggle against the intervention and aggression of the US imperialists. Many foreign and Vietnamese scholars have researched and published many works in the form of books and articles from different perspectives and approaches regarding the Geneva Conference and Accords on Indochina. In this article, the author approaches from the perspective of a researcher about the two wars against France and the US of the Vietnamese people on the basis of accessing published domestic and international open sources with the hope of clarifying three issues: 1. Analyzing and clarifying the international context at the time of the Geneva Conference on Indochina; 2. Clarifying strategic intentions and purposes of major countries attending the Geneva Conference on Indochina; 3. Clarifying the position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam towards the Geneva Conference on the restoration of peace in Indochina.

A New wto Protocol on Fisheries Subsidies: Potential Implications for the South China Sea Disputes

Abstract For close to two decades, wto member countries have discussed the possibility of disciplining the practice of subsidizing fishing activities. Concrete progress has been made as there is now a consensus on eliminating certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute towards overcapacity, overfishing and illegal unreported and unregulated fishing. In June 2022, at the end of 12th Ministerial Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (afs) was finally adopted. Against this backdrop, this paper will attempt to investigate the role that the afs might play in arresting the collapse of global fish stocks. Part i provides a brief background on the state of global fisheries and the role of subsidies in their depletion. Part ii discusses the key features of and contentious issues in the afs. Finally, Part iii considers the potential implications of the afs on disputed waters such as the South China Sea.

Economic Comparison between China and the UK under the Influence of Ideology in the Pandemic Era

In the end of 2019, a virus called covid-19 on a press conference in Geneva held by the National Health Organization on February 11, that the novel corona-virus was officially named covid-19. It was initially found in Wuhan, China, which has a high contagious and a terrible death rate. The author studies the economic development of the two countries by describing the different measures taken by China and Britain in the face of the COVID-19 under the influence of ideology and system. The article finds that the ideology and institution will affect the decisions making by the government. In that case, different policies will lead to different outcome in economic growth and recovery in the epidemic and in the post-epidemic era.

1954년 제네바정치회의에서의 ‘중립국’ 문제: ‘중립’ 개념을 둘러싼 진영 간 대립과 한국정부의 저항

이 연구는 6.25전쟁 정전 이후 개최된 1954년 제네바정치회의에서 통일정부 총선거 감시안을 두고 발생한 한국/자유진영과 공산진영 간 갈등을 ‘중립국’ 문제에 기초해 분석한다. 총선거의 감시를 위해 공산진영은 중립국감시안을 주장했고, 한국과 미국은 중립국감시안 반대와 유엔감시안을 제시했다. 공산 측의 중립국감시안은 체코슬로바키아와 폴란드라는 공산국을 참여시켜 의사 판단에 반수를 확보하는 방식이었다. 그렇다면 한국은 왜 국제적 압박 속에서 중립국 감시를 반대했을까? 첫째, 한국은 정치회의에 인도가 중립국으로 참가하는 것에 대해 한국 내에서 인도군과의 마찰에 따라 비판적 입장을 취했다. 또한 소련이 중립국 자격으로 정치회의에 참가하는 것 역시 중립적 지위를 활용해 공산주의를 확장하려는 전략이라 판단했다. 둘째, 공산 측이 제안한 인도차이나 휴전 중립국감시안은 공산 2개국을 참여시켜 반수를 확보하는 한국 정전 중립국감시위원단 구성과 동일했다. 자유진영은 공산주의와 중립이 양립할 수 없는 것이라고 판단했다. 셋째, 한국에서 공산 중립국감시위원단의 정전협정 위반은 최근 연구로 입증되었다. 체코슬로바키아는 북한을 지원하며 전투태세를 갖춰 한국에 입국하려 했고, 폴란드의 정보요원들은 정전감시 규정을 위반했다. 이 ‘중립국’들은 한국을 ‘적’으로 북한을 ‘친구’로 인식했다. 6.25전쟁 직후 국가생존의 위기 처한 한국정부로서는 공산 ‘중립국’ 감시에 의한 총선거 제안은 받아들일 수 없는 것이었다.

Isolating the Enemy: Diplomatic Strategy in China and the United States, 1953–1956

Isolating the Enemy is a valuable addition to continuing historical debates about Sino-American relations in the 1950s and beyond. It conclusively resolves persistent questions, weighs in on others, and opens the door for new avenues of inquiry. Drawing on newly available Chinese, Russian, and Vietnamese government materials, Tao Wang shows that from 1953 to 1956, Beijing and Washington each pursued a “wedge strategy” meant “to eliminate the other's threat through uniting allies and mobilizing supporters to push the other to make concessions” (pp. 3, 7). Each sought to isolate the other from natural allies, and both understood what their opponent was up to. These opposing wedge strategies generated a mix of confrontation and conciliation in U.S. and Chinese diplomacy, confounding contemporaries and entrenching mutual suspicions. The book is organized around three major events: the Geneva Conference on Indochina (April–July 1954), the first Taiwan Strait crisis (September 1954–May 1955), and the Bandung Conference (April 1955). Wang suggests that China's leaders generally got the better of their American counterparts in all three of these high-stakes encounters. Effectively shaming the United States for trying to derail the Geneva Conference, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and head of state Mao Zedong skillfully concluded complex bargains with leaders in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Russia, Britain, and France. In contrast, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles found themselves caught between “the unattainable and the unacceptable” because they ignored conciliatory overtures, exaggerated Chinese ambitions, underestimated tensions between China and Vietnam, and overestimated Sino-Soviet differences (p. 61). Ultimately,

GENEVA DECLARATION 2021 ON SELF-CARE, INTER-CARE, AND WELL-BEING IN PANDEMIC TIMES

Emerging from the 13th Geneva Conference on Person Centered Medicine organized as a virtual event on 5–7 April 2021 by the International College of Person-Centered Medicine (ICPCM) in collaboration with the World Medical Association, the International Council of Nurses, and the Pan-American Health Organization.

ПОЛІТИКА АДМІНІСТРАЦІЇ ДЖИММІ КАРТЕРА ЩОДО АРАБСЬКО-ІЗРАЇЛЬСЬКОГО КОНФЛІКТУ (1977–1981 РР.)

The purpose of the article is to consider the U.S. policymaking towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Middle East process and the Palestinian problem under the presidency of Jimmy Carter. The research methodology is based on the principle of historicism and standards of objectivity. The author uses historical-comparative, problem-chronological, historical-genetic, and historical-systemic methods of historical research. The scientific originality. Special attention is paid to the U.S. policymaking towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the intellectual basis of Carter’s Middle East policy. The author analyses the views of American high-ranking officials, leading experts, and policymakers regarding the concept of Arab-Israeli settlement and Soviet involvement in the Middle East peace process. The author outlines the role of the Soviet factor in American diplomatic calculations and considerations regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Conclusions. Initially, President Carter’s administration abandoned the concept of a step-by-step approach, partial settlement, and interim agreements. Instead, President Carter was determined to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, revived the idea of cooperation between Superpowers in the Middle East peace process, and agreed to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Middle East peace. The USA and the USSR were co-chairmen of the Geneva conference and issued a joint communiqué on the principles of a Middle East settlement. Among U.S. policymakers were opponents and supporters of Soviet participation in the peace process. Sadat’s peace initiative was a turning point in the U.S. strategy in the Middle East. After that, the USA changed its approach to the Middle East peace settlement, abandoned the idea of reconvening the Geneva Conference, and endorsed separate Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. President Carter’s administration was convinced that a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem was essential to Middle East settlement. The U.S. officials began to mention the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and their self-determination. American policymakers elaborated an interim solution to the problem of a Palestinian homeland. In particular, they proposed the concept of a transitional arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

ВО ИМЯ STATUS QUO: США И ПРОБЛЕМА ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЯ КОРЕИ В 1955–1966 ГОДЫ

The article examines the U.S. approaches to the Korean question in the decade between the failure of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the entry into force of the U.S.–South Korea mutual defense treaty and the establishment of a new status quo in the region, and the beginning of the conflict in the Korean DMZ of 1966–1969. During this period, the Americans insisted that only the Republic of Korea, established in 1948 with the direct UN involvement, was the only legitimate regime on the peninsula. They allowed Korean unification only in the format of North Korea's accession to the Republic of Korea. The evolution of American policy in the region in the context of the change of political regimes in the south of the country and the transformation of North Korean tactics to restore the territorial unity of Korea are discussed. In general, during the period under review, the Americans quite effectively resisted the DPRK's attempts to put the issue of restoring Korean unity on the international agenda in a constructive way. The UN acted as a tool for legitimizing the U.S. military presence in the region, while the Korean Unification and Restoration Commission in fact merely broadcasted South Korea’s official point of view on events. On the other hand, the contradictions between real U.S. policy and Washington's articulated support for Korean unity discredited the American position in the eyes of the southerners. The Communists did not doze off, systematically working to strengthen their position in the UN. Under these circumstances, by the second half of the 1960s, the U.S. position on the Korean issue at the UN was in dire need of modernization.

The 1954 Geneva Conference: Who Won?

The article analyzes the 1954 Geneva Conference dedicated to the settlement of conflicts in Korea and Indochina. Despite the division of the conference participants into two camps, the motives of the delegations in each of them differed. Soviet diplomacy, led by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, was concerned with obtaining a result that generally reinforced the peacekeeping policy of early détente. The Chinese diplomacy headed by Zhou Enlai sought to accomplish more specific tasks of creating buffers on the northern and southern flanks of the confrontation with the United States and its allies. As a result, Soviet diplomacy followed China's lead, and the option of partitioning Vietnam, first proposed by the PRC, was implemented, while the settlement of the Korean conflict was frozen. At the same time, the fate of Korea demonstrated to the participants that hopes for Vietnam's unification in the near future were illusory, yet the Vietnamese leadership nevertheless agreed to this option. Although, like their antagonists, the DRV and the DPRK played the role of junior partners, the representatives of the “great powers” took their position into account. Having weighed the disadvantages and advantages of partitioning Vietnam, the leadership of the DRV supported it. The PRC and the USSR also further improved relations with Britain and France, while the latter two went some way to isolating the more intransigent US diplomacy at the conference. As a result, the 1954 Geneva Conference was one of the major successes of the “early détente”, although it failed to create the conditions for long-term peace in Indochina.

The democratic republic of Vietnam delegation with Geneva conference in 1954

Geneva Conference discussed re-establishing peace in Indochina at the official opening on May 08, 1954. On July 21, 1954 the agreement on stopping war in Vietnam was signed, and the countries attending the Conference ratified the Final Declaration. This is a large multipartite international convention The Democratic Republic of Vietnam joining for the first time. Passed 68 years, but there are still different perceptions and assessments of researchers about the Conference. The following study concentrates on exchanging some of the current opinions and arguments about Vietnam’s participation in the Conference and the results that Vietnam achieved at the Geneva Conference in 1954.

“A Special Form of Making Foreign Policy by the Threat of War to Imperialists”. A Case Study of Military-Political Activity of Central Committee Presidium under N.S. Khrushchev, 1954–1964. Part 1

Khrushchev’s foreign policy (1953–1964) that characterized by the strategy of “balancing on the edge” is usually recognized as erroneous. Immediately after Stalin’s death, his successors initially feared a nuclear attack from the United States, which their own Air Force and Air Defense were unable to repel or to retaliate. Therefore, in 1954–1955, the Soviet leader attempted to create a buffer zone of neutral states along the perimeter of the USSR’s borders: he stopped the Korean War, proposed the mutual withdrawal of troops from Europe, etc. After the 1955 Geneva Conference, Khrushchev began to act more courageously, because he saw that the U.S. were afraid of the USSR too and didn’t want to attack it first. Trying to use the opportunities of the European colonial empires’ disintegration, the USSR provided to the newly independent states in Asia and Africa a large-scale economic, military, technical, and political support, and first of all, to Egypt and Indonesia, which controlled the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca – key areas on the sea route from Europe to the Far East. The negotiations between Mao Tse Tung and Khrushchev in 1957–1958 reveals their intention to shake up the military blocs created by the Americans near the borders of the socialist camp (NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact). The Soviet leader initiated a series of political crises as interconnected stages of geopolitical offensive against the US position: the Suez (1956), the Syrian (1957), the Middle East (1958), the 2nd Berlin (1958), the Caribbean (1962), etc., which brought the USSR to the brink of war.

Національне пи- тання на Женевській конференції соціалістичних партій Росії (2-8 квітня 1905 р.): дискусії та рішення

The purpose of the study is to shed light on the SRs’ consideration of projects to resolve the national issue in the Russian Empire at the Geneva Conference of Socialist Parties and to evaluate the proposed ideas for Russia’s restructuring. In the context of reviewing the discussions, special attention was paid to the future of tsarist-enslaved peoples, who were represented at the meetings by delegates from the National Socialist parties and demanded autonomous status, and sometimes national independence and secession from Russia, as in the case of Poland and Finland. The research methodology is based on the principles of concrete-historical approach or historicism, objectivity, comprehensiveness and integrity, systematics, as well as the use of the methods – analysis and synthesis, historical-comparative, historical-typological and problem-chronological. The scientifi c novelty is that in the course of the study for the fi rst time there’s been an attempt made to analyze the consideration of the national question in the Russian Empire at the Geneva Conference and to fi nd out the attitude of the delegates from the National Socialist Parties to the SR projects. A complex topic is considered, which is practically not disclosed in historical studies of this period. Conclusions. Th e Geneva Conference was an important stage in the development of the Russian Revolution, when the leading socialist forces of Russia, as well as the national socialist parties and organizations, sought to understand each other in order to defeat the common enemy, tsarism. It demonstrated common views on the federalization of the Russian state in the postrevolutionary era and the granting of broad autonomy to enslaved nations. A separate point of the agreement was the support for perestroika mechanisms, which stated that the aim of the revolution would be to convene a Constituent Assembly, not only in Russia but also in Poland and Finland, which stated the abolition of tsarism and building a democratic republic. However, the events of the revolution made their adjustments to the plans of the Socialists, so the agreements in Geneva were never implemented in practice.

The Power of Putin in Russian Foreign Policy

The Power of Putin in Russian Foreign Policy