General Disarmament Research Articles

Asia and the Prospects for World Order

Three critical unsolved problems, Asian as well as global, confront the world: peace, population, and pollution. Non-violence, economic development, and social justice are needed to solve these problems, which are global in their scope. World order is a workable system of war prevention conceived on a global basis. International institutions capable of keeping the peace are required to achieve it. There are six major Asian countries or areas capable of affecting developments in Asia: Japan, mainland China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and the Middle East complex. Of these, only Japan, Israel, and possibly Indonesia are capable of creative action in the sense used by Arnold J. Toynbee. In many Asian areas, hate between adjacent countries is so great that constructive moves for peace are unlikely. Thus, Asia desperately needs world order but is not likely to contribute much toward its achievement. World order, if it comes, will result from widespread disarmament of the super- and middle-sized powers, the growth concurrently of an international peace force, and the creation of international institutions with power to prevent violence and administer justice. Leadership must come from the Soviet Union and the United States, hopefully through the United Nations, or from amplification of the treaties of General and Complete Disarmament filed by the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva in 1962. China can be disregarded for the time being as a paper tiger. The Soviet Union is more likely to contribute to world order than the United States, which has become a militaristic nation since the end of World War II. The Germanization of the United States springs from a powerful and highly respected elite corps of military officers who manipulate the youth of the nation through conscription. Much of this is due to the unnecessary involvement of the United States on the land mass of Asia. Withdrawal of American forces from Asia is the place to start in the search for world order.

Economic Consequences of Disarmament: The Soviet View

SOVIET writers on the economic consequences of general and complete disarmament unanimously express the traditional Soviet doctrine that disarmament is a problem capable of eventual resolution, that no other matter is of more importance to the future of world peace and security and that implementation of measures of disarmament will yield economic results so advantageous that mankind will enter a new era of economic and social well-being.' Much more significant, however, is the tenor and overall attitude of recent Soviet studies of this question. Perhaps in no other area of international relations have Soviet specialists addressed themselves to a current problem with similar freedom from the outworn slogans and cliches of party ideology that have seriously detracted from their scholarly work in the past. This refreshing objectivity would be welcome in many fields of endeavor, but particularly in the area of disarmament, where disillusionment and disappointment in concrete advances have recently occasioned great loss of interest among political scientists of all nations. Soviet writers on disarmament no longer honor the contention that militarization and defense spending are essential to the prosperity and even the survival of the capitalist system (though Western capitalists are said to perpetuate the arms race to reap colossal profits from defense procurement and military production). It is now customary among the Soviets to cite militarization as the greatest obstacle to sound economic growth in the West and to characterize defense procurement 1A representative example of Soviet optimism concerning the resolution of the problems of disarmament in N. Arkadiev, Razoruzhenie-put' k miru, Moscow, 1958, pp. 53-62.

The Lot of the Civilian Population in War-Time

The International Review has already given the text of the Resolutions passed at the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross last year. One of these (No. XXVIII) is of particular importance and we shall no doubt have reason to revert to it. It reads as follows:The XXth International Conference of the Red Cross,in its endeavours for the protection of the civilian population, reaffirms Resolution No. XVIII of the XVIIIth International Conference of the Red Cross (Toronto, 1952), which, in consideration of Resolution No. XXIV of the XVIIth International Conference of the Red Cross (Stockholm, 1948) requested Governments to agree, within the framework of general disarmament, to a plan for the international control of atomic energy which would ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes,)thanks the International Committee of the Red Cross for the initiative taken and the comprehensive work done by it in defining and further developing international humanitarian law in this sphere,states that indiscriminate warfare constitutes a danger to the civilian population and the future of civilisation

Character and Mission of a United Nations Peace Force, Under Conditions of General and Complete Disarmament

A principal element of the United States Government's conception of general and complete disarmament pertains to establishment and development of a force not identified with any national governing entity, subject to control by an all-embracing international collectivity, and charged with missions of global scope in connection with peace-keeping.The purpose of this essay is to examine what might be entailed, as conditions and as consequences, in establishing such a force. The discussion focuses quite explicitly on terms in the United States' proposal before the eighteen-nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1962—a document hereinafter referred to by the short title Outline. Other sources, including proposals and discussions of forces of kindred type, are referred to for details concerning conceivable forms and conditions for the undertaking.As set forth in the Outline, such a force would be brought into existence over a span of years. The process of realizing it would be linked, stage by stage, with a progressive diminution of all forces under national control. At a transforming juncture, national forces would have been scaled down to a level rendering impossible their projection of any threat beyond the borders of their respective domains.

The Economic Consequences of Disarmament in the Netherlands

General and complete disarmament in the Netherlands would result, as might be expected, in a decreasing national product and an increasing unemployment. How ever, these unfavourable consequences can be met successfully by rather simple coun ter-measures, consisting of the maintenance or even the increase of total effective de mand, provided these measures are prepared and taken in time. To make the like lihood of a smooth conversion as great as possible this preparation should be done by the Government as well as by the individual firms. This last condition is not fulfilled in reality. Detailed governmental counter-measures, meaning intervention in individual firms or industries, do not seem necessary on a large scale. Supply of labour being a bottleneck for growth in the Netherlands, the resources freed by disarmament may give new possibilities for economic growth. The effects of disarmament for Surinam and the Antillian Islands run via the markets for primary products, especially bauxite and oil. Since demand on these markets is probably determined not only by such factors as price, quality and distance, but also by national-political influences, the ultimate result cannot be predicted but can be described as non-positive for the development of these areas.

Informed Dissent and Academic Research

It is difficult to determine whether an 'academic establishment' can be traced sociologically among the 1,000 American campuses listed in the 1964 almanacs. Certainly, there is an establishment east of mind in the 'knowledge industry,' as it has been called. For evidence of this academic attitude one need look no further than at the recent proliferation of studies of U.S. foreign policy, deterrence theory, and economic growth problems. They have lately become fashionable among Faculty research institutions and financially well-supported by outside sources. Axiomatic among most of these studies is the assumed continuance of the Cold War and the narrowest possible definition of national interest. Lacking almost com? pletely is the imagination to criticize the fundamental premises of American strategy or to cope with the revolutionary measures necessary to achieve a disarmed world. Indeed, it sometimes seems embarrassing to remind some of the academicians in this new field of study that the United States is officially committed to General and Complete Disarmament and to the replacement of a war system with a radically changed sense of world community. Notwithstanding the encouragement and research contracts of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the 'establishment* think? ing of American academia has been directed cautiously to the clarification of limited and immediate problems and not to the exploration of basic policy choices.

The Immediate Steps Toward Disarmament

Last month the Bulletin published an article by the Soviet scientist Dr. Yuri Sheinin, which posed the thesis that general and complete disarmament is a “yes” or “no” proposition, that it is—in contrast to arms control—”not a modification of a trivial concept of military strategy, aims not at adjusting disarmament to the needs of the military establishment, but at destroying this establishment once and for all.” This month Dr. Franklin Long, until recently chief scientist of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, presents the view, widely held in America, that complete and general disarmament is a desirable end goal, but that it may perhaps be best approached by means more modest and indirect than frontal assault. The cynic will possibly conclude that both the sophisticated and the simplistic views amount to a basic rejection of disarmament, but he would be only partially right. I think it was Bernard Shaw who said of Christianity that it might be all right but that it was hard to tell, si...

Unmanaged Weapons and the Calculated Control of International Politics

The main idea of this essay is to raise the question of what the arrays of political and scientific roles in the working of the international system may be like after the world has passed beyond its present phase, with its particular preoccupations with bipolar conflicts, tensions and crises, deterrence, arms control, and prescriptions for world government, general and complete disarmament, and world peace. The reason for raising the question is fairly obvious: there is always the likely possibility that present efforts to understand and control are on the wrong track. Perhaps our continuous scannings of the future are covering the wrong sectors or are overlooking the important phenomena. Perhaps the assumptions and the affirmations that guide both policy and research on the international system-and that have high face validity-are correct more for the past than for the future.

The Folklore of General Disarmament

The Folklore of General Disarmament

International Force in a Disarming—but Revolutionary—World

General disarmament plans, like weapons of mass destruction, supply excessive solutions to problems, and, like those weapons, they tend to leave unanswered many highly pertinent questions about lesser conflicts, low-level disorders, ambiguous enemies, and local policing jobs. By and large, strategic planners have come to recognize this weakness in military doctrines, but it is not certain that the planners of general and complete disarmament (GCD) yet recognize that a blueprint geared to the deliberate violation, the great war, the two super-states in hostile confrontation, may turn out to be quite irrelevant to the real problems of a disarmed or even semidisarmed world. At best such a blueprint is bound to be deficient until it comes to grips with disorders other than classic open encounters of two states—that is, with the painfully familiar gamut ranging from civil war fomented in a great state by outside agents to the purely internal breakdown of law and order in a small state.

Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty.

Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control

Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control

International Prestige, Competition and Peaceful Coexistence

There is room for unilateral action to improve international relations in areas other than nuclear test bans, the cessation of bomb production, or general disarmament. One such area—the subject of this article—concerns the effects of international competition for prestige on peaceful coexistence.

Inspection and general disarmament

Inspection and general disarmament

Defence with Mobility

LAST month saw the presentation to Parliament of the annual Report on Defence, and the Army, Navy and Air Estimates for 1961–62. The defence statement reiterates the Government's intention to press for a satisfactory agreement on general disarmament under effective international control, but the existence of immense military power in the Soviet bloc and the growth of Chinese might necessitate the maintenance of adequate power by the Western allies to discourage aggression.

An American Policy Toward Communist China

Security—the containment of Communist China —is one of the basic ingredients of the official United States policy in east and southeast Asia. At the same time we are attempting, with near-success, to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty that will eventually, it is hoped, become one part of a more general disarmament agreement. But is there any hope for a lasting disarmament agreement that excludes Communist China? Moreover, can a nuclear test ban treaty be effective whose control system requires inspection sites on the China mainland and yet denies the possibility to Communist China to participate in its formulation? Furthermore, how advanced is Communist China in the scientific realm? Is it not probable that she too will join the nuclear club in the foreseeable future? When the answers to these questions are faced squarely, they will of necessity indicate the unrealistic nature of the policy we are taking towards Communist China. Hopefully, before even this door is closed, we will begin to explore those contacts with Communist China which are now available to the United States to discover whether or not there is a basis on which a disarmament agreement that includes the Chinese Communists can be concluded.—Ed.

Warsaw Collective Security Pact

The Political Consultative Committee established under the Warsaw collective security treaty held its first meeting in Prague on January 27 and 28, 1956. In addition to representatives of the eight signatory powers (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union), an observer from the People's Republic of China attended the meeting. According to press reports, a declaration was issued at the close of the two-day meeting in which an immediate big-power agreement to exclude nuclear weapons from the equipment of any armies stationed in Germany was proposed. The declaration said that the Warsaw powers noted a basic change in the international situation and the existence of possibilities for its further improvement; while in Europe the continued armament of the western powers and the remilitarization of Germany made it essential for the signatories to ensure their own safety, at the same time they intended to work constantly for a system of collective security and general disarmament. Specifically, the declaration renewed an earlier Soviet proposal for a European collective security system and the establishment of a zone to include all Germany, where arms and troops would be limited and controlled. In the meantime, it recommended that nonaggression pacts should be made between states, and in general a start should be made to improve relations between states, irrespective of their existing or eventual membership in one or another military bloc. A communique issued with the declaration announced that the newly created army of the German Democratic Republic had been formally accepted into the command of Marshal Ivan S. Konev, supreme commander of the Warsaw treaty military structure.