Abstract

Security—the containment of Communist China —is one of the basic ingredients of the official United States policy in east and southeast Asia. At the same time we are attempting, with near-success, to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty that will eventually, it is hoped, become one part of a more general disarmament agreement. But is there any hope for a lasting disarmament agreement that excludes Communist China? Moreover, can a nuclear test ban treaty be effective whose control system requires inspection sites on the China mainland and yet denies the possibility to Communist China to participate in its formulation? Furthermore, how advanced is Communist China in the scientific realm? Is it not probable that she too will join the nuclear club in the foreseeable future? When the answers to these questions are faced squarely, they will of necessity indicate the unrealistic nature of the policy we are taking towards Communist China. Hopefully, before even this door is closed, we will begin to explore those contacts with Communist China which are now available to the United States to discover whether or not there is a basis on which a disarmament agreement that includes the Chinese Communists can be concluded.—Ed.

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