Future World Order Research Articles

After insularity: Hegemony and the future world order

Geostrategic insularity—historically based on water as a medium of long-distance commerce and a barrier to land armies—helped hegemonic countries to emerge from global wars with worldwide predominance in military capability and economic strength (in production, trade, finance). The role of insularity in hegemony is discussed and two pre-modern prototypes (Athens and Venice) and five modern cases of insularity (Portugal, the Netherlands, 18th and 19th century Britain, and the USA) are examined. The undermining of insularity by air power and missiles is then considered, and four scenarios are explored for future world order in a post-insular era: (1) US hegemonic revival; (2) rapid hegemonic decline leading to anarchy or hegemonic war; (3) peaceful transition to Japanese hegemony; and (4) slow hegemonic decline with great power cooperation under lingering US leadership. Neither resurgent hegemony nor rapid decline (toward anarchy, war, or hegemonic transfer) appears likely. Rather, shared responsibility for world order under continuing US leadership is foreseen.

Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order

'Middle power' and 'functionalism' were key terms in John Holmes's work. His was perhaps the most articulate expression of the thought behind Canadian diplomacy in the reconstruction of international organization after the Second World War. Although the great powers, and in the first place the United States, were, in Dean Acheson's words, 'present at the creation/ Canada and other middle and smaller powers were, as Holmes underscored, 'also present.' Canada's contribution, in Holmes's thinking, should not be just to claim a place for the assertion of particularist national interests. Beyond such particulars, Canada had an overriding interest in the development of institutions and practices conducive to peace, tranquillity, and orderly adjustment in world politics. Middle powers, of which Canada was an exemplar, could be an important influence to this end because, unlike great powers, they were not suspected of harbouring intentions of domination and because they had resources sufficient to enable them to be functionally effective. This in substance was the Canadian doctrine of function-

Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order

Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order

Public International Law and the Future World Order: Liber Amicorum in Honor of A.J. Thomas, Jr. Edited by J.J. Norton. Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1987. xxxii + 574 pp. $47.50

Journal Article Public International Law and the Future World Order: Liber Amicorum in Honor of A.J. Thomas, Jr . Edited by J.J. Norton. Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1987. xxxii + 574 pp. $47.50 Get access Marc M. Weller Marc M. Weller Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar British Yearbook of International Law, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1988, Pages 253–254, https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/59.1.253 Published: 01 November 1989

Gorbachev and Europe: Reflections of the future world order

Soviet foreign political thinking may be separated into two different elements, the ideological and the Utopian. Both elements have been apparent in Soviet policy towards Western Europe over the post‐war period. Gorbachev, especially in his book Perestroika (1987), has however begun to speak of a ‘common European home’ in a manner that suggests he has begun to question the bipolar international system established in 1945, and that he attaches greater importance to relations with other European states. Although there has always been a strong Utopian element in Marxist‐Leninist thought, this element does not appear to be as dominant in Soviet thinking as it was before Gorbachev's accession to the General Secretaryship.

A Review of the Report of the Brandt Commission in View of Future World Order

Not Available.

Unity with diversity: Toward social policies for a future world order∗

Unity with diversity: Toward social policies for a future world order∗

Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of Korea

world order. In spite of a good deal of research on nuclear proliferation, this topic has not been focused upon clearly or, perhaps, has been under a taboo. This is not surprising since most research on nuclear proliferation has been implicitly or explicitly centered on national interests of nuclear superpowers or near-nuclear countries. The real dilemma of nuclear proliferation, however, cannot be fully understood and explained from this perspective, as can be seen in the conflicting arguments on the proliferation problem between nuclear-weapon states and near-nuclear countries. On the other hand, the analysis of the impact of nuclear proliferation on world order from a global perspective will give some new insights into this problem. Furthermore, it is also significant that this effort could be an essential first step for the study of the control or management of nuclear proliferation for the preferred world order. This study will analyze the case of Korea to evaluate the utility of small nuclear forces for the more relevant utopia of future world order. Northeast Asia is one of the few places that reveal most clearly the major characteristics of the present world order. Thus this study will seek to determine the degree of impact of the possible nuclearization of Korea on world order, and will address the following specific topics:

A mandate on behalf of the poor?

An analysis of international agencies (IAs) is presented, with a view toward defining their role in the future New World Order. These IAs fall into two broad categories: private transnational corporations in which maximum profitability is the ultimate goal, and private foundations in which profitability is immaterial. The second group is better suited for development objectives due to the severe limitations imposed by the profit motive. An assessment of past performance by IAs in Third World development reveals many successes and, particularly on the part of the World Bank Group, an ability to learn from experience and to adjust policies accordingly. Major shortcomings include deficient program review; lack of coordination among agencies and of coherence within the system; and a failure to link foreign assistance with trade flows, private capital, and monetary questions. Major proposals include the establishment of new IAs for specific functions, automatic resource transfers, increased governmental management of IAs, and direct efforts toward the alleviation of poverty. Given time and determination, IAs should be valuable international machinery for the New World Order.

The Future World Order —A Review Article

The Future World Order —A Review Article

On Thinking about Future World Order

Three types of thought approach the question of future world order: the naturalrational, positivist-evolutionary, and historicist-dialectical. The normative criterion in the natural-rational approach has, in recent times, most commonly been bound up with the view that liberal pluralism in polities is the condition for a just world order. This view has, however, succumbed both under the critique of positivist-evolutionary political science which argues that authoritarianism is characteristic of early stages of political development, and to the manipulation of “pluralism” in poor countries by powerful external forces (investment, trade union, and intelligence). The positivist-evolutionary approach has two main currents. One is functionalism, of which the transnational and transgovernmental relations versions are currently fashionable. The other is the notion of a global ecological system. Both versions take existing structures of power and social relations as implicit givens from which future trends are extrapolated; they provide no basis for considering the possibility of changes in these structures. The historicist-dialectical approach offers the possibility of understanding change in these basic structures of power and social relations by searching out points of emerging conflict and the alternative conceptions of order which the forces in conflict express.

Models of Future World Order

Models of Future World Order

The United Nations Since 1945: An Appraisal

While the United Nations offers new channels for international co-operative policies and for collaborative action, emphasis upon national sovereignty and the defense of national interest has tended to make of it an instrument of national policy to defend and extend the vital national interests of the member states. There exist an essential dualism in the Char ter and a pragmatic dualism in American policy regarding the United Nations. With the international shift from an allied- axis split to an East-West split, it has become apparent that the effectiveness of the United Nations in settling disputes is directly related to the remoteness of the dispute from the bi polar conflict. The United Nations clearly lacks the power to be effective within the Soviet sphere. The United States has, in the past, used the United Nations as an instrument of its national policy, but, with the admission to the United Na tions of Afro-Asian states who oppose the colonialist allies of the United States, the United States can no longer count on majorities favorable to its national policies. It can be said that the United Nations and its members live today with one foot in the world of power and the other foot in the hopes for a future world order. In the present global struggle, the great est contribution of the United Nations may well be its function as an educational forum before the world.—Ed.

The Teheran Three

I do not know if the conclusion that was reached at Teheran, now after three months still holds good : ‘We come here with hope and determination. We have been friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.’ Nor do I know whether the British and American columnists who so solemnly proclaimed that the Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences, had laid the foundations for the perpetual and peaceable direction by the Big Three or Four (leaving out of count all the other countries) of a future world order are to-day of the same mind. What has happened in these months is so significant and entails so many hypotheses as to the future of the world, that it challenges all the over-simple formulae which have nourished a superficial press.Stalin is in the foreground. He has an active, volitive policy which starts from Moscow and arrives at Moscow. Without stressing historical comparisons too much, he can be considered as a Russian Napoleon, who is as much a Muscovite (a Muscovite of Georgia) as the Corsican was a Parisian. Such types bring to capital cities a certain provincial originality, which cuts them off from tradition, thus facilitating the developments of their inventive spirit. Just as Napoleon transformed the semi-anarchic democracy of the French Revolution, (already at its third phase), into a Directory and then into an Empire, while maintaining the symbols of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, so Stalin has transformed the Leninist Soviet regime into a politico-military dictatorship, while preserving the name and certain structures of Communism.Stalin has dropped the Red International for a more concrete and profitable nationalism ; he has passed from persecution of the Orthodox Church to benevolent toleration ; he has restored a particularist trend to economic life, little by little bringing back private interest.

Power Politics and World Organization

Le Pouvoir est la manifestation supreme de la peur que l'homme fait à luimême par ses efforts pour s'en libirer. Là est peut-être le secret le plus profond et obscur de l'histoire. Ferrero, Pouvoir, p. 43.The current discussion of a future world order has made it plain that the problem of coming international relations is of a magnitude surpassing even that of winning the war. It is not intended here to add to the rising tide of concrete plans in this field, but rather to elucidate certain proposals in the light of some basic features of the present system of international relations and, starting from a clearer picture of what is, to seek to discriminate between what is desirable and undesirable, possible and utopian. Wrong concepts of the forces underlying the present system have too often produced “peace plans” built on the sands of wishful thinking, and therefore bound to be wrecked on the rocks of reality. Disappointment caused by the failure of ill-conceived devices, in turn, is apt to produce a “realism” which ridicules any attempt to discuss international relations in terms of a possible evolution toward a more integrated stage.Power, in modern international relations, has been the ultimate means of deciding issues and adjusting relationships among the units constituting international society. The states have regarded themselves as “sovereign” entities, not subordinated to any superior political power nor guided in their power politics by considerations of an a-political, i.e., power-alien, nature.