Formal Democratic Institutions Research Articles

Informal institutionalization in modern Ukraine

The relevance of the research lies in the observation that, while Ukraine has established formal democratic institutions since its independence, many democratization issues remain unresolved. These formal structures lack effectiveness and support, with informal, often non-democratic political processes and secret agreements continuing to prevail. The study aims to conclude a theoretical study, conceptualization, and generalization of the problems of the existence of informal institutions, as well as a comprehensive analysis of practical technologies of informal institutionalization in modern Ukraine. The authors used such general scientific methods as analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, abstraction, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete. The authors considered such informal institutions that exist in the political reality of Ukraine, such as lobbying, corruption, populism, non-conventional forms of political participation of citizens, party agreements, clientelism, and political bargaining. The effective technologies for the informal institutionalization of modern Ukraine, including technologies for eliminating authoritarian practices, technologies of party structuring, technologies of political participation and technologies for the formation of democratic political consciousness have been proposed. These technologies are aimed at the political modernization of Ukraine, ensuring the institutional functioning of democracy at the proper level and minimizing the negative effects of informal institutions.

Guns, gender and petroleum: a critical analysis of the underlying dynamics of Timor-Leste’s development trajectory

This article examines the underlying political economy context of the uneven development outcomes in post-conflict Timor-Leste. We use a modified version of a structural political economy approach that is situated in a Gramscian understanding of the state-society relationship. This approach conceptualises development as a process of historically specific class-based and gender-based contestations over the distribution of resources that result in particular forms of socio-political orders maintained through a combination of institutional and ideological mechanisms of wealth generation. Our analysis of whose interests have been prioritised and marginalised in post-independence Timor-Leste is based on a systematic examination of three major factors: regulation of class relations, organisation of gender relations, and the governance of the petroleum industry. We conclude that despite some important improvements in the formation of formal democratic institutions in Timor-Leste, the processes of the distribution of power and access to resources remain far from being inclusive prioritising a class-based group of male-dominant elites that manipulates institutions to advance their interests and use a hegemonic gender ideology to justify and maintain these existing unequal arrangements in the prevailing socio-political order. Thus, the development outcomes in Timor-Leste are strongly connected to the political-economic processes from a larger historical perspective.

India: Developmental challenges faced by a dual economy

AbstractWith a population of over 1.4 billion surpassing China's in 2023, India has now become the world's most populous country. Despite its robust IT and service sectors propelling it to become the fifth‐largest economy, India still grapples with low GDP per capita and significant poverty. The paradoxical nature of India's development necessitates a closer examination of its governance. Over 90% of the Indian population works outside the purview of formal democratic institutions and capital‐intensive economic sectors. Challenges arise from the need to sustain a large poor population with limited resources while catering to the formal sector that generates more than half of its GDP. India's governance exhibits a deep mismatch between its institutional design, politics and developmental needs. This article explores the duality of informal and formal sectors underlying challenges in Indian governance by way of the Berggruen Governance Index.

Armed and dangerous: Legacies of incumbent-military ties and electoral violence in Africa

While a growing literature explores the danger that authoritarian military legacies pose for regime break-down, there is little research on the effects of similar legacies in the context of multiparty politics. This is an important gap in the literature since in many cases the introduction of formal democratic institutions has led to neither democratic consolidation nor regime breakdown. We start exploring this lacuna by developing a theory that links the use of violent electoral tactics to the ties of the executive with the authoritarian era's military. We argue that incumbents with close ties to the authoritarian regime's military are more likely to instigate election violence. Empirical tests on a sample of 230 elections in 39 African countries since 1974 show that election violence is more prevalent in countries where such ties exist. These findings speak to several areas of study, including those on election violence, and on military legacies.

New Insights On Africa’s Autocratic Past

africa has not been immune to recent global trends in democratic backsliding. Although the vast majority of countries on the continent have been holding competitive multi-party elections since the end of the Cold War, we are currently witnessing attempts by elected presidents and ruling parties to extend their tenures through undemocratic means.1 These trends are concerning, not only for those seeing their rights and freedoms constrict, but because they are happening despite the presence of formal democratic institutions that are meant to curb the impulses of autocratic rule. Our current era is not the first in which Africans have seen the erasure of hard-fought political freedoms as African countries turned autocratic after brief flirtations with democracy at independence. And like today, the autocracies of Africa’s past boasted many of the formal institutions that we assume should constrain executives. For instance, data from the Varieties of Democracy project indicate that,...

The Imperfect Democratic Transition in Somalia

The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors undermining the democratic transition in Somalia. During the first decade of independence, Somalia attempted to institutionalize a multiparty democracy. However, several factors, such as the lack of a clear political ideology, authoritarianism, and the formation of clan-based political parties, led to the decline of democratic practices, followed by a military coup and a protracted civil war. That had a devastating impact on the short and long-term democratic efforts in the country. Thirty years after the collapse of the central government, the country is embroiled in protracted political instability that continues to undermine efforts to establish formal democratic institutions and mechanisms. Apart from the political cleavage among political actors, this paper examines other factors undermining the successful transition to democracy in Somalia. It identifies factors such as the practice of clannism or a clan-based political system, rampant electoral corruption, and the inconsistent role of the international community in supporting the democratization process in Somalia. The paper argues that continuing the indirect elections has blocked the attaining successful democratic transition and stalled the adoption of procedural democracy. In addition, susceptible public institutions and instability have negatively impacted a prolonged transition in Somalia.

Prepare developed democracies for long-run economic slowdowns.

Developed democracies proliferated over the past two centuries during an unprecedented era of economic growth, which may be ending. Macroeconomic forecasts predict slowing growth throughout the twenty-first century for structural reasons such as ageing populations, shifts from goods to services, slowing innovation, and debt. Long-run effects of COVID-19 and climate change could further slow growth. Some sustainability scientists assert that slower growth, stagnation or de-growth is an environmental imperative, especially in developed countries. Whether slow growth is inevitable or planned, we argue that developed democracies should prepare for additional fiscal and social stress, some of which is already apparent. We call for a 'guided civic revival', including government and civic efforts aimed at reducing inequality, socially integrating diverse populations and building shared identities, increasing economic opportunity for youth, improving return on investment in taxation and public spending, strengthening formal democratic institutions and investing to improve non-economic drivers of subjective well-being.

From cultural policy towards cultural politics? The case of the Hungarian cultural sphere

ABSTRACT Recent political science literature has identified the emergence of a new form of authoritarian regime, in which formal democratic institutions continue to exist but the playing field becomes seriously tilted towards the incumbents. This article offers an interpretation of the recent turn in Hungarian cultural policy in such a competitive authoritarian context. It focuses on state interventions that seek to limit the autonomy of the cultural sphere. They have the following features: 1) the growing significance of nationalist ideology (‘culture wars’), 2) an increasing instrumentalisation of cultural policy, and 3) no clear separation between cultural policy and politics (the emergence of political patronage and the replacement of the former cultural elite). The article explores the means, actors and institutions through which these interventions have occurred and the extent of their success.

Fostering communities of practice for improved food democracy: Experiences and learning from South Africa

AbstractThe highly concentrated formal agri‐food sector holds enormous power in the governance of the food system in South Africa. Yet the concept of food democracy holds that all people should have an equal opportunity to participate in (re)shaping their food system. To contribute to decision making, however, stakeholders not only need access to knowledge about the food system, but should also be able to inform what is considered relevant knowledge. Communities of practice—groups of people who share a common interest or concern and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis—provide novel spaces for stakeholder involvement in food governance. This article sets out the process of establishing and maintaining a community of (food) practice in the Western Cape province of South Africa. Through participant observation, analysis of unpublished documents, as well as in depth interviews, the core elements of the community of practice are charted over its 3 yr history. The article demonstrates the informal and evolving nature of communities of practice as social learning structures that can gain credibility and potentially develop into more formal democratic institutions over.

Preparing Developed Democracies for Long-Run Economic Slowdowns

Economic growth in the 19th and 20th centuries, following the Industrial Revolutions, was much faster than in preceding centuries. This unprecedented global growth coincided with the global proliferation of democracy, with some evidence for bidirectional causation. Macroeconomic forecasts have predicted slower economic growth in the 21st century--perhaps substantially slower--for structural reasons such as aging populations, slowdowns in innovation, and debt. Long-run effects of COVID-19 and climate change could further slow growth. Moreover, some sustainability scientists assert that slower growth, stagnation, or even de-growth is an environmental imperative. Whether slow growth is inevitable or planned, we argue that democracies should prepare for additional fiscal and social stress--some of which is already apparent. Focusing on developed democracies, we propose that preparations should include efforts to: (i) reduce inequality; (ii) socially integrate diverse populations and build shared identities; (iii) increase economic opportunity for youth; (iv) improve return on investment in taxation and public spending; (v) strengthen formal democratic institutions; and (vi) invest in improving non-economic drivers of subjective well-being. Many aspects of our analysis likely also apply to other types of societies besides developed democracies.

How Predatory Informal Rules Outlast State Reform: Evidence from Postauthoritarian Guatemala

ABSTRACTThe coexistence of predatory informal rules alongside formal democratic institutions is a defining, if pernicious, feature of Latin America’s political landscape. How do such rules remain so resilient in the face of bureaucratic reforms? This article explicates the mechanisms underlying the persistence of such rules and challenges conventional explanations through process-tracing analysis in one arena: Guatemala’s customs administration. During Guatemala’s period of armed conflict and military rule, military intelligence officers introduced a powerful customs fraud scheme that endured for more than 20 years, despite state reforms. Its survival is best attributed to the ability of the distributional coalition underwriting the predatory rules to capture new political and economic spaces facilitated by political party and market reforms. This illustrates that distributional approaches to institutional change must attend to how those with a stake in the status quo may continue to uphold perverse institutional arrangements on the margins of state power.

Democracy's backsliding in the international environment.

If the end of the 20th century was defined by the relatively widespread acceptance of democracy, the second decade of the 21st century is marked by concerns about backsliding in new and established democracies alike and by a notable decline in foreign support for democracy around the world. As democracy's global tailwinds shift to headwinds, scholars have an opportunity to better understand how experience with even superficial forms of democratic institutions across a diverse set of contexts influences citizen behavior when formal democratic institutions erode or disappear. This shift also provides the opportunity to examine whether citizen movements alone-absent external support-are sufficient to check newly emboldened autocrats.

Occluded Histories: Philippine Labor after EDSA

Abstract The uprising alternately called EDSA Revolution or People Power Revolution or EDSA People Power Revolt, which led to the downfall of Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, supposedly ushered in the formal restoration of civil freedoms that had been snatched away by Marcos’ martial law. In the aftermath of the uprising, formal democratic institutions and civil rights were returned, including the right to free elections and the right to peaceful assembly. But as this article seeks to show, the administrations after EDSA have been marred by the neglect of workers’ welfare and the failure to address old labor concerns such as inadequate wages, job precarity, and contractualization. Given the shortage of employment opportunities in the Philippines, the administrations after EDSA have also promoted migration as its de facto job-generating mechanism. But the export of human resources is not without its ugly consequences, such as making overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) susceptible to abuse and exploitation. Deploying the notion of counter-history and using various materials from both government and non-government organizations, this article undertakes to critically assess the labor conditions during the historical period after the fabled EDSA People Power Revolt, and concludes that no notable changes have taken place.

Promuovere la democrazia

Democracy assistance significantly expanded at the end of the XX century thanks to an important increase of available funds and the growth of actors engaged in this domain. At the same time social sciences, and in particular anthropology, addressed such theme by producing ethnographies of democracy assistance that applied the tools of critical analysis used in the field of international cooperation and development. In 2015 the adoption by the United Nations of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development stressed the importance of democratic governance in aid rhetoric. Democracy assistance lies at the intersection of two policy worlds: international development and foreign policy. This uncomfortable position generates ambiguities and contradictions mirrored in the performance of the transnational actors that populate the ecosystem of democracy promotion. The paper explores some important analogies that link the domains of democracy support and development aid. Despite some fundamental differences among the goals and the actors involved, the two fields tend to use similar technocratic approaches. As in the domain of development cooperation, transnational actors focus on the design and strengthening of formal democratic institutions and processes, thus turning the object of their supposedly aseptic action into an oxymoron: the apolitical deployment of technologies, tools and standards of political reforms, with limited or no recognition of the social and cultural factors influencing the “vernacularization” of democratic values and practices on the ground.

Conflicting Objectives in Democracy Promotion: Avoiding Blueprint Traps and Incomplete Democratic Transitions

Western donors attempting to promote democracy across the globe face a dilemma. Democracy is a highly valued policy goal, but they are fearful that the path to democ¬racy will undermine another highly valued goal – political stability – and potentially cause widespread violence in the recipient countries or beyond. We ask whether these fears have empirical support and how donors can balance the potentially conflicting objectives of democratisation and stability when intervening in governance matters. Recent research at the German Development Institute shows that fears about the destabilising effects of democratisation do indeed have some empirical support (Leininger et al 2012; Ziaja 2013). But these fears deflect attention from the bigger problem of “getting stuck in the middle”. Hybrid regimes that exhibit authoritarian traits under a facade of formal democratic institutions constitute, in the long run, a larger security risk than attempts to make these countries more democratic. Hybrid regimes also hamper economic development, thus constituting an additional, indirect, risk of violent conflict. The promotion of democracy is hence a laudable effort, but it may itself carry risks. A recent DIE study of 47 African countries suggests that support for democracy increases popular mobilisation in the short run, leading to increased demonstrations and riots. However, the same study produced no evidence that democracy support is likely to spark civil wars. Increased mobilisation is thus rather a sign of aid effectiveness than a reason to worry. Yet, to be effective in the long run and to help steer popular demands into peaceful channels, democracy support must assist domestic actors in building institutions that fit the needs of their society. In the past, the potentially de¬stabilising consequences of popular participation have seduced would-be engineers of social change into re¬stricting competition in young democracies. This is a bad idea, as our recent research shows: narrow, elite pacts have, on average, led to worse political outcomes than open competition. The best contribution that donors can make from the out¬side is to enable marginalised groups to participate in crea¬ting the institutional setup. This is best achieved when many donors promote democracy simultaneously. Only then can they avoid the “blueprint trap”, which snaps shut when donors try to impose – advertently or inadvertently – an institutional setup on the partner country that does not fit its society’s needs. Diversity on the donor side increases the chances of finding a context-adequate institutional design. These findings suggest that an overly cautious sequencing approach to democracy promotion – stability first, only then democracy – has little empirical support. Most countries in the world embarked on a (formally) democratic path more than two decades ago. A gradualist approach that builds institutions while at the same time encouraging mobilisation is thus the more viable approach. Recommendations in brief: Promote democracy now Keep democracy aid diverse Encourage endogenous, inclusive polity design Enforce conditionality on conflict resolution mechanisms in institutional design Balance trade-offs of democratic transitions.

Psychologiczne i społeczne aspekty poparcia dla autorytarnej polityki

Główne pytanie, na które szukamy odpowiedzi w tym artykule, dotyczy czynników, które mogą wyjaśnić poparcie dla autorytarnej władzy Zjednoczonej Prawicy, utrzymujące się w polskim społeczeństwie. Autorytarne rządy rozumiane są jako taki sposób rządzenia, w którym istnieją demokratyczne instytucje (wolne wybory, sejm i senat, różne partie, organizacje społeczne, czy rzecznik praw obywatelskich), ale ich wpływy są stopniowo ograniczane, tak by rządzący mogli maksymalizować swoją władzę. Regułami autorytarnego systemu są zwykle: tworzenie własnych elit, ograniczanie wpływów opozycji, zastraszanie i represjonowanie przeciwników, jednostronna agresywna propaganda [por. Inglehart, Norris 2016; Levitsky, Way 2010; Przeworski 2017]. Dwa badania, prowadzone w 2016 roku na ogólnopolskich losowych próbach osób dorosłych (badanie 1: n = 1019; badanie 2: n = 1063), w których mierzono stosunek do autorytarnej władzy za pomocą dwóch skal oraz stawiano pytania o zgodę na jednopartyjność, wykazały predyktywną dla stopnia akceptacji tej władzy rolę kilku zmiennych mentalnych. Konserwatywny światopogląd, prawicowy autorytaryzm, narcyzm grupowy, akceptacja niczym nieograniczonej wolności sprzyjają poparciu autorytarnej władzy (wyniki wielozmiennowych analiz regresji – badanie 1); wysoka ważność dwóch zasad moralnych: troski/krzywdy oraz sprawiedliwości osłabia poparcie dla autorytarnej władzy, natomiast ważność zasad wspólnotowych: lojalności grupowej, autorytetu i świętości – wzmacnia to poparcie (badanie 2).

The new EU industrial policy: authoritarian neoliberal structural adjustment and the case for alternatives

ABSTRACTIn 2017, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker declared the re-industrialization of the European Union (EU) a top priority. The new EU industrial policy seeks to boost industrial competitiveness and leverage investments into manufacturing, thereby increasing industry’s share of EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 20% by 2020. What may appear to be a Keynesian industrial policy and thus a move away from the EU’s previous neoliberal agenda, however, seeks to calibrate a further neoliberal structural adjustment in a highly authoritarian fashion. Internal devaluation through devaluing labour, intensifying competition and reducing corporate taxes takes centre-stage. As an auxiliary to the European Semester, national productivity boards have been established to monitor wage developments alongside labour productivity and to suggest policy adjustments when cost competitiveness lags behind the Eurozone average and that of the main trading partners. Not only have formal democratic institutions and organized labour been circumvented in the decision-making process regarding such boards, they will have little voice in the future, and this an area that hitherto fell largely within the scope of member states: wage bargaining. Hence, the new EU industrial policy needs to be discredited, de-legitimized and thus, politicized. A political counter-project, rooted in an alternative industrial policy geared towards fostering horizontal and democratic solidarity economy initiatives which have proliferated since 2008, is discussed in the article’s closing pages.

Negation, Inclusion, Gradual Oblivion: State Strategies on Soviet Heritage in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan

In the year of 100th anniversary of the October Revolution, the author turns to the question of the Soviet heritage influence on nation- and state-building processes in three countries of the South Caucasus –Azerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgia. The article postulates clear differences between the study of postcolonialism and the post-Soviet space, and therefore the author presents his own operationalization of the "imperial heritage" study. The countries of the South Caucasus are compared based on the following criteria: a number of ethnic Russians as the main constituent of the Soviet people living in the country; a status of the Russian language; national symbols (statutes, architecture, Soviet state symbols, the hierarchy of military ranks), and political practices (functioning of the party systems, type of sovereignty, degree of freedom of speech and political competition). StudyingAzerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgiadifferently coming out of theUSSRand using the disintegration of theUSSRto construct their national narratives in accordance with their own ideas about the ways of development, the author finds a repetition of the Soviet system elements. Each of the states demonstrates a unique combination of “post-Soviet Soviet” phenomena. The difference lies in the ratio between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet elements. Azerbaijanseems to maintain a pro-Soviet narrative more than the others. It inherited the Soviet cult of personality and combined this practice with a completely non-Soviet (Eastern) tradition of political dynasties covered by the election system. The Armenian political tradition includes reference to Soviet Armenia as theSecondRepublic, which distinguishes the country from the neighbors who consider themselves to be the successors of the democratic republics that emerged during the Civil War inRussia. Despite competitive elections and free media, the Armenian leadership seeks to establish a political system with a single dominant party and formally maintain electoral competition. This conjunction of Soviet symbols (Armeniadid not carry out systematic decommunization) and political practices is oddly mixed with the image of GareginNzhdeh as “the father of nation”, a person who was accused in theUSSRfor collaborating with the Third Reich. Georgia tries to part with the Soviet Union to the maximum extent at a symbolic level, has made great progress in building formal democratic institutions, but in reality it is still managed through informal procedures, to which discursive and symbolic decommunization did not affect in principle. Discursive and symbolic decommunization had no impact on the way this country is ruled. The study is based on the data from national censuses, sociological studies, texts of official documents and, especially, the invaluable experience of the included observation of symbolic politics in all three countries.

Negation, Inclusion, Gradual Oblivion: State Strategies on Soviet Heritage in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan

In the year of 100th anniversary of the October Revolution, the author turns to the question of the Soviet heritage influence on nation- and state-building processes in three countries of the South Caucasus –Azerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgia. The article postulates clear differences between the study of postcolonialism and the post-Soviet space, and therefore the author presents his own operationalization of the "imperial heritage" study. The countries of the South Caucasus are compared based on the following criteria: a number of ethnic Russians as the main constituent of the Soviet people living in the country; a status of the Russian language; national symbols (statutes, architecture, Soviet state symbols, the hierarchy of military ranks), and political practices (functioning of the party systems, type of sovereignty, degree of freedom of speech and political competition). StudyingAzerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgiadifferently coming out of theUSSRand using the disintegration of theUSSRto construct their national narratives in accordance with their own ideas about the ways of development, the author finds a repetition of the Soviet system elements. Each of the states demonstrates a unique combination of “post-Soviet Soviet” phenomena. The difference lies in the ratio between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet elements. Azerbaijanseems to maintain a pro-Soviet narrative more than the others. It inherited the Soviet cult of personality and combined this practice with a completely non-Soviet (Eastern) tradition of political dynasties covered by the election system. The Armenian political tradition includes reference to Soviet Armenia as theSecondRepublic, which distinguishes the country from the neighbors who consider themselves to be the successors of the democratic republics that emerged during the Civil War inRussia. Despite competitive elections and free media, the Armenian leadership seeks to establish a political system with a single dominant party and formally maintain electoral competition. This conjunction of Soviet symbols (Armeniadid not carry out systematic decommunization) and political practices is oddly mixed with the image of GareginNzhdeh as “the father of nation”, a person who was accused in theUSSRfor collaborating with the Third Reich. Georgia tries to part with the Soviet Union to the maximum extent at a symbolic level, has made great progress in building formal democratic institutions, but in reality it is still managed through informal procedures, to which discursive and symbolic decommunization did not affect in principle. Discursive and symbolic decommunization had no impact on the way this country is ruled. The study is based on the data from national censuses, sociological studies, texts of official documents and, especially, the invaluable experience of the included observation of symbolic politics in all three countries.

Testing for voter rigging in small polling stations.

Nowadays, a large number of countries combine formal democratic institutions with authoritarian practices. Although in these countries the ruling elites may receive considerable voter support, they often use several manipulation tools to control election outcomes. A common practice of these regimes is the coercion and mobilization of large numbers of voters. This electoral irregularity is known as voter rigging, distinguishing it from vote rigging, which involves ballot stuffing or stealing. We develop a statistical test to quantify the extent to which the results of a particular election display traces of voter rigging. Our key hypothesis is that small polling stations are more susceptible to voter rigging because it is easier to identify opposing individuals, there are fewer eyewitnesses, and interested parties might reasonably expect fewer visits from election observers. We devise a general statistical method for testing whether voting behavior in small polling stations is significantly different from the behavior in their neighbor stations in a way that is consistent with the widespread occurrence of voter rigging. On the basis of a comparative analysis, the method enables third parties to conclude that an explanation other than simple variability is needed to explain geographic heterogeneities in vote preferences. We analyze 21 elections in 10 countries and find significant statistical anomalies compatible with voter rigging in Russia from 2007 to 2011, in Venezuela from 2006 to 2013, and in Uganda in 2011. Particularly disturbing is the case of Venezuela, where the smallest polling stations were decisive to the outcome of the 2013 presidential elections.