Communication between parties is an important part of persuasion and the diffi- culty of communication has a first order effect on the outcomes of strategic persuasion games and welfare of agents. We study a model of Bayesian Persuasion in which the communication between the sender and the receiver is coarse, which we model by al- lowing the cardinality of the signal space to be less than the cardinality of the action space and the state space. This limits the number of action recommendations that the sender can make. We define the set of simple Bayes Plausible information structures and show that there exists an optimal information structure that is simple for a signal space with arbitrary finite cardinality. We characterize the set of highest attainable payoffs for any cardinality of the signal space k, by what we call k-concavification of the sender utility. Under coarse communication, sender’s willingness to pay for an ad- ditional signal can be interpreted as the value of precise communication for the sender. We provide an upper bound on the value of precision. While increased precision is always better for the sender, we show that the receiver may prefer coarse communi- cation. We show this by analyzing a game of advice seeking, where the receiver can choose the cardinality of the signal space and ask for simple recommendations.