Fictional Entities Research Articles

A contextualist treatment of negative existentials

Abstract In this paper, I want to vindicate the contextualist treatment that is typically applied by artefactualists on fictional entities (ficta) both to general and to singular negative existentials. According to this treatment, the truth value of a negative existential, whether general or singular, changes according to whether the existential quantifier or the first-order existence predicate is contextually used as respectively ranging over and applying to a restricted or an unrestricted domain of beings. In (2003), Walton has criticized this treatment with respect to singular negative existentials in particular. First of all, however, as (Predelli, Stefano. 2002. ‘Holmes’ and Holmes. A Millian analysis of names from fiction. Dialectica 56. 261–279) has shown, this treatment can be applied to singular predications in general, independently of the existential case. Moreover, not only does applying it to singular negative existentials explain why we may contextually use the quantifier restrictedly in general negative existentials, but also it accounts for why comparative negative existentials, both singular and general, may have different truth values as well depending on the comparison group they mobilize.

A pragmatic approach to the ontology of models

What are scientific models? Philosophers of science have been trying to answer this question during the last three decades by putting forward a number of different proposals. Some say that models are best understood as abstract Platonic objects or fictional entities akin to Sherlock Holmes, while others focus on their mathematical nature and see them as set theoretical structures. Although each account has its own strengths in offering various insights on the nature of models, several objections have been raised against these views which still remain unanswered, making the debate on the ontology of models seem unresolvable. The primary aim of this paper is to show that a large part of these difficulties stems from an inappropriate reading of the main question on the ontology of models as a purely metaphysical question. Building on Carnap, it is argued that the question of the ontology of scientific models is either (i) an internal theoretical question within an already accepted linguistic framework or (ii) an external practical question regarding the choice of the most appropriate form of language in order to describe and explain the practice of scientific modelling. The main implication of this view is that the question of the ontology of models becomes a means of probing other related questions regarding the overall practice of scientific modelling, such as questions on the capacity of models to provide knowledge and the relation of models with background theories.

A critical analysis of Markovian monism.

Free Energy Principle underlies a unifying framework that integrates theories of origins of life, cognition, and action. Recently, FEP has been developed into a Markovian monist perspective (Friston et al. in BC 102: 227–260, 2020). The paper expresses scepticism about the validity of arguments for Markovian monism. The critique is based on the assumption that Markovian models are scientific models, and while we may defend ontological theories about the nature of scientific models, we could not read off metaphysical theses about the nature of target systems (self-organising conscious systems, in the present context) from our theories of nature of scientific models (Markov blankets). The paper draws attention to different ways of understanding Markovian models, as material entities, fictional entities, and mathematical structures. I argue that none of these interpretations contributes to the defence of a metaphysical stance (either in terms of neutral monism or reductive physicalism). This is because scientific representation is a sophisticated process, and properties of Markovian models—such as the property of being neither physical nor mental—could not be projected onto their targets to determine the ontological properties of targets easily.

Dynamic types of artistic image: Roman Ingarden’s phenomenology and literary theory

The article is devoted to the question of some data obtained by Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden, and primarily to his study of the literary work of art. Development upon Ingardens ideas is associated with use of Russian authors which are rarely treated in phenomenological aesthetics. The dynamic types of the image structure is that appear as potential states and actualize themselves in the readers reception as problem of imageability of fictional entities. Thus the dynamic character of types of an image structure is a transition from non-thematic background into its actual state and back. To study the visual in fiction, one must understand that the readers encounter with the literary work actualizes potential types, which, according to R. Ingarden, sparkle and go out. The visual nature of the aesthetic object directly depends on which of these potential states are actualized.

Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act

Emotional responses to fiction are part of our experience with art and media. Some of these responses (“fictional emotions”) seem to be directed towards fictional entities—entities that we believe do not exist. Some philosophers argue that fictional emotions differ in nature from other emotional responses. (cf. Walton in J Philos 75(1):5–27, 1978, Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, Walton, in: Hjort, Laver (ed.) Emotion and the arts, Oxford University, New York, 1997; Currie in The nature of fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Stecker in Br J Aesthet 51(3):295–308, 2011) The claim is supposed to be supported among others by ‘the argument from action.’ In contrast to genuine emotions, proponents of this argument claim, fictional emotions do not motivate their bearers to act. (cf. Yanal in Paradoxes of emotion and fiction, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1999; Lamarque in Br J Aesthet 21(4):291–304, 1981; Carroll in The philosophy of horror: or, paradoxes of the heart, Routledge, London, 1990; Currie 1990; Walton 1978, 1990; Suits in Pac Philos Q 87(3):369–386, 2006; Friend, in: Kind (ed.) The Routledge handbook of philosophy of imagination, Routledge, New York, 2016) This claim grounds in what may appear to be an obvious fact: that viewers and readers of are not led to act by their fictional emotions. It is certainly true that viewers and readers of fiction do not form intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional entities. In contrast to the proponents of the argument from action, I will argue that the lack of any such intentions can be explained only with reference to intending’s doxastic conditions, conditions that are unsatisfied in the fictional scenario. Decisively, this explanation does not refer to the motivational force of the agent’s emotions; indeed, it doesn’t refer to emotions at all. Thus, the lack of intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional objects provides no support for the claim that fictional emotions are no genuine emotions.

Phenomenology of imagining and the pragmatics of fictional language

This paper focuses on the performative character of fictional language. While assuming that all speaking is a form of acting, it aims to shed light on the nature of fictional, and particularly literary, speech acts. To this aim, relevant input can be found in (a) the discussion of the ontological status of fictional entities and of their constitution and in (b) the inquiry into the interaction between author and receiver of a fictional work. Based on the critical assessment of different approaches in the debate on speech-act theory and literary fiction, the article first clarifies why the study of the performative character of fictional language cannot be reduced to either the discussion of the status of singular speech acts in the fiction or the inquiry into the pretend or unserious nature of fictional speech acts formulated by an author. While referring to Roman Ingarden’s, Jean-Paul Sartre’s, and Wolfgang Iser’s work, it subsequently argues that such a performative character should be understood as a specific serious affordance—or appeal—to imagine and thus to participate in the constitution of the fictional world.

Against mythical backward-looking creationism

ABSTRACT I want to hold an original position as regards the metaphysics of mythical entities, a kind of fictional entities that, typically at least, are not recognised as such by their purported authors, for they entertain no relevant act of make-believe. This position is weak mythical creationism, which lies between straightforward mythical creationism, the position holding that all mythical entities are on a par by being created by their purported authors (Braun, David. 2005. “Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names.” Noûs 39: 596–631; Salmon, Nathan. 2002. “Mythical Objects.” In Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, edited by J. K. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier, 105–123. New York: Seven Bridges Press; Zvolenszky, Zsofia. 2016. “Fictional Characters, Mythical Objects and the Phenomenon of Inadvertent Creation.” Res Philosophica 93: 311–333), and mythical anticreationism, for which mythical entities are no artefactual creations (Goodman, Jeffrey. 2014. “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth.” Analysis 74: 35–40; Goodman, Jeffrey. 2017. “On Inadvertently Created a, Fictional Storytelling, and Scientific Hypothesizing.” Res Philosophica 94: 177–188). According to weak mythical creationism, one must draw a distinction between standard and nonstandard mythical entities, i.e. legendary entities and post-empirical posits. For unlike legendary entities, a post-empirical posit is an artefact created only later by an audience. Thus, weak creationism rejects the form of mythical backward-looking creationism that straightforward mythical creationism entails: namely, the idea that the merely purported authors of post-empirical posits are nevertheless their original creators.

The problem of creation and abstract artifacts

Abstract artifacts such as musical works and fictional entities are human creations; they are intentional products of our actions and activities. One line of argument against abstract artifacts is that abstract objects are not the kind of objects that can be created. This is so, it is argued, because abstract objects are causally inert. Since creation requires being caused to exist, abstract objects cannot be created. One common way to refute this argument is to reject the causal inefficacy of abstracta. I argue that creationists should rather reject the principle that creation requires causation. Creation, in my view, is a non-causal relation that can be explained using an appropriate notion of ontological dependence. The existence and the creation of abstract artifacts depend on certain individuals with appropriate intentions, along with events of a certain kind that include but are not limited to creations of certain concrete objects.

Sherlock Holmes Is Not Out There: Some Ideas for An Anti-Exoticist Account of Fictional Characters

Abstract: Many philosophers include fictional objects like Sherlock Holmes in their ontological inventory. Yet, if Sherlock Holmes is part of reality, then he must be an «exotic» entity: either non-concrete or non-actual or non-existent. In this paper, I will assume that whatever there is (in reality) is concrete, actual, and existent. Accordingly, I will sketch a way to get rid of fictional entities, based on Sellars' metalinguistic strategy for nominalism. Roughly speaking, the main result can be stated as follows: when we talk about Sherlock Holmes, we are actually talking about Sherlock Holmes depictions. Keywords : Fiction, Nominalism, Actualism.

Aptness of Fiction-Directed Emotions

Abstract I argue that the criteria governing the aptness of emotions directed towards fictional entities, such as characters and events in fiction, are structurally identical to the criteria governing the aptness of emotions directed towards real entities in the following sense: in both cases, aptness is characterized in terms of fittingness, justification, and being salience-tracking, and each of these notions is understood in an analogous way across reality- and fiction-directed emotions. The only differences are that, in the case of fiction-directed emotions, fictional truth rather than truth is relevant to fittingness, and salience in the context of engaging with the fiction replaces salience in the real context. Other asymmetries between the aptness criteria of fiction- and reality-directed emotions that seem to conflict with this claim are reducible to these two differences or stem from the failure to distinguish between emotions directed towards the content of a fiction and the fiction itself.

Emotion, Fiction and Rationality

The aim of this article is to explore in a systematic way the rationality of emotions elicited when we engage with works of fiction. I first lay out the approach to the emotions on which my discussion is premised. Next, I concentrate on two facets of emotional rationality — the first pertains to the relation between emotions and the mental states on which they are based, the second to the relation between emotions and the judgements and behaviour they elicit. These observations about emotional rationality are then applied to emotions elicited by works of fiction. After having distinguished several families of emotions, I concentrate on what I call blob-emotions (for example, one is terrified by the monster on the screen) and emotions-for (for example, one is afraid for a character in the movie). I argue that, given their nature as direct responses to a restricted range of stimuli, blob-emotions are not irrational. As regards emotions - for fictional entities, I emphasize that a subject’s rationality shows in the way her emotions - for respond to evidence. On this basis, I discard an influential reason to think that emotions-for fictional entities are irrational. Finally, I offer an argument to conclude that they are typically correct and rational.

What’s wrong with truth-conditional accounts of slurs

The aim of this paper is to provide arguments based on linguistic evidence that discard a truth-conditional analysis of slurs (TCA) and pave the way for more promising approaches. We consider Hom and May’s version of TCA, according to which the derogatory content of slurs is part of their truth-conditional meaning such that, when slurs are embedded under semantic operators such as negation, there is no derogatory content that projects out of the embedding. In order to support this view, Hom and May make two moves: (1) they point to cases where it looks like projection does not occur and (2) they try to explain away cases where projection seems to occur by appealing to a pragmatic phenomenon that they call ‘offense’. Pace Hom and May, we argue that the derogatory content of slurs does in fact project and, in advocating for our claim, (1) we show that those cases where it looks like projection does not occur are in fact metalinguistic uses in which slurs are not really used, by relying on three linguistic tests (Sect. 3); and (2) we refute Hom and May’s attempt to explain why speakers would entertain the supposedly wrong intuition that the derogatory content of slurs projects out of semantic embedding, by focusing on the case of slurs for fictional entities (Sect. 4). We conclude that Hom and May’s strategies to support TCA ultimately fail.

Phenomenal, bodily and brain correlates of fictional reappraisal as an implicit emotion regulation strategy.

The ability to modulate our emotional experience, depending on our current goal and context, is of critical importance for adaptive behavior. This ability encompasses various emotion regulation strategies, such as fictional reappraisal, at stake whenever one engages in fictional works (e.g., movies, books, video games, virtual environments). Neuroscientific studies investigating the distinction between the processing of real and fictional entities have reported the involvement of brain structures related to self-relevance and emotion regulation, suggesting a threefold interaction between the appraisal of reality, aspects of the Self, and emotions. The main aim of this study is to investigate the effect of implicit fictional reappraisal on different components of emotion, as well as on the modulatory role of autobiographical and conceptual self-relevance. While recording electrodermal, cardiac, and brain activity (EEG), we presented negative and neutral pictures to 33 participants, describing them as either real or fictional. After each stimulus, the participants reported their subjective emotional experience, self-relevance of the stimuli, as well as their agreement with their description. Using the Bayesian mixed-modeling framework, we showed that stimuli presented as fictional, compared with real, were subjectively appraised as less intense and less negative, and elicited lower skin conductance response, stronger heart-rate deceleration, and lower late positive potential amplitudes. Finally, these phenomenal and physiological changes did, to a moderate extent, rely on variations of specific aspects of self-relevance. Implications for the neuroscientific study of implicit emotion regulation are discussed.

METHOD TO INVESTIGATE FICTIONAL ENTITIES: A CASE OF ISHINOMORI SHOTARO’S “KAMENRIDER BLACK” TV SERIES IN INDONESIA

This article reports an experiment to pursue appropriate observation method on fictional entities inside popular culture products from Japan: two dimensional characters, fictional characters in a movie. Previous research showed how Indonesian popular culture producers being empowered in production, as fictional entities involved, such as “Hatsune Miku” (HM), a virtual singer persona. This article focused on older cases where media Japan travelled to Indonesia. Back in 1989, a TV action serial "Kamen Rider Black/ Ksatria Baja Hitam" (KRB/KBH) from Japan, was broadcasted by Indonesian local television station RCTI, and dubbed in Indonesian language. The experiment on finding appropriate observation method is conducted by constructing frameworks, imagined as ‘dissecting’ fictional entities into smaller observable parts. The purpose of this paper is to map methods to examine the role of non-human entities under transnational media by evaluating through early stage experiment.

Against an Identity Criterion for Fictional Ersatz Realism

Abstract Fictional ersatz realism is the metaphysical stance that abstract fictional entities exist and are dependent on fiction and literary practices. Everett [4] tackled the position of ersatz realism by claiming that the ersatz realist cannot provide an identity criterion for fictional entities that does not imply a contradiction. Al- though Woodward [20] proposed a defense to Everett's argument, I will argue that ersatz realism is no tenable position, as it still cannot provide an adequate identity criterion. To establish this result, I will provide a base frame for identity criteria available to the ersatz realist. Afterwords, I will show that to any identity criterion the ersatz realist may propose there is a story such that a fictional entity corresponding to this story is not self-identical, imposing a contradiction to the metaphysical account of ersatz realism.

On the Systematic Inadequacy of Fictionalism about Fictional Characters

Critical statements, if true, bear ontological commitments to fictional entities. A well-known version of fictionalism about fictional characters tries to eliminate these ontological commitments by proposing that we understand critical statements as prefixed by a special sentential operator, such as ‘according to a fictional realist theory’. The aim of the present paper is to show that fictionalism about fictional characters is underdeveloped as it stands because it can be shown to be systematically inadequate. Because the fictionalist’s paraphrases of critical statements suggest that fictional realists affirm the propositions expressed by critical statements, the fictionalist mistakenly attributes to fictional realists an expertise in matters that pertain to literary criticism. Importantly, this problem of misattributed expertise paves the way to other issues that might be much more devastating to the fictionalist project. It can be shown that, because she wrongly attributes expertise to fictional realists, the fictionalist unintentionally portrays fictional realist theories in a way that renders them inconsistent and self-defeating. This undermines fictionalism about fictional characters because it leaves no workable fictional realist account in which to ground a fictionalist explanation. This is why the fictionalist about fictional characters should try to eliminate the problem of misattributed expertise and its related issues. At the end of the paper, I sketch some of the available options in this regard.

Beardsley and the Implied Author

Beardsley and the Implied Author

Analytic Philosophy and the World of the Play by Michael Y. Bennett

Reviewed by: Analytic Philosophy and the World of the Play by Michael Y. Bennett David Krasner ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE WORLD OF THE PLAY. By Michael Y. Bennett. Routledge Advances in Theatre and Performance Studies series. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017; pp. 156. In Michael Bennett's thoughtful book, analytic philosophy and dramatic performance share a balancing act between data and potentiality. In the case of analytic philosophy, as explained by Bertrand Russell's landmark essay "On Denoting," logic, mathematics, and epistemology emphasize "knowledge about" and "acquaintance about"—that is, unambiguous (definite data) and ambiguous (indefinite potentiality) knowledge. Definite knowledge employs empiricism (something happens, leading to general knowledge about); indefinite (or subjunctive) knowledge employs logic (something might, should, or could happen, providing an acquaintance about). In theatre the oscillation between definite and indefinite knowledge, or between reality and possibility, coincides with Coleridge's famous maxim, "willing suspension of disbelief." Productions depend on audiences' "willingness" to accept theatre's situated-ness between reality and modality (possibility). Bennett asserts that "fictional entities … exist analogously to 'possible worlds'" (7). The book's fundamental claim is that possible worlds enable theatrical productions to present "the world of the play [through] the developed idea of 're-creation'" (9). Among Bennett's salient points is that theatre is, or should be, a laboratory for analytic philosophers to examine language, reality, and the imagination; theatre also provides a vehicle for considering distinctions among what is, might be, ought to be, and, for theatre, could be "re-created." He confects the various threads of theatre and analytic philosophy, whereby possible worlds initiate theatrical productions. For Bennett, "the world of play is a 're-creation' of our world" (2; emphasis in original). It is neither a reflection, copy, imitation, nor mirror of nature, nor is it a metaphysical abstraction divorced from reality; rather, theatre is a fungible operation recreating modalities of possible worlds. Modal logic, for Bennett, straddles the lines among necessity, reality, and possibility, sharing with fiction (literature or drama) constructs analogous to possible worlds. Theatrical re-creation, then, is what Bennett describes as a "messy" interface between fiction and reality in which a dramatic character has a "dual existence on the page and stage" (10). Characters share characteristics of reality, but reside onstage in their subjunctive sphere of possibility. The book is structured in two parts: part 1 "outlines the problems" of comparing analytic philosophy with theatre, then "develops the (proposed) solutions"; part 2 "applies the proposed solutions" to numerous examples (18). This structure enables the author to proceed systematically from problems inherent in his comparison between analytic philosophy and theatre, to its usefulness in practical terms. In the first part Bennett describes theatrical characters as "dialectical-synecdochic objects," encompassing an "entire range of re-creation" (31; emphasis in original). Dialectical-synecdochic objects exist "as a 're-creation' of our world, through a particular combination of synecdochic elements, which are actually existing subjects and predicates" (38). An actor (might, could, would) proceed according to possibilities (predicates); audiences observe productions through the dialectic process of deciphering reality (what is) and possible worlds (what might be). Audiences compare what is given in the world and what is presented onstage, with reality and possibility existing simultaneously through the imagination. This theory implicitly privileges director-producer over author-writer, because directors can recreate the production-performance as the urcreation of a play. Bennett is sensitive to dramatic texts, but eventually comes down on the side of the director, and by extension the actor, because both are able to create a wide range of interpretive and spontaneous choices (possible worlds). The actor and director are, in a sense, creating possibilities of the character: the actor, guided by the director, embodies the role not merely as a surrogate, or simulacrum, of reality, but rather as a re-creator of various possible worlds, since the role has been and will likely be inhabited by many actors over time, with each performer re-creating the role anew, and by extension creating new and possible worlds. Part 2 examines theatre not as a momentary presence, but as a "past subjunctive," conceptually providing "an accurate description of the temporality of theatre both in the dramatic text and in...

Who’s Afraid Of Fictional Characters?

What happens us emotionally when we read a work of fiction? According to some philosophers our emotional engagement with fiction gives rise to a paradox and involves either irrationality or participation in a game of make believe. I argue that an Object Theory in a meinongian style, by supporting a realistic perspective on fictional emotions, is able to dissolve the paradox of fiction by providing a positive ontological account of fictional entities (and the properties characterizing them).

The Emperor’s New Augmented Clothes. Digital Objects as Part of the Every Day

The main aim of this work is to solve a problem that Augmented Reality is facing by using phenomenological and phenomenological analyses and projectors. Augmented reality seeks to merge the digital and real world by producing a mixed reality where the digital objects are usually visualised thanks to the head mounted or mobile devices. However, this technology is facing problems because the objects generated by the digital devices are existing merely inside the small group of people while using specific devices. Therefore, these objects look fictitious for the other members of the society who are not using them. In order to analyse the elements which make these objects fictitious for the other member of the society, we will take into account the story of The Emperor’s new clothes because, even in this story, there are fictional entities not perceivable by other members of the community. Thanks to this story, it will be possible to highlight some elements which make the objects part of the everyday world. Moreover, it will show how the intersubjectivity of these objects is directly related to their way of being perceived by the subjects and, in the case of augmented reality, to the devices used to make them perceivable. For this reason, it is possible to solve the problem Augmented Reality is facing by changing the devices used to produce these digital objects. At the end of the work, we will propose a project which can solve the problem by following the elements previously highlighted. We will show how, thanks to wearable projectors, it is possible to produce digital clothes as part of the everyday world of every subject. Thanks to these digital clothes people will be able to wear the digital objects as if they were common, usual objects without being naked.