Abstract

What are scientific models? Philosophers of science have been trying to answer this question during the last three decades by putting forward a number of different proposals. Some say that models are best understood as abstract Platonic objects or fictional entities akin to Sherlock Holmes, while others focus on their mathematical nature and see them as set theoretical structures. Although each account has its own strengths in offering various insights on the nature of models, several objections have been raised against these views which still remain unanswered, making the debate on the ontology of models seem unresolvable. The primary aim of this paper is to show that a large part of these difficulties stems from an inappropriate reading of the main question on the ontology of models as a purely metaphysical question. Building on Carnap, it is argued that the question of the ontology of scientific models is either (i) an internal theoretical question within an already accepted linguistic framework or (ii) an external practical question regarding the choice of the most appropriate form of language in order to describe and explain the practice of scientific modelling. The main implication of this view is that the question of the ontology of models becomes a means of probing other related questions regarding the overall practice of scientific modelling, such as questions on the capacity of models to provide knowledge and the relation of models with background theories.

Highlights

  • One of the most important activities in scientific inquiry is the construction of models

  • Carnap’s motivation in applying his method to metaphysics was to bring to philosophy the kind of progress that is usually found in the natural sciences, and this paper aims in showing how this progress can be achieved in the debate about the ontology of models by applying the Carnapian method

  • The main implication of this view is that the question of the ontology of models is only taken as a means of probing other related questions regarding the overall practice of scientific modelling, such as questions on the capacity of models to provide knowledge and the relation of models with background theories

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Summary

Introduction

One of the most important activities in scientific inquiry is the construction of models. Given that the aim of philosophical investigations on the nature of scientific models is to understand as much as possible about their function as epistemological tools in science, the various existing accounts should not be seen as competing and mutually exclusive theories aiming to find a unique true answer to the question of the ontology of models. The main implication of this view is that the question of the ontology of models is only taken as a means of probing other related questions regarding the overall practice of scientific modelling, such as questions on the capacity of models to provide knowledge and the relation of models with background theories This realization effectively dissolves the debate on the ontology of models and urges philosophers to move forward, by arguing that there is nothing more to be gained in trying to settle on a unique true answer to the question of the ontology of models. The conclusion is that the objection does not succeed in rendering pragmatism about the ontology of models an unattractive position

The problem of the ontology of models
Internal and external questions
Theories of ontology as competing frameworks
French’s quietism
Models and sortals
Thomson–Jones against the bracketing of metaphysics
Conclusion
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