Fairness Preferences Research Articles

Conflict and parochialism among combatants and civilians: Evidence from Ukraine

How does conflict affect prosocial and parochial preferences within a society? Our research considers the case of recent violence in Donbas, Ukraine where ethnic Russian separatists are battling the Ukrainian military. To evaluate social preferences, we utilize a non-costly dictator game with ethnic treatments among young ethnic Ukrainian male combatants and noncombatants in the eastern city of Kharkiv, which borders the Donbas region. At the onset of violence, we find no differences in how these men treat ethnic Russians in their local community compared to their own in-group. However, after a year of intense fighting with separatists in the nearby Donbas region, we find evidence of the erosion of fairness preferences and increased bias against ethnic Russians, especially among noncombatant civilians, underscoring how parochial responses to violence may extend beyond direct combat exposure mechanisms. Our results point to the short-term destabilizing effects of conflict on prosocial preferences with potential long-term consequences for entrenching parochial divisions.

Game analysis of environmental cost allocation in green supply chain under fairness preference

Cost allocation is a way to promote enterprises to actively implement green supply chain management, and the behavior preference of decision makers will affect the process. This paper considers the situation that manufacturer has fairness preference and retailer is fair neutral, and constructs a secondary supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. We explore two models of cost allocation—based on the Stackelberg model, the impact of retailers’ nonparticipation/participation in cost allocation on supply chain is discussed, while through the Nash bargaining model, the range and optimal solution of the environmental cost allocation ratio are determined. And we show how product wholesale prices, retail prices, green innovation investment, and the optimal ratio of environmental cost allocation are influenced by fairness preference. The results show that retailers’ participation in environmental cost allocation will increase the level of product greenness and make the entire supply chain Pareto optimal. The strong fairness preference of manufacturer will weaken the positive effect of retailers participating in cost allocation on the supply chain. Therefore, the government and enterprises should adopt incentive measures to actively promote the collaboration between channel partners in order to share the environmental cost, and manufacturers should pay less attention to fairness.

Pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain considering manufacturer’s fairness preference under different recycling mode

To study recycling and pricing decisions for closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) considering fairness preference, under the structure of retailer, manufacturer and both them recycling channel, three decision models were constructed, respectively. The influence of manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior on the optimal decision-making of CLSC in three different situations was analyzed. According to the analysis and comparison of the equilibrium results under the three situations, it shows that no matter what the recycling channel structure is, the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior is always beneficial to maximizing profits and economic utility, but always unfavorable to the dominant retailer and the whole system. Further comparing the three recycling channels of CLSC, the research shows that, the dual-recycling channel structure when retailer and manufacturer recycling simultaneous is the best compared with the retailer or manufacturer recycling alone.

A Research on Cooperative Advertising Strategy in Supply Chain Based on Fairness Preference of the Distributors

A Research on Cooperative Advertising Strategy in Supply Chain Based on Fairness Preference of the Distributors

Research on Reward and Punishment Contract Model and Coordination of Green Supply Chain Based on Fairness Preference

With the increasing demand for “green” goods, it is necessary for companies to develop green innovation to seize market opportunities. Companies often use the model of supply chain cooperation to carry out green innovation. The standard reward and punishment contract model is constructed based on the green degree of the product provided by the supplier when the manufacturer has a fair preference. The impact of the manufacturer’s fairness preference on the green degree of the product, price, manufacturer’s profit, supplier’s profit, and overall profit when the product green degree standard provided by the supplier is greater or smaller than the manufacturer’s demand standard is analyzed. The impact of the difference in channel power between manufacturers and suppliers is also analyzed on the overall profit of the green supply chain. The research results showed that when the manufacturer’s attention to fairness is equal to the attention to self-interest, the overall profit of the green supply chain is the largest, the coordination of the supply chain can be achieved, and the difference in the channel power of the participants in the green supply chain has a significant impact on the overall profit, which is verified by numerical analysis.

Social preferences correlate with cortical thickness of the orbito-frontal cortex.

Humans differ in their preferences for personal rewards, fairness and others’ welfare. Such social preferences predict trust, public goods provision and mutual gains bargaining and have been linked to neural activity in regions involved in reward computation, cognitive control and perspective-taking. Although shaped by culture, social preferences are relatively stable across time, raising the question whether differences in brain anatomy predict social preferences and their key components—concern for personal outcomes and concern for others’ outcomes. Here, we examine this possibility by linking social preferences measured with incentivized economic games to 74 cortical parcels in 194 healthy humans. Neither concerns for personal outcomes nor concerns for the outcomes of others in isolation were related to anatomical differences. However, fitting earlier findings, social preferences positively scaled with cortical thickness in the left olfactory sulcus, a structure in the orbital frontal cortex previously shown to be involved in value-based decision-making. Consistent with work showing that heavier usage corresponds to larger brain volume, findings suggest that pro-social preferences relate to cortical thickness in the left olfactory sulcus because of heavier reliance on the orbital frontal cortex during social decision-making.

A limited cost consensus approach with fairness concern and its application

People will always consciously or unconsciously compare their cost or benefits of actions with those of others and make judgments about fairness. Aiming at consensus reaching process where decision makers have fairness concern behaviors, this paper proposes a limited cost consensus model with fairness concern. To do this, we define the fairness utility function and fairness utility level based on fairness preference theory and explore some properties. In view of this, we propose a limited cost consensus approach with fairness concern of decision makers, which can obtain a stable and balanced consensus. Through emission reduction consensus problem of Chinese manufacturing enterprises, comparative analysis and sensitivity analysis are used to explain the proposed model. Conclusions about fairness preferences, consensus cost budget, and unit compensation cost can provide significant managerial references for real-world economic and management activities.

Incentive Contract Design considering Fairness Preferences and Carbon Emission Reduction Multiobjective Tasks

Considering the multitargets of corporate carbon emission reduction and the fairness preference psychology of the company, a government incentive model for corporate carbon emission reduction was constructed. The impact of corporate fairness preferences on government carbon emission reduction incentive strategies is studied. In addition, numerical simulation is used to analyze the impact of changes in correlation coefficients, fairness preference coefficients, and discount rates on the optimal enterprise effort coefficient and the government optimal incentive coefficient. Research shows that the degree of fairness preference of a company has a direct impact on the degree of corporate effort, while the discount rate will only have an impact on the company’s long-term effort. In order to improve corporate carbon emission reduction efforts, the government must not only consider the impact of fairness preference on corporate efforts but also flexibly adjust the incentive coefficient of long-term and short-term tasks based on the discount rate.

An Improved Revenue Distribution Model for Logistics Service Supply Chain Considering Fairness Preference

Revenue distribution is an important issue in the operations of a logistics service supply chain (LSSC). The existing works on revenue distribution are mostly based on the assumption of rational economic people that are purely self-interested. However, people also have a fairness preference, which impacts people’s decision-making behavior or even the success operations of the LSSC. For a two-level supply chain consisting of logistics service integrator (LSI) and several functional logistics service providers (FLSP), this paper establishes an improved revenue distribution model considering FLSPs’ inequity aversion. Specifically, the BO model (abbreviation of a model proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels in 2000) is improved to describe the FLSPs’ inequity aversion, which is combined into the conventional revenue distribution model. The proposed model aims to maximize the revenue of logistics service supply chain and obtains the best revenue distribution ratio of each member under equilibrium. In the numerical cases, the impacts of inequity aversion and the number of members with inequity aversion on the revenue distribution are discussed, respectively. The results show that a higher degree of FLSP’s advantageous inequity aversion corresponds to a lower revenue distribution ratio; a higher degree of FLSP’s disadvantageous inequity aversion corresponds to a higher revenue distribution ratio. Increasing the number of FLSP members with inequity aversion results in a higher profit of LSI and lower total utility of FLSPs and the utility of the supply chain. The more FLSP members with inequity aversion there are, the higher the LSI’s profit is, and the lower the total utility of FLSPs and the utility of supply chain are. In addition, the revenue distribution ratio of the FLSP increases with its relative fairness revenue coefficient among FLSPs.

Anthropological Prosociality via Sub-Group Level Selection.

A perennial challenge of evolutionary psychology is explaining prosocial traits such as a preference for fairness rather than inequality, compassion towards suffering, and an instinctive ability to coordinate within small teams. Considering recent fossil evidenceand a novel logical test, we deem present explanations insufficiently explanatory of the divergence of hominins. In answering this question, we focus on the divergence of hominins from the last common ancestor (LCA) shared with Pan. We consider recent fossil discoveries that indicate the LCA was bipedal, which reduces the cogency of this explanation for hominin development. We also review evolutionary theory that claims to explain how hominins developed into modern humans, however it is found that no mechanism differentiates hominins from other primates. Either the mechanism was available to the last common ancestor (LCA) (with P. troglodytes as its proxy), or because early hominins had insufficient cognition to utilise the mechanism. A novel mechanism, sub-group level selection (sGLS) is hypothesised by triangulating two pieces of data rarely considered by evolutionary biologists. These are behavioural dimorphism of Pan (chimpanzees and bonobos) that remain identifiable in modern humans, and the social behaviour of primate troops in a savannah ecology. We then contend that sGLS supplied an exponential effect which was available to LCA who left the forest, but was not sufficiently available to any other primates. In conclusion, whileonly indirectly supported by variousevidence,sGLS is found to besingularly and persuasively explanatoryof human's unique evolutionary story.

Insider Trading: Has Society Handcuffed Market Efficiency without Cause?

This paper poses the question whether insider trading should be legalized. The paper proceeds to introduce the work of the academic father of insider trading, Henry G. Manne, and proceeds to introduce his critics arguments before ending with a surprising conclusion. There is no right or wrong answer to the prudence of legalizing insider trading; rather, it’s a choice society must make by weighing its preferences for market efficiency versus market fairness.

Voice or silence: antecedents of whistleblowing intentions

Purpose This study aims to examine the effects of peer ethical behavior and individual differences in valuation of fairness vs loyalty on whistleblowing intentions in academic settings. This study also tests the underlying mechanism responsible for the effects of peer behavior on reporting intentions, namely, fear of reprisal. Design/methodology/approach A survey was conducted with 947 undergraduate students. The model was tested using ordinary least squares regression models followed by bootstrapped mediation analyses. Findings Results showed that the effects of peer ethical behavior on whistleblowing intentions are mediated by fear of retaliation. Moreover, the findings indicated that, for low-severity transgressions, there is an interactive effect between fear of retaliation and endorsement of fairness over loyalty on whistleblowing intentions. Research limitations/implications When the misconduct is seen as minor, a potential whistleblower may understand that the expected costs outweigh the possible benefits of blowing the whistle. In such situations, higher fear of retaliation would undermine the effects of individual’s endorsement of fairness over loyalty on reporting intentions. Practical implications As the social environment significantly affects someone’s whistleblowing intentions, there should be visible efforts to improve and to foster an ethical infrastructure in organizations. Social implications As fear of retaliation by peers is one of the most important determinants affecting the decision to report misconduct in general, there must be serious efforts from leaders to mitigate any threat of retaliation to those who come forward. Originality/value This work contributes to the discussion about individual and situational antecedents of whistleblowing. More importantly, it sheds light on one potential boundary condition for the influence of the fairness–loyalty tradeoff on whistleblowing decisions: severity of the transgression. The findings provide initial evidence that, for low-severity transgressions, fear of retaliation weakens the positive effects of one’s moral compass in terms of preference for fairness over loyalty on whistleblowing intentions.

Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric Information About Fairness

Problem definition: To improve the poor performance of supply chains caused by misaligned incentives under the wholesale price contract, theory proposes coordinating contracts. However, a common finding of experimental studies testing such contracts is that they tend to yield only a marginal, if any, performance improvement over wholesale pricing. These studies identify several behavioral factors that are at play but none accounted for by the theory proposing coordinating contracts. Among them, identified as the single most detrimental for the supply chain performance, is incomplete information about preferences for fairness causing contract rejections. Can the supply chain performance be improved with a contract designed allowing for this type of information asymmetry? What does this contract (mechanism) look like? Academic/practical relevance: The extant research characterized the optimal contracting mechanisms for such important practical cases as the suppliers’ private information about production cost or the retailers’ private information about the end customer demand. The present study addresses the gap in another important practical case: when the source of information asymmetry is the private information about preferences for fairness. Methodology: The underlying research method is mechanism design. Results: We prove that the optimal mechanism consists of a single contract positioned on the Pareto frontier and characterize the optimal profit split between the supplier and the retailer. We show that, under a wide range of preferences for fairness, the efficiency loss because of private information is strictly positive, but exceptions are possible. We also show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented with a variety of commonly used in practice and widely studied in academic literature contracts, including the minimum order quantity and the two-part tariff ones. Managerial implications: We establish a direct link between a large volume of theoretical and empirical literature on social preferences with the research on supply chain contracts. Because rejections that are because of incomplete information are an important cause of contract inefficiency observed in the laboratory, managers should avoid take it or leave it offers when they negotiate contracts. Instead, the bargaining process should be geared toward discovering the extent of the fairness preferences of the contracting parties.

Multidimensional Fair Fuzzy Equilibrium Evaluation of Housing Expropriation Compensation from the Perspective of Behavioral Preference: A Case Study from China

With the rapid development of urbanization, substantial land areas and houses are expropriated, which can cause huge numbers of disputes related to expropriation compensation. The root of the disputes is that the associated subjects are affected by various behavioral preferences and make different cognitive fairness judgments based on the same compensation price. However, the existing expropriation compensation strategies based on the market value under the assumption of “the economic man” hypothesis cannot meet the fairness preference demands of the expropriated. Therefore, finding a compensation price that satisfies subjects’ multidimensional fairness preferences, including profit-seeking, loss aversion, and interactive fairness preferences, is necessary. Only in this way can the subjects reach an agreement regarding fair compensation and resolve their disputes. Because of the fuzziness of subjects’ expected revenues, this paper innovatively introduces trigonometric intuitional fuzzy numbers to construct one-dimensional and multidimensional fair fuzzy equilibrium evaluation models. The Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method is adopted to convert a multidimensional problem into a multiattribute group decision problem, which simplifies the problem of finding multidimensional equilibrium when considering the multidimensional fairness preferences of the two subjects. Real case data are introduced to verify the validity of this method. The research results show that upward revision of the multidimensional fairness preferences based on the market value assists in achieving a fair compensation agreement. Consideration of the influence of the subjects’ multidimensional fairness preferences on the fairness equilibrium is conducive to resolving the disputes, and provides a reference for the settlement of expropriation compensation disputes in developing countries.

Effects of peer relationship and peer presence on giving and repaying in preschoolers' triad interactions.

This study aimed to assess social preferences in dynamic interpersonal interactions among preschool children and to examine the effects of peer relationship (friend vs. stranger) and peer presence (peer presence vs. peer absence) on giving and repaying. Ninety-nine children participated in a triad game, which consisted of two mixed-dictator games. The allocations from a proposer in the first dictator game were evaluated as giving, and the allocations from two respondents in the second dictator game were evaluated as repaying friends and strangers. The results indicated that children did not have any specific social preferences for friends in giving and repaying but had altruistic and fair preferences for giving to strangers, and strangers had egoistic preferences in repaying. Furthermore, children allocated more to strangers than to friends and allocated more in peer presence. Besides, friends positively reciprocated to proposers in peer absence and repaid less in peer presence. However, strangers consistently repaid less regardless of whether peers were present or not. These results provide more evidence for the assumption of weak ties in giving and demonstrate the strength of strong ties in repaying. These findings enhance our understanding of the interplay of childhood interactions in the development of early relationships.

Personnel Scheduling Problem under Hierarchical Management Based on Intelligent Algorithm

This paper studies a special scheduling problem under hierarchical management in nurse staff. This is a more complex rostering problem than traditional nurse scheduling. The first is that the rostering requirements of charge nurses and general nurses are different under hierarchical management. The second is that nurses are preferable for relative fair rather than absolute fair under hierarchical management. The model aims at allocating the required workload to meet the operational requirements, weekend rostering preferences, and relative fairness preferences. Two hybrid heuristic algorithms based on multiobjective grey wolf optimizer (MOGWO) and three corresponding single heuristic algorithms are employed to solve this problem. The experimental results based on real cases from the Third People’s Hospital, Panzhihua, China, show that MOGWO does not as good as it does on other engineering optimization. However, the hybrid algorithms based on MOGWO are better than corresponding single algorithms on generational distance (GD) and spacing (SP) of Pareto solutions. Furthermore, for relative fair rostering objective, NSGAII-MOGWO has more power to find the optimal solution in the dimension of relative fairness.

Managing a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Fairness and Channel Preference

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells the product via an offline retailer or online store. The manufacturer sets the wholesale and online price, and the retailer decides the retail price with the retailer’s fairness preference and consumer’s online channel preference. Through investigating the combined impacts of fairness preference and channel preference on the enterprises’ operational strategies, this paper obtains some meaningful results. If a manufacturer thinks over the fairness preference, he decreases the wholesale price to mitigate a loss of retailer and benefit the supply chain design. The manufacturer intends to set up the online channel with a lower acceptance as the fairness preference grows. However, the gains from enhanced online channel acceptance cannot compensate for the manufacturer’s loss by the fairness effect that benefits the retailer. Moreover, the manufacturer cannot neglect the retailer’s fairness preference generating a “lose-lose” case for both members.

Screening a supplier with fairness preference

This paper is to study how a firm to screen an external supplier who has fairness preference using a general screening framework. The supplier with fairness preference provides products or services to the firm, and the firm designs a contract to screen the preference type of suppliers. The supplier’s fairness preference is adjusted by their ability difference, this paper analyzes how the supplier’s ability difference affect the optimal contract variables under the standard framework. The results illustrate that the larger ability difference will narrow the output difference between two different type suppliers. Associated with fairness preference, the probability distribution can increase or decrease the output difference. Furthermore, different strengths of the fairness preference would amplify or shrink the output difference between two different type suppliers.

Communication, Expectations, and Trust: An Experiment with Three Media

We studied how communication media affect trust game play. Three popular media were considered: traditional face-to-face, Facebook groups, and anonymous online chat. We considered post-communication changes in players’ expectations and preferences, and further analyzed the contents of group communications to understand the channels though which communication appears to improve trust and trustworthiness. For senders, the social, emotional, and game-relevant contents of communication all matter, significantly influencing both their expectations of fair return and preferences towards receivers. Receivers increased trustworthiness is mostly explained by their adherence to the norm of sending back a fair share of the amount received. These results do not qualitatively differ among the three communication media; while face-to-face had the largest volume of messages, all three media proved equally effective in enhancing trust and trustworthiness.

Distributive fairness and the social responsibility of the representative of a group

ABSTRACT Using an ultimatum game experiment where a representative makes a decision on behalf of the group members and equally shares the outcomes with them, we investigate whether the representative’s social responsibility exists and has a systematic relationship with his or her individual distributive fairness. The experimental results show that the representative of a respondent group tends to change his or her individual willingness to accept due to social responsibility. More importantly, we find that the minimum fairness of other members in the group tends to be the representative’s group standard for aggregating fairness, and that representatives whose individual fairness is higher [lower] than the minimum fairness of other members has a strong [negligible] tendency to incorporate their group members’ fairness preferences. According to our conceptual framework, this tendency can be only consistent with a positive correlation between the representative’s social responsibility and his or her individual distributive fairness. The results suggest that an incentive mechanism for a representative making a public decision would need to consider such a positive correlation between his or her social responsibility and distributive fairness.