Abstract
With the rapid development of urbanization, substantial land areas and houses are expropriated, which can cause huge numbers of disputes related to expropriation compensation. The root of the disputes is that the associated subjects are affected by various behavioral preferences and make different cognitive fairness judgments based on the same compensation price. However, the existing expropriation compensation strategies based on the market value under the assumption of “the economic man” hypothesis cannot meet the fairness preference demands of the expropriated. Therefore, finding a compensation price that satisfies subjects’ multidimensional fairness preferences, including profit-seeking, loss aversion, and interactive fairness preferences, is necessary. Only in this way can the subjects reach an agreement regarding fair compensation and resolve their disputes. Because of the fuzziness of subjects’ expected revenues, this paper innovatively introduces trigonometric intuitional fuzzy numbers to construct one-dimensional and multidimensional fair fuzzy equilibrium evaluation models. The Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method is adopted to convert a multidimensional problem into a multiattribute group decision problem, which simplifies the problem of finding multidimensional equilibrium when considering the multidimensional fairness preferences of the two subjects. Real case data are introduced to verify the validity of this method. The research results show that upward revision of the multidimensional fairness preferences based on the market value assists in achieving a fair compensation agreement. Consideration of the influence of the subjects’ multidimensional fairness preferences on the fairness equilibrium is conducive to resolving the disputes, and provides a reference for the settlement of expropriation compensation disputes in developing countries.
Highlights
In the field of housing expropriation compensation, there is no lack of research from the perspective of behavioral preference, previous studies focus solely on the influence of behavioral choices or psychological changes of participants in expropriation compensation disputes, in addition to rare examples of multidimensional fair fuzzy equilibrium evaluation research
Based on the perspective of behavioral preference, this paper first proposes that the key to resolving housing expropriation compensation disputes lies in the fact that the associated subjects form a consensus on beliefs and strategies for expropriation compensation, satisfying the subjects’ multidimensional fairness demands under the influence of profit-seeking preference, loss aversion, and interactive fairness preference, and achieve the fairness equilibrium under the interaction of the strategies and beliefs of the associated subjects
Regarding the housing expropriation compensation, when the associated subjects are only affected by the profit-seeking preference and aim to pursue their own interests and utility maximization, the game strategy mainly depends on the utility of the associated subjects
Summary
The game equilibrium is the result of the strategic and belief interactions of the subjects under the influence of behavioral preferences Applying this logic to the housing expropriation compensation scenarios, it can be seen that the subjects’ different perceptions of fair compensation are the root of expropriation compensation disputes. In-depth analysis of the behavioral preference laws of the stakeholders in housing expropriation compensation conflicts, as well as the influences on the game equilibrium, must be carried out to find an effective way to solve expropriation compensation disputes. This has become a practical problem that needs to be solved urgently on the road to China’s new urbanization goals
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