Executive-legislative Relations Research Articles

The European Parliament oversight of EU agencies through written questions

ABSTRACTThe reinforcement of the legislative and oversight powers of the European Parliament by virtue of successive treaty reforms over the last two decades has been in parallel with an expanding process of agency creation at the European Union (EU) level. While these two institutional developments entail major transformations of legislative–executive relations in the EU, the European Parliament oversight of EU agencies remains an underexplored topic of research. Based on an original dataset on parliamentary written questions overseeing EU agencies asked during the 2009–14 Legislature, the article analyses members of the European Parliament (MEPs) questioning activity overseeing EU agencies. The article argues that legislative oversight of agencies through written questions is driven by MEPs national party opposition status as well as by agency salience and size.

The Evolution of Theories about the Brazilian Multiparty Presidential System

In recent years, four approaches about executive-legislative relations in Brazil have emerged: i) the perspective that points out limitations and constraints of multiparty presidential systems; ii) the building of government coalitions; iii) coalition management; and iv) the role played by institutions including the prerogatives of party leadership inside the House. In this paper, we review the literature on these approaches, offering a guide for studies about the Brazilian multiparty presidential system.

¿Cooperación o conflicto? Las relaciones ejecutivo-legislativo en el sexenio de Felipe Calderón.

El principal objetivo de este artículo es evaluar dos aspectos clave de la relación ejecutivo-legislativo durante la administración del presidente Felipe Calderón Hinojosa: la tasa de aprobación de la agenda legislativa del ejecutivo y las observaciones o vetos que el presidente realizó a los decretos aprobados por los legisladores. También se examina si algunos de los cambios constitucionales aprobados durante este periodo modificaron el equilibrio de poder en la relación entre el presidente y el Congreso. El análisis indica que ni el sistema presidencial, el multipartidismo, ni la ausencia de mayoría del partido del presidente en el Congreso produjeron una parálisis legislativa, pero sí dificultaron la aprobación de algunas reformas clave para el país.

Executive Strength, Executive-Legislative Relations, and Budget Deficits

Other SectionsAbstractCOMMON POOL RESOURCE PROBLEM OR POLICY INERTIA?HYPOTHESISDATA, MODEL, AND MEASURESEMPIRICAL ANALYSISCONCLUSIONFigureTableFootnoteReference

Analisis espacial de la reforma fiscal en México en la lviii Legislatura: un ejercicio aplicado de preferencias radiales y simétricas

The aim of this work is explained by the theory of veto players, as an exercise in applying radial and symmetric preferences, because it did not carry the tax reform in the lviii Legislature. This empirical application of the theory of veto players in the case of Mexico is inserted into the problem of separation of powers and executive-legislative relations that has impacted the new Latin American democracies.The work is divided into two parts: the first presents the main theoretical elements of spatial analysis and the theory of veto players. The second part focuses on the application of the theory of Veto Player (vp) in the analysis of the results of the tax reform in the lviii Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies.

Separation of Powers and Universal Suffrage

The introduction of universal suffrage for the selection of the Hong Kong Chief Executive is often portrayed as the answer to the problems afflicting the executive-legislative relationship in Hong Kong. But even in the increasingly unlikely event that a consensus can be reached on the necessary electoral methods, the introduction of universal suffrage would, by itself, do little to address some of the structural problems that spring from the strong system of separation of powers — and, particularly, separation of persons — that exists under the Hong Kong Basic Law.The near total separation of membership of the executive and legislature in Hong Kong weakens the political party system and creates the potential for deadlock between the two branches of the political structure. Such structural issues will need to be addressed alongside the introduction of universal suffrage.If the introduction of a parliamentary system is considered too radical a solution in Hong Kong, such reforms should instead focus on finding the maximum cross membership possible within the present constitutional structure, and improving channels of communication between the executive and legislature. Such reforms would also offer hope for addressing some of the problems currently afflicting the executive-legislative relationship in Hong Kong, even if consensus cannot be reached on the introduction of universal suffrage.

From a Technocratic Solution to a Fragile Grand Coalition: The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Parliamentary Government in Italy

Italy is an interesting case to be included in a comparative analysis of the effects determined by the recent financial crisis on the European political systems, because of the distinctiveness characterising the recent development of this parliamentary democracy. The processes of making and breaking governments, in particular, have been particularly unusual: the end of the governmental experience of Silvio Berlusconi and the formation of the technical government led by Mario Monti have been strongly influenced by external factors, as well as the recent formation of the government guided by Enrico Letta, supported by a broad coalition including the former competing centre-right and centre-left cartels. The paper focuses on the practices of executive–legislative relationships in Italy between 2008 and the 2013 elections. Its basic puzzle is to understand the effective impact determined by the economic crisis over the core mechanisms of parliamentary democracy. Comparing the impact of the governmental policy agenda set by the technocratic cabinet vis-à-vis the previous ‘political’ executives, and measuring the reactions of the different parliamentary actors, it is possible to test a number of empirical propositions concerning the transformation of the adversarial mode that emerged in past years into a more or less consensual parliamentary atmosphere.

The Development of Brazilian Multiparty Presidential System Theories: A Comparative Approach

In this paper we’ll review the literature of Brazilian Multiparty Presidential System, also known as coalitional presidentialism. We’ll not offer only a guide for the last 25 years of research, but also give some suggestions. Were identified six kinds of studies about Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil: the pessimistic view, comparing presidentialism with parliamentarism; creation of government coalitions, analyzing the proportionality in the cabinets; maintenance of the coalitions with resources provided by the Executive to Congressmen for pork barrel; power of institutions; strength of party leadership inside the Congress; and finally, researches about federalism and its consequences. We can make at least three observations. First: create a proportionality index of cabinets giving the same weight to all Departments, like the literature did, isn’t the best thing to do. Second: what happen with the maintenance of coalition if a new law is approved stating that the Executive must give the same resources for pork to all Representatives? Third: there’s another view about federalism looking at the weakness of Governors compared to the strength of Mayors and Presidents, how can it be analyzed inside this framework?

Alliances, Coalitions and the Weakening of the Party System in Malawi

In nascent democracies, like that in Malawi, with presidential regimes and plurality electoral systems, the emergence of fragmented political party systems is inevitable, characterised by ethnically polarised political behaviour, fragile institutions and minority governments. This ultimately leads to volatile and contentious legislative-executive relations, weak political party cohesion and the stagnation of democratic consolidation. Malawi's system inherently offers neither incentives for coalition formation nor mutual interdependence between the executive and the legislature. Hence, the latent conflicts, persistent governance crises, inertia and grinding executive-legislative confrontations. Among political actors and across minority regimes in Malawi recourse to coalition politics has not been embraced as an optimal democratic instrument and formal strategy for state governability since 1994. The Mutharika minority government (2004-2009), which was persistently frustrated by parliamentary paralysis, survived on the floorcrossing inducements of opposition legislators, extended judicial injunctions and the presidential prorogation of Parliament. In addition, the brief 'experiments' with government coalitions, 'collusions' and electoral alliances weakened cohesion within partner parties and hardly increased national cohesion, but promoted state governability and yielded marginal gains in democratic consolidation. This article argues that political institutions that are designed to encourage formal political coalitions and discourage floorcrossing (parliamentary systems and proportional electoral laws) serve to mitigate against state instability and enhance democratic consolidation.

Beyond roll call: executive-legislative relations and lawmaking in the Philippine House of Representatives

This article analyzes lawmaking in presidential systems where legislative roll call votes do not reflect policy or ideological stance, taking the Philippines as a case study. As an alternative to roll call analysis, this study suggests that the time from when a bill is filed until its passage can be a gauge not only of policy preferences but executive-legislative dynamics. This is tested through an event history analysis of bills filed in the Philippine House of Representatives from the 8th to the 14th Congress. The propensity for approval of a bill is modeled as a function of institutional and political resources available to both the chief executive and members of the House of Representatives. The results indicate that a bill certified as urgent by the president generally has a higher likelihood of passage, but the effect changes over time and at some point being part of the president's so-called legislative agenda actually increases the risk of non-approval.

Rules of Procedure as a Cause of Legislative Paralysis: The Case of Costa Rica, 2002–2012

AbstractResearch on executive-legislative relations in Latin America has focused on the impact of minority presidents and multiparty legislatures on legislative productivity. But an additional deadlock scenario, the blocking of a majority president by a minority through filibustering, has been understudied. This article analyzes filibustering in Costa Rica and explains the legislative paralysis in the wake of the nation's transition to a multiparty system in 2002. Legislative paralysis is seen as a product of the interaction between increased legislative fragmentation and polarization and the legislature's preexisting rules of procedure, which enable legislators easily to block bills they oppose, even when those bills are supported by supermajorities. This argument is tested through a comparison of major economic reforms in the 2000s to the reforms tackled in the 1990s. The role of filibustering, well acknowledged in U.S. politics, should also be studied in comparative politics.

Constitutional choices: Uncertainty and institutional design in democratising nations

Why do democratising nations make the constitutional choices they do? Conceiving democratic transition as a critical juncture, we propose a theory of constitutional choice. We place the degree of uncertainty at the centre of our theorising efforts to explain the relationship between constitutional bargains among competing political groups and the type of executive–legislative relations adopted during democratisation. We posit that parliamentarism is more likely to be adopted under high-uncertainty conditions, while presidentialism is more likely under low-uncertainty conditions. Identifying four factors that affect the level of uncertainty in the transition process, we examine how the choices of executive–legislative relations are made under strong influences of historical and geographic factors.

Oversight Effectiveness and Political Will: Some Lessons from West Africa

The purpose of the present note is to advance two theoretical claims. The first claim proposed is that the impact of the availability of oversight tools and of the most broadly understood legislative capacity (availability of material, technical, financial resources; availability of well-trained staff) on the effectiveness with which legislative oversight is performed is conditional. The second claim put forward, after reviewing a rich body of work on executive–legislative relations and legislative oversight in West Africa, is that, of the various conditions that promote or prevent the effective use of oversight tools and capacity, political will is the single most important. These claims have both theoretical and practical relevance, for if political will is as important as is claimed for the effective performance of the oversight function, then international organisations may have to reconsider their approach to legislative strengthening.

Parliament without Government: The Belgian Parliament and the Government Formation Processes of 2007–2011

Parliamentary systems are characterised by strong links between the executive and the legislature. While the importance of executive–legislative relationships is well-known, the extent to which executive dominance affects parliamentary behaviour is hard to grasp. This study uses the recent institutional crises in Belgium to study parliamentary behaviour in the absence of a government with full powers. Cabinet formation in Belgium has proved to be protracted in recent years, leading to long periods of government formation in both 2007–2008 and 2010–2011. Such circumstances provide a unique comparison between normal situations of parliament in the presence of government, and exceptional situations of prolonged periods of caretaker government. In particular the article looks at three aspects of parliamentary behaviour that are usually linked to executive–legislative relations: legislative initiatives, voting behaviour and party unity. The general hypothesis is that prolonged periods of government formation gave parliamentarians more opportunities to influence the legislative process and more (ideological) freedom. The results show a nuanced picture: parliament became more pro-active, the salience of the government–opposition divide declined, while party unity remained as strong as ever. It is concluded that government formation processes did not lead to drastic changes in the legislative–executive relationship, but rather permitted a modest correction to the extremely weak position of parliament.

Legislatures, Courts, and Statutory Control of the Bureaucracy across the U.S. States

AbstractHow do state legislatures use statutory language to control policy implementation by state agencies? In this article, I consider—in a specific policy area and time period—the extent to which this decision is affected by legislative anticipation of the likely actions of state courts. Previous literature has argued that the legislative use of statutory language to control bureaucrats varies with the availability of nonstatutory methods of control, but it does not explicitly consider the potential role of courts. My expectations are derived from a simple formal model of executive–legislative relations and are supported when I test them using data on the number of words added to a state's Medicaid laws from 1995 to 1996. In particular, I find that state legislatures write longer, more constraining, statutes when the likelihood that state courts intervene on their behalf is neither very high nor very low.

Determinantes do controle horizontal em parlamentos reativos: o caso do Brasil (1988-2005)

Horizontal accountability is a key challenge to new democracies, and especially so in those regimes where reactive legislatures face dominant presidents. Although the 1988 Constitution gives impressive legislative and agenda-setting powers to the Brazilian president, it also equips the legislature with a set of oversight tools that can be used to monitor or scrutinize the powerful executive. In analysing a large database of oversight initiatives between 1988 and 2005, we trace broad trends and patterns in the overall usage of oversight tools and attempt to isolate the political and institutional conditions under which they are deployed. We find that the use of oversight mechanisms has risen in recent years; that oversight is mediated by measures of presidential popularity and by the size of the pro-presidential faction in Congress; and that oversight responds to the logic of Brazils coalitional politics, driven by the shifting context of the executive-legislative relationship under multiparty presidentialism.

Congress and Harry S. Truman: A Conflicted Legacy. Edited by Donald A.Ritchie. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2011. 209 pp.

Congress and Harry S. Truman: A Conflicted Legacy. Edited by Donald A. Ritchie. Kirksville, MO: State University Press, 2011. 209 pp. The subtitle of this collection of essays is certainly appropriate. Participants at the Seventh Legacy Symposium, Truman and Congress: A Conflicted Legacy, offered wide array of opinions Harry S. Truman's relationship with Congress, as his administration tackled the weighty affairs of state. The resulting book includes three contributions focusing legislative-executive relations, three domestic affairs, and three foreign policy matters, as well as fascinating Graphic Essay with images of key documents, White House staff members, powerful members of Congress, and the president at work. So, how did contributors to this volume interpret Truman's record of accomplishments? To set the stage, Donald A. Ritchie, historian of the U.S. Senate, stressed the circumstances that the new president confronted when he assumed the office: difficult time politically, with the gas tank of liberal reformism on empty and citizens eager to get with their lives (p. xviii). Truman's tenure unfolded, in Alonzo L. Hamby's words, during a postwar age of conservative restoration (p. 93). Nevertheless, gutsy president accomplished great deal. Central to Truman's record was more systematic approach to relations with the legislative branch. In his sweeping introductory survey of White House-Congress relations after Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ritchie emphasized the significance of the administration's pioneering liaison efforts with Congress. was transitional figure whose dealings with Congress, Ritchie reminds readers, was halfway between the 'designed chaos' of his predecessor and the 'structural purity' of his successor (p. xxi). It must be noted, however, that Ken Hechler, White House staff member from 1949 to 1953, believes that interpretation an exaggeration, and recalled senior administrative assistant George Elsey's description of liaison staffers as glorified errand boys for the White House appointments secretary (pp. 4-5). In the policy realm, the embattled president articulated broad liberal vision for the postwar years and what Hamby concluded was a largely unattainable checklist of legislation (p. 99). Ritchie, Hamby, Susan M. Hartmann, Richard S. Conley, and other contributors to this volume recognized the deep schism that occurred between foreign and domestic policy. Bipartisanship in foreign policy, the focus of Hartmann's assessment of the early Cold War years, led to the enactment of far-reaching containment program. …

Renegotiation of Executive Powers and Executive-Legislative Relations in Botswana

The strength of the legislature has been identified as one of the strongest predictors of democratic survival. Executive-legislative relations are defined by formal constitutional arrangements, but also by their interpretation in the practice of political power and in the courts. Renegotiation of executive-legislative relations thus occurs through reinterpretations of political practice as well as constitutional change. What conditions and processes prompt the renegotiation of executive-legislative relations and influence whether changes favor a strengthening of the executive or the legislature? These issues are examined through an analysis of the renegotiation of executive power and executive-legislative relations in Botswana. Although Botswana has never had a strong legislature, the weakness of the legislature became more glaring in the 1990s as the long-ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) faced growing competition from both the opposition and internal factions. Growing opposition, both internal and external to the BDP, made the legislature more threatening to the executive. A number of developments further concentrated power in the hands of the executive. These include constitutional amendments, court cases, and changes in political practices such as an increased reliance on presidential directives that favor the executive. Calls for constitutional reform to check the power of the executive and strengthen the legislature featured prominently in Botswana’s 2009 elections. When the tenth parliament opened in November 2009, MPs from across the political divide stood up and called for constitutional reforms. The paper will analyze the dynamics associated with the strengthening of the executive and evaluate the possibilities for launching a renegotiation of executive-legislative relations that is more favorable for the legislature. The analysis draws on research conducted in Botswana during August 2009 and May – July 2010.

Legislative Coalitions in Presidential Systems: The Case of Uruguay

AbstractThe article analyzes executive-legislative relations in Uruguay between 1985 and 2005. It demonstrates that even after controlling for ideological affinity and acknowledging that ideology affects presence in the cabinet, legislators whose factions hold ministerial positions behave in a more progovernment way than their ideology would predict. This result not only shows that coalitions “work” but suggests that they work because the presidents use resources under their control to attract support from legislators. This article presents a systematic analysis of executive-legislative relations in multiparty settings that builds on the finding that nonideologically contiguous coalitions often form to separate the ideological from the strategic determinants of legislative behavior. It also contributes to the literature by presenting a new set of roll call data and, more generally, highlights the risks of attempting to infer ideology directly from legislative behavior in presidential multiparty settings.

Informal Institutions and Horizontal Accountability: Protocols in the Chilean Budgetary Process

Abstract Studies of executive-legislative relations are usually based only on the analysis of formal institutions, although informal institutions also shape interbranch behavior. This omission leads to questionable results when scholars examine the capacity of state institutions to audit other public agencies and branches of government. This article explores how the protocols, an informal institution that shapes the Chilean budgetary negotiations, have increasingly allowed the congress to have a more relevant budgetary role than what the constitution permits. It argues that protocols accommodate some of the undesired consequences of a charter that is strongly biased toward the central government, and describes how this institution has departed from its stringent budgetary focus to encompass broader executive-legislative agreements that enhance the legislature's capacity to oversee the executive.