Renegotiation of Executive Powers and Executive-Legislative Relations in Botswana

Abstract

The strength of the legislature has been identified as one of the strongest predictors of democratic survival. Executive-legislative relations are defined by formal constitutional arrangements, but also by their interpretation in the practice of political power and in the courts. Renegotiation of executive-legislative relations thus occurs through reinterpretations of political practice as well as constitutional change. What conditions and processes prompt the renegotiation of executive-legislative relations and influence whether changes favor a strengthening of the executive or the legislature? These issues are examined through an analysis of the renegotiation of executive power and executive-legislative relations in Botswana. Although Botswana has never had a strong legislature, the weakness of the legislature became more glaring in the 1990s as the long-ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) faced growing competition from both the opposition and internal factions. Growing opposition, both internal and external to the BDP, made the legislature more threatening to the executive. A number of developments further concentrated power in the hands of the executive. These include constitutional amendments, court cases, and changes in political practices such as an increased reliance on presidential directives that favor the executive. Calls for constitutional reform to check the power of the executive and strengthen the legislature featured prominently in Botswana’s 2009 elections. When the tenth parliament opened in November 2009, MPs from across the political divide stood up and called for constitutional reforms. The paper will analyze the dynamics associated with the strengthening of the executive and evaluate the possibilities for launching a renegotiation of executive-legislative relations that is more favorable for the legislature. The analysis draws on research conducted in Botswana during August 2009 and May – July 2010.