Evolutionary Game Research Articles

Research on the diffusion and control of unsafe behaviors among chemical industry park enterprises based on the SEIR evolutionary game model

In order to control the diffusion of unsafe behaviors among chemical industrial park enterprises, a Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) evolutionary game model is constructed based on the theory of epidemiology and evolutionary game theory. By exploring the game relationship between emergency management departments and safety assessment agencies, the paper analyzes the diffusion paths and evolutionary patterns of unsafe behaviors in chemical industrial park enterprises under different behavioral strategies adopted by both parties. Furthermore, it examines the process and patterns of system evolution to a positive stable state, and conducts multi-scenario simulation and analysis. The results indicate that the interactive behaviors of "strict regulation" by emergency management departments and "high-quality safety assessment" by safety assessment agencies are more conducive to controlling the diffusion of unsafe behaviors among chemical industrial park enterprises. Improving the efficiency of emergency management departments, establishing an attractive and constraining reward and punishment system to guide safety assessment agencies in conducting high-quality safety assessments, and stimulating the initiative of chemical industrial park enterprises in safety behaviors will be more conducive to forming an integrated, coordinated, and mutually constraining mechanism for work safety governance.

Taxation Can Significantly Enhance The Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment Mechanisms in The N-Person Snowdrift Game

We extend the reward and punishment mechanisms in the N-person evolutionary snowdrift game (NSG) model by constructing a tax-based pure punishment NSG model and a tax-based pure reward NSG model. Using replicator dynamics, we established two sets of dynamic equations that describe the evolution of the frequencies of the three strategies. Over longer time scales, both systems exhibit stable states involving two strategies, with the exclusion of the third. Introducing tax factors into the reward and punishment mechanisms significantly increases the proportion of cooperators in the steady state and eliminates defectors, with the time to reach the steady state depending on the tax rate. Moreover, we found that tax-based pure reward strategies are more conducive to fostering cooperative behavior within the system compared to tax-based pure punishment strategies. We employed numerical algorithms to simulate the replicator dynamics, and the results of the dynamic equations were in perfect agreement with the numerical simulations.

A complete classification of evolutionary games with environmental feedback

Abstract A tragedy of the commons, in which rational behavior of individuals to maximize their own payoffs depletes common resources, is one of the most important research topics in game theory. To better understand the social dilemma problem, recent studies have developed a theoretical framework of feedback-evolving game where individual behavior affects an environmental (renewable) resource and the environmental resource changes individual payoffs. While previous studies assumed that the frequency of defectors increases (prisoner's dilemma [PD] game) when the environmental resource is abundant to investigate an oscillating tragedy of the commons, it is also possible for other types of game to produce the social dilemma. In this paper, we extend the feedback-evolving game by considering not only PD game, but also the other three game structures when the environmental resource is replete for a reasonably complete classification. The three games are Chicken game where defectors and cooperators coexist through minority advantage, Stag-Hunt (SH) game with minority disadvantage, and Trivial game where the frequency of cooperators increases. In addition, we utilize a dilemma phase plane to visually track (transient) dynamics of game structure changes. We found that an emergent initial condition dependence (i.e. bistability) is pervasive in the feedback-evolving game when the three games are involved. We also showed that persistent oscillation dynamics arise even with Chicken or SH games in replete environments. Our generalized analysis will be an important step to further extend the theoretical framework of feedback-evolving game to various game situations with environmental feedback.

Empirical evidence of resource dependent evolution of payoff matrices in Saccharomyces cerevisiae populations.

In evolutionary game theory, a relative comparison of the cost and benefit associated with obtaining a resource, called payoff, is used as an indicator of fitness of an organism. Payoffs of different strategies, quantitatively represented as payoff matrices, are used to understand complex inter-species and intra-species interactions like cooperation, mutualism, and altruism. Payoff matrices, however, are usually treated as invariant with time - largely due to the absence of any empirical data quantifying their evolution. In this paper, we present empirical evidence of three types of resource-dependent changes in the payoff matrices of evolving Saccharomyces cerevisiae populations. We show that depending on the carbon source and participating genotypes, N-player games could collapse, be born, or be maintained. Our results highlight the need to consider the dynamic nature of payoff matrices while making even short-term predictions about population interactions and dynamics.

Compensation Mechanism for Ecological Diversity Governance in Chinese River Basins Application Based on Low-Carbon Water Quality Game Theory

Background: Taking the construction of ecological civilization as an important core of the overall layout of the “Five in One” and the coordinated promotion of the “Four Comprehensives” strategic layout, combined with the global concept of ecological environment governance, provides a new direction for the reform and innovation of China’s watershed ecological compensation system through diversified governance. Subjects and methods: This article focuses on ecological compensation in river basins, exploring collaborative cooperation models between upstream and downstream of the basin under the dual constraints of “low-carbon” and “water quality”, to achieve a “win-win” situation between the ecological environment of the basin and all parties involved in basin protection. Based on the theory of evolutionary game theory, the indicators of “carbon emissions” and “water quality” are introduced to construct a diversified ecological co-governance compensation strategy model for the watershed. By exploring the optimal strategies among various entities in the upstream and downstream of the watershed. Results: (1) In the initial stage, the optimal strategy for ecological compensation in the watershed among stakeholders cannot achieve a stable balance through their evolution; (2) In the mature stage, based on the regulation of the superior government, interest subjects will choose a mutual supervision strategy to avoid bearing high penalties, to achieve Pareto effectiveness in achieving a stable overall economy of the basin; (3) By paying for high-quality resources from downstream and implementing carbon trading among basin entities, we can promote internal resource digestion, reduce intermediate transaction costs, and deeply promote the overall green and sustainable development of the basin. Through analysis, it has been proven that the conclusion is effective, providing decision support for the diversified co-governance of watershed ecosystems. Based on building an ecological community with a shared future in the watershed, we aim to achieve the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind.

Four-party evolutionary game analysis of enterprise environmental behavior.

With the implementation of the "Rural Revitalization Strategy" in China, it is common for enterprises to go to the countryside to develop business. However, enterprises often neglect the local environmental protection in rural areas while developing the economy to pursue profits. As the end of the national administrative system and the villagers' autonomous organization, the village committee needs to participate in monitoring enterprises' environmental behavior. With this in mind, this paper builds a game model of enterprises, grass-roots governments, farmers, and village committees and analyzes the impact of village committees, grass-roots governments, and farmers on enterprise environmental behavior. The conclusions are as follows: (i) it is difficult for the village committee to promote the positive environmental behavior of enterprises, which needs the supervision of the grass-roots government; (ii) Improving the coordination ability of village committees is conducive to reducing the burden of government supervision; (iii) Farmers' awareness of environmental protection can affect the environmental behavior of enterprises through the rights protection mechanism and reputation mechanism.

Edge Caching Placement Strategy based on Evolutionary Game for Conversational Information Seeking in Edge Cloud Computing

In Internet applications, network conversation is the primary communication between the user and server. The server needs to efficiently and quickly return the corresponding service according to the conversation sent by the user to improve the users’ Quality of Service. Thus, Conversation Information Seeking (CIS) research has become a hot topic today. In Cloud Computing (CC), a central service mode, the conversation is transmitted between the user and the remote cloud over a long distance. With the explosive growth of Internet applications, network congestion, long-distance communication, and single point of failure have brought new challenges to the centralized service mode. People put forward Edge Cloud Computing (ECC) to meet the new challenges of the centralized service mode of CC. As a distributed service mode, ECC is an extension of CC. By migrating services from the remote cloud to the network edge closer to users, ECC can solve the above challenges in CC well. In ECC, people solve the problem of CIS through edge caching. The current research focuses on designing the edge cache strategy to achieve more predictable caching. In this article, we propose an edge cache placement method Evolutionary Game based Caching Placement Strategy (EG-CPS). This method consists of three modules: the user preference prediction module, the content popularity calculation module, and the cache placement decision module. To maximize the predictability of the cache strategy, we are committed to optimizing the cache hit rate and service latency. The simulation experiment compares the proposed strategy with several other cache strategies. The experimental results illustrate that EG-CPS can reduce up to 2.4% of the original average content request latency, increase the average direct cache hit rate by 1.7%, and increase the average edge cache hit rate by 3.3%.

Secure and efficient trust enabled routing in mobile ad hoc network using game theory and grey wolf optimisation techniques

AbstractMobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are crucial wireless networks for military, corporate, and emergency use, yet they are vulnerable to disruptions from malicious nodes. The presence of malicious nodes can lead to message transmission and routing disorganisation, and network performance is effectively compromised. Game theory‐based fuzzy secure clustering (GTFSC) improves performance metrics in low‐scale and high‐scale networks. This protocol's novel ability to dynamically scale performance measures as nodes expand improves efficiency and adaptability. While improving performance metrics, the proposed algorithm also efficiently identifies malicious nodes and re‐routes the transmission, excluding the found malicious nodes. For any MANET system, secure and successful data transmission is paramount. The proposed protocol integrates various algorithms to fulfil its aim of customised EGT, GWO, and fuzzy clustering. Black hole attacks, grey hole attacks, Sybil attacks, and data tampering attacks are all considered to provide comprehensive attacks on MANET. Every node is assigned trust values, which get updated on data transmission. Fuzzy Clustering is employed to identify malicious nodes. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) optimises network organisation by designating cluster heads and clusters as nodes. Additionally, the proposed protocol leverages the Grey Wolf Optimisation Routing Algorithm (GWO), which establishes efficient routes from the source to the sink node. The analysis result shows maximum performance with a packet delivery ratio of around 98%, throughput of 90% end‐to‐end delay reduced by 15%, and energy consumption reduced by 18%, respectively, compared to an existing protocol.

Optimization strategies for green power and certificate trading in China considering seasonality: An evolutionary game-based system dynamics

China has adopted renewable portfolio standards and tradable green certificates (including hydropower) to increase the proportion of green power used and reduce carbon emissions. However, hydropower generation is affected by seasonal factors, making it difficult to increase green power consumption in water-scarce areas. Trading electricity and green certificates in regions with different resource endowments can effectively solve this problem. Therefore, this study uses evolutionary game theory to explore the impact of the change in the policy of issuing green certificates for hydropower on the strategic choices of the trading parties. Based on the evolutionary game model, a system dynamics model is established to explore the optimization strategies of green power and certificate trading under the influence of seasonal factors. The results of the case study show that (1) the price of green certificates varies with seasonal changes. (2) Sellers with abundant hydropower resources should increase the amount of hydropower connected to the grid during the water-abundant period to help deficit areas achieve their consumption targets (3) Expanding the scope of green certificates can gradually eliminate government subsidies and incentives and reduce the government's financial pressure.

Spontaneous Formation of Evolutionary Game Strategies for Long-Term Carbon Emission Reduction Based on Low-Carbon Trading Mechanism

In the context of increasing global efforts to mitigate climate change, effective carbon emission reduction is a pressing issue. Governments and power companies are key stakeholders in implementing low-carbon strategies, but their interactions require careful management to ensure optimal outcomes for both economic development and environmental protection. This paper addresses this real-world challenge by utilizing evolutionary game theory (EGT) to model the strategic interactions between these stakeholders under a low-carbon trading mechanism. Unlike classical game theory, which assumes complete rationality and perfect information, EGT allows for bounded rationality and learning over time, making it particularly suitable for modeling long-term interactions in complex systems like carbon markets. This study builds an evolutionary game model between the government and power companies to explore how different strategies in carbon emission reduction evolve over time. Using payoff matrices and replicator dynamics equations, we determine the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) points and analyze their stability through dynamic simulations. The findings show that in the absence of a third-party regulator, neither party achieves an ideal ESE. To address this, a third-party regulatory body is introduced into the model, leading to the formulation of a tripartite evolutionary game. The results highlight the importance of regulatory oversight in achieving stable and optimal low-carbon strategies. This paper offers practical policy recommendations based on the simulation outcomes, providing a robust theoretical framework for government intervention in carbon markets and guiding enterprises towards sustainable practices.

Public participation in Governance of E-waste recycling: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

The surge in informal E-waste recycling has led to significant resource wastage and environmental hazards. The current government-centered governance system faces substantial obstacles to effective implementation due to information gaps and operational challenges. This study adopts the concept of social governance by incorporating public participation into the traditional government-led e-waste recycling system. Utilizing the bounded rationality of evolutionary game theory, this research constructs a tripartite game model involving the government, recyclers, and the public. It analyzes the behavioral strategy choices of each participant and the mechanisms of mutual influence under different scenarios. The main findings are: (1) Solely relying on public power is insufficient for effectively governing informal recyclers. (2) Reasonable and moderate incentives can promote public participation, serving as an effective supplementary tool for government regulation. (3) Increasing public exposure to the informal dismantling behaviors of recyclers is crucial for enhancing governance effectiveness. Specific measures can include establishing complaint departments for related incidents and creating media channels. These findings underscore the importance of integrating public participation into e-waste governance to address the limitations of a purely government-centered approach.

Evolutionary game theoretical approach for reducing carbon emissions in a complex supply chain organization

PurposeOur research explores the intricate behavior of low-carbon supply chain organizations in an ever-evolving landscape, emphasizing the profound implications of government-mandated low-carbon policies and the growing low-carbon market. Central to our exploration is applying a combined game theory model, merging Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) with the Shapley Value Cooperative Game Theory Approach (SVCGTA).Design/methodology/approachWe establish a two-tier supply chain featuring retailers and manufacturers within this novel framework. We leverage an integrated approach, combining strategic Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperative Game Theory, to conduct an in-depth analysis of four distinct low-carbon strategy combinations for retailers and manufacturers.FindingsThe implications of our findings transcend theoretical boundaries and resonate with a trinity of economic, environmental and societal interests. Our research goes beyond theoretical constructs to consider real-world impacts, including the influence of changes in government low-carbon policies, the dynamics of consumer sensitivities and the strategic calibration of retailer carbon financing incentives and subsidies on the identified ESS. Notably, our work highlights that governments can effectively incentivize organizations to reduce carbon emissions by adopting a more flexible approach, such as regulating carbon prices, rather than imposing rigid carbon caps.Originality/valueOur comprehensive analysis reveals the emergence of an Evolutionary Stability Strategy (ESS) that evolves in sync with the phases of low-carbon technology development. During the initial stages, our research suggests that manufacturers or retailers adopt low-carbon behavior as the optimal approach.

The Social Contagion of Risk Perceptions of Emerging Technologies through Evolutionary Game in Networks

Emerging technologies are leading the fourth industrial revolution, bringing profound changes to modern life. However, the contagion of public risk perceptions pertaining to these technologies may result in new social stability risks according to the social amplification of risk framework (SARF). As such, understanding the formation and contagion mechanisms behind public risk perceptions of emerging technologies is critical to promoting their increased receptivity. Based on an evolutionary game theoretical approach to complex networks, this paper constructs a social contagion model of the risk perception of emerging technologies and uses simulations to analyze the influence of factors such as individual cognition and social environment. Results indicate the following: (1) the rate of risk perception contagion gradually increases with the level of individual risk perception and trust in communicators; (2) the risk perception contagion rate gradually decreases as the level of risk governance participation increases; and (3) comparing different social networks, kinship networks have a greater effect than social media networks on risk perception contagion.

Effects of conservative-militant defection strategies on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma

Competition in the international arena and business realm offers avenues for individual growth and advancement. Individuals using different means of competition can obtain unequal rewards. This paper claims that when no consensus is reached in business activities, defectors will choose conservative or militant defection strategies during market competition. Conservative defectors, who are in a comparatively weak position, need to pay the costs brought by market share losses. However, their personal abilities cannot be ignored, which prompts them to bravely choose the conservative defection strategy. This brings rewards to conservative defectors. Militant defectors, typically in stronger positions, also receive greater rewards. Research results establish an evolutionary game model of three strategies, the cooperation strategy, the conservative defection strategy, and the militant defection strategy. After the system is stable, this model displays two stable states. Through numerical simulation, it can be found that the personal abilities of conservative defectors play a decisive role in promoting cooperation. However, the market share losses of conservative defectors have periodical impacts on cooperation. Moreover, the threats of militant defectors to cooperation should be comprehensively considered in combination with the personal abilities of conservative defectors.

Evolutionary game analysis of multi-agent cooperation strategy analysis in agricultural water conservancy PPP project under digitization background

This study constructed a system dynamics (SD) evolutionary game model, from which we analyzed the conditions that need to be met by multi-agents to achieve cooperation in agricultural water conservancy (AWC) Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Simultaneously, this study used numerical simulation to depict the impact of initial participation willingness, reward, punishment, income, and other parameters of local governments, project enterprises, and farmers on the evolution strategy. The results firstly showed that the basic conditions for tripartite cooperation are to strengthen the rewards and punishments for project enterprises and improve the participation benefits of farmers. Secondly, it showed that increasing the rewards for farmers and improving the project dividend benefits can effectively motivate farmers to participate. Thirdly, it showed that enhancing the incentive subsidies and reputation benefits for project enterprise’s participation, as well as strengthening the supervision of local government, boosts the motivation of project enterprises significantly. However, it is vital to ensure that the reward amounts are not too high to allow local government to play its guiding role efficiently. Lastly, the results indicated that digital technology can help reduce the participation cost of local government, project enterprises and farmers, and improve the external reputation benefits of each participant, thus forming a win-win situation for all three participants. Analyzing the cooperation strategies of the three parties in AWC PPP projects provides theoretical support and a decision-making basis for the efficient operation of AWC PPP projects under the digital background, and also provides practical policy recommendations for the high-quality development of AWC.

Can subsidy policies achieve fuel cell logistics vehicle (FCLV) promotion targets? Evidence from the beijing-tianjin-hebei fuel cell vehicle demonstration city cluster in China

Fuel cell logistics vehicle (FCLV) plays a pillar role in achieving carbon neutrality in the freight sector. Due to high costs and imperfect infrastructure, millions of subsidies are granted to develop FCLV and fulfill promotion targets set by the government. To examine the effectiveness of this action, the study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory (EGT) model to simulate the interactions between local governments, private investors, and consumers, and explores the fulfillment of promotion targets in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei fuel cell vehicle demonstration city cluster. The obtained results show that: (i) the FCLV promotion targets of demonstration cities except Tangshan could be substantially achieved under the current subsidy; (ii) purchase subsidies for consumers can help achieve promotion targets at a faster pace, while construction subsidies for investors have a limited incentive effect, so more non-financial incentives need to be provided to investors, such as innovative operating models and priority approval of land for hydrogen refueling station construction; (iii) a comparison of subsidies in different cities reveals that Beijing's subsidies are the most efficient and that there is an optimal allocation between consumers and private investors that allows for the faster accomplishment of promotion targets without increasing the fiscal burden.

Impact analysis of the four-party evolutionary game in renewable portfolio standard under dynamic parameters

Renewable portfolio standard has become the primary policy tool to improve the integration of renewable energy. The motivation of the parties involved and the formulation of the policy parameters are crucial for the rapid development of renewable energy industry. However, the role of large consumers has often been neglected as the main party for renewable energy consumption, and the policy parameters have been dominated by static parameters. This paper innovatively introduces large consumers into the evolutionary game, constructs a four-party revenue matrix and the replicated dynamic equations, analyzes the equilibrium conditions of the evolutionary game, and constructs the functions of the key dynamic parameters over time, then simulates the behavioral strategies of the game players under the dynamic parameters with a system dynamics model. The optimal strategy is regulators waive regulation, while power plants, large consumers and power sales companies fulfill their quotas. Dynamic fines, dynamic quotas, and dynamic consumption prices have a large impact on each player, while dynamic TGC prices have a limited impact on them. Reasonably high fines in the initial stage are effective in facilitating each player to its stable state more quickly than static fines. Even if the fine is reduced in the later stages, it will not affect their strategies. High quotas and low consumption prices will significantly accelerate the exit of regulators from regulation, while power sales companies and large consumers will quickly fulfill their quota tasks. Only power generators prefer low quotas and high consumption prices. These results provide some recommendations for the setting of policy parameters.

The impact of time delays on mutant fixation in pairwise social dilemma games

Evolutionary game theory examines how strategies spread and persist in populations through reproduction and imitation based on their fitness. Traditionally, models assume instantaneous dynamics where fitness depends on the current population state. However, some real-world processes unfold over time, with outcomes emerging from history. This motivates incorporating time delays into evolutionary game models, where fitness relies on the past. We study the impact of time delays on mutant fixation in a Moran Birth–death process with two strategies in a well-mixed population. At each time step of the process, an individual reproduces proportionally to fitness coming from the past. We model this as an absorbing Markov chain, allowing computational calculation of the fixation probability and time. We focus on three important games: the Stag-Hunt, Snowdrift and Prisoner’s Dilemma. We will show time delays reduce the fixation probability in the Stag-Hunt and the Prisoner’s Dilemma but increase it in the Snowdrift. For the Stag-Hunt and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, time delays lengthen the fixation time until a critical point, then reduce it. The Snowdrift exhibits the opposite trend.

Evolutionary game and simulation study of public transport under government incentive and punishment mechanism.

Public transport plays an indispensable role in the whole public transport system. This paper makes an in-depth study on how public transport can provide passengers with higher service quality while meeting the needs of passengers. In order to achieve this research goal, this paper organically incorporates the three key subjects of government supervision, public transport and passengers into the research framework. Evolutionary game theory is used to construct the corresponding research model. It has been found that the decision-making behaviours of government regulators, public transport and passengers are intricately intertwined to influence each other in the evolutionary process. It is particularly noteworthy that the incentive or punishment measures adopted by the government have a great impact on the quality of public transport services. In addition, timely supervision and inspection of government regulatory authorities by higher authorities proved to be crucial for buses to provide stable and high-quality services. This study reveals the mechanisms of interaction between different subjects in the public transport system, particularly the government-guided incentive measures and supervision mechanism to promote the overall service level. To further support the research conclusions, this paper carries on the simulation analysis, and puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions for the bus to provide high-quality service according to the simulation results. These recommendations will help guide the government, public transport and passengers to make better decisions in the synergistic development process, thereby improving the overall level of service.

Perception, Evolution, and the Explanatory Scope of Scientific Theories

According to the interface theory of perception, our perceptual systems have evolved to provide a species-specific interface to guide adaptive behaviour, and not to provide veridical representations of an observer-independent world. Results of simulations of evolutionary resource games, genetic algorithms, and multiple mathematical theorems have supported and fleshed out this claim in various ways. They indicate that the probability is zero that any perceptual system has been shaped by natural selection to represent the true structure of an observer-independent world. Bagwell (2023) thinks that this argument is self-defeating because it implies that organisms, resources, genes, etc. that are essential constituents of Darwin's theory do not provide an insight into the nature of observerindependent reality. Bagwell's argument relies on a false premise, however — namely, that the mathematical formulation of a scientific theory cannot dethrone its fundamental concepts. More broadly, his argument involves a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of scientific theories — of their explanatory scope and their necessary limits.