Abstract
In evolutionary game theory, a relative comparison of the cost and benefit associated with obtaining a resource, called payoff, is used as an indicator of fitness of an organism. Payoffs of different strategies, quantitatively represented as payoff matrices, are used to understand complex inter-species and intra-species interactions like cooperation, mutualism, and altruism. Payoff matrices, however, are usually treated as invariant with time - largely due to the absence of any empirical data quantifying their evolution. In this paper, we present empirical evidence of three types of resource-dependent changes in the payoff matrices of evolving Saccharomyces cerevisiae populations. We show that depending on the carbon source and participating genotypes, N-player games could collapse, be born, or be maintained. Our results highlight the need to consider the dynamic nature of payoff matrices while making even short-term predictions about population interactions and dynamics.
Published Version
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