Can Subsidy Policies Achieve Fuel Cell Logistics Vehicle (FCLV) Promotion Targets? Evidence from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Fuel Cell Vehicle Demonstration City Cluster in China

Abstract

Fuel cell logistics vehicle (FCLV) plays a pillar role in achieving carbon neutrality in the freight sector. Due to high costs and imperfect infrastructure, millions of subsidies are granted to develop FCLV and fulfill promotion targets set by the government. To examine the effectiveness of this action, the study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory (EGT) model to simulate the interactions between local governments, private investors, and consumers, and explores the fulfillment of promotion targets in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei fuel cell vehicle demonstration city cluster. The obtained results show that: (i) the FCLV promotion targets of demonstration cities except Tangshan could be substantially achieved under the current subsidy; (ii) purchase subsidies for consumers can help achieve promotion targets at a faster pace, while construction subsidies for investors have a limited incentive effect, so more non-financial incentives need to be provided to investors, such as innovative operating models and priority approval of land for hydrogen refueling station construction; (iii) a comparison of subsidies in different cities reveals that Beijing's subsidies are the most efficient and that there is an optimal allocation between consumers and private investors that allows for the faster accomplishment of promotion targets without increasing the fiscal burden.