Strategies In Evolutionary Games Research Articles

Spontaneous Formation of Evolutionary Game Strategies for Long-Term Carbon Emission Reduction Based on Low-Carbon Trading Mechanism

In the context of increasing global efforts to mitigate climate change, effective carbon emission reduction is a pressing issue. Governments and power companies are key stakeholders in implementing low-carbon strategies, but their interactions require careful management to ensure optimal outcomes for both economic development and environmental protection. This paper addresses this real-world challenge by utilizing evolutionary game theory (EGT) to model the strategic interactions between these stakeholders under a low-carbon trading mechanism. Unlike classical game theory, which assumes complete rationality and perfect information, EGT allows for bounded rationality and learning over time, making it particularly suitable for modeling long-term interactions in complex systems like carbon markets. This study builds an evolutionary game model between the government and power companies to explore how different strategies in carbon emission reduction evolve over time. Using payoff matrices and replicator dynamics equations, we determine the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) points and analyze their stability through dynamic simulations. The findings show that in the absence of a third-party regulator, neither party achieves an ideal ESE. To address this, a third-party regulatory body is introduced into the model, leading to the formulation of a tripartite evolutionary game. The results highlight the importance of regulatory oversight in achieving stable and optimal low-carbon strategies. This paper offers practical policy recommendations based on the simulation outcomes, providing a robust theoretical framework for government intervention in carbon markets and guiding enterprises towards sustainable practices.

Research on the Green Transition Path of Airport Development under the Mechanism of Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Since existing studies primarily explore green development measures from the static perspective of a single airport stakeholder, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of three key stakeholders: airport authorities, third-party organizations, and government departments, based on evolutionary game theory. By solving the stable strategy of the tripartite evolution using the Jacobian matrix, the green transition of airport development can be divided into three stages: “initiation”, “development”, and “maturity”, allowing for the exploration of key factors influencing the green transition of airport development. A simulation analysis is conducted based on real Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport data. The results indicate that the tripartite evolutionary game strategy is stable at E4(0,0,1) and the green transition of Baiyun Airport remains in the development stage. By improving the reward and punishment mechanisms of government departments, the evolutionary game strategy can be stabilized at E8(1,1,1), promoting the green transition of airport development toward the mature stage. By adjusting the game parameters, the dynamic process of green transition in airports at different levels of development and under varying regulatory environments can be effectively captured, supporting the precise formulation of corresponding policies.

Trilateral Evolutionary Game Strategy for the Design Optimization of Engineering General Contracting Projects in the Chinese Context

The engineering general contracting mode is an advanced engineering transaction mode, and design optimization is one of the important driving forces for vigorously promoting the general contracting mode. The application proportion of the general contracting mode in infrastructure projects is not high, the number of successful projects is not large, and the implementation effect is not ideal. One of the main reasons is that the design optimization theory and practice of international standard general contracting projects cannot adapt to the general contracting projects in the Chinese context, making local general contracting projects face huge challenges such as low enthusiasm for design optimization from all parties and unsatisfactory design optimization effects. Therefore, under the premise of bounded rationality, when the owner adopts control methods of different intensities, an evolutionary game study on the selection of design optimization strategies between the design and construction parties is carried out, and stability control strategies are proposed through case experiments and simulations. The research results indicate the following: firstly, the design optimization of general contracting projects in the Chinese context is feasible, but it depends on the distribution ratio of benefits obtained from the design optimization. Compared with general civil construction general contracting projects, the design optimization allocation ratio of industrial construction general contracting projects is more significant; secondly, the mixed control method of strong control and weak control is the optimal choice for the owner of the general contracting project; and thirdly, there are multiple evolutionary stable points, and mechanism design or incentive measures should be used to guide owners to choose weak control strategies, while design and construction parties should choose their design optimization strategies. The research results provide a reference for owners to determine the proportion and scheme of design optimization allocation, and for construction parties to determine design optimization strategies.

Stability, period and chaos of the evolutionary game strategy induced by time-delay and mutation feedback

In the classical evolutionary game theory, mutation is usually considered as a constant, however strategy mutation is affected by strategies in the real game process. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to study the effects of mutation feedback and time delays on strategy dynamics, where mutation is a linear feedback related to strategy. First, we construct a co-evolutionary game model with two time delays induced by mutation feedback and analyze the existence and stability of the equilibria of the non-time delay system. The conditions for the coexistence of the two strategies and the mutation rate are obtained. Second, Sotomayor’s theorem is used to explore the transcritical bifurcation of the system. Then, the existence of Hopf bifurcation is investigated by using feedback delay and payoff delay as bifurcation parameters in the time-delay system. Furthermore, we discuss the direction of the Hopf bifurcation, stability and periodic change of the periodic solution in detail. Finally, a series of numerical simulations are used to describe the theoretical analysis. The main results are as follows: (i) Mutation causes negative feedback to cooperative strategy. (ii) As the time delay increases, the stable equilibrium point becomes unstable, and which branches a stable limit cycle. When the time delay continues to increase sufficiently, the stable limit cycle becomes unstable and produces irregular oscillation and chaos. (iii) When the two time delays are large enough, the coexistence of the two strategies becomes that defective strategy is dominant, and the mutation rate also reaches the maximum.

Evolutionary game of inland waterways LNG construction under government subsidy and carbon tax policy under fuzzy environment

Abstract Since the pollution from inland waterways account for a great portion of urban pollutions, to use clean energy in inland waters has become an efficient means in combatting inland waterway pollution. With the increasing global demand for clean energy, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is increasingly favored by various countries, and its application in inland waterways transportation is becoming increasingly widespread. This paper focuses on the evolutionary game interaction mechanism between the government, energy company and shipping company as the main participants in inland waterways LNG construction, considering the costs as fuzzy variables. The impact of participating in LNG construction implementation on the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) was discussed. The research result indicates the following: (1) If the government, energy company and shipping company all participate in inland waterways LNG construction, the conditions are that the profits of the government, energy company and shipping company that choose to participate in LNG construction exceed the costs of not participating. (2) The convergence rates of ESS of the government, energy company and shipping company are positively correlated with the initial values of each other’s choice strategies, negatively correlated with carbon tax, subsidy and the cost of implementing positive strategy. (3) The cooperation between the energy company and shipping company has no impact on the selection of government evolutionary game strategy. The premise for the energy company and shipping company to participate in LNG construction together is that both parties have excess returns. Therefore, to ensure the implement of LNG application in inland waterways, the government should carry out carbon tax and at the same time perform subsidy policy, with the common participation of the energy company and shipping company.

Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy with Fuzzy Payment

Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy with Fuzzy Payment

Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Strategy for Ecotourism Development in National Parks: A Case Study of Wuyishan National Park

This paper proposes a multi-agent evolutionary game model that can be used to study sustainable ecotourism development in national parks, with a focus placed on coordinating the interests of multiple stakeholders. Based on the limited rationality hypothesis, this study explores the impact of strategic choice evolution and the change of key factors on the stability of the ecotourism development system in national parks. To achieve this, a tripartite evolutionary game model involving “local government–tourism enterprises–tourists” is constructed. The model is applied to Wuyishan National Park as a case study, incorporating actual data and conducting numerical simulation experiments using MATLAB software. The findings of the study are as follows: (1) The optimal stable strategy for the three game players (local government, tourism enterprises, and tourists) is determined to be one that works to “supervise, implement high-level services, and participate in ecotourism”, respectively. This strategy is influenced by factors such as government subsidies, government fines, economic benefits obtained by tourism enterprises at different service levels, and the utilities experienced by participating and non-participating tourists in national park ecotourism. (2) Government subsidy policies can promote the attainment of a stable state for tourism enterprises and tourists. However, excessive subsidies may hinder the fulfillment of local governments’ expectations. (3) The greater the economic benefits obtained by tourism enterprises through high-level services are, the more favorable it will be for tourism enterprises to reach a stable state. However, this may lead to a relatively slower response from the government. (4) The higher the utilities that tourists derive from high-level services in ecotourism are, the faster the game players will reach a stable state. (5) The higher the utilities associated with tourists spending time in other places are, the more challenging it becomes for the three game players to achieve a stable state. This situation may cause tourists to shift from the initial strategy of “participating in ecotourism” to “not participating in ecotourism”. Based on these findings, the paper provides countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the sustainable development of ecotourism in Wuyishan National Park. These recommendations aim to offer decision-making references for enhancing the development of ecotourism in national parks across the country.

Evolution Game Analysis of Chemical Risk Supervision Based on Special Rectification and Normal Regulation Modes

Chemical safety is closely related to public health, safety, and environmental concerns. Strengthening chemical safety supervision is not only vital for ensuring safe production but also plays a crucial role in maintaining overall social safety. This paper aims to analyze the evolutionary game strategies between chemical enterprises and government regulators under different regulatory modes, namely, ‘special rectification’ and ‘normal regulation’. The results indicate that under the ‘special rectification’ pattern, the strategic choices of chemical enterprises regarding safety investment rely on the cost–benefit analysis of safety non-investment. Conversely, in the ‘normal regulation’ mode, the decision to invest in safety is based on the comparison between the cost of safety investment and the cost of not investing in safety. Increasing government sanctions encourages chemical enterprises to prioritize safety investment under both supervision modes. Notably, while punishment significantly impacts safety investment behavior under the ‘normal regulation’ mode, it exhibits negligible influence under the ‘special rectification’ pattern. These research findings provide valuable decision-making support for government agencies tasked with effectively supervising the safety production of chemical enterprises.

Analysis of Strategy Selection in Third-Party Governance of Rural Environmental Pollution

In the context of increasingly prominent rural environmental problems, the third-party pollution governance model has become an important initiative for the comprehensive governance of rural environmental problems in China. However, the current third-party governance initiatives continue to suffer from governance failures caused by unclear responsibility sharing and opportunistic behavior. To analyze the reasons behind the behavioral choices of the various stakeholders involved in rural environmental third-party governance and to provide policy insights for formulating more reasonable rural environmental third-party governance solutions, a game model was constructed between local governments and third-party governance institutions. Specifically, the model examined the different evolutionary game strategies that appear between local governments and third-party governance institutions in different institutional design contexts when responsibility disputes arise in third-party governance. These disputes involve the re-governing of pollution control responsibility, which can be borne either by the local governments or the party causing the damage. The results shown are as follows: It is crucial to define the boundaries of re-governance responsibility in the third-party governance of rural environmental pollution. When local governments bear the primary responsibility for governance, regardless of whether they provide regulatory oversight, third-party governance institutions tend to adopt a passive approach. In such cases, the third-party governance market fails to effectively fulfill its role in governance. By reconstructing the third-party governance market model and dividing the main responsibility for pollution governance among the damaging parties, it is possible to achieve active governance by third-party governance institutions without the need for regulation by local governments.

Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy Selection and Simulation Research of Carbon Emission Reduction of Government and Enterprises under the “Dual Carbon” Goal

As one of the effective market instruments in carbon emission reduction policy, carbon trading is capable of promoting the smooth implementation of the “dual carbon” goal. Based on the path evolutionary game method of information economics, this paper constructs a dynamic game model of the evolution and development of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction. It also analyzes the evolution and development law of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction. We used the carbon market trading data of Guangdong Province to simulate the evolutionary game path of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction under the “double carbon” target and then selected strategies. Results show that (1) Scientific adjustment of carbon quota can effectively shorten the realization time of carbon emission reduction probability of high-pollution enterprises, obtain additional surplus carbon quota, and win extra carbon emission reduction income; (2) Increasing financial subsidies can improve the probability of carbon emission reduction of high-pollution enterprises but cannot prevent the periodic change in carbon emission reduction probability, which in turn helps prolong the “window period” of government regulation on carbon emission reduction; (3) Increasing carbon emission penalties will help high-pollution enterprises actively reduce emissions and improve the motivation of government supervision; (4) The government can introduce a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism. If the government properly chooses the reward and punishment strategy, it may not necessarily pay additional subsidies, so that the government and enterprises can cooperate in tacit agreement to achieve the goal of carbon emission reduction; (5) If the price of carbon emission permits is adjusted, high-pollution enterprises will actively reduce carbon emissions and gain greater benefits no matter what regulatory measures the government takes. Results of this study have profound significance for carbon emission reduction strategies and government regulation of high-pollution enterprises and will help China achieve its “dual carbon” development goal.

Evolutionary Game Strategies Analysis of Economic Development and Environmental Protection between Local Governments under Central Supervision Mechanism in China

The positive interaction between economic development and environmental protection is an important social issue which concerns people’s livelihoods. In order to explore the coordinated path of economic development and environmental protection, game models are constructed, successively, between local governments and among central-local governments by the evolutionary game method, and then, numerical simulation technology is used to analyze the results. The results show that the presented evolutionary stability strategies are consistent with the three stages of economic development and environmental protection since the reform and opening up in China. From the early to the middle stage, the sum of the special governance funds and local penalty fees play a key role; from the middle to the late stage, the heterogeneity coefficient between the local governments, local environmental governance costs, and environmental pollution losses plays a decisive role; during the late stage, the sum of the special governance funds and local penalty fees and the performance appraisal indicators play an important role. According to the above conclusions, local governments tend to choose environmental priority strategy, and the central government tends to choose a loose supervision strategy to achieve coordinated development by improving the phased planning for coordinated development, appropriately increasing the special governance funds and local penalty standards, and appropriately balancing the weights of the economic and environmental indicators.

Multi-strategy evolutionary games: A Markov chain approach.

Interacting strategies in evolutionary games is studied analytically in a well-mixed population using a Markov chain method. By establishing a correspondence between an evolutionary game and Markov chain dynamics, we show that results obtained from the fundamental matrix method in Markov chain dynamics are equivalent to corresponding ones in the evolutionary game. In the conventional fundamental matrix method, quantities like fixation probability and fixation time are calculable. Using a theorem in the fundamental matrix method, conditional fixation time in the absorbing Markov chain is calculable. Also, in the ergodic Markov chain, the stationary probability distribution that describes the Markov chain's stationary state is calculable analytically. Finally, the Rock, scissor, paper evolutionary game are evaluated as an example, and the results of the analytical method and simulations are compared. Using this analytical method saves time and computational facility compared to prevalent simulation methods.

Attack-Defense Evolutionary Game Strategy for Uploading Channel in Consensus-Based Secondary Control of Islanded Microgrid Considering DoS Attack

Nowadays, with the development of communication technology and its application in islanded microgrid, the pure power grid has gradually become a kind of cyber-physical system. In this system, the communication data and consensus algorithm are widely used in the secondary control of energy resources. However, in the communication process, there are also risks of network attacks, such as denial of service attack. To deal with this kind of attack existing in the data uploading channel during secondary control, the evolutionary game-based defense mechanism is designed, and the main works are as follows: firstly, the caused influence by attack on the control effect is analyzed through constructing a small-signal model. Secondly, two defense strategies including “Adjacent prediction” and “Path reconstruction” are designed. Facing different attack situations, the most suitable strategy can be selected via the evolutionary game. Thirdly, a game-based active defense strategy is designed, which can simulate the attack probability in the near future so that the defense can be prepared in advance. Finally, based on Laplace transformation and <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\text{H}_{\infty } $ </tex-math></inline-formula> robust theories, the parameter design in defense strategies is completed. The effectiveness of the above strategies is shown in multiple case studies.

Multiparty Evolutionary Game Strategy for Green Technology Innovation Under Market Orientation and Pandemics.

Building a market-oriented green technology innovation system is important for China's green development. In this system, the government, enterprises, and consumers promote green innovation. Given this backdrop, this study constructs an evolutionary game model that combines the government, enterprises and consumers to analyse their evolution trend of strategy by simulating theoretical analyses. It is found that government subsidies for enterprises and consumers, benefits of enterprises speculation, and green consumption costs affect the enterprise decisions of green innovation. These factors significantly affect the enterprises' decision-making of green technology innovation. It is also observed that the market mechanism motivates enterprises' green technology innovation under pandemics. It is suggested that adopting more green consumption subsidy policies, improving the supervision mechanism and formulating more incentive policies from other aspects will be useful policy implications.

An Evolution Model of Fintech Supports Technology‐Based SMEs Innovation and Growth

The survival and growth of technology‐based small and medium‐sized enterprises are faced with a complex and changeable market environment. Introducing the role of fintech, the paper builds an evolutionary model for growth of technology‐based SMEs and analyzes fintech incentive mechanisms to guide corporate growth strategies based on some cases by the simulation. The research results show that the evolutionary game strategy that SMEs are willing to adopt is {cooperation, cooperation}. And, under the incentive mechanism of fintech, the evolutionary game strategy adopted by SMEs and fintech institutions is {cooperation, cooperation, participation}. In the growth of fintech institutions serving technology‐based SMEs, the selection strategy of SMEs is more sensitive to changes in fintech institutions’ willingness to participate in cooperation, cooperation costs, and cooperation benefits. The selection strategy of fintech institutions is more affected by changes in cooperation costs and incentive funds during the process of participating in cooperation.

Evolutionary game strategy of stakeholders under the sustainable and innovative business model: A case study of green building

The industry is facing severe environmental degradation challenges and complex regulatory systems. A sustainable and innovative business model of green building is regarded as an important strategy for the realization of ecological and economic value. However, from a system perspective, research on the interest boundaries of stakeholders and the decision-making process is still relatively limited. This study addresses the gap by developing a systematic game analysis framework that integrates government, developer and consumer as players. Results indicate that the convergence of the stable strategy system is closely related to the initial strategy selection of each stakeholder. The government's policy cost cannot promote the stability of the system. Compared with economic benefits, consumers' recognition of the ecological value of green buildings is an important factor. Stakeholders' attention to their benefits and costs dominates the market. The government's subsidy strategy depends on the profit and loss of the target, not that the higher the incentive, the more significant the effect can be obtained. This study enhances the body of knowledge by providing a novel framework for research in related disciplines. It also provides insights into the decision-making mechanism of stakeholders in the green building market.

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

A single-task and multi-decision evolutionary game model based on multi-agent reinforcement learning

In the evolutionary game of the same task for groups, the changes in game rules, personal interests, the crowd size, and external supervision cause uncertain effects on individual decision-making and game results. In the Markov decision framework, a single-task multi-decision evolutionary game model based on multi-agent reinforcement learning is proposed to explore the evolutionary rules in the process of a game. The model can improve the result of a evolutionary game and facilitate the completion of the task. First, based on the multi-agent theory, to solve the existing problems in the original model, a negative feedback tax penalty mechanism is proposed to guide the strategy selection of individuals in the group. In addition, in order to evaluate the evolutionary game results of the group in the model, a calculation method of the group intelligence level is defined. Secondly, the Q-learning algorithm is used to improve the guiding effect of the negative feedback tax penalty mechanism. In the model, the selection strategy of the Q-learning algorithm is improved and a bounded rationality evolutionary game strategy is proposed based on the rule of evolutionary games and the consideration of the bounded rationality of individuals. Finally, simulation results show that the proposed model can effectively guide individuals to choose cooperation strategies which are beneficial to task completion and stability under different negative feedback factor values and different group sizes, so as to improve the group intelligence level.

Analysis on Construction of Science Culture and De-extremization of Religion

This paper first discusses different development periods of science culture and religion culture and elaborates forms of religious extremization. At the same time, by solving the evolutionary game strategy between science culture and religious extremization, it explores the important role of science culture in eliminating religious extremization. It found that science culture and religious extremization can reach an evolutionary equilibrium after a long-term game, and converge to a stable node; strengthening science culture construction can effectively eliminate the phenomenon of religious extremization. Finally, this paper puts forward some suggestions that it should continue to strengthen science culture construction in China and apply it to eliminate religious extremism.

Cooperation guided by imitation, aspiration and conformity-driven dynamics in evolutionary games

Pursuing maximal profit is a general motivation for rational players to update their strategies in evolutionary games. Players could either imitate the more successful neighbors or adjust strategy based on their own aspirations, which is known as imitation-driven or aspiration-driven strategy-updating rule in evolution dynamics. Besides, there exist some other pervasive motivations for the social players. For example, complying to the majority might be an effective choice to mitigate the costs of decision and help players adapt to the environment. Along this way, the strategy-updating rule based on conformity is usually called conformity-driven updating. In this work, we assume these alternative strategy-updating rules coevolve with the strategies of players during the evolution process. Our results show that, one of the three strategy-updating rules prevails throughout the population in most parameter regions, while they could coexist in a small parameter region. Meanwhile, we find that, in a large parameter area, the alliances of the conformity-driven and the aspiration-driven cooperators can boost the cooperation to a rather high level during the evolution. Moreover, such alliances play key roles in the boom of cooperation for some parameter regions which might be otherwise dominated by defectors.