Evolutionary game of inland waterways LNG construction under government subsidy and carbon tax policy under fuzzy environment

Abstract

Abstract Since the pollution from inland waterways account for a great portion of urban pollutions, to use clean energy in inland waters has become an efficient means in combatting inland waterway pollution. With the increasing global demand for clean energy, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is increasingly favored by various countries, and its application in inland waterways transportation is becoming increasingly widespread. This paper focuses on the evolutionary game interaction mechanism between the government, energy company and shipping company as the main participants in inland waterways LNG construction, considering the costs as fuzzy variables. The impact of participating in LNG construction implementation on the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) was discussed. The research result indicates the following: (1) If the government, energy company and shipping company all participate in inland waterways LNG construction, the conditions are that the profits of the government, energy company and shipping company that choose to participate in LNG construction exceed the costs of not participating. (2) The convergence rates of ESS of the government, energy company and shipping company are positively correlated with the initial values of each other’s choice strategies, negatively correlated with carbon tax, subsidy and the cost of implementing positive strategy. (3) The cooperation between the energy company and shipping company has no impact on the selection of government evolutionary game strategy. The premise for the energy company and shipping company to participate in LNG construction together is that both parties have excess returns. Therefore, to ensure the implement of LNG application in inland waterways, the government should carry out carbon tax and at the same time perform subsidy policy, with the common participation of the energy company and shipping company.