Evolutionary Game Simulation Research Articles

A network perspective on tourism waste management: An evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders' participation in the Third Pole region

There is a striking absence of complex network models and extensive analysis of behavioral factors in the field of waste management research. Moreover, research on effective collaboration among different stakeholders in tourism waste management in the Third Pole region is currently lacking, despite the increasing involvement of various groups. Therefore, this paper aims to explore the cooperative relationship between multiple stakeholders in tourism waste management using the Lulang Scenic Area as a case study. A field investigation and complex network evolutionary game simulation were used to identify the cooperation dynamics between multiple stakeholders. The results indicate the following. (1) The stakeholder network characterized by small-world dynamics has efficient information diffusion and cooperation. (2) A threshold value for positive externalities and returns on investment exists, beyond which stakeholders are more inclined to participate in sustainable waste management. (3) Incentives below the threshold attract direct stakeholders in waste generation and management, whereas incentives above it draws in a broader range of stakeholders, primarily indirect stakeholders. (4) A critical mass of cooperative stakeholders tends to create a demonstration effect that encourages additional participation, supporting the growth of cooperative networks in tourism waste management. This paper innovatively shows the potential of a cooperation strategy between multiple stakeholders strengthened by appropriate incentives.

Diffusion model to analyse the performance of electric vehicle policies: An evolutionary game simulation

Previous studies on policy interventions prompting electric vehicle (EV) adoption have mainly involved fragmented analyses of multiple policies using system dynamics models and evolutionary games. This study integrates these two approaches to examine EV policies in mainland China and compares their impact on the interaction between governments, consumers, and manufacturers. The results indicate that the annual sales of EVs are most heavily impacted by license plate restrictions, followed by battery capacity. They are most sensitive to the dual-credit policy (DCP) and least affected by government research and development (R&D) subsidies; meanwhile, all four policies increase the sales of EVs. A substitution relationship exists between the dual-credit policy and the government’s R&D subsidies. A simulation analysis of the different scenarios confirmed the multiple impacts of several policy interventions on the increase in EV sales, which should be explicitly considered in EV policymaking.

The impact of characteristic function of Shapley value mechanism in distributed machine learning environment for equipment diagnosis

The distributed machine learning environment with multiple data providers has recently gotten attention. By using this environment, a production equipment manufacturer and its customer companies can collaboratively perform large-scale machine learning for equipment diagnosis. To construct a high-performance machine learning model, the environment should compensate and reward each data provider for sensing, collecting, and cleansing relevant and informative data. Most previous studies use Shapley-value-based incentive mechanism for this purpose. However, they do not consider the impact of the characteristic function used to evaluate the Shapley value on the behavior of the data providers and the performance of the final machine learning model. This research evaluates the impact through evolutionary game simulation.

Understanding the Corrective Effect of the Urban Growth Boundary Policy on Land Finance Dependence of Local Governments in China.

The preference for land urbanization of local governments promotes urban sprawl, which leads to the dilemma of land finance dependence (LFD) of local governments and the negative constraints on the ecosystem of urban areas in China. However, how the urban growth boundary (UGB) policy corrects local governments’ reliance on land finance has not been discussed in depth. In July 2014, the UGB policy began to be piloted in fourteen cities in China, providing a setting to further reveal the effectiveness of the UGB policy. By constructing an evolutionary game simulation model to clarify the behavioral strategies that local governments tend to adopt in the context of the UGB policy implementation, this study proves that the effective implementation of the UGB policy, by controlling the urban land capacity, can help solve local governments’ LFD dilemma in China. The UGB policy consists of a set of technical means and policy tools that controls urban sprawl. It breaks the “unlimited land capacity” situation faced by local governments in China by limiting the urban land capacity within a given period of time, and has become a new solution to the dilemma of LFD. The implementation of the UGB policy highlighted the shortage of urban land, which has led to the increasing cost of land finance for local governments and constraints on local governments’ LFD behavior. The shortage has also forced local governments to adjust and optimize their fiscal revenue structure. The UGB policy induced ongoing evolution in the benefit distribution among relevant entities in land finance, motivated local governments and other entities to adjust their primary strategies, and made it possible to address the dilemma of LFD in China.

An Evolutionary Game Simulation of a Composite Subsidy Policy to Promote Military-Civilian Integration: A National System of Innovation With Chinese Characteristics

Collaborative innovation involving military and civilian actors is a key component of National Systems of Innovation. It is an approach that is explicitly promoted in China under the name of Military-Civilian Integration. To more effectively promote Military-Civilian Integration, it is necessary to study the impact of government subsidies on enterprise-level behavior. The research reported in this paper analyzes a composite subsidy policy’s influence on the cooperative innovation behavior of military and civilian enterprises with game theory. First, during the early stage of development, an R&D subsidy can stimulate firms to invest in technological innovation, but it harms the long-term and stable development of civil-military cooperation by encouraging free-riding behaviors. Second, as military-civilian integration continues and deepens, the input-output rate of the R&D will increase, and this makes the role of tax subsidies increasingly relevant. Third, the composite application of scale and tax subsidies will be most effective in reinforcing innovation during the Industrialization Stage. Fourth, further simulations show an apparent heterogeneity in the responses of the military enterprise and the civilian enterprise to the three kinds of subsidy that we have considered. Civilian enterprises are more sensitive to subsidies, while military enterprises are more sensitive to technology spillovers. Therefore, the government should build a military-civilian integration platform to share resources in ways that maintain security confidence and improve the R&D input-output rate. The government should strengthen confidentiality management, training, and risk prevention and control measures for military-civilian integration projects, to reduce the risk of technology spillover.

Simulation on Multiple Supervision Strategy of Construction Waste in China

Along with the rapid urbanization of China, the construction waste disposal becomes an urgent problem than ever before. Through evolutionary game simulation, we studied the evolution law of government - enterprise - social governance system by using simulation and analyzed the case of “12 20” special heavy landslide accident in Shenzhen construction waste dumping site. Results indicate that the economic efficiency of the risk strategies, the strength of social supervision, the punishment intensity of government and the cost coefficient of illegal waste disposal all have a significantly influence on the multi-parties evolutionary game model. It is concluded that, for the effective supervision of construction waste disposal, government should built social supervision mechanism, promote the strength of social supervision, enhance the punishment intensity of government, and reduce the risk income of waste disposal enterprises.

Evolutionary Game Simulation on Government Incentive Strategies of Prefabricated Construction: A System Dynamics Approach

Prefabricated construction is a state-of-the-art construction technology of both socio-economic and environmental benefits, but sometimes, it is not welcome due to its high cost. Governments play an important role in deeply promoting prefabricated construction, but its effects are not clear. This paper developed a system dynamics model for investigating and simulating the impacts of government incentive strategies on prefabricated construction by considering the evolutionary game process between the government and contractors. Data of Shanghai, China, is collected for demonstration and validation of the developed simulation model. Results show that (1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in static game process; (2) the rate of adopting prefabricated construction is affected by the level of penalties and subsidies; (3) dynamic incentive strategies can better improve the stability of the evolutionary game process; and (4) the rational range of incentive rate can be obtained. Findings of this study facilitate governments to formulate and improve the incentive strategies of prefabricated construction, thus boosting the development of construction industrialization.

From the perspective of information leakage risk life cycle: Research on high-tech enterprise counter intelligence mechanism model

In order to reduce the harm of High-tech enterprise information leakage, solve the risk management problem of information leakage, and provide reference for High-tech enterprises to deal with information leakage. This paper systematically discusses the counter intelligence flow and counter intelligence work process from the perspective of information leakage risk life cycle by using literature research and theoretical deduction method, and constructs a corporate counter intelligence mechanism model based on information leakage risk life cycle. This study believes that counter intelligence can provide information support for information leakage risk management at various stages of the risk life cycle, and effectively improve the efficiency of information leakage risk management, and also provide a knowledge service model and empirical research for enterprise information leakage risk management in the future, theoretical basis and new research perspectives and ideas. On the basis of this research, in order to further improve the validity of the model, the evolutionary game simulation and empirical research will be used to verify the model to enhance the practical significance of guiding enterprise information leakage risk management.

The multi-user evolutionary game simulation in water quality-based water source system

Water is a crucial factor for human living and maintaining ecological system health. Water resource conflict has become an important factor which restricts regional economic development and affects the harmony and stability of society. This paper, on the one hand, builds a trilateral evolution game model of water intaking in the upper, middle, and lower reaches in terms of water-quality conflict, and makes an analysis of the evolutionary stable strategy of the model on the foundation of a cross-border water resource conflict warning system and based on the view of evolution game. The paper verifies related conclusions by using numerical simulation calculation examples and makes sensitivity analysis of the change of the parameters of the model. The result of the research indicates that (1) there are three groups of system local gradual stable points [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] in the trilateral game of water quality-based cross-border conflicts. This means that there are three groups of evolutionary stable strategies: (non-cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation), (cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation), and (non-cooperation, cooperation, cooperation). The conclusion obtained via verification by using numerical simulation is that upper and middle reaches are the sections which most likely lead to conflicts, so the strategy selected therefor is (non-cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation); (2) in water quality-based cross-border conflict, the factor [Formula: see text] of compensation cost increased because excessive transfer of pollutants has a significant effect on water-intaking group strategy evolution path. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to the scientific operation of cross-border water quality and water amount conflicts and the realization of the goal of water resources management.

Machine learning-based evolution model and the simulation of a profit model of agricultural products logistics financing

An agricultural products logistics and financial warehousing business mainly involves a tripartite of agricultural production and processing enterprises, third-party logistics enterprises and financial institutions and enables the three parties to achieve win–win outcomes. This article first identifies the dynamic and evolutionary stability strategies used by the businesses participating in the tripartite and then uses the NetLogo simulation platform and the multi-agent modelling and simulation method to establish an asymmetric evolutionary game simulation model that allows for the participation of the three parties; this study runs the model under different revenue parameters. Finally, this study analyses the behaviour of asymmetric cooperative competition games in the process of selecting different strategies and identifies strategies that should be used by nonsymmetric member companies that cooperate. To manage the logistics of agricultural products, financial financing businesses participate in the tripartite and obtain mutually beneficial win–win outcomes, thus promoting the smooth development of agricultural logistics businesses and ensuring the cooperation between agricultural production and processing enterprises and third-party logistics enterprises so they can realize common development.

Evolution Model and Simulation of Profit Model of Agricultural Products Logistics Financing

Agricultural products logistics financial warehousing business mainly involves agricultural production and processing enterprises, third-party logistics enterprises and financial institutions tripartite, to enable the three parties to achieve win-win situation, the article first gives the replication dynamics and evolutionary stability strategy between the three parties in business participation, and then use NetLogo simulation platform, using the overall modeling and simulation method of Multi-Agent, established the evolutionary game simulation model, and run the model under different revenue parameters, finally, analyzed the simulation results. To achieve the agricultural products logistics financial financing warehouse business to participate in tripartite mutually beneficial win-win situation, thus promoting the smooth flow of agricultural products logistics business.

Evolution of Human-Like Social Grooming Strategies Regarding Richness and Group Size

Human beings tend to cooperate with close friends, therefore they have to construct strong social relationships to recieve cooperation from others. Therefore they should have acquired their strategies of social relationship construction through an evolutionary process. The behavior of social relationship construction is know as "social grooming." In this paper, we show that there are four classes including a human-like strategy in evolutionary dynamics of social grooming strategies based on an evolutionary game simulation. Social relationship strengths (as measured by frequency of social grooming) often show a much skewed distribution (a power law distribution). It may be due to time costs constraints on social grooming, because the costs are too large to ignore for having many strong social relationships. Evolution of humans' strategies of construction of social relationships may explain the origin of human intelligence based on a social brain hypothesis. We constructed an individual-based model to explore the evolutionary dynamics of social grooming strategies. The model is based on behavior to win over others by strengthening social relationships with cooperators. The results of evolutionary simulations show the four classes of evolutionary dynamics. The results depend on total resources and the ratio of each cooperator's resource to the number of cooperators. One of the four classes is similar to a human strategy, i.e. the strategies based on the Yule--Simon process of power law.

Evolutionary game simulation of corporate investing and financing behavior from a risk perspective

Risk factors have a significant influence on corporate investing and financing behavior. Based on agency theory, this paper analyzes conflicts of interest that are involved in the process of corporate investing and financing under the influence of risk, and it conducts this analysis using the evolutionary game model for investing and financing behavior. The evolutionary simulation analysis is conducted using the system dynamics method to explore the investing and financing behavior of corporate entities that are influenced by different risks. The results of this analysis show that the risks that impact the debt financing strategies of corporations are usually investment risk and interest rate risk, and that internal governance risk does not appear to change the financing structure of corporate behavior. Risks that impact the excessive investment strategy choices of corporations are mainly investment risk and internal governance risk, while interest rate risk does not appear to have any effect on the excessive investment tendencies of certain managers.

Complex Network Modeling and Evolutionary Game Simulation of the Arctic Environmental Emergency Response and Governance

Climate change provides opportunities in the surrounding areas of North Pole to commercial shipping activities, but which also poses risks to ship strikes, oil spills, chronic marine environmental pollution, etc. However, the public product supply of Arctic environmental emergency response and governance is seriously insufficient. As such, a collective and effective system should be established to protect the Arctic environment. In the present paper, a complex network model of Arctic environmental emergency response and governance system is developed. The strategy of each country in the complex network is demonstrated by evolutionary game simulations of this system model. Computational results indicate that the benefit of environmental emergency response and governance affects the cooperation strategy of each country. Moreover, Long-term benefit and return intensity are the key parameters of environmental emergency response and governance benefit. These findings extend theoretical research in the sustainable development Arctic routes and provide reference for the participation of other countries beyond the Arctic Council.

Food safety evolutionary game simulation model based on improved prospect theory

Currently, China's food quality and safety has arisen the attention from the whole society. To strengthen the government supervision is imperative. We introduce a perceived benefit parameter ϕ value function and make a reasonable improvement. And thereby we build a food safety evolutionary game simulation model based on improved prospect theory. The study shows that, because of the limited rationality of both game players, conditions C ≤ ρϖ F2, T ≤ (1 – ϖ)F2, C ≤ F1 + ρ(1 – η) F2 and T ≤ F1 + ηF2 are hardly met simultaneously in reality, which means it is difficult to achieve the stable evolutionary strategy of food safety in effect.

For the sustainable performance of the carbon reduction labeling policies under an evolutionary game simulation

The study proposes an evolutionary game model to investigate the possible responses of enterprises to incentive policies related to the implementation of a carbon reduction labeling scheme, such as a direct subsidy and preferential taxation rates. System dynamics is applied to simulate the created game model and we analyze two scenarios, namely the individual and combined intervention of incentive policies. A case study of China's air conditioner enterprises is then examined, with the simulation results highlighting that both a direct subsidy and preferential taxation positively influence the implementation of the carbon reduction labeling scheme. In particular, the combination of these two incentive policies is efficient compared with individual policy making. Finally, the limitations of the game theoretical analysis are discussed and future research directions are provided.

Product Concept Evaluation System Applying Preference Market

A product concept evaluation system combining conjoint analysis with prediction markets is developed. It is also proposed how to determine the payoff for each prediction security corresponding to a product concept, so as to have participants to behave truthfully in the market. Further, how the proposed system works is investigated by evolutionary game simulation.

Some results on ethnic conflicts based on evolutionary game simulation

The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially originating from the negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a harmonious ethnic relationship, some scholars have proposed a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing civic identity. However, this viewpoint is discussed only from a philosophical prospective and still lacks support of scientific evidences. Because ethnic group and ethnic identity are products of evolution and ethnic identity is the parochialism strategy under the perspective of game theory, this paper proposes an evolutionary game simulation model to study the relationship between civic identity and ethnic conflict based on evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicate that: (1) the ratio of individuals with civic identity has a negative association with the frequency of ethnic conflicts; (2) ethnic conflict will not die out by killing all ethnic members once for all, and it also cannot be reduced by a forcible pressure, i.e., increasing the ratio of individuals with civic identity; (3) the average frequencies of conflicts can stay in a low level by promoting civic identity periodically and persistently.

Sequential Evolutionary Game Simulation Characterized by Learning and Emotion

Sequential Evolutionary Game Simulation Characterized by Learning and Emotion