Abstract
Prefabricated construction is a state-of-the-art construction technology of both socio-economic and environmental benefits, but sometimes, it is not welcome due to its high cost. Governments play an important role in deeply promoting prefabricated construction, but its effects are not clear. This paper developed a system dynamics model for investigating and simulating the impacts of government incentive strategies on prefabricated construction by considering the evolutionary game process between the government and contractors. Data of Shanghai, China, is collected for demonstration and validation of the developed simulation model. Results show that (1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in static game process; (2) the rate of adopting prefabricated construction is affected by the level of penalties and subsidies; (3) dynamic incentive strategies can better improve the stability of the evolutionary game process; and (4) the rational range of incentive rate can be obtained. Findings of this study facilitate governments to formulate and improve the incentive strategies of prefabricated construction, thus boosting the development of construction industrialization.
Highlights
Prefabricated construction refers to an advanced construction technology, similar to “building blocks,” which involves manufacturing building components in factories before assembling at construction sites [1, 2]
Because of its significant socio-economic and environmental benefits, prefabricated construction is considered as an important approach to achieve sustainable construction and building industrialization [10]
Current application of prefabricated construction in China is still at the development stage compared with most western countries. e cost of prefabricated construction is usually higher than traditional cast-in-place construction methods due to the unsound standard system, weak modular design ability, and low efficiency for scale production [11, 12]
Summary
Prefabricated construction refers to an advanced construction technology, similar to “building blocks,” which involves manufacturing building components in factories before assembling at construction sites [1, 2]. Jin et al [29] further developed a tripartite evolutionary game model of government-contractor-consumer and concluded that the government should encourage contractors adopting prefabricated construction from tax preferences, financial subsidies, and other aspects to make the game evolve in the direction of advantageous to the development of market and industry All these studies help to understand the dynamic interaction between stakeholders when promoting prefabricated construction and provide decision-making reference for governments [24,25,26,27,28,29]. They usually failed to intuitively simulate and show the dynamic game process and evolution results due to limitations of the evolutionary game theory approach.
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