Abstract
Currently, China's food quality and safety has arisen the attention from the whole society. To strengthen the government supervision is imperative. We introduce a perceived benefit parameter ϕ value function and make a reasonable improvement. And thereby we build a food safety evolutionary game simulation model based on improved prospect theory. The study shows that, because of the limited rationality of both game players, conditions C ≤ ρϖ F2, T ≤ (1 – ϖ)F2, C ≤ F1 + ρ(1 – η) F2 and T ≤ F1 + ηF2 are hardly met simultaneously in reality, which means it is difficult to achieve the stable evolutionary strategy of food safety in effect.
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