Developments In Cognitive Science Research Articles

Nativism in Cognitive Science

Abstract Though nativist hypotheses have played a pivotal role in the development of cognitive science, it remains exceedingly obscure how they—and the debates in which they figure—ought to be understood. The central aim of this paper is to provide an account which addresses this concern and in so doing: a) makes sense of the roles that nativist theorizing plays in cognitive science and, moreover, b), explains why it really matters to the contemporary study of cognition. I conclude by outlining a range of further implications of this account for current debate in cognitive science.

Universal Natural Law and Universal Human Behavior

People generally agree that life processes are thermodynamic processes and that the lower needs of human beings, such as eating, are thermodynamic processes. But the needs, such as literature, arts, are seen as beyond the working of the entropy law. However, good poems and distinct piece of paintings are rare events, characterized by high information content, which represents low entropy level. The developments in cognitive sciences reveal that the needs of human beings are methods of attracting members of the opposite sex in the competition for reproduction, or sexual selection. Organisms have evolved the ability to reproduce sexually for about one billion years. Since the entropy law, which states that closed systems tend towards states of higher entropy, is the most universal law of the nature, it is natural that the display of low entropy levels evolves as the universal signal of attractiveness in sexual and social communication. From poem writing to money making, the pursuit of low entropy is the main drive of human behavior. This common understanding of animal and human behavior will allow us to utilize the insights developed from different disciplines systematically.

Technology, institutions, and innovation systems

There has been very little overlap or even interchange between scholars studying technological advance, and scholars in the field of cognitive science. Yet both fields of study are concerned with human know-how, the former at the level of society, and the latter at the level of the individual. Recent developments in cognitive science have made possible greater contact between the two fields. This essay reviews several of those developments, and points to a variety of interesting connections.

Universalità della scienza, democratizzazione della cultura e società aperta : da Feyeraband alla riscoperta della natura umana

The paper uses Paul Feyerabend’s model of the “free society” to furnish a philosophical analysis of the relation between science and the other cultural traditions present in our society. Feyerabend’s model is analysed and criticised on the basis of recent developments in cognitive science. In particular, the claim is made that a pluralistic account of the relations between science and other cultural traditions is compatible with a rejection of (a strong version of) cultural relativism.

The Social Construction of Mind and the Future of Cognitive Science

Cognitive activity, which essentially consistsof the use of signs, does not only depend onthe internal (mental, or brain) processes. Thefirst part of the paper presents severalversions of the idea of the external andcultural organization of individual's mentalprocesses. The second part of the paperconsiders a future development of cognitivescience as a science of the “extended” andsocially constructed mind. KazimierzTwardowski's theory of intentionality and histheory of actions and products provide theconceptual framework of the undertaken analysis.

From Theory to Application

Neuropsychology owes much to the pioneering efforts of researchers in cognitive psychology. Theory and methods derived from the cognitive sciences have provided an important foundation for neuropsychology. The Attention and Performance series has been at the vanguard of cognitive psychology, both chronicling major developments in cognitive science that emerged over the past half century, and catalyzing new directions in cognitive theory, method, and application. Most students of psychology can probably recall some time during their undergraduate or graduate studies, pulling from university library shelves, one of the earlier volumes of this series, as they prepared a term paper, thesis, or research project. The 17th volume of Attention and Performance of this edited series was the product of the proceedings of the International Association for the Study of Attention and Performance, held in Haifa, Israel, 30 years after the first edition in 1966. Reviewing the topics covered in the earlier editions, one is struck by the extent to which this series has both mirrored current direction and anticipated shifts in the paradigms of cognitive science.

From Cartesian towards non-Cartesian pragmatics

This paper focuses on the philosophical and methodological problems of modern cognitive science and linguistic pragmatics in the context of their interdependence and a growing convergence of goals and methods. First of all, it introduces the distinction between a Cartesian and non-Cartesian view of doing science. The traditional Cartesian paradigm associated with (1) the idea of nativism, (2) Noam Chomsky's approach to linguistics and (3) computationalism in cognitive science has to face strong opposition from non-Cartesian trends both in cognitive science and linguistic pragmatics. The Cartesian autonomous agent (speaker-hearer) is replaced by a pancontextualized cognitive agent dependent on a number of internal (mental) factors, such as pertaining to the cognitive-affective-conative system, and external ones, e.g., socio-cultural, interactional, and relational. Such an agent has to participate in ‘joint actions’, ‘collective cognition’, ‘dynamic cognition’ and be aware of a plethora of emergent phenomena in social interaction. The integrative approaches in linguistic pragmatics reveal different degrees of integration, theoretical justification, empirical corroboration and methodological advances. It has been noted that progress in such a ‘holistic pragmatics’ seems to depend on developments in cognitive science and vice versa. Finally, it has been suggested that the construction of a holistic approach to linguistic pragmatics should satisfy a number of ‘minimal requirements’ that so far have not been met. The discussion is closely related to important philosophical problems, such as (1) rationalism vs. empiricism; (2) the reductionism vs. holism dichotomies; and the debates on (3) the unity vs. diversity of science and (4) the role of context in contemporary research.

Does early speaking experience in Korean help adult relearners?

Research indicates that early linguistic input is crucial for acquiring native-like phonology and morphosyntax. This study investigates whether early discontinued linguistic experience helps adult relearners master the phonology of a language. Students from first-year Korean classes were classified into three groups: no/minimal speaking experience, childhood speaking experience (until about age 5), and native speakers. Native speakers not enrolled in Korean classes also participated. Participants produced sentences that included words utilizing the three-way contrast in Korean stop consonants (lenis, tense, and aspirated). Measurements of stop closure duration indicate that only the two native speaker groups were differentially producing lenis and tense consonants. Measurements of VOT indicate that only the childhood and the native speaker groups were differentially producing the three consonants. Furthermore, the childhood speakers’ general pattern of closure duration and VOT for the three consonants was similar to those of the native speakers (this was not true for the no/minimal experience group). Results indicate that even early discontinued speaking experience can provide an advantage in relearning a language as an adult. [Work supported by an NIMH Developmental Cognitive Science Training Grant awarded to Janet Oh, and by NIMH Grant MH56118 and a UCLA Academic Senate Grant awarded to Terry Au.]

Commentary: Implicit and emotional processes in cognitive-behavioral therapy.

Psychology is in the midst of a “second cognitive revolution,” characterized by a shift from serial to parallel processing models, a shift from concepts of memory stores to memory systems, a distinction between implicit and explicit processes, a growing awareness of the role of emotion and motivation in everyday thought and memory, and a shift in metaphor from mind as computer to mind as brain. These changes are likely to have a broad impact on the way cognitive-behavioral therapy is conceptualized and practiced. In doing so, it is important to distinguish the implicit/explicit distinction from others that are related but not identical, such as procedural/declarative, irrational/rational, and emotional/cognitive. New developments in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience suggest the importance for cognitive-behavioral therapy of developing methods of eliciting and altering implicit as well as explicit networks, such as directed free association, in which the therapist elicits associations to emotion-laden material.

The emergence of cognitive science in France.

A comparison between the development of cognitive science in France and the USA enables us to analyze some national differences linked to specific connections between the scientific, military, economic and political worlds. The influence of new practices and tools developed during World War II and the Cold War appears to be of crucial importance in understanding the development of this new field, as well as that of cybernetics, computer science, artificial intelligence and molecular biology. This paper can be considered as a study in how the differing contexts in France and the USA shaped the history of the construction of cognitive science in each of these two countries. In spite of various differences, some common aspects may be pointed out: in both cases, computer experts and psychologists using a computational modelling approach were those first engaged in the construction of cognitive science. If in France neuroscience-oriented cognitive science research was stronger than in the USA, it seems that the artificial intelligence orientation is also of growing importance in France.

The foundations of numerical thinking in a brain without numbers

Clearly, much more work needs to be done to establish firmly the neural substrates of quantification processing in visuospatial circuitry, but it already looks like a promising enterprise. Dehaene et al. have presented data that provide strong new evidence for the dichotomy between perceptually and conceptually based quantitative competence. However, the findings pose new questions about which common cultural experiences are necessary to stimulate our brains to organize themselves in such a way as to add these, initially unspecified, functional capabilities. The fact that societies still exist without requirements to go beyond a number system of three items19xYanomamo: The Last Days of Eden. Chagnon, N.A. See all References19, indicates that Dehaene et al.’s findings characterize a pattern of ontogenetic brain organization that has responded to ecological demands. Questions of how environmental stimulation transforms cognitive competence from one level to another are central to the field of developmental cognitive science. Unfortunately, these are not the kinds of investigations that many of us are experienced at tackling. With the powerful new tools of brain imaging to add to our experimental methods we have reached the point where we should be able to discover how mathematical thinking arises from a brain without numbers. These new findings of Dehaene et al. and Sathian et al. should stimulate us to do so with renewed zeal.

Discussion

Current research on the capacities of the infant has lead to a better understanding of developmental processes underlying cognition and motor skill acquisition. ASHA's Eighth Annual Research Symposium on Infant-Toddler Development, in November 1998, included a presentation on developmental cognitive science by Dr. Andrew Meltzoff and a presentation on motor skill acquisition by Dr. Esther Thelen. The theoretical constructs and data presented served to broaden our current perspectives on infant abilities. The data reported by Meltzoff and Thelen challenged several long-standing theories of infant cognition and motor development. Alternative theoretical models were used to describe skill acquisition during the first several years of life. Our response will include a brief summary of each investigator's presentation, discuss their findings with respect to research in the area of infant speech physiology and production, and provide possible future directions and challenges for individuals conducting developmental research.

A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Consciousness is to be explained either in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys or in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, although there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research that purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind--the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. Two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies used in the dissociation studies--so critical, in fact, that it is no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this target article we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists of the explicit representation of information in neurally realized parallel distributed processing (PDP) networks. This hypothesis leads us to reassess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways.

Mate choice turns cognitive

Evolutionary psychology has revolutionized research on human mate choice and sexual attraction in recent years, combining a rigorous Darwinian framework based on sexual selection theory with a loosely cognitivist orientation to task analysis and mechanism modelling. This hard Darwinian, soft computational approach has been most successful at revealing the adaptive logic behind physical beauty, demonstrating that many sexual cues computed from face and body shape are not arbitrary, but function as reliable indicators of phenotypic and genetic quality. The same approach could be extended from physical to psychological cues if evolutionary psychology built stronger ties with personality psychology, psychometrics and behavioral genetics. A major challenge for mate choice research is to develop more explicit computational models at three levels, specifying: (1) the perceptual adaptations that register sexual cues given sensory input, (2) the judgment adaptations that integrate multiple cues into assessments of overall attractiveness, and (3) the search strategies that people follow in trying to form mutually attracted pairs. We describe both recent efforts and possible extensions in these directions. The resulting confluence between evolutionary principles, cognitive models and game-theoretic insights can put mate choice research at the vanguard of an emerging `evolutionary cognitive science' more concerned with domain-specific mental adaptations than with domain-general intelligence.

The notion of dynamic unit: Conceptual developments in cognitive science

We suggest a common ground for alternative proposals In different domains of cognitive science which have previously seemed to have little in common. The underlying common theme is associated with a redefinition of the basic unit of analysis in each domain of thought. Our framework suggests a definition of unity which is based not on inherent properties of the elements constituting the unit, but rather on dynamic patterns of correlation across the elements. We introduce a set of features that characterize the new dynamic units, and distinguish them from traditional units of analysis. A conceptual connection is made with the identification of elementary units in modern physics theories, as well as with concepts and structures in the study of complex dynamical systems and connectionism. The paper analyses the evolution of the concept of unit in different domains of thought in cognitive science, and examines the proposed framework of “dynamic unity” with regard to various theoretical problems within each domain. The particular cognitive science issues discussed in the paper include: (1) the binding problem in the brain; (2) the mental unit of conceptual organization; (3) defining ‘wordhood’ in linguistics; and (4) identifying the unit of cognition in the natural environment.

The Notion of Dynamic Unit: Conceptual Developments in Cognitive Science

We suggest a common ground for alternative proposals In different domains of cognitive science which have previously seemed to have little in common. The underlying common theme is associated with a redefinition of the basic unit of analysis in each domain of thought. Our framework suggests a definition of unity which is based not on inherent properties of the elements constituting the unit, but rather on dynamic patterns of correlation across the elements. We introduce a set of features that characterize the new dynamic units, and distinguish them from traditional units of analysis. A conceptual connection is made with the identification of elementary units in modern physics theories, as well as with concepts and structures in the study of complex dynamical systems and connectionism. The paper analyses the evolution of the concept of unit in different domains of thought in cognitive science, and examines the proposed framework of “dynamic unity” with regard to various theoretical problems within each domain. The particular cognitive science issues discussed in the paper include: (1) the binding problem in the brain; (2) the mental unit of conceptual organization; (3) defining ‘wordhood’ in linguistics; and (4) identifying the unit of cognition in the natural environment.

Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture, and the Problem of Meaning

Culture in Mind is an ethnographic portrait of the human mind. Using case studies from both western and nonwestern societies. Shore argues that "cultural models" are necessary to the functioning of the human mind. Drawing on recent developments in cognitive science as well as anthropology, Culture in Mind explores the cognitive world of culture in the ongoing production of meaning in everyday thinking and feeling.

Words, thoughts, and theories

The other Socratic method: Socrates's problem Augustine's problem a road map. Part 1 The theory theory: the scientist as child - but surely it can't really be a theory? a cognitive view of science, naturalistic epistemology and development - an evolutionary speculation, science as horticulture, objections - sociology, objections - timing and convergence, objections - magic, empirical advances, what is theory? structural features of theories, functional features of theories, dynamic features of theories, theories in childhood, theories as representations theories, modules, and empirical generalizations - modules, theories and development, modules and development, modularity in peripheral and central processing, empirical generalization - scripts, narratives, and nets, interactions among theories, modules, and empirical generalizations, nonconceptual development - information processing and social construction. Part 2 Evidence for the theory theory: the child's theory of appearances - the adult theory, the initial theory, the paradox of invisible objects, an alternative - a theory-change account, the nine-month-old's theory, the A-not-B error as an auxiliary hypothesis, the 18-month-old's theory, other evidence for the theory theory, semantic developments - from objects permanence to perspective taking, later semantic developments - gone and see, conclusion the child's theory of action - the adult theory, the initial theory, the nine-month-old's theory, the 18-month-old's theory, other evidence for the theory theory, semantic development - no, uh-oh and there, later developments - from actions to desires, later semantic developments - want, conclusion the child's theory of kinds - the adult theory, categories and kinds, the initial theory, the nine-month-old's theory, the 18-month-old's theory , other evidence for the theory theory, semantic development - the naming Spurt, later developments, conclusion. Part 3 Theories and language: language and thought - prerequisites, interactions, a theory-theory view, methodological issues - specificity and correlation, developmental relations between language and cognition, theories and constraints, crosslinguistic studies, individual-difference studies, conclusion the Darwinian conclusion - who's afraid of semantic holism? a developmental cognitive science, computational and neurological mechanisms, after Piaget, sailing in Neurath's boat.

Minds and Bodies: Human and Divine

Does God have a mind? Western theism has traditionally construed God as an intentional agent who acts on creation and in relation to humankind. God loves, punishes, and redeems. God's intentionality has traditionally been construed in analogy to human intentionality, which in turn has often presumed a supernatural dualism. Developments in cognitive science, however, render supernatural dualism suspect for explaining the human mind. How, then, can we speak of the mind of God? Borrowing from Daniel Dennett's intentional stance, I suggest that analogical reasoning regarding the mind of God be abandoned in favor of an ontologically agnostic approach that treats God as an intentional system. In this approach, God's purposive action is an explanatory feature of the believer's universe, a real pattern that informs our values and beliefs about the world and our place in it.

Culture in mind: cognition, culture, and the problem of meaning

Culture in Mind is an ethnographic portrait of the human mind. Using case studies from both western and nonwestern societies. Shore argues that cultural models are necessary to the functioning of the human mind. Drawing on recent developments in cognitive science as well as anthropology, Culture in Mind explores the cognitive world of culture in the ongoing production of meaning in everyday thinking and feeling.